1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/tty.h>
67 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
68 #include <linux/highmem.h>
69 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
70 #include <asm/syscall.h>
71 #include <linux/capability.h>
72 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
73 #include <linux/compat.h>
74 #include <linux/ctype.h>
78 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
79 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
80 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
81 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
83 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
84 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
86 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
87 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
89 /* number of audit rules */
92 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
95 struct audit_aux_data {
96 struct audit_aux_data *next;
100 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
102 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
103 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
105 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
106 struct audit_aux_data d;
107 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
108 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
109 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
110 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
111 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
116 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
117 struct audit_aux_data d;
118 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
119 unsigned int fcap_ver;
120 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
121 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
124 struct audit_tree_refs {
125 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
126 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
129 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
131 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
132 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
133 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
137 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
144 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
146 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
147 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
149 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
150 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
152 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
153 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
156 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
157 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
158 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
160 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
161 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
163 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
164 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
168 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
170 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
171 case 4: /* socketcall */
172 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
174 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
180 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
182 struct audit_names *n;
183 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
188 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
189 if ((n->ino != -1) &&
190 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
198 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
199 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
200 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
201 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
202 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
203 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
204 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
207 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
208 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
212 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
216 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
218 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
219 int left = ctx->tree_count;
221 p->c[--left] = chunk;
222 ctx->tree_count = left;
231 ctx->tree_count = 30;
237 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
239 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
240 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
246 p->next = ctx->trees;
248 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
249 ctx->tree_count = 31;
254 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
255 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
257 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
258 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
261 /* we started with empty chain */
262 p = ctx->first_trees;
264 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
269 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
271 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
275 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
276 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
280 ctx->tree_count = count;
284 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
286 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
287 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
293 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
295 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
296 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
301 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
302 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
303 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
308 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
309 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
316 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
317 struct audit_names *name,
318 struct audit_field *f,
319 struct audit_context *ctx)
321 struct audit_names *n;
325 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
331 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
332 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
340 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
341 struct audit_names *name,
342 struct audit_field *f,
343 struct audit_context *ctx)
345 struct audit_names *n;
349 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
355 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
356 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
364 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
365 const struct cred *cred,
366 struct audit_field *f,
367 struct audit_context *ctx,
368 struct audit_names *name)
371 /* process to file object comparisons */
372 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
373 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
374 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
375 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
376 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
377 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
379 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
380 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
381 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
382 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
383 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
384 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
385 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
387 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
389 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
390 /* uid comparisons */
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
392 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
393 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
394 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
396 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
399 /* auid comparisons */
400 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
401 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
402 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
403 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
404 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
405 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
406 /* euid comparisons */
407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
408 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
410 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
411 /* suid comparisons */
412 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
413 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
414 /* gid comparisons */
415 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
416 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
418 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
419 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
420 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
421 /* egid comparisons */
422 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
423 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
424 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
425 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
426 /* sgid comparison */
427 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
428 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
430 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
436 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
437 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
440 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
441 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
442 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
444 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
445 struct audit_krule *rule,
446 struct audit_context *ctx,
447 struct audit_names *name,
448 enum audit_state *state,
451 const struct cred *cred;
455 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
457 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
458 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
459 struct audit_names *n;
465 pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
466 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
471 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
472 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
476 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
479 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
482 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
485 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
488 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
489 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
491 result = in_group_p(f->gid);
492 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
494 result = !in_group_p(f->gid);
498 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
499 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
501 result = in_egroup_p(f->gid);
502 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
504 result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid);
508 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
511 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
514 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
518 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
522 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
523 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
526 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
528 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
530 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
535 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
536 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
539 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
540 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
541 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
550 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
551 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
554 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
555 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
556 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
565 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
567 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
568 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
577 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
579 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
580 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
589 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
591 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
592 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
601 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
605 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
610 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
612 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
613 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
615 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
616 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
617 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
620 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
621 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
622 match for now to avoid losing information that
623 may be wanted. An error message will also be
627 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
630 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
639 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
640 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
641 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
644 /* Find files that match */
646 result = security_audit_rule_match(
647 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
650 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
651 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
659 /* Find ipc objects that match */
660 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
662 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
673 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
675 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
676 /* ignore this field for filtering */
680 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
683 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
685 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
686 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
694 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
696 if (rule->filterkey) {
697 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
698 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
700 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
702 switch (rule->action) {
703 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
704 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
709 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
710 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
711 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
713 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
715 struct audit_entry *e;
716 enum audit_state state;
719 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
720 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
722 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
723 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
729 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
732 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
736 if (val > 0xffffffff)
739 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
740 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
743 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
745 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
748 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
749 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
750 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
751 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
753 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
754 struct audit_context *ctx,
755 struct list_head *list)
757 struct audit_entry *e;
758 enum audit_state state;
760 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
761 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
764 if (!list_empty(list)) {
765 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
766 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
767 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
770 ctx->current_state = state;
776 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
780 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
781 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
783 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
784 struct audit_names *n,
785 struct audit_context *ctx) {
786 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
787 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
788 struct audit_entry *e;
789 enum audit_state state;
791 if (list_empty(list))
794 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
795 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
796 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
797 ctx->current_state = state;
805 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
806 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
807 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
808 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
810 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
812 struct audit_names *n;
814 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
819 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
820 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
826 /* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
827 static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
831 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
835 context->return_valid = return_valid;
838 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
839 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
842 * This is actually a test for:
843 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
844 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
846 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
848 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
849 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
850 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
851 context->return_code = -EINTR;
853 context->return_code = return_code;
855 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
856 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
857 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
860 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
864 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
866 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
867 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
868 context->proctitle.len = 0;
871 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
873 struct audit_names *n, *next;
876 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
879 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
880 " name_count=%d put_count=%d ino_count=%d"
881 " [NOT freeing]\n", __FILE__, __LINE__,
882 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
883 context->name_count, context->put_count,
885 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
886 pr_err("names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, n->name,
887 n->name->name ?: "(null)");
894 context->put_count = 0;
895 context->ino_count = 0;
898 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
900 if (n->name && n->name_put)
901 final_putname(n->name);
905 context->name_count = 0;
906 path_put(&context->pwd);
907 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
908 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
911 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
913 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
915 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
916 context->aux = aux->next;
919 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
920 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
925 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
927 struct audit_context *context;
929 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
932 context->state = state;
933 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
934 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
935 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
940 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
943 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
944 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
945 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
948 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
950 struct audit_context *context;
951 enum audit_state state;
954 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
955 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
957 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
958 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
959 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
963 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
965 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
968 context->filterkey = key;
970 tsk->audit_context = context;
971 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
975 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
977 audit_free_names(context);
978 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
979 free_tree_refs(context);
980 audit_free_aux(context);
981 kfree(context->filterkey);
982 kfree(context->sockaddr);
983 audit_proctitle_free(context);
987 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
988 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
991 struct audit_buffer *ab;
996 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
1000 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
1001 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
1002 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
1004 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1005 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1008 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1009 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1012 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1013 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1020 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1021 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1022 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1024 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1025 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1026 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1027 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1028 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1030 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1031 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1034 const char __user *p,
1037 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1038 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1039 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1040 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1041 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1042 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1043 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1046 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1047 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1050 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1051 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1052 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1055 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1057 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1061 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1063 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1064 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1067 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1069 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1070 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1075 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1078 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1079 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1082 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1083 * send half as much in each message
1085 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1088 len_left -= to_send;
1090 } while (len_left > 0);
1094 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1097 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1098 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1101 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1102 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1106 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1107 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1109 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1111 room_left -= to_send;
1112 if (room_left < 0) {
1115 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1121 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1122 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1124 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1125 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1126 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1129 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1130 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1131 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1133 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1134 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1139 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1142 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1144 /* actually log it */
1145 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1147 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1148 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1150 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1152 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1155 len_left -= to_send;
1156 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1158 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1160 *len_sent += to_send;
1162 /* include the null we didn't log */
1166 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1167 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1170 size_t len_sent = 0;
1171 const char __user *p;
1174 p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1176 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1179 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1180 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1181 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1182 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1184 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1186 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1190 for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) {
1191 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1200 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1202 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1205 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1209 switch (context->type) {
1210 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1211 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1212 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1213 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1214 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1215 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1218 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1220 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1221 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1222 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1227 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1228 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1231 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1232 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1235 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1237 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1238 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1241 audit_log_format(ab,
1242 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1243 context->ipc.qbytes,
1244 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1245 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1246 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1249 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1250 audit_log_format(ab,
1251 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1252 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1253 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1254 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1255 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1256 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1257 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1259 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1260 audit_log_format(ab,
1261 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1262 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1263 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1264 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1265 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1266 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1267 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1269 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1270 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1271 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1272 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1274 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1275 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1276 audit_log_format(ab,
1277 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1279 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1280 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1281 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1283 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1284 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1285 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1286 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1287 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1290 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1291 context->mmap.flags);
1293 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1294 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1300 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1302 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1303 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1306 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1307 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1308 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1312 static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk,
1313 struct audit_context *context)
1317 char *msg = "(null)";
1318 int len = strlen(msg);
1319 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1321 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1323 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1325 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1328 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1329 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1332 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1333 res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1338 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1343 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1344 context->proctitle.len = res;
1346 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1347 len = context->proctitle.len;
1349 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1353 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1355 int i, call_panic = 0;
1356 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1357 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1358 struct audit_names *n;
1360 /* tsk == current */
1361 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1363 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1365 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1366 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1367 context->arch, context->major);
1368 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1369 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1370 if (context->return_valid)
1371 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1372 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1373 context->return_code);
1375 audit_log_format(ab,
1376 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1381 context->name_count);
1383 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1384 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1387 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1389 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1391 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1393 switch (aux->type) {
1395 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1396 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1397 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1398 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1399 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1400 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1401 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1402 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1403 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1404 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1405 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1406 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1414 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1416 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1417 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1419 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1420 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1425 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1426 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1428 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1429 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1430 context->sockaddr_len);
1435 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1436 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1438 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1439 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1440 axs->target_auid[i],
1442 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1444 axs->target_comm[i]))
1448 if (context->target_pid &&
1449 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1450 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1451 context->target_sessionid,
1452 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1455 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1456 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1458 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd);
1464 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1467 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1470 audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
1472 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1473 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1477 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1481 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1482 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1484 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1486 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1488 struct audit_context *context;
1490 context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1494 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1495 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1496 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1497 * in the context of the idle thread */
1498 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1499 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1500 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1501 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1502 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1504 audit_free_context(context);
1508 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1509 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1510 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1511 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1512 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1513 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1515 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1516 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1517 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1518 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1519 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1520 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1523 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1524 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1526 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1527 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1528 enum audit_state state;
1533 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1538 context->arch = syscall_get_arch();
1539 context->major = major;
1540 context->argv[0] = a1;
1541 context->argv[1] = a2;
1542 context->argv[2] = a3;
1543 context->argv[3] = a4;
1545 state = context->state;
1546 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1547 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1549 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1551 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1554 context->serial = 0;
1555 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1556 context->in_syscall = 1;
1557 context->current_state = state;
1562 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1563 * @success: success value of the syscall
1564 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1566 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1567 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1568 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1569 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1570 * free the names stored from getname().
1572 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1574 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1575 struct audit_context *context;
1578 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1580 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1582 context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1586 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1587 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1589 context->in_syscall = 0;
1590 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1592 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1593 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1595 audit_free_names(context);
1596 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1597 audit_free_aux(context);
1598 context->aux = NULL;
1599 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1600 context->target_pid = 0;
1601 context->target_sid = 0;
1602 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1604 context->fds[0] = -1;
1605 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1606 kfree(context->filterkey);
1607 context->filterkey = NULL;
1609 tsk->audit_context = context;
1612 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1614 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1615 struct audit_context *context;
1616 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1617 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1619 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1621 context = current->audit_context;
1623 count = context->tree_count;
1625 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1629 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1631 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1632 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1633 audit_set_auditable(context);
1634 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1635 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1638 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1642 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1644 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1645 struct audit_context *context;
1646 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1647 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1648 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1652 context = current->audit_context;
1654 count = context->tree_count;
1659 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1661 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1662 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1663 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1664 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1666 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1672 parent = d->d_parent;
1677 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1680 /* just a race with rename */
1681 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1684 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1685 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1686 /* OK, got more space */
1687 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1691 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1692 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1693 audit_set_auditable(context);
1700 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1703 struct audit_names *aname;
1705 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1706 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1707 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1709 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1712 aname->should_free = true;
1715 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1717 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1719 context->name_count++;
1721 context->ino_count++;
1727 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1728 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1730 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1731 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1732 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1735 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1737 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1738 struct audit_names *n;
1740 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1743 if (n->name->uptr == uptr)
1750 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1751 * @name: name to add
1753 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1754 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1756 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1758 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1759 struct audit_names *n;
1761 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1762 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1763 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1764 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1771 /* The filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1772 BUG_ON(!name->name);
1775 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1780 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1784 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1785 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1788 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1789 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1791 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1792 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1793 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1795 void audit_putname(struct filename *name)
1797 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1800 if (!name->aname || !context->in_syscall) {
1801 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1802 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n",
1803 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1804 if (context->name_count) {
1805 struct audit_names *n;
1808 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1809 pr_err("name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++, n->name,
1810 n->name->name ?: "(null)");
1813 final_putname(name);
1817 ++context->put_count;
1818 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1819 pr_err("%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d putname(%p)"
1820 " name_count=%d put_count=%d\n",
1822 context->serial, context->major,
1823 context->in_syscall, name->name,
1824 context->name_count, context->put_count);
1832 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1833 * @name: name being audited
1834 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1835 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1837 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1840 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1841 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1842 struct audit_names *n;
1843 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1845 if (!context->in_syscall)
1852 /* The struct filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1853 BUG_ON(!name->name);
1856 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1857 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1862 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1863 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1866 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1871 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1872 /* does the name pointer match? */
1873 if (!n->name || n->name->name != name->name)
1876 /* match the correct record type */
1878 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1879 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1882 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1888 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname(). Allocate a new
1891 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL);
1896 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1897 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1898 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
1901 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1902 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
1904 handle_path(dentry);
1905 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
1909 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1910 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1911 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1912 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1914 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1915 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1916 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1917 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1918 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1919 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1920 * unsuccessful attempts.
1922 void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
1923 const struct dentry *dentry,
1924 const unsigned char type)
1926 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1927 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1928 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
1929 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1931 if (!context->in_syscall)
1937 /* look for a parent entry first */
1938 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1939 if (!n->name || n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1942 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1943 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
1949 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1950 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1951 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1952 if (!n->name || n->type != type)
1955 /* if we found a parent, make sure this one is a child of it */
1956 if (found_parent && (n->name != found_parent->name))
1959 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) ||
1960 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
1962 found_parent->name_len :
1969 if (!found_parent) {
1970 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1971 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
1974 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
1978 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
1982 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1983 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1984 * audit_free_names() */
1986 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
1987 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1988 /* don't call __putname() */
1989 found_child->name_put = false;
1993 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
1995 found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1997 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2000 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2001 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2002 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2003 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2005 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2007 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2008 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2010 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2013 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2014 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2015 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2016 *serial = ctx->serial;
2019 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2024 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2025 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2027 static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
2029 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
2030 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
2032 /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
2033 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
2035 /* it is set, you need permission */
2036 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
2038 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
2039 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
2044 static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
2045 unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid,
2048 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2049 uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
2054 uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
2055 oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
2056 loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
2058 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2061 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid);
2062 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2063 audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
2064 oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
2069 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2070 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2074 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2076 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
2078 struct task_struct *task = current;
2079 unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1;
2083 oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2084 oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2086 rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
2090 /* are we setting or clearing? */
2091 if (uid_valid(loginuid))
2092 sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2094 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2095 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2097 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
2102 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2105 * @attr: queue attributes
2108 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2110 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2113 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2115 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2117 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2118 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2120 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2124 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2125 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2126 * @msg_len: Message length
2127 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2128 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2131 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2132 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2134 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2135 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2138 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2140 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2142 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2143 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2144 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2146 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2150 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2151 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2152 * @notification: Notification event
2156 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2158 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2161 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2163 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2165 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2166 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2170 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2171 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2175 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2177 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2178 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2179 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2180 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2184 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2185 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2188 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2190 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2191 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2192 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2193 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2194 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2195 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2196 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2200 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2201 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2202 * @uid: msgq user id
2203 * @gid: msgq group id
2204 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2206 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2208 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2210 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2212 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2213 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2214 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2215 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2216 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2219 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2221 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2223 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2224 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2229 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2230 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2234 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2236 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2238 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2240 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2241 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2242 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2247 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2248 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2249 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2252 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2254 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2255 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2256 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2260 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2261 * @len: data length in user space
2262 * @a: data address in kernel space
2264 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2266 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2268 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2270 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2271 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2274 context->sockaddr = p;
2277 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2278 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2282 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2284 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2286 context->target_pid = task_pid_nr(t);
2287 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2288 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2289 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2290 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2291 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2295 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2296 * @sig: signal value
2297 * @t: task being signaled
2299 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2300 * and uid that is doing that.
2302 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2304 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2305 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2306 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2307 kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2309 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2310 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2311 audit_sig_pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
2312 if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
2313 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2315 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2316 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2318 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2322 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2323 * in audit_context */
2324 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2325 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2326 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2327 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2328 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2329 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2330 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2334 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2335 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2336 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2340 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2341 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2342 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2344 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2346 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2347 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2348 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2349 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2350 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2351 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2358 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2359 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2360 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2361 * @old: the old credentials
2363 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2364 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2368 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2369 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2371 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2372 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2373 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2374 struct dentry *dentry;
2376 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2380 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2381 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2382 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2384 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2385 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2388 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2389 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2390 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2391 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2393 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2394 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2395 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2397 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2398 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2399 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2404 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2405 * @new: the new credentials
2406 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2408 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2409 * audit system if applicable
2411 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2413 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2414 context->capset.pid = task_pid_nr(current);
2415 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2416 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2417 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2418 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2421 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2423 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2424 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2425 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2426 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2429 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2433 unsigned int sessionid;
2434 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
2436 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2437 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2438 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2440 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2441 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2442 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2443 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2445 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2446 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
2447 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2449 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2451 audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path);
2452 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
2454 audit_log_format(ab, " exe=(null)");
2458 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2459 * @signr: signal value
2461 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2462 * should record the event for investigation.
2464 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2466 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2471 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2474 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2478 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2482 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2484 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2486 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2490 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2491 signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall, is_compat_task(),
2492 KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2496 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2498 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2499 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2501 return &ctx->killed_trees;