1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/tty.h>
67 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
68 #include <linux/highmem.h>
69 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
70 #include <asm/syscall.h>
71 #include <linux/capability.h>
72 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
73 #include <linux/compat.h>
74 #include <linux/ctype.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
80 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
81 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
82 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
83 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
85 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
86 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
88 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
89 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
91 /* number of audit rules */
94 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
97 struct audit_aux_data {
98 struct audit_aux_data *next;
102 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
104 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
105 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
107 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
108 struct audit_aux_data d;
109 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
110 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
111 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
114 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
118 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
119 struct audit_aux_data d;
120 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
121 unsigned int fcap_ver;
122 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
123 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
126 struct audit_tree_refs {
127 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
128 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
131 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
138 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
140 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
141 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
143 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
144 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
146 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
147 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
150 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
151 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
152 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
154 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
155 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
157 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
158 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
162 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
164 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
165 case 4: /* socketcall */
166 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
168 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
174 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
176 struct audit_names *n;
177 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
182 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
183 if ((n->ino != -1) &&
184 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
192 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
193 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
194 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
195 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
196 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
197 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
198 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
201 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
202 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
206 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
210 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
212 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
213 int left = ctx->tree_count;
215 p->c[--left] = chunk;
216 ctx->tree_count = left;
225 ctx->tree_count = 30;
231 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
233 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
234 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
240 p->next = ctx->trees;
242 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
243 ctx->tree_count = 31;
248 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
249 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
251 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
252 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
255 /* we started with empty chain */
256 p = ctx->first_trees;
258 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
263 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
265 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
269 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
270 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
274 ctx->tree_count = count;
278 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
280 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
281 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
287 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
289 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
290 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
295 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
296 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
297 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
302 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
303 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
310 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
311 struct audit_names *name,
312 struct audit_field *f,
313 struct audit_context *ctx)
315 struct audit_names *n;
319 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
325 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
326 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
334 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
335 struct audit_names *name,
336 struct audit_field *f,
337 struct audit_context *ctx)
339 struct audit_names *n;
343 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
349 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
350 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
358 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
359 const struct cred *cred,
360 struct audit_field *f,
361 struct audit_context *ctx,
362 struct audit_names *name)
365 /* process to file object comparisons */
366 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
367 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
368 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
369 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
370 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
371 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
372 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
373 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
374 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
375 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
376 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
377 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
378 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
379 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
380 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
381 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
382 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
383 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
384 /* uid comparisons */
385 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
386 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
387 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
388 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
389 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
390 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
392 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
393 /* auid comparisons */
394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
395 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
396 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
397 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
398 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
399 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
400 /* euid comparisons */
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
402 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
405 /* suid comparisons */
406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
407 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
408 /* gid comparisons */
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
410 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
412 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
413 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
414 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
415 /* egid comparisons */
416 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
417 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
419 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
420 /* sgid comparison */
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
424 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
430 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
431 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
434 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
435 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
436 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
438 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
439 struct audit_krule *rule,
440 struct audit_context *ctx,
441 struct audit_names *name,
442 enum audit_state *state,
445 const struct cred *cred;
449 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
451 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
452 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
453 struct audit_names *n;
459 pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
460 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
465 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
466 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
470 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
473 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
476 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
479 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
482 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
483 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
485 result = in_group_p(f->gid);
486 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
488 result = !in_group_p(f->gid);
492 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
493 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
495 result = in_egroup_p(f->gid);
496 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
498 result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid);
502 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
505 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
508 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
512 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
516 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
517 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
520 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
522 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
524 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
529 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
530 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
533 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
534 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
535 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
544 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
545 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
548 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
549 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
550 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
559 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
561 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
562 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
571 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
573 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
574 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
583 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
585 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
586 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
595 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
599 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
602 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
604 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
605 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
607 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
608 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
609 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
612 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
613 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
614 match for now to avoid losing information that
615 may be wanted. An error message will also be
619 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
622 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
631 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
632 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
633 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
636 /* Find files that match */
638 result = security_audit_rule_match(
639 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
642 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
643 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
651 /* Find ipc objects that match */
652 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
654 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
665 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
667 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
668 /* ignore this field for filtering */
672 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
675 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
677 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
678 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
686 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
688 if (rule->filterkey) {
689 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
690 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
692 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
694 switch (rule->action) {
695 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
696 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
701 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
702 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
703 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
705 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
707 struct audit_entry *e;
708 enum audit_state state;
711 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
712 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
714 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
715 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
721 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
724 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
728 if (val > 0xffffffff)
731 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
732 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
735 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
737 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
740 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
741 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
742 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
743 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
745 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
746 struct audit_context *ctx,
747 struct list_head *list)
749 struct audit_entry *e;
750 enum audit_state state;
752 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
753 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
756 if (!list_empty(list)) {
757 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
758 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
759 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
762 ctx->current_state = state;
768 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
772 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
773 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
775 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
776 struct audit_names *n,
777 struct audit_context *ctx) {
778 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
779 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
780 struct audit_entry *e;
781 enum audit_state state;
783 if (list_empty(list))
786 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
787 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
788 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
789 ctx->current_state = state;
797 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
798 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
799 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
800 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
802 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
804 struct audit_names *n;
806 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
811 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
812 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
818 /* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
819 static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
823 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
827 context->return_valid = return_valid;
830 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
831 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
834 * This is actually a test for:
835 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
836 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
838 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
840 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
841 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
842 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
843 context->return_code = -EINTR;
845 context->return_code = return_code;
847 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
848 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
849 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
852 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
856 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
858 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
859 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
860 context->proctitle.len = 0;
863 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
865 struct audit_names *n, *next;
867 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
874 context->name_count = 0;
875 path_put(&context->pwd);
876 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
877 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
880 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
882 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
884 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
885 context->aux = aux->next;
888 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
889 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
894 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
896 struct audit_context *context;
898 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
901 context->state = state;
902 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
903 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
904 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
909 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
912 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
913 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
914 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
917 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
919 struct audit_context *context;
920 enum audit_state state;
923 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
924 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
926 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
927 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
928 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
932 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
934 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
937 context->filterkey = key;
939 tsk->audit_context = context;
940 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
944 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
946 audit_free_names(context);
947 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
948 free_tree_refs(context);
949 audit_free_aux(context);
950 kfree(context->filterkey);
951 kfree(context->sockaddr);
952 audit_proctitle_free(context);
956 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
957 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
960 struct audit_buffer *ab;
965 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
969 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
970 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
971 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
973 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
974 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
977 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
978 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
981 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
982 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
989 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
990 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
991 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
993 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
994 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
995 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
996 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
997 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
999 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1000 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1003 const char __user *p,
1006 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1007 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1008 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1009 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1010 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1011 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1012 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1015 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1016 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1019 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1020 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1021 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1024 if (unlikely((len == 0) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1026 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1030 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1032 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1033 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1036 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1038 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1039 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1044 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1047 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1048 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1051 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1052 * send half as much in each message
1054 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1057 len_left -= to_send;
1059 } while (len_left > 0);
1063 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1066 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1067 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1070 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1071 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1075 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1076 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1078 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1080 room_left -= to_send;
1081 if (room_left < 0) {
1084 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1090 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1091 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1093 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1094 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1095 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1098 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1099 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1100 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1102 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1103 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1108 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1111 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1113 /* actually log it */
1114 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1116 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1117 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1119 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1121 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1124 len_left -= to_send;
1125 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1127 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1129 *len_sent += to_send;
1131 /* include the null we didn't log */
1135 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1136 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1139 size_t len_sent = 0;
1140 const char __user *p;
1143 p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1145 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1148 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1149 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1150 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1151 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1153 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1155 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1159 for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) {
1160 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1169 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1171 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1174 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1178 switch (context->type) {
1179 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1180 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1181 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1182 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1183 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1184 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1187 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1189 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1190 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1191 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1196 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1197 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1200 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1201 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1204 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1206 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1207 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1210 audit_log_format(ab,
1211 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1212 context->ipc.qbytes,
1213 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1214 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1215 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1218 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1219 audit_log_format(ab,
1220 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1221 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1222 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1223 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1224 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1225 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1226 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1228 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1229 audit_log_format(ab,
1230 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1231 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1232 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1233 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1234 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1235 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1236 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1238 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1239 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1240 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1241 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1243 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1244 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1245 audit_log_format(ab,
1246 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1248 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1249 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1250 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1252 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1253 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1254 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1255 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1256 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1259 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1260 context->mmap.flags);
1262 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1263 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1269 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1271 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1272 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1275 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1276 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1277 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1281 static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk,
1282 struct audit_context *context)
1286 char *msg = "(null)";
1287 int len = strlen(msg);
1288 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1290 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1292 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1294 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1297 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1298 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1301 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1302 res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1307 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1312 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1313 context->proctitle.len = res;
1315 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1316 len = context->proctitle.len;
1318 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1322 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1324 int i, call_panic = 0;
1325 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1326 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1327 struct audit_names *n;
1329 /* tsk == current */
1330 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1332 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1334 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1335 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1336 context->arch, context->major);
1337 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1338 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1339 if (context->return_valid)
1340 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1341 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1342 context->return_code);
1344 audit_log_format(ab,
1345 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1350 context->name_count);
1352 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1353 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1356 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1358 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1360 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1362 switch (aux->type) {
1364 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1365 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1366 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1367 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1368 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1369 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1370 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1371 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1372 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1373 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1374 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1375 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1383 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1385 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1386 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1388 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1389 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1394 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1395 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1397 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1398 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1399 context->sockaddr_len);
1404 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1405 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1407 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1408 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1409 axs->target_auid[i],
1411 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1413 axs->target_comm[i]))
1417 if (context->target_pid &&
1418 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1419 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1420 context->target_sessionid,
1421 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1424 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1425 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1427 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd);
1433 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1436 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1439 audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
1441 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1442 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1446 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1450 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1451 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1453 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1455 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1457 struct audit_context *context;
1459 context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1463 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1464 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1465 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1466 * in the context of the idle thread */
1467 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1468 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1469 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1470 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1471 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1473 audit_free_context(context);
1477 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1478 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1479 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1480 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1481 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1482 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1484 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1485 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1486 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1487 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1488 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1489 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1492 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1493 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1495 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1496 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1497 enum audit_state state;
1502 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1507 context->arch = syscall_get_arch();
1508 context->major = major;
1509 context->argv[0] = a1;
1510 context->argv[1] = a2;
1511 context->argv[2] = a3;
1512 context->argv[3] = a4;
1514 state = context->state;
1515 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1516 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1518 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1520 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1523 context->serial = 0;
1524 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1525 context->in_syscall = 1;
1526 context->current_state = state;
1531 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1532 * @success: success value of the syscall
1533 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1535 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1536 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1537 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1538 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1539 * free the names stored from getname().
1541 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1543 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1544 struct audit_context *context;
1547 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1549 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1551 context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1555 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1556 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1558 context->in_syscall = 0;
1559 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1561 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1562 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1564 audit_free_names(context);
1565 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1566 audit_free_aux(context);
1567 context->aux = NULL;
1568 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1569 context->target_pid = 0;
1570 context->target_sid = 0;
1571 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1573 context->fds[0] = -1;
1574 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1575 kfree(context->filterkey);
1576 context->filterkey = NULL;
1578 tsk->audit_context = context;
1581 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1583 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1584 struct audit_context *context;
1585 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1586 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1588 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1590 context = current->audit_context;
1592 count = context->tree_count;
1594 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1598 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1600 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1601 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1602 audit_set_auditable(context);
1603 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1604 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1607 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1611 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1613 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1614 struct audit_context *context;
1615 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1616 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1617 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1621 context = current->audit_context;
1623 count = context->tree_count;
1628 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1630 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1631 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1632 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1633 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1635 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1641 parent = d->d_parent;
1646 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1649 /* just a race with rename */
1650 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1653 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1654 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1655 /* OK, got more space */
1656 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1660 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1661 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1662 audit_set_auditable(context);
1669 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1672 struct audit_names *aname;
1674 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1675 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1676 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1678 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1681 aname->should_free = true;
1684 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1686 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1688 context->name_count++;
1693 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1694 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1696 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1697 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1698 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1701 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1703 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1704 struct audit_names *n;
1706 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1709 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1718 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1719 * @name: name to add
1721 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1722 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1724 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1726 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1727 struct audit_names *n;
1729 if (!context->in_syscall)
1732 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1737 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1741 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1742 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1746 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1747 * @name: name being audited
1748 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1749 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1751 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1754 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1755 const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1756 struct audit_names *n;
1757 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1759 if (!context->in_syscall)
1766 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1767 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1772 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1773 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1776 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1781 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1783 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
1784 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
1785 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
1787 } else if (n->name) {
1788 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
1789 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
1792 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
1795 /* match the correct record type */
1797 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1798 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1801 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1807 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
1808 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1818 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1819 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1820 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
1823 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1824 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
1826 handle_path(dentry);
1827 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
1830 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
1832 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
1836 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1837 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1838 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1839 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1841 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1842 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1843 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1844 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1845 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1846 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1847 * unsuccessful attempts.
1849 void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
1850 const struct dentry *dentry,
1851 const unsigned char type)
1853 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1854 const struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1855 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
1856 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1858 if (!context->in_syscall)
1864 /* look for a parent entry first */
1865 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1867 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
1868 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
1871 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
1872 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
1873 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
1874 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1875 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1881 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1882 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1883 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1885 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
1888 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) ||
1889 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
1891 found_parent->name_len :
1893 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1900 if (!found_parent) {
1901 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1902 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
1905 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
1909 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
1913 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1914 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1915 * audit_free_names() */
1917 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
1918 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1919 found_child->name->refcnt++;
1924 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
1926 found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1928 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1931 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1932 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1933 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1934 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1936 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1938 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1939 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1941 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
1944 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1945 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1946 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1947 *serial = ctx->serial;
1950 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
1955 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1956 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1958 static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
1960 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
1961 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
1963 /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
1964 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
1966 /* it is set, you need permission */
1967 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
1969 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
1970 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
1975 static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
1976 unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid,
1979 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1980 uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
1985 uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
1986 oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
1987 loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
1989 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1992 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid);
1993 audit_log_task_context(ab);
1994 audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
1995 oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
2000 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2001 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2005 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2007 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
2009 struct task_struct *task = current;
2010 unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1;
2014 oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2015 oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2017 rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
2021 /* are we setting or clearing? */
2022 if (uid_valid(loginuid))
2023 sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2025 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2026 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2028 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
2033 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2036 * @attr: queue attributes
2039 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2041 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2044 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2046 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2048 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2049 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2051 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2055 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2056 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2057 * @msg_len: Message length
2058 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2059 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2062 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2063 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2065 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2066 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2069 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2071 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2073 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2074 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2075 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2077 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2081 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2082 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2083 * @notification: Notification event
2087 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2089 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2092 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2094 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2096 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2097 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2101 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2102 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2106 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2108 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2109 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2110 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2111 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2115 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2116 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2119 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2121 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2122 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2123 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2124 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2125 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2126 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2127 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2131 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2132 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2133 * @uid: msgq user id
2134 * @gid: msgq group id
2135 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2137 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2139 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2141 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2143 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2144 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2145 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2146 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2147 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2150 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2152 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2154 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2155 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2160 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2161 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2165 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2167 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2169 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2171 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2172 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2173 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2178 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2179 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2180 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2183 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2185 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2186 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2187 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2191 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2192 * @len: data length in user space
2193 * @a: data address in kernel space
2195 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2197 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2199 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2201 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2202 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2205 context->sockaddr = p;
2208 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2209 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2213 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2215 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2217 context->target_pid = task_pid_nr(t);
2218 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2219 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2220 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2221 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2222 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2226 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2227 * @sig: signal value
2228 * @t: task being signaled
2230 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2231 * and uid that is doing that.
2233 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2235 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2236 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2237 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2238 kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2240 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2241 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2242 audit_sig_pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
2243 if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
2244 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2246 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2247 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2249 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2253 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2254 * in audit_context */
2255 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2256 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2257 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2258 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2259 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2260 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2261 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2265 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2266 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2267 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2271 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2272 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2273 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2275 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2277 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2278 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2279 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2280 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2281 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2282 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2289 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2290 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2291 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2292 * @old: the old credentials
2294 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2295 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2299 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2300 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2302 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2303 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2304 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2306 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2310 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2311 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2312 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2314 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2316 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2317 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2318 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2319 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2321 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2322 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2323 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2325 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2326 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2327 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2332 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2333 * @new: the new credentials
2334 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2336 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2337 * audit system if applicable
2339 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2341 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2342 context->capset.pid = task_pid_nr(current);
2343 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2344 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2345 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2346 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2349 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2351 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2352 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2353 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2354 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2357 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2361 unsigned int sessionid;
2362 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2364 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2365 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2366 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2368 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2369 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2370 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2371 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2373 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2374 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
2375 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2376 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2380 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2381 * @signr: signal value
2383 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2384 * should record the event for investigation.
2386 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2388 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2393 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2396 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2400 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2404 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2406 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2408 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2412 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2413 signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall, is_compat_task(),
2414 KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2418 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2420 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2421 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2423 return &ctx->killed_trees;