1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
70 #include <linux/compat.h>
74 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
75 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
76 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
77 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
79 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
80 * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate
81 * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
84 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
85 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
87 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
88 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
90 /* number of audit rules */
93 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
96 struct audit_cap_data {
97 kernel_cap_t permitted;
98 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
100 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
101 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
105 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
106 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
107 * pointers at syscall exit time).
109 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
111 struct list_head list; /* audit_context->names_list */
120 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
121 unsigned int fcap_ver;
122 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
123 bool name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
125 * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
126 * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name
127 * should be freed on syscall exit
132 struct audit_aux_data {
133 struct audit_aux_data *next;
137 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
139 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
140 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
142 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
143 struct audit_aux_data d;
146 struct mm_struct *mm;
149 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
150 struct audit_aux_data d;
151 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
152 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
153 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
154 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
155 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
156 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
160 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
161 struct audit_aux_data d;
162 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
163 unsigned int fcap_ver;
164 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
165 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
168 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
169 struct audit_aux_data d;
171 struct audit_cap_data cap;
174 struct audit_tree_refs {
175 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
176 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
179 /* The per-task audit context. */
180 struct audit_context {
181 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
182 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
183 enum audit_state state, current_state;
184 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
185 int major; /* syscall number */
186 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
187 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
188 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
190 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
192 * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
193 * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
194 * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
195 * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced
196 * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
197 * by running the names_list.
199 struct audit_names preallocated_names[AUDIT_NAMES];
200 int name_count; /* total records in names_list */
201 struct list_head names_list; /* anchor for struct audit_names->list */
202 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
204 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
205 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
206 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
207 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
209 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
211 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
212 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
213 unsigned long personality;
219 unsigned int target_sessionid;
221 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
223 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
224 struct list_head killed_trees;
242 unsigned long qbytes;
246 struct mq_attr mqstat;
255 unsigned int msg_prio;
256 struct timespec abs_timeout;
265 struct audit_cap_data cap;
280 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
282 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
283 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
284 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
288 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
295 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
297 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
298 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
300 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
301 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
303 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
304 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
307 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
308 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
309 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
311 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
312 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
314 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
315 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
319 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
321 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
322 case 4: /* socketcall */
323 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
325 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
331 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
333 struct audit_names *n;
334 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
339 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
340 if ((n->ino != -1) &&
341 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
349 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
350 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
351 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
352 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
353 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
354 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
355 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
358 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
359 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
363 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
367 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
369 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
370 int left = ctx->tree_count;
372 p->c[--left] = chunk;
373 ctx->tree_count = left;
382 ctx->tree_count = 30;
388 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
390 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
391 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
397 p->next = ctx->trees;
399 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
400 ctx->tree_count = 31;
405 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
406 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
408 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
409 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
412 /* we started with empty chain */
413 p = ctx->first_trees;
415 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
420 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
422 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
426 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
427 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
431 ctx->tree_count = count;
435 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
437 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
438 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
444 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
446 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
447 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
452 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
453 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
454 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
459 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
460 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
467 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
468 struct audit_names *name,
469 struct audit_field *f,
470 struct audit_context *ctx)
472 struct audit_names *n;
476 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
482 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
483 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
491 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
492 struct audit_names *name,
493 struct audit_field *f,
494 struct audit_context *ctx)
496 struct audit_names *n;
500 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
506 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
507 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
515 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
516 const struct cred *cred,
517 struct audit_field *f,
518 struct audit_context *ctx,
519 struct audit_names *name)
522 /* process to file object comparisons */
523 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
524 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
525 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
526 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
527 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
528 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
529 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
530 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
531 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
532 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
533 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
534 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
535 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
536 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
537 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
538 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
539 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
540 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
541 /* uid comparisons */
542 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
543 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
544 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
545 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
546 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
547 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
548 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
549 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
550 /* auid comparisons */
551 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
552 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
553 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
554 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
555 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
556 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
557 /* euid comparisons */
558 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
559 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
560 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
561 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
562 /* suid comparisons */
563 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
564 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
565 /* gid comparisons */
566 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
567 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
568 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
569 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
570 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
571 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
572 /* egid comparisons */
573 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
574 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
575 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
576 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
577 /* sgid comparison */
578 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
579 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
581 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
587 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
588 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
591 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
592 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
593 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
595 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
596 struct audit_krule *rule,
597 struct audit_context *ctx,
598 struct audit_names *name,
599 enum audit_state *state,
602 const struct cred *cred;
606 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
608 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
609 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
610 struct audit_names *n;
615 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
620 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
621 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
625 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
628 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
631 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
634 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
637 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
640 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
643 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
646 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
649 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
653 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
657 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
658 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
661 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
663 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
665 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
670 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
671 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
674 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
675 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
676 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
685 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
686 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
689 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
690 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
691 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
700 result = (name->ino == f->val);
702 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
703 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
712 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
714 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
715 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
724 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
726 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
727 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
736 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
740 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
745 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
747 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
748 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
749 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
752 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
753 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
754 match for now to avoid losing information that
755 may be wanted. An error message will also be
759 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
762 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
771 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
772 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
773 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
776 /* Find files that match */
778 result = security_audit_rule_match(
779 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
782 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
783 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
791 /* Find ipc objects that match */
792 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
794 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
805 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
807 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
808 /* ignore this field for filtering */
812 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
815 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
817 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
818 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
826 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
828 if (rule->filterkey) {
829 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
830 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
832 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
834 switch (rule->action) {
835 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
836 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
841 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
842 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
843 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
845 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
847 struct audit_entry *e;
848 enum audit_state state;
851 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
852 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
854 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
855 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
861 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
864 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
865 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
866 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
867 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
869 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
870 struct audit_context *ctx,
871 struct list_head *list)
873 struct audit_entry *e;
874 enum audit_state state;
876 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
877 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
880 if (!list_empty(list)) {
881 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
882 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
884 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
885 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
886 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
889 ctx->current_state = state;
895 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
899 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
900 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
902 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
903 struct audit_names *n,
904 struct audit_context *ctx) {
906 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
907 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
908 struct audit_entry *e;
909 enum audit_state state;
911 word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
912 bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
914 if (list_empty(list))
917 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
918 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
919 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
920 ctx->current_state = state;
928 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
929 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
930 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
931 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
933 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
935 struct audit_names *n;
937 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
942 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
943 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
949 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
953 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
957 context->return_valid = return_valid;
960 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
961 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
964 * This is actually a test for:
965 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
966 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
968 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
970 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
971 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
972 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
973 context->return_code = -EINTR;
975 context->return_code = return_code;
977 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
978 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
979 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
982 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
986 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
988 struct audit_names *n, *next;
991 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
992 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
993 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
994 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
996 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
997 context->name_count, context->put_count,
999 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1000 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1001 n->name, n->name ?: "(null)");
1008 context->put_count = 0;
1009 context->ino_count = 0;
1012 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
1014 if (n->name && n->name_put)
1019 context->name_count = 0;
1020 path_put(&context->pwd);
1021 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
1022 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
1025 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
1027 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1029 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
1030 context->aux = aux->next;
1033 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
1034 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
1039 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
1040 enum audit_state state)
1042 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
1043 context->state = state;
1044 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1047 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
1049 struct audit_context *context;
1051 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
1053 audit_zero_context(context, state);
1054 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
1055 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
1060 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
1063 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
1064 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
1065 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
1068 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
1070 struct audit_context *context;
1071 enum audit_state state;
1074 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
1075 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
1077 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
1078 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1081 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
1083 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
1086 context->filterkey = key;
1088 tsk->audit_context = context;
1089 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
1093 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
1095 struct audit_context *previous;
1099 previous = context->previous;
1100 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
1102 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
1103 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
1104 context->serial, context->major,
1105 context->name_count, count);
1107 audit_free_names(context);
1108 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1109 free_tree_refs(context);
1110 audit_free_aux(context);
1111 kfree(context->filterkey);
1112 kfree(context->sockaddr);
1117 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
1120 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
1127 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
1131 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
1133 if (error != -EINVAL)
1138 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
1139 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1143 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
1147 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
1149 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
1151 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
1152 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
1153 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
1155 /* tsk == current */
1157 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
1158 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
1159 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
1162 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
1165 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
1167 audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=",
1168 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
1173 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
1175 audit_log_task_context(ab);
1178 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
1179 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
1180 u32 sid, char *comm)
1182 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1187 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
1191 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
1193 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1194 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1197 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1198 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1200 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1201 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1208 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1209 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1210 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1212 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1213 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1214 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1215 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1216 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1218 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1219 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1222 const char __user *p,
1225 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1226 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1227 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1228 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1229 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1230 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1231 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1234 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1235 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1238 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1239 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1240 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1243 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1245 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1249 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1251 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1252 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1255 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1257 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1258 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1263 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1266 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1267 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1270 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1271 * send half as much in each message
1273 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1276 len_left -= to_send;
1278 } while (len_left > 0);
1282 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1285 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1286 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1289 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1290 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1294 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1295 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1297 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1299 room_left -= to_send;
1300 if (room_left < 0) {
1303 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1309 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1310 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1312 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1313 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1314 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1317 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1318 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1319 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1321 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1322 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1327 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1330 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1332 /* actually log it */
1333 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1335 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1336 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1338 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1340 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1343 len_left -= to_send;
1344 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1346 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1348 *len_sent += to_send;
1350 /* include the null we didn't log */
1354 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1355 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1356 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1359 size_t len_sent = 0;
1360 const char __user *p;
1363 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1364 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1366 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1368 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
1371 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1372 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1373 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1374 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1376 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1378 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1382 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1383 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1392 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1396 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1397 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1398 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1402 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1404 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1405 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1408 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1409 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1412 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1413 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1418 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1421 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1423 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1426 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1430 switch (context->type) {
1431 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1432 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1433 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1434 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1435 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1436 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1439 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1441 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1442 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1446 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1447 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1450 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1451 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1454 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1456 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1457 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1458 audit_log_format(ab,
1459 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1460 context->ipc.qbytes,
1461 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1462 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1463 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1468 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1469 audit_log_format(ab,
1470 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1471 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1472 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1473 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1474 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1475 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1476 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1478 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1479 audit_log_format(ab,
1480 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1481 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1482 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1483 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1484 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1485 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1486 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1488 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1489 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1490 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1491 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1493 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1494 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1495 audit_log_format(ab,
1496 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1498 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1499 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1500 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1502 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1503 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1504 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1505 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1506 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1509 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1510 context->mmap.flags);
1516 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1517 int record_num, int *call_panic)
1519 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1520 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1522 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1524 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1527 switch (n->name_len) {
1528 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1529 /* log the full path */
1530 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1531 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1534 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1535 * directory component is the cwd */
1536 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1539 /* log the name's directory component */
1540 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1541 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1545 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1547 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1548 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1549 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
1550 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1563 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1564 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1565 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1568 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1569 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1573 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1578 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1580 const struct cred *cred;
1581 int i, call_panic = 0;
1582 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1583 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1585 struct audit_names *n;
1587 /* tsk == current */
1588 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1590 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1591 cred = current_cred();
1592 context->uid = cred->uid;
1593 context->gid = cred->gid;
1594 context->euid = cred->euid;
1595 context->suid = cred->suid;
1596 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
1597 context->egid = cred->egid;
1598 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
1599 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
1600 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1602 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1604 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1605 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1606 context->arch, context->major);
1607 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1608 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1609 if (context->return_valid)
1610 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1611 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1612 context->return_code);
1614 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1615 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1616 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1619 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1621 audit_log_format(ab,
1622 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1623 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1624 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1625 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1630 context->name_count,
1636 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1637 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1641 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1642 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1645 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1647 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1649 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1651 switch (aux->type) {
1653 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1654 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1655 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1658 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1659 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1660 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1661 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1662 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1663 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1664 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1665 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1666 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1667 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1668 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1669 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1677 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1679 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1680 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1682 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1683 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1688 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1689 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1691 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1692 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1693 context->sockaddr_len);
1698 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1699 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1701 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1702 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1703 axs->target_auid[i],
1705 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1707 axs->target_comm[i]))
1711 if (context->target_pid &&
1712 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1713 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1714 context->target_sessionid,
1715 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1718 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1719 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1721 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd);
1727 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1728 audit_log_name(context, n, i++, &call_panic);
1730 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1731 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1735 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1739 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1740 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1742 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1744 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1746 struct audit_context *context;
1748 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1752 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1753 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1754 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1755 * in the context of the idle thread */
1756 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1757 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1758 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1759 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1760 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1762 audit_free_context(context);
1766 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1767 * @arch: architecture type
1768 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1769 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1770 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1771 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1772 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1774 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1775 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1776 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1777 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1778 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1779 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1782 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1783 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1784 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1786 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1787 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1788 enum audit_state state;
1794 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1795 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1796 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1797 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1798 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1802 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1804 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1805 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1807 if (context->in_syscall) {
1808 struct audit_context *newctx;
1812 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1813 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1814 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1816 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1818 newctx->previous = context;
1820 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1822 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1823 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1824 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1825 * to abandon auditing. */
1826 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1829 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1834 context->arch = arch;
1835 context->major = major;
1836 context->argv[0] = a1;
1837 context->argv[1] = a2;
1838 context->argv[2] = a3;
1839 context->argv[3] = a4;
1841 state = context->state;
1842 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1843 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1845 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1847 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1850 context->serial = 0;
1851 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1852 context->in_syscall = 1;
1853 context->current_state = state;
1858 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1859 * @success: success value of the syscall
1860 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1862 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1863 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1864 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1865 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1866 * free the names stored from getname().
1868 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1870 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1871 struct audit_context *context;
1874 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1876 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1878 context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1882 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1883 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1885 context->in_syscall = 0;
1886 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1888 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1889 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1891 if (context->previous) {
1892 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1893 context->previous = NULL;
1894 audit_free_context(context);
1895 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1897 audit_free_names(context);
1898 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1899 audit_free_aux(context);
1900 context->aux = NULL;
1901 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1902 context->target_pid = 0;
1903 context->target_sid = 0;
1904 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1906 context->fds[0] = -1;
1907 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1908 kfree(context->filterkey);
1909 context->filterkey = NULL;
1911 tsk->audit_context = context;
1915 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1917 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1918 struct audit_context *context;
1919 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1920 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1922 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1924 context = current->audit_context;
1926 count = context->tree_count;
1928 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1932 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1934 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1935 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1936 audit_set_auditable(context);
1937 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1938 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1941 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1945 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1947 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1948 struct audit_context *context;
1949 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1950 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1951 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1955 context = current->audit_context;
1957 count = context->tree_count;
1962 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1964 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1965 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1966 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1967 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1969 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1975 parent = d->d_parent;
1980 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1983 /* just a race with rename */
1984 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1987 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1988 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1989 /* OK, got more space */
1990 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1995 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1996 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1997 audit_set_auditable(context);
2004 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context)
2006 struct audit_names *aname;
2008 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
2009 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
2010 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
2012 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
2015 aname->should_free = true;
2018 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2019 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
2021 context->name_count++;
2023 context->ino_count++;
2029 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
2030 * @name: name to add
2032 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
2033 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
2035 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
2037 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2038 struct audit_names *n;
2040 if (!context->in_syscall) {
2041 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
2042 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
2043 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
2049 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2054 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2057 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
2058 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
2061 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
2062 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
2064 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
2065 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
2066 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
2068 void audit_putname(const char *name)
2070 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2073 if (!context->in_syscall) {
2074 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
2075 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
2076 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
2077 if (context->name_count) {
2078 struct audit_names *n;
2081 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
2082 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
2083 n->name, n->name ?: "(null)");
2090 ++context->put_count;
2091 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
2092 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
2093 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
2096 context->serial, context->major,
2097 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
2098 context->put_count);
2105 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
2107 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
2113 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
2117 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
2118 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
2119 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2120 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2126 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
2127 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
2128 const struct inode *inode)
2130 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
2131 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
2132 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
2133 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
2134 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
2135 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
2136 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
2137 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
2141 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2142 * @name: name being audited
2143 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2145 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
2147 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
2149 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2150 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2151 struct audit_names *n;
2153 if (!context->in_syscall)
2156 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2157 if (n->name && (n->name == name))
2161 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname() */
2162 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2166 handle_path(dentry);
2167 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
2171 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2172 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2173 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2175 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2176 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2177 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2178 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2179 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2180 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2181 * unsuccessful attempts.
2183 void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry,
2184 const struct inode *parent)
2186 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2187 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2188 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2189 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
2190 struct audit_names *n;
2193 if (!context->in_syscall)
2199 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2200 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2204 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2205 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2206 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2207 found_parent = n->name;
2212 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2213 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2217 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2218 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2219 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2221 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2223 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2224 found_child = n->name;
2230 if (!found_parent) {
2231 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2234 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
2238 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2242 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2243 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2244 * audit_free_names() */
2246 n->name = found_parent;
2247 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2248 /* don't call __putname() */
2249 n->name_put = false;
2253 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2256 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2259 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2260 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2261 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2262 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2264 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2266 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2267 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2269 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2272 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2273 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2274 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2275 *serial = ctx->serial;
2278 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2283 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2284 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2287 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2288 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2292 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2294 int audit_set_loginuid(uid_t loginuid)
2296 struct task_struct *task = current;
2297 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2298 unsigned int sessionid;
2300 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
2301 if (task->loginuid != -1)
2303 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
2304 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
2306 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
2308 sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2309 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2310 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2312 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2314 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2315 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2316 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2317 task->pid, task_uid(task),
2318 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2319 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2323 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2324 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2329 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2332 * @attr: queue attributes
2335 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2337 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2340 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2342 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2344 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2345 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2347 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2351 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2352 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2353 * @msg_len: Message length
2354 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2355 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2358 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2359 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2361 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2362 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2365 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2367 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2369 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2370 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2371 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2373 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2377 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2378 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2379 * @notification: Notification event
2383 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2385 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2388 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2390 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2392 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2393 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2397 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2398 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2402 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2404 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2405 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2406 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2407 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2411 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2412 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2415 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2417 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2418 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2419 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2420 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2421 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2422 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2423 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2427 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2428 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2429 * @uid: msgq user id
2430 * @gid: msgq group id
2431 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2433 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2435 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2437 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2439 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2440 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2441 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2442 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2443 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2446 int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2448 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2449 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2451 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2455 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2456 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2458 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2459 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2460 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2466 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2467 * @nargs: number of args
2471 void __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2473 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2475 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2476 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2477 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2481 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2482 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2483 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2486 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2488 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2489 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2490 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2494 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2495 * @len: data length in user space
2496 * @a: data address in kernel space
2498 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2500 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2502 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2504 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2505 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2508 context->sockaddr = p;
2511 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2512 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2516 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2518 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2520 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2521 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2522 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2523 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2524 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2525 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2529 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2530 * @sig: signal value
2531 * @t: task being signaled
2533 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2534 * and uid that is doing that.
2536 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2538 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2539 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2540 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2541 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2543 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2544 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2545 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2546 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2547 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2549 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2550 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2552 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2556 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2557 * in audit_context */
2558 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2559 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2560 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2561 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2562 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2563 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2564 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2568 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2569 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2570 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2574 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2575 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2576 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2578 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2580 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2581 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2582 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2583 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2584 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2585 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2592 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2593 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2594 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2595 * @old: the old credentials
2597 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2598 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2602 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2603 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2605 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2606 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2607 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2608 struct dentry *dentry;
2610 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2614 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2615 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2616 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2618 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2619 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2622 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2623 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2624 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2625 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2627 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2628 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2629 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2631 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2632 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2633 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2638 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2639 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2640 * @new: the new credentials
2641 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2643 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2644 * audit system if applicable
2646 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2647 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2649 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2650 context->capset.pid = pid;
2651 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2652 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2653 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2654 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2657 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2659 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2660 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2661 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2662 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2665 static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
2669 unsigned int sessionid;
2671 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2672 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2673 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2675 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2676 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
2677 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2678 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2679 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2680 audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
2681 audit_log_string(ab, reason);
2682 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2685 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2686 * @signr: signal value
2688 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2689 * should record the event for investigation.
2691 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2693 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2698 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2701 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2702 audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr);
2706 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2708 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2710 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2711 audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr);
2712 audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
2713 audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
2714 audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
2715 audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code);
2719 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2721 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2722 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2724 return &ctx->killed_trees;