1 #include <linux/kernel.h>
2 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
3 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
4 #include <linux/string.h>
5 #include <linux/random.h>
6 #include <linux/module.h>
7 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
8 #include <linux/init.h>
9 #include <linux/errno.h>
10 #include <linux/cache.h>
11 #include <linux/bug.h>
12 #include <linux/err.h>
13 #include <linux/kcmp.h>
15 #include <asm/unistd.h>
18 * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons.
19 * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we
20 * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead.
22 * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
23 * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
24 * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
25 * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
26 * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
27 * relative prime to 2^n).
29 * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed
30 * it can be changed to an alternate scheme.
32 static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
34 static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
36 return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
40 * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2
41 * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2
42 * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2
43 * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
45 static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type)
49 t1 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type);
50 t2 = kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type);
52 return (t1 < t2) | ((t1 > t2) << 1);
55 /* The caller must have pinned the task */
57 get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx)
59 struct file *file = NULL;
65 file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx);
73 static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
80 static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
87 err = mutex_lock_killable(m1);
88 if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) {
89 err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
97 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
98 unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2)
100 struct task_struct *task1, *task2;
106 * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only.
108 task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1);
109 task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2);
110 if (!task1 || !task2)
113 get_task_struct(task1);
114 get_task_struct(task2);
119 * One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
121 ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
122 &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
125 if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ) ||
126 !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
133 struct file *filp1, *filp2;
135 filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
136 filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2);
139 ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE);
145 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM);
148 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES);
151 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS);
154 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND);
157 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO);
160 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
161 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list,
162 task2->sysvsem.undo_list,
174 kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
175 &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
177 put_task_struct(task1);
178 put_task_struct(task2);
187 static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void)
191 get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies));
193 for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++)
194 cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1);
198 arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init);