2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
32 #include <linux/sched.h>
33 #include <linux/security.h>
34 #include <linux/xattr.h>
35 #include <linux/capability.h>
36 #include <linux/unistd.h>
38 #include <linux/mman.h>
39 #include <linux/slab.h>
40 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
41 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
42 #include <linux/swap.h>
43 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
44 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
45 #include <linux/dcache.h>
46 #include <linux/file.h>
47 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
48 #include <linux/namei.h>
49 #include <linux/mount.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52 #include <linux/tty.h>
54 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <linux/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
99 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
101 /* SECMARK reference count */
102 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
104 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
105 int selinux_enforcing;
107 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
109 unsigned long enforcing;
110 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
111 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
114 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
117 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
118 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
120 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
122 unsigned long enabled;
123 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
124 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
127 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
129 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
135 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
138 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
139 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
140 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
141 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
144 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
146 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
150 * initialise the security for the init task
152 static void cred_init_security(void)
154 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
155 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
157 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
159 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
161 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
162 cred->security = tsec;
166 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
168 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
170 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
172 tsec = cred->security;
177 * get the objective security ID of a task
179 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
184 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
190 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
192 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
194 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
199 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
201 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
204 u32 sid = current_sid();
206 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
210 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
211 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
213 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
214 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
215 isec->task_sid = sid;
216 inode->i_security = isec;
221 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
223 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
224 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
226 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
227 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
228 list_del_init(&isec->list);
229 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
231 inode->i_security = NULL;
232 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
235 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
237 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
238 u32 sid = current_sid();
240 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
245 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
246 file->f_security = fsec;
251 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
253 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
254 file->f_security = NULL;
258 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
260 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
262 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
266 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
267 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
268 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
270 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
271 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
272 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
273 sb->s_security = sbsec;
278 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
280 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
281 sb->s_security = NULL;
285 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
287 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
289 "uses transition SIDs",
291 "uses genfs_contexts",
292 "not configured for labeling",
293 "uses mountpoint labeling",
296 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
298 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
300 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
309 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
312 static const match_table_t tokens = {
313 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
317 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
321 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
323 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
324 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
325 const struct cred *cred)
327 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
330 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
331 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
335 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
336 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
340 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
341 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
342 const struct cred *cred)
344 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
346 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
347 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
351 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
352 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
356 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
358 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
359 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
360 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
363 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
364 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
365 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
366 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
367 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
368 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
369 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
370 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
371 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
375 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
376 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
377 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
378 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
379 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
380 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
382 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
383 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
384 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
389 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
391 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
392 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
393 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
395 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
396 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
397 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
399 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
400 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
401 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
402 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
403 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
405 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
406 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
407 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
409 /* Initialize the root inode. */
410 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
412 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
413 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
414 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
416 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
418 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
419 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
420 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
421 struct inode_security_struct, list);
422 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
423 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
424 inode = igrab(inode);
426 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
430 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
431 list_del_init(&isec->list);
434 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
440 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
441 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
442 * mount options, or whatever.
444 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
445 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
448 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
449 char *context = NULL;
453 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
455 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
461 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
462 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
463 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
465 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
468 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
469 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
470 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
472 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
473 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
478 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
479 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
485 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
486 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
489 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
490 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
492 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
493 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
496 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
497 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
499 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
500 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
503 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
504 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
506 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
507 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
508 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
510 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
513 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
514 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
516 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
517 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
518 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
521 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
526 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
530 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
531 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
533 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
535 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
536 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
537 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
538 (old_sid != new_sid))
541 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
542 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
544 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
545 if (mnt_flags & flag)
551 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
552 * labeling information.
554 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
555 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
557 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
559 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
560 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
561 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
562 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
563 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
564 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
565 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
566 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
567 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
569 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
571 if (!ss_initialized) {
573 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
574 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
575 server is ready to handle calls. */
579 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
580 "before the security server is initialized\n");
585 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
586 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
587 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
588 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
590 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
591 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
592 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
593 * will be used for both mounts)
595 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
600 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
601 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
602 * than once with different security options.
604 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
607 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
609 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
610 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
612 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
613 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
614 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
621 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
623 goto out_double_mount;
625 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
630 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
632 goto out_double_mount;
634 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
636 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
637 rootcontext_sid = sid;
639 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
641 goto out_double_mount;
643 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
647 defcontext_sid = sid;
649 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
651 goto out_double_mount;
653 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
662 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
663 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
664 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
665 goto out_double_mount;
670 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
671 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
673 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
674 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
676 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
677 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
681 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
683 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
687 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
691 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
692 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
693 * the superblock context if not already set.
696 if (!fscontext_sid) {
697 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
701 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
703 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
708 if (!rootcontext_sid)
709 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
712 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
715 if (rootcontext_sid) {
716 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
721 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
722 root_isec->initialized = 1;
725 if (defcontext_sid) {
726 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
728 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
729 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
733 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
734 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
740 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
743 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
745 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
749 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
750 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
754 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
755 struct super_block *newsb)
757 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
758 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
760 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
761 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
762 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
765 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
766 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
771 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
772 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
774 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
775 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
778 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
780 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
782 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
783 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
784 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
787 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
791 if (!set_rootcontext) {
792 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
793 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
796 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
798 if (set_rootcontext) {
799 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
800 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
801 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
802 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
804 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
807 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
808 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
811 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
812 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
815 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
816 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
817 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
819 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
821 /* Standard string-based options. */
822 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
824 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
829 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
833 if (context || defcontext) {
835 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
838 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
848 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
851 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
858 case Opt_rootcontext:
861 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
864 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
872 if (context || defcontext) {
874 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
877 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
883 case Opt_labelsupport:
887 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
894 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
899 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
900 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
905 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
906 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
909 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
910 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
913 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
914 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
917 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
918 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
921 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
932 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
934 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
937 char *options = data;
938 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
940 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
945 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
947 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
952 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
955 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
959 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
960 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
965 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
968 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
969 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
973 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
975 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
978 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
980 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
981 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
984 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
988 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
994 /* we need a comma before each option */
999 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1005 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1007 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1010 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1012 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1018 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1020 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1025 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1027 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1029 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1031 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1033 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1035 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1037 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1039 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1041 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1045 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1048 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1050 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1053 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1055 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1058 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1064 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1065 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1067 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1074 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1075 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1077 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1079 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1080 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1082 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1084 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1086 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1093 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1095 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1101 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1104 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1105 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1106 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1107 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1108 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1109 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1110 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1115 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1117 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1122 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1125 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1126 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1131 char *buffer, *path;
1133 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1137 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1141 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1142 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1143 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1144 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1148 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1150 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1154 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1162 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1163 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1165 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1166 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1168 struct dentry *dentry;
1169 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1170 char *context = NULL;
1174 if (isec->initialized)
1177 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1178 if (isec->initialized)
1181 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1182 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1183 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1184 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1185 server is ready to handle calls. */
1186 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1187 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1188 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1189 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1193 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1194 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1195 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1196 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1200 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1201 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1203 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1204 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1206 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1207 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1211 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1212 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1213 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1214 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1215 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1216 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1217 * be used again by userspace.
1222 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1223 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1229 context[len] = '\0';
1230 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1232 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1235 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1236 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1243 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1249 context[len] = '\0';
1250 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1256 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1257 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1258 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1259 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1263 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1264 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1267 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1271 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1272 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1274 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1275 if (printk_ratelimit())
1276 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1277 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1278 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1280 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1281 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1282 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1285 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1293 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1294 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1296 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1297 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1298 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1300 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1301 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1302 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1303 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1308 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1309 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1312 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1313 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1315 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1317 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1318 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1329 isec->initialized = 1;
1332 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1334 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1335 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1339 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1340 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1346 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1347 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1350 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1351 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1354 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1355 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1358 /* All other signals. */
1359 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1367 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1368 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1370 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1371 const struct cred *target,
1374 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1376 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1380 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1381 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1382 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1383 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1385 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1386 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1389 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1393 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1394 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1396 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1400 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1401 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1402 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1403 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1405 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1410 sid = current_sid();
1411 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1412 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1415 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1416 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1419 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1420 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1423 struct common_audit_data ad;
1424 struct av_decision avd;
1426 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1427 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1430 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1434 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1436 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1439 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1443 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1448 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1449 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1450 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1457 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1458 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1461 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1463 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1464 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1467 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1468 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1469 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1470 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1471 struct inode *inode,
1473 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1476 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1479 validate_creds(cred);
1481 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1484 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1485 isec = inode->i_security;
1487 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1490 static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
1491 struct inode *inode,
1495 struct common_audit_data ad;
1497 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
1499 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
1502 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1503 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1504 pathname if needed. */
1505 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1506 struct dentry *dentry,
1509 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1510 struct common_audit_data ad;
1512 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1513 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1514 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1517 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1518 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1519 pathname if needed. */
1520 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1524 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1525 struct common_audit_data ad;
1527 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1529 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1532 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1533 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1534 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1535 check a particular permission to the file.
1536 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1537 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1538 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1539 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1540 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1544 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1545 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1546 struct common_audit_data ad;
1547 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1550 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1551 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1553 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1554 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1562 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1565 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1571 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1572 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1573 struct dentry *dentry,
1576 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1577 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1578 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1580 struct common_audit_data ad;
1583 dsec = dir->i_security;
1584 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1587 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1589 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1590 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1592 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1593 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1598 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1599 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1600 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1605 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1609 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1610 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1611 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1614 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1615 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1616 struct task_struct *ctx)
1618 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1620 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1624 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1627 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1628 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1629 struct dentry *dentry,
1633 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1634 struct common_audit_data ad;
1635 u32 sid = current_sid();
1639 dsec = dir->i_security;
1640 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1642 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1643 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1646 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1647 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1662 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1667 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1671 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1672 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1673 struct inode *new_dir,
1674 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1676 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1677 struct common_audit_data ad;
1678 u32 sid = current_sid();
1680 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1683 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1684 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1685 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1686 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1688 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1690 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1691 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1692 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1695 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1696 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1699 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1700 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1701 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1706 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1707 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1708 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1709 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1710 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1713 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1714 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1715 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1716 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1718 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1726 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1727 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1728 struct super_block *sb,
1730 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1732 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1733 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1735 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1736 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1739 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1740 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1744 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1745 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1746 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1747 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1750 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1752 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1756 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1758 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1760 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1767 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1768 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1772 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1774 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1775 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1782 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1791 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1794 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1796 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1798 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1804 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1806 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1811 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1815 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1816 u32 sid = current_sid();
1817 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1818 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1821 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1824 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1828 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1832 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1835 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1836 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1840 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1844 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1847 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1848 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1849 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1850 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1854 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1855 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1859 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1863 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1864 * which was removed).
1866 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1867 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1868 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1869 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1872 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1877 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1881 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1884 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1886 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1898 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1903 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1906 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1912 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1914 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1916 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1919 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1924 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1925 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1926 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1928 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1929 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1930 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1931 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1932 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1934 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1935 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1936 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1937 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1938 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1940 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1947 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1948 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1949 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1951 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1952 * processes that allocate mappings.
1954 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1956 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1958 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1959 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1963 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1966 /* binprm security operations */
1968 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1970 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1971 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1972 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1973 struct common_audit_data ad;
1974 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1977 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1981 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1982 * the script interpreter */
1983 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1986 old_tsec = current_security();
1987 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1988 isec = inode->i_security;
1990 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1991 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1992 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1994 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1995 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1996 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1997 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1999 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2000 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2001 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2002 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2004 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2005 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2006 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2012 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
2013 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2015 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2016 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2018 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2019 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2020 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2024 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2025 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2026 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2030 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2031 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2035 /* Check for shared state */
2036 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2037 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2038 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2044 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2045 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2047 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2048 struct task_struct *tracer;
2049 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2053 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2054 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2055 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2061 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2063 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2069 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2070 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2076 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2078 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2086 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2087 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2088 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2089 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2091 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2094 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2097 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2098 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2099 struct files_struct *files)
2101 struct common_audit_data ad;
2102 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2103 struct tty_struct *tty;
2104 struct fdtable *fdt;
2108 tty = get_current_tty();
2110 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2111 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2112 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2113 struct inode *inode;
2115 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2116 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2117 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2118 file may belong to another process and we are only
2119 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2120 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2121 struct tty_file_private, list);
2122 file = file_priv->file;
2123 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2124 if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
2125 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
2129 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2132 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2136 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2138 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2140 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2142 unsigned long set, i;
2147 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2148 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2150 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2153 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2154 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2159 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2161 file_to_av(file))) {
2163 fd = get_unused_fd();
2173 devnull = dentry_open(
2175 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2177 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2184 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2189 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2192 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2196 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2198 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2200 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2201 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2204 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2205 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2208 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2209 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2211 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2212 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2214 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2215 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2216 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2218 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2219 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2220 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2221 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2222 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2224 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2225 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2227 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2229 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2230 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2231 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2232 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2234 task_unlock(current);
2235 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2240 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2243 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2245 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2246 struct itimerval itimer;
2256 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2257 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2258 * flush and unblock signals.
2260 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2261 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2263 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2265 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2266 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2267 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2268 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2269 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2270 __flush_signals(current);
2271 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2272 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2274 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2277 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2278 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2279 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2280 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2281 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2284 /* superblock security operations */
2286 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2288 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2291 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2293 superblock_free_security(sb);
2296 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2301 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2304 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2306 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2307 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2308 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2309 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2310 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2313 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2320 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2324 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2327 int current_size = 0;
2335 while (current_size < len) {
2345 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2347 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2348 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2349 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2355 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2363 in_save = in_end = orig;
2367 open_quote = !open_quote;
2368 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2370 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2372 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2373 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2375 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2377 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2379 } while (*in_end++);
2381 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2382 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2387 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2390 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2391 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2392 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2394 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2400 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2403 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2404 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2407 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2409 goto out_free_secdata;
2411 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2413 goto out_free_secdata;
2415 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2416 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2418 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2422 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2424 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2425 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2427 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2428 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2429 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2435 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2436 goto out_bad_option;
2439 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2440 goto out_bad_option;
2442 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2443 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2444 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2446 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2447 goto out_bad_option;
2450 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2451 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2452 goto out_bad_option;
2461 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2463 free_secdata(secdata);
2466 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2467 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2472 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2474 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2475 struct common_audit_data ad;
2478 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2482 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2483 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2486 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2487 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2488 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2491 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2493 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2494 struct common_audit_data ad;
2496 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2497 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2498 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2501 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2504 unsigned long flags,
2507 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2509 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2510 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2511 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2513 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2516 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2518 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2520 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2521 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2524 /* inode security operations */
2526 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2528 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2531 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2533 inode_free_security(inode);
2536 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2537 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2538 void **value, size_t *len)
2540 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2541 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2542 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2543 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2545 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2547 dsec = dir->i_security;
2548 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2551 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2553 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2554 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2555 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2556 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2557 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2558 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2561 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2562 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2565 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2570 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2571 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2572 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2573 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2575 isec->initialized = 1;
2578 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2582 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2589 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2601 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2603 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2606 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2608 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2611 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2613 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2616 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2618 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2621 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2623 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2626 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2628 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2631 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2633 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2636 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2637 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2639 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2642 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2644 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2646 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2649 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2651 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2653 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2656 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2658 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2659 struct common_audit_data ad;
2662 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2664 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2665 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2667 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2671 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2675 ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2677 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2679 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
2682 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2684 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2685 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2687 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2688 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2689 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2695 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2696 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2697 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2699 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2702 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2704 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2707 path.dentry = dentry;
2710 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2713 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2715 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2717 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2718 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2719 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2720 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2722 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2723 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2724 Restrict to administrator. */
2729 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2730 ordinary setattr permission. */
2731 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2734 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2735 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2737 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2738 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2739 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2740 struct common_audit_data ad;
2741 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2744 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2745 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2747 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2748 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2751 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2754 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2755 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2757 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2758 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2762 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2763 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2764 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2766 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2771 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2772 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2776 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2781 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2783 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2784 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2788 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2789 const void *value, size_t size,
2792 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2793 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2797 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2798 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2802 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2804 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2805 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2806 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2814 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2816 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2818 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2821 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2823 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2825 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2828 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2830 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2831 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2833 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2834 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2839 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2841 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2843 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2847 char *context = NULL;
2848 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2850 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2854 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2855 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2856 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2857 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2858 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2859 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2860 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2862 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2863 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2865 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2868 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2881 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2882 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2884 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2888 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2891 if (!value || !size)
2894 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2899 isec->initialized = 1;
2903 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2905 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2906 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2907 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2911 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2913 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2917 /* file security operations */
2919 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2921 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2922 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2924 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2925 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2928 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2929 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2932 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2934 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2935 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2936 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2937 u32 sid = current_sid();
2940 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2943 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2944 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2945 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2948 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2951 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2953 return file_alloc_security(file);
2956 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2958 file_free_security(file);
2961 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2964 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2974 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2976 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2977 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2980 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2982 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2983 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2986 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2990 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
2995 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
2996 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
2999 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3000 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3003 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3008 static int default_noexec;
3010 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3012 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3015 if (default_noexec &&
3016 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3018 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3019 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3020 * This has an additional check.
3022 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3028 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3029 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3031 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3032 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3035 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3036 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3038 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3045 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3046 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3047 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3050 u32 sid = current_sid();
3053 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3054 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3055 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3056 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3058 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3059 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3060 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3065 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3066 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3067 if (rc || addr_only)
3070 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3073 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3074 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3077 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3078 unsigned long reqprot,
3081 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3083 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3086 if (default_noexec &&
3087 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3089 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3090 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3091 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3092 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3093 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3094 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3095 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3096 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3098 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3099 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3100 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3101 * modified content. This typically should only
3102 * occur for text relocations.
3104 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3110 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3113 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3115 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3117 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3120 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3123 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3128 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3133 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3134 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3143 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3144 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3149 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3154 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3158 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3165 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3167 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3169 fsec = file->f_security;
3170 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3175 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3176 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3179 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3181 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3183 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3184 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3186 fsec = file->f_security;
3189 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3191 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3193 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3194 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3197 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3199 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3201 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3204 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3206 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3207 struct inode *inode;
3208 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3210 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3211 fsec = file->f_security;
3212 isec = inode->i_security;
3214 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3215 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3216 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3217 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3218 * struct as its SID.
3220 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3221 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3223 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3224 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3225 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3226 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3227 * new inode label or new policy.
3228 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3230 return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
3233 /* task security operations */
3235 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3237 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3241 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3243 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3245 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3247 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3251 cred->security = tsec;
3256 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3258 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3260 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3263 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3264 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3266 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3267 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3272 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3274 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3277 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3278 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3280 old_tsec = old->security;
3282 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3286 new->security = tsec;
3291 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3293 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3295 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3296 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3302 * set the security data for a kernel service
3303 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3305 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3307 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3308 u32 sid = current_sid();
3311 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3312 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3313 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3317 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3318 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3319 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3325 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3326 * objective context of the specified inode
3328 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3330 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3331 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3332 u32 sid = current_sid();
3335 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3336 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3337 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3341 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3345 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3348 struct common_audit_data ad;
3350 sid = task_sid(current);
3352 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3353 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3355 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3356 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3359 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3361 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3364 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3366 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3369 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3371 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3374 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3376 *secid = task_sid(p);
3379 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3383 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3387 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3390 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3394 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3398 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3401 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3403 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3406 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3407 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3409 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3411 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3412 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3413 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3414 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3415 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3416 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3421 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3425 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3429 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3432 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3434 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3437 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3439 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3442 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3449 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3451 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3453 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3454 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3456 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3460 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3462 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3465 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3466 struct inode *inode)
3468 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3469 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3472 isec->initialized = 1;
3475 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3476 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3477 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3479 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3480 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3482 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3483 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3487 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3488 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3491 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3492 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3496 *proto = ih->protocol;
3498 switch (ih->protocol) {
3500 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3502 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3506 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3510 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3511 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3516 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3518 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3522 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3526 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3527 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3531 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3532 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3534 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3538 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3542 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3543 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3554 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3556 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3557 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3558 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3561 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3562 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3565 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3566 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3570 ad->u.net.v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3571 ad->u.net.v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3574 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3575 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3576 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3585 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3587 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3591 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3592 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3597 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3599 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3603 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3604 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3608 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3609 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3611 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3615 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3616 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3620 /* includes fragments */
3630 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3631 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3636 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3638 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3641 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3642 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3645 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3647 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3650 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3651 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3661 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3662 " unable to parse packet\n");
3672 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3674 * @family: protocol family
3675 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3678 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3679 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3680 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3681 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3682 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3686 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3693 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3694 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3696 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3697 if (unlikely(err)) {
3699 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3700 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3707 /* socket security operations */
3709 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3710 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3712 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3713 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3717 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3721 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3723 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3724 struct common_audit_data ad;
3725 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3727 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3730 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3733 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3736 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3737 int protocol, int kern)
3739 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3747 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3748 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3752 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3755 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3756 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3758 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3759 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3760 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3763 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3766 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3768 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3773 isec->initialized = 1;
3776 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3777 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3778 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3779 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3785 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3786 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3787 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3789 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3791 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3795 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3800 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3801 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3802 * check the first address now.
3804 family = sk->sk_family;
3805 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3807 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3808 struct common_audit_data ad;
3809 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3810 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3811 unsigned short snum;
3814 if (family == PF_INET) {
3815 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3816 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3817 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3819 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3820 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3821 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3827 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3829 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3830 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3834 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3835 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3836 ad.u.net.family = family;
3837 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3839 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3845 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3846 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3847 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3850 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3851 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3854 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3855 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3859 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3863 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3867 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3868 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3869 ad.u.net.family = family;
3871 if (family == PF_INET)
3872 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3874 ad.u.net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3876 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3877 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3885 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3887 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3888 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3891 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3896 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3898 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3899 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3900 struct common_audit_data ad;
3901 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3902 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3903 unsigned short snum;
3906 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3907 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3908 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3910 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3912 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3913 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3915 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3918 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3922 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3923 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3925 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3926 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3927 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3928 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3933 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3939 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3941 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3944 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3947 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3948 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3950 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3954 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3956 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3957 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3958 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3959 newisec->initialized = 1;
3964 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3967 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3970 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3971 int size, int flags)
3973 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3976 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3978 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3981 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3983 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3986 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3990 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3994 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3997 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4000 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4003 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4005 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4008 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4012 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4013 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4014 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4015 struct common_audit_data ad;
4018 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4019 ad.u.net.sk = other;
4021 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4022 sksec_other->sclass,
4023 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4027 /* server child socket */
4028 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4029 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4034 /* connecting socket */
4035 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4040 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4041 struct socket *other)
4043 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4044 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4045 struct common_audit_data ad;
4047 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4048 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4050 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4054 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4056 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4062 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4065 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4066 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4070 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4073 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4074 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4077 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4081 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4082 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4083 struct common_audit_data ad;
4086 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4087 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4088 ad.u.net.family = family;
4089 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4093 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4094 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4100 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4103 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4108 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4111 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4112 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4113 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4114 struct common_audit_data ad;
4119 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4122 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4123 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4126 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4127 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4128 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4129 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4130 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4131 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4133 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4134 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4135 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4138 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4139 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4140 ad.u.net.family = family;
4141 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4145 if (peerlbl_active) {
4148 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4151 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4154 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4157 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4160 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4163 if (secmark_active) {
4164 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4173 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4174 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4179 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4180 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4182 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4183 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4184 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4185 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4186 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4188 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4192 if (scontext_len > len) {
4197 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4201 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4207 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4209 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4212 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4214 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4217 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4221 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4222 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4224 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4227 *secid = peer_secid;
4228 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4233 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4235 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4237 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4241 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4242 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4243 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4244 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4249 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4251 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4253 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4254 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4258 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4260 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4261 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4263 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4264 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4265 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4267 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4270 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4273 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4275 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4277 *secid = sksec->sid;
4281 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4283 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4284 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4286 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4287 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4288 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4289 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4292 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4293 struct request_sock *req)
4295 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4297 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4301 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4302 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4305 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4308 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4309 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4310 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4312 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4315 req->secid = newsid;
4316 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4319 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4322 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4323 const struct request_sock *req)
4325 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4327 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4328 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4329 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4330 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4331 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4332 time it will have been created and available. */
4334 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4335 * thread with access to newsksec */
4336 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4339 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4341 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4342 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4344 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4345 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4348 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4351 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4353 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4356 __tsec = current_security();
4359 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4362 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4364 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4367 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4369 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4372 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4375 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4378 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4380 u32 sid = current_sid();
4382 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4383 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4384 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4385 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4386 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4387 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4389 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4393 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4395 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4397 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4398 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4399 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4400 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4401 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4402 * protocols were being used */
4404 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4405 * the sockcreate SID here */
4407 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4408 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4411 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4413 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4414 u32 sid = current_sid();
4417 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4418 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4421 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4422 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4431 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4435 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4436 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4438 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4442 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4444 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4446 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4447 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4448 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4449 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4450 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4451 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4461 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4466 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4468 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4474 struct common_audit_data ad;
4479 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4482 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4483 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4484 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4485 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4488 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4491 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4492 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4493 ad.u.net.family = family;
4494 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4497 if (peerlbl_active) {
4498 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4501 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4507 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4508 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4512 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4513 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4514 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4516 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4522 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4523 struct sk_buff *skb,
4524 const struct net_device *in,
4525 const struct net_device *out,
4526 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4528 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4531 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4532 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4533 struct sk_buff *skb,
4534 const struct net_device *in,
4535 const struct net_device *out,
4536 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4538 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4542 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4547 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4550 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4551 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4552 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4554 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4557 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4558 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4564 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4565 struct sk_buff *skb,
4566 const struct net_device *in,
4567 const struct net_device *out,
4568 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4570 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4573 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4577 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4578 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4579 struct common_audit_data ad;
4585 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4587 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4588 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4589 ad.u.net.family = family;
4590 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4593 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4594 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4595 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4596 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4598 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4599 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4604 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4610 struct common_audit_data ad;
4615 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4616 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4617 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4618 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4619 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4620 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4622 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4623 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4624 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4625 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4626 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4627 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4628 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4631 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4632 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4633 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4636 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4637 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4638 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4639 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4643 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4644 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4647 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4648 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4651 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4652 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4653 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4656 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4657 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4658 ad.u.net.family = family;
4659 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4663 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4664 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4665 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4667 if (peerlbl_active) {
4671 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4673 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4674 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4675 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4677 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4679 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4680 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4681 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4687 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4688 struct sk_buff *skb,
4689 const struct net_device *in,
4690 const struct net_device *out,
4691 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4693 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4696 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4697 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4698 struct sk_buff *skb,
4699 const struct net_device *in,
4700 const struct net_device *out,
4701 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4703 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4707 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4709 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4713 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4717 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4720 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4721 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4724 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4727 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4731 sid = task_sid(task);
4732 isec->sclass = sclass;
4734 perm->security = isec;
4739 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4741 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4742 perm->security = NULL;
4746 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4748 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4750 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4754 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4755 msg->security = msec;
4760 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4762 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4764 msg->security = NULL;
4768 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4771 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4772 struct common_audit_data ad;
4773 u32 sid = current_sid();
4775 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4777 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4778 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4780 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4783 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4785 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4788 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4790 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4793 /* message queue security operations */
4794 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4796 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4797 struct common_audit_data ad;
4798 u32 sid = current_sid();
4801 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4805 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4807 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4808 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4810 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4813 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4819 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4821 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4824 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4826 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4827 struct common_audit_data ad;
4828 u32 sid = current_sid();
4830 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4832 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4833 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4835 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4836 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4839 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4847 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4848 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4851 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4854 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4857 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4863 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4867 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4869 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4870 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4871 struct common_audit_data ad;
4872 u32 sid = current_sid();
4875 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4876 msec = msg->security;
4879 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4881 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4883 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4884 * message queue this message will be stored in
4886 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4892 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4893 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4895 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4896 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4899 /* Can this process send the message */
4900 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4903 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4904 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4905 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4910 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4911 struct task_struct *target,
4912 long type, int mode)
4914 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4915 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4916 struct common_audit_data ad;
4917 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4920 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4921 msec = msg->security;
4923 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4924 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4926 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4927 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4929 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4930 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4934 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4935 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4937 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4938 struct common_audit_data ad;
4939 u32 sid = current_sid();
4942 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4946 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4948 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4949 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4951 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4954 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4960 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4962 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4965 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4967 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4968 struct common_audit_data ad;
4969 u32 sid = current_sid();
4971 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4973 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4974 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4976 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4977 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4980 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4981 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4989 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4990 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4993 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4996 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5003 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5009 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5013 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5014 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5018 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5021 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5023 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5026 /* Semaphore security operations */
5027 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5029 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5030 struct common_audit_data ad;
5031 u32 sid = current_sid();
5034 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5038 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5040 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5041 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5043 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5046 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5052 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5054 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5057 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5059 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5060 struct common_audit_data ad;
5061 u32 sid = current_sid();
5063 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5065 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5066 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5068 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5069 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5072 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5073 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5081 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5082 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5086 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5097 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5100 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5104 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5110 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5114 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5115 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5120 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5124 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5127 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5133 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5135 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5140 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5143 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5145 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5149 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5152 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5155 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5156 char *name, char **value)
5158 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5164 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5170 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5172 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5174 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5176 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5177 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5178 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5179 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5180 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5181 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5182 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5183 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5191 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5201 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5202 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5204 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5205 struct task_struct *tracer;
5212 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5213 security attributes. */
5218 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5219 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5220 * above restriction is ever removed.
5222 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5223 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5224 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5225 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5226 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5227 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5228 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5229 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5230 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5231 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5237 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5238 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5239 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5243 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5244 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5245 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5247 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5254 new = prepare_creds();
5258 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5259 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5260 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5261 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5262 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5263 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5264 tsec = new->security;
5265 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5266 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5267 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5268 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5269 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5270 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5273 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5274 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5275 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5276 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5281 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5283 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5284 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5289 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5290 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5291 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5295 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5296 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5299 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5301 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5305 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5306 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5325 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5327 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5330 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5332 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5335 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5341 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5343 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5345 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5349 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5351 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5353 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5356 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5359 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5368 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5369 unsigned long flags)
5371 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5372 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5374 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5378 tsec = cred->security;
5379 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5380 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5382 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5388 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5390 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5396 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5397 const struct cred *cred,
5401 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5404 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5405 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5406 appear to be created. */
5410 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5412 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5413 ksec = key->security;
5415 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5418 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5420 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5421 char *context = NULL;
5425 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5434 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5437 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5438 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5439 .capget = selinux_capget,
5440 .capset = selinux_capset,
5441 .capable = selinux_capable,
5442 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5443 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5444 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5445 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5447 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5449 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5450 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5451 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5452 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5454 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5455 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5456 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5457 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5458 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5459 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5460 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5461 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5462 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5463 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5464 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5465 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5468 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5469 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5470 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5471 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5472 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5473 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5474 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5475 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5476 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5477 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5478 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5479 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5480 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5481 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5482 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5483 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5484 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5485 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5486 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5487 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5488 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5489 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5490 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5491 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5492 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5494 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5495 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5496 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5497 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5498 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5499 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5500 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5501 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5502 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5503 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5504 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5506 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5508 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5509 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5510 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5511 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5512 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5513 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5514 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5515 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5516 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5517 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5518 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5519 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5520 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5521 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5522 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5523 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5524 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5525 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5526 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5527 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5528 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5529 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5531 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5532 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5534 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5535 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5537 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5538 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5539 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5540 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5541 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5542 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5544 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5545 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5546 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5547 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5548 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5550 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5551 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5552 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5553 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5554 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5556 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5558 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5559 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5561 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5562 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5563 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5564 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5565 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5566 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5568 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5569 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5571 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5572 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5573 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5574 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5575 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5576 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5577 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5578 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5579 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5580 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5581 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5582 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5583 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5584 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5585 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5586 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5587 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5588 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5589 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5590 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5591 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5592 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5593 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5594 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5595 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5596 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5597 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5598 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5599 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5600 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5601 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5603 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5604 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5605 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5606 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5607 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5608 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5609 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5610 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5611 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5612 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5613 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5617 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5618 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5619 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5620 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5624 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5625 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5626 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5627 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5631 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5633 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5634 selinux_enabled = 0;
5638 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5639 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5643 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5645 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5646 cred_init_security();
5648 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5650 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5651 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5652 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5655 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5656 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5658 if (selinux_enforcing)
5659 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5661 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5666 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5668 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5671 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5673 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5675 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5676 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5677 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5680 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5681 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5682 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5684 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5686 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5688 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5689 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5691 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5692 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5695 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5696 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5698 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5699 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5702 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5703 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5705 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5706 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5710 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5712 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5714 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5715 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5717 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5718 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5721 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5722 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5724 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5725 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5731 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5735 if (!selinux_enabled)
5738 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5740 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5742 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5744 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5745 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5747 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5754 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5756 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5757 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5759 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5761 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5762 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5763 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5768 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5770 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5771 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5774 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5776 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5777 static int selinux_disabled;
5779 int selinux_disable(void)
5781 if (ss_initialized) {
5782 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5786 if (selinux_disabled) {
5787 /* Only do this once. */
5791 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5793 selinux_disabled = 1;
5794 selinux_enabled = 0;
5796 reset_security_ops();
5798 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5801 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5802 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5804 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */