2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing;
103 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 unsigned long enforcing;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
107 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 unsigned long enabled;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
120 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 int selinux_enabled = 1;
128 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
131 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
134 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
135 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
136 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
137 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
138 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
147 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
150 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
151 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
152 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
153 * is always considered enabled.
156 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
161 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
163 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
173 * initialise the security for the init task
175 static void cred_init_security(void)
177 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
178 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
182 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
185 cred->security = tsec;
189 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
195 tsec = cred->security;
200 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
207 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
213 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
217 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
222 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
226 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
227 u32 sid = current_sid();
229 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
233 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
234 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
236 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
237 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
238 isec->task_sid = sid;
239 inode->i_security = isec;
244 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
246 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
248 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
249 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
252 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
254 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
255 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
257 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
258 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
259 list_del_init(&isec->list);
260 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
263 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
264 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
265 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
266 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
267 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
268 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
269 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
271 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
274 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
276 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
277 u32 sid = current_sid();
279 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
284 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
285 file->f_security = fsec;
290 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
292 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
293 file->f_security = NULL;
297 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
299 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
301 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
305 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
306 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
307 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
309 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
311 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sb->s_security = sbsec;
317 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
319 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
320 sb->s_security = NULL;
324 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
326 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
328 "uses transition SIDs",
330 "uses genfs_contexts",
331 "not configured for labeling",
332 "uses mountpoint labeling",
333 "uses native labeling",
336 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
338 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
340 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
349 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
353 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
355 static const match_table_t tokens = {
356 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
357 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
358 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
359 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
364 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
366 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
367 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
368 const struct cred *cred)
370 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
373 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
374 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
378 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
379 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
383 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
384 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
385 const struct cred *cred)
387 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
389 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
390 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
394 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
395 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
399 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
401 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
403 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
404 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
405 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
406 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
407 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
408 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
409 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
410 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
411 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
414 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
416 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
417 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
418 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
421 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
422 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
423 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
424 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
425 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
426 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
427 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
428 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
429 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
433 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
434 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
435 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
436 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
437 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
438 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
440 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
441 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
442 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
447 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
448 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
449 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
451 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
452 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
453 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
455 /* Initialize the root inode. */
456 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
458 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
459 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
460 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
462 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
464 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
465 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
466 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
467 struct inode_security_struct, list);
468 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
469 list_del_init(&isec->list);
470 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
471 inode = igrab(inode);
473 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
477 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
480 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
486 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
487 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
488 * mount options, or whatever.
490 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
491 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
494 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
495 char *context = NULL;
499 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
501 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
507 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
508 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
510 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
511 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
512 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
514 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
517 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
518 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
519 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
521 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
527 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
528 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
534 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
535 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
538 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
539 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
541 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
542 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
545 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
546 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
548 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
549 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
552 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
553 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
555 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
556 struct inode *root = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
557 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
559 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
562 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
563 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
565 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
566 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
567 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
570 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
575 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
579 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
580 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
582 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
584 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
585 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
586 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
587 (old_sid != new_sid))
590 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
591 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
593 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
594 if (mnt_flags & flag)
600 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
601 * labeling information.
603 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
604 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
605 unsigned long kern_flags,
606 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
608 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
610 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
611 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
612 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
613 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
614 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
615 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
616 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
617 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
618 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
620 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
622 if (!ss_initialized) {
624 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
625 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
626 server is ready to handle calls. */
630 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
631 "before the security server is initialized\n");
634 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
635 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
636 * place the results is not allowed */
642 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
643 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
644 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
645 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
647 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
648 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
649 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
650 * will be used for both mounts)
652 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
657 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
658 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
659 * than once with different security options.
661 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
664 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
666 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
667 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
669 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
670 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
671 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
678 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
680 goto out_double_mount;
682 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
687 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
689 goto out_double_mount;
691 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
693 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
694 rootcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
704 defcontext_sid = sid;
706 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
708 goto out_double_mount;
710 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
719 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
720 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
721 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
722 goto out_double_mount;
727 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
728 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
730 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
731 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
732 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
733 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
735 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
737 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
740 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
743 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
744 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
748 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
750 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
754 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
758 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
759 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
760 * the superblock context if not already set.
762 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
763 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
764 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
768 if (!fscontext_sid) {
769 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
773 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
775 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
780 if (!rootcontext_sid)
781 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
783 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
784 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
787 if (rootcontext_sid) {
788 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
793 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
794 root_isec->initialized = 1;
797 if (defcontext_sid) {
798 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
799 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
801 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
802 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
806 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
807 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
813 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
816 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
818 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
822 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
823 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
827 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
828 const struct super_block *newsb)
830 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
831 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
832 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
833 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
835 if (oldflags != newflags)
837 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
839 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
841 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
843 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
844 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root)->i_security;
845 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root)->i_security;
846 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
851 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
852 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
853 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
857 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
858 struct super_block *newsb)
860 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
861 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
863 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
864 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
865 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
868 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
869 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
874 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
875 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
877 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
878 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
879 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
881 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
883 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
885 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
886 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
887 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
890 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
894 if (!set_rootcontext) {
895 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
896 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
899 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
901 if (set_rootcontext) {
902 const struct inode *oldinode = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root);
903 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
904 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
905 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
907 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
910 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
911 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
915 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
916 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
919 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
920 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
921 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
923 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
925 /* Standard string-based options. */
926 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
928 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
933 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
937 if (context || defcontext) {
939 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
942 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
952 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
955 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
962 case Opt_rootcontext:
965 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
968 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
976 if (context || defcontext) {
978 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
981 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
987 case Opt_labelsupport:
991 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
998 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
1002 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
1003 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
1004 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1009 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1010 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1013 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1014 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1017 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1018 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1021 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1022 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1025 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1036 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1038 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1041 char *options = data;
1042 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1044 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1049 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1051 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1056 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1059 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1063 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1064 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1069 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1072 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1073 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1077 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1079 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1082 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1084 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1085 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1087 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1088 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1092 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1098 /* we need a comma before each option */
1100 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1103 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1109 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1111 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1114 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1116 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1122 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1124 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1129 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1131 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1133 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1135 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1137 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1139 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1141 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1143 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1145 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1149 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1152 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1154 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1157 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1159 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1162 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1168 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1169 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1178 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1179 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1181 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1183 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1184 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1186 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1188 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1190 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1197 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1203 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1208 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1209 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1210 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1211 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1212 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1213 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1214 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1215 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1216 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1217 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1218 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1219 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1220 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1221 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1222 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1224 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1225 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1226 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1228 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1231 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1233 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1235 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1238 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1241 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1247 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
1248 char *buffer, *path;
1250 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1254 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1258 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1259 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1260 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1261 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1262 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1267 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid);
1269 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1273 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1274 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1276 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1277 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1279 struct dentry *dentry;
1280 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1281 char *context = NULL;
1285 if (isec->initialized)
1288 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1289 if (isec->initialized)
1292 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1293 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1294 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1295 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1296 server is ready to handle calls. */
1297 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1298 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1299 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1300 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1304 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1305 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1308 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1309 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1313 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1314 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1316 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1317 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1319 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1320 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1324 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1325 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1326 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1327 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1328 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1329 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1330 * be used again by userspace.
1335 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1336 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1342 context[len] = '\0';
1343 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1345 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1348 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1349 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1356 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1362 context[len] = '\0';
1363 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1369 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1370 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1371 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1372 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1376 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1377 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1380 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1384 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1385 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1387 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1388 if (printk_ratelimit())
1389 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1390 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1391 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1393 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1394 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1395 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1398 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1406 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1407 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1409 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1410 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1411 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1413 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1414 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1415 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1416 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1421 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1422 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1425 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1426 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1428 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1429 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1432 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1433 * d_splice_alias. */
1434 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1436 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1438 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1440 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1441 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1442 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1443 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1444 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1445 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1446 * could be used again by userspace.
1450 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1451 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass,
1452 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1461 isec->initialized = 1;
1464 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1466 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1467 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1471 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1472 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1478 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1479 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1482 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1483 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1486 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1487 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1490 /* All other signals. */
1491 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1499 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1500 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1502 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1503 const struct cred *target,
1506 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1508 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1512 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1513 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1514 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1515 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1517 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1518 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1521 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1525 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1526 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1528 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1532 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1533 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1534 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1535 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1537 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1542 sid = current_sid();
1543 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1544 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1547 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1548 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1551 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1552 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1555 struct common_audit_data ad;
1556 struct av_decision avd;
1558 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1559 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1562 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1565 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1567 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1570 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1574 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1579 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1580 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1581 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1588 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1589 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1592 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1594 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1595 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1598 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1599 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1600 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1601 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1602 struct inode *inode,
1604 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1606 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1609 validate_creds(cred);
1611 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1614 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1615 isec = inode->i_security;
1617 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1620 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1621 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1622 pathname if needed. */
1623 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1624 struct dentry *dentry,
1627 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1628 struct common_audit_data ad;
1630 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1631 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1632 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1635 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1636 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1637 pathname if needed. */
1638 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1639 const struct path *path,
1642 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1643 struct common_audit_data ad;
1645 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1647 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1650 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1651 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1655 struct common_audit_data ad;
1657 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1658 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1659 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1662 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1663 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1664 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1665 check a particular permission to the file.
1666 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1667 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1668 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1669 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1670 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1674 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1675 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1676 struct common_audit_data ad;
1677 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1680 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1681 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1683 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1692 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1695 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1701 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1702 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1703 struct dentry *dentry,
1706 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1707 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1708 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1710 struct common_audit_data ad;
1713 dsec = dir->i_security;
1714 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1717 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1719 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1720 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1722 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1723 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1728 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1729 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1730 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1735 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1739 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1740 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1741 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1744 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1745 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1746 struct task_struct *ctx)
1748 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1750 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1754 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1757 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1758 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1759 struct dentry *dentry,
1763 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1764 struct common_audit_data ad;
1765 u32 sid = current_sid();
1769 dsec = dir->i_security;
1770 isec = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1772 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1773 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1776 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1777 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1792 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1797 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1801 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1802 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1803 struct inode *new_dir,
1804 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1806 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1807 struct common_audit_data ad;
1808 u32 sid = current_sid();
1810 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1813 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1814 old_isec = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_security;
1815 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1816 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1818 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1820 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1821 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1822 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1825 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1826 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1829 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1830 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1831 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1836 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1837 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1838 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1839 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1840 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1843 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1844 new_isec = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_security;
1845 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1846 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1848 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1856 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1857 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1858 struct super_block *sb,
1860 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1862 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1863 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1865 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1866 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1869 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1870 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1874 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1875 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1876 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1877 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1880 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1882 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1886 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1888 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1890 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1897 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1898 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1902 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1904 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1905 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1912 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1921 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1924 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1926 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1928 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1934 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1936 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
1938 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1939 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
1941 return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1942 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
1945 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
1946 struct task_struct *to)
1948 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1949 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1950 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1953 if (mysid != fromsid) {
1954 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1955 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
1960 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
1964 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
1965 struct task_struct *to)
1967 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1968 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1970 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
1974 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
1975 struct task_struct *to,
1978 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
1979 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1980 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
1981 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1982 struct common_audit_data ad;
1985 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1986 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1988 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1989 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1997 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2000 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2004 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2007 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
2008 u32 sid = current_sid();
2009 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2010 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2013 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2016 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2018 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2021 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2022 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2024 return current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
2027 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2028 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2029 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2030 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2032 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
2036 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2037 * which was removed).
2039 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2040 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2041 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2042 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2045 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2048 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2051 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2053 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2065 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2070 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2073 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2079 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2081 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2083 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2086 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2091 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2092 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2093 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2095 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2096 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2097 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2098 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2099 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2101 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2102 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2103 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2104 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2105 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2107 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2114 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2115 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2116 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2118 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2119 * processes that allocate mappings.
2121 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2123 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2125 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2126 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2130 return cap_sys_admin;
2133 /* binprm security operations */
2135 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2136 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2137 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2139 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2140 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2143 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2144 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2146 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2147 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2150 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2151 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2152 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2153 * of the current SID.
2155 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2158 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2159 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2160 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2170 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2172 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2173 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2174 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2175 struct common_audit_data ad;
2176 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2179 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2180 * the script interpreter */
2181 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2184 old_tsec = current_security();
2185 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2186 isec = inode->i_security;
2188 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2189 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2190 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2192 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2193 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2194 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2195 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2197 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2198 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2199 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2200 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2202 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2203 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2207 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2208 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2209 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2215 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2218 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2220 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2223 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2224 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2226 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2227 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2228 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2232 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2233 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2234 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2238 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2239 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2243 /* Check for shared state */
2244 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2245 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2246 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2252 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2253 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2255 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2256 struct task_struct *tracer;
2257 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2261 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2262 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2263 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2269 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2271 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2277 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2278 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2284 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2286 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2294 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2295 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2296 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2297 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2299 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2305 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2307 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2310 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2311 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2312 struct files_struct *files)
2314 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2315 struct tty_struct *tty;
2319 tty = get_current_tty();
2321 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2322 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2323 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2325 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2326 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2327 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2328 open file may belong to another process and we are
2329 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2330 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2331 struct tty_file_private, list);
2332 file = file_priv->file;
2333 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2336 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2339 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2343 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2344 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2345 if (!n) /* none found? */
2348 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2349 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2351 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2353 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2354 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2360 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2362 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2364 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2365 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2368 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2369 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2372 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2373 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2375 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2376 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2378 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2379 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2380 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2382 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2383 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2384 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2385 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2386 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2388 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2389 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2391 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2393 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2394 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2395 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2396 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2398 task_unlock(current);
2399 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2404 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2407 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2409 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2410 struct itimerval itimer;
2420 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2421 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2422 * flush and unblock signals.
2424 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2425 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2427 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2429 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2430 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2431 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2432 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2433 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2434 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2435 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2436 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2437 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2438 recalc_sigpending();
2440 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2443 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2444 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2445 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2446 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2447 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2450 /* superblock security operations */
2452 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2454 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2457 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2459 superblock_free_security(sb);
2462 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2467 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2470 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2472 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2473 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2474 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2475 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2476 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2479 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2486 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2490 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2493 int current_size = 0;
2501 while (current_size < len) {
2511 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2513 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2514 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2515 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2521 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2529 in_save = in_end = orig;
2533 open_quote = !open_quote;
2534 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2536 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2538 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2539 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2541 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2543 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2545 } while (*in_end++);
2547 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2548 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2553 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2556 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2557 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2560 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2566 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2569 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2570 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2573 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2575 goto out_free_secdata;
2577 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2579 goto out_free_secdata;
2581 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2582 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2584 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2588 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2590 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2591 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
2594 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2595 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2596 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2602 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2603 goto out_bad_option;
2606 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2607 goto out_bad_option;
2609 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2610 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2611 root_isec = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root)->i_security;
2613 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2614 goto out_bad_option;
2617 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2618 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2619 goto out_bad_option;
2628 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2630 free_secdata(secdata);
2633 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2634 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2639 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2641 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2642 struct common_audit_data ad;
2645 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2649 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2650 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2653 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2654 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2655 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2658 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2660 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2661 struct common_audit_data ad;
2663 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2664 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2665 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2668 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2671 unsigned long flags,
2674 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2676 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2677 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2678 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2680 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2683 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2685 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2687 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2688 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2691 /* inode security operations */
2693 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2695 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2698 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2700 inode_free_security(inode);
2703 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2704 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2707 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2708 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2709 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2710 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2711 struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent);
2715 tsec = cred->security;
2716 dsec = dir->i_security;
2717 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2719 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2720 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2722 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2723 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2728 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2734 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2737 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2738 const struct qstr *qstr,
2740 void **value, size_t *len)
2742 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2743 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2744 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2745 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2749 dsec = dir->i_security;
2750 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2753 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2755 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2756 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2757 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2758 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2759 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2760 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2763 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2764 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2767 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2772 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2773 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2774 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2775 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2777 isec->initialized = 1;
2780 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2784 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2787 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2797 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2799 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2802 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2804 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2807 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2809 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2812 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2814 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2817 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2819 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2822 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2824 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2827 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2829 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2832 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2833 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2835 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2838 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2840 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2842 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2845 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2847 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2849 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2852 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2853 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2857 struct common_audit_data ad;
2858 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2861 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2864 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2865 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2871 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2873 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2876 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2877 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2879 struct av_decision avd;
2881 u32 audited, denied;
2883 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2884 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2886 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2890 validate_creds(cred);
2892 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2895 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2897 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2898 isec = inode->i_security;
2900 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2901 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2902 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2904 if (likely(!audited))
2907 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2913 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2915 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2916 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2917 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2919 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2920 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2921 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2927 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2928 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2929 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2931 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2934 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2937 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
2939 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
2942 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2944 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2946 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2947 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2948 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2949 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2951 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2952 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2953 Restrict to administrator. */
2958 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2959 ordinary setattr permission. */
2960 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2963 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2964 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2966 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2967 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2968 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2969 struct common_audit_data ad;
2970 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2973 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2974 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2976 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2977 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2980 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2983 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2984 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2986 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2987 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2991 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
2992 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2993 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2994 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2998 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2999 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3002 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3003 audit_size = size - 1;
3010 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3011 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3012 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3017 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3022 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3023 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3027 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3032 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3034 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3035 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3039 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3040 const void *value, size_t size,
3043 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3044 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3048 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3049 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3053 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3055 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3056 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3057 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3061 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3063 isec->initialized = 1;
3068 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3070 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3072 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3075 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3077 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3079 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3082 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3084 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3085 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3087 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3088 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3093 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3095 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3097 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3101 char *context = NULL;
3102 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3104 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3108 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3109 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3110 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3111 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3112 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3113 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3114 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3116 error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3117 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3119 error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3120 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3122 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3125 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3138 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3139 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3141 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3145 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3148 if (!value || !size)
3151 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3155 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3157 isec->initialized = 1;
3161 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3163 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3164 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3165 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3169 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3171 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3175 /* file security operations */
3177 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3179 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3180 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3182 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3183 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3186 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3187 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3190 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3192 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3193 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3194 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3195 u32 sid = current_sid();
3198 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3201 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3202 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3203 /* No change since file_open check. */
3206 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3209 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3211 return file_alloc_security(file);
3214 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3216 file_free_security(file);
3219 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3222 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3232 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3234 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3235 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3238 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3240 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3241 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3244 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3248 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3253 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3254 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3257 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3258 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3261 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3266 static int default_noexec;
3268 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3270 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3273 if (default_noexec &&
3274 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3276 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3277 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3278 * This has an additional check.
3280 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3286 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3287 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3289 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3290 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3293 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3294 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3296 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3303 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3307 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3308 u32 sid = current_sid();
3309 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3310 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3316 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3317 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3319 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3322 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3323 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3326 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3327 unsigned long reqprot,
3330 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3332 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3335 if (default_noexec &&
3336 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3338 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3339 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3340 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3341 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3342 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3343 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3344 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3345 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3347 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3348 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3349 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3350 * modified content. This typically should only
3351 * occur for text relocations.
3353 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3359 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3362 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3364 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3366 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3369 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3372 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3377 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3378 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3387 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3388 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3389 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3397 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3402 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3409 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3411 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3413 fsec = file->f_security;
3414 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3417 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3418 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3421 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3423 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3425 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3426 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3428 fsec = file->f_security;
3431 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3433 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3435 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3436 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3439 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3441 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3443 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3446 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3448 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3449 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3451 fsec = file->f_security;
3452 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3454 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3455 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3456 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3457 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3458 * struct as its SID.
3460 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3461 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3463 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3464 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3465 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3466 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3467 * new inode label or new policy.
3468 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3470 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3473 /* task security operations */
3475 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3477 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3481 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3483 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3485 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3487 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3491 cred->security = tsec;
3496 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3498 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3500 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3503 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3504 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3506 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3507 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3512 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3514 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3517 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3518 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3520 old_tsec = old->security;
3522 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3526 new->security = tsec;
3531 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3533 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3535 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3536 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3542 * set the security data for a kernel service
3543 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3545 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3547 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3548 u32 sid = current_sid();
3551 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3552 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3553 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3557 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3558 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3559 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3565 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3566 * objective context of the specified inode
3568 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3570 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3571 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3572 u32 sid = current_sid();
3575 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3576 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3577 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3581 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3585 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3588 struct common_audit_data ad;
3590 sid = task_sid(current);
3592 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3593 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3595 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3596 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3599 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3601 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3604 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3606 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3609 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3611 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3614 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3616 *secid = task_sid(p);
3619 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3621 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3624 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3626 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3629 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3631 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3634 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3635 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3637 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3639 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3640 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3641 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3642 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3643 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3644 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3649 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3651 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3654 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3656 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3659 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3661 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3664 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3671 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3673 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3675 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3676 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3678 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3682 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3684 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3687 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3688 struct inode *inode)
3690 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3691 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3694 isec->initialized = 1;
3697 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3698 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3699 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3701 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3702 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3704 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3705 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3709 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3710 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3713 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3714 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3718 *proto = ih->protocol;
3720 switch (ih->protocol) {
3722 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3724 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3728 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3732 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3733 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3738 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3740 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3744 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3748 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3749 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3753 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3754 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3756 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3760 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3764 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3765 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3776 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3778 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3779 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3780 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3783 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3784 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3787 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3788 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3792 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3793 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3796 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3797 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3798 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3807 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3809 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3813 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3814 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3819 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3821 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3825 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3826 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3830 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3831 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3833 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3837 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3838 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3842 /* includes fragments */
3852 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3853 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3858 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3860 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3863 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3864 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3867 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3869 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3872 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3873 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3883 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3884 " unable to parse packet\n");
3894 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3896 * @family: protocol family
3897 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3900 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3901 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3902 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3903 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3904 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3908 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3915 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3918 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3922 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3923 if (unlikely(err)) {
3925 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3926 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3934 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3935 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3936 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3937 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3939 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3940 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3941 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3942 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3945 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
3949 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
3950 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
3957 /* socket security operations */
3959 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3960 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3962 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3963 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3967 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3971 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3973 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3974 struct common_audit_data ad;
3975 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3976 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3978 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3981 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3985 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3988 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3989 int protocol, int kern)
3991 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3999 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4000 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4004 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4007 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4008 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4010 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4011 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4012 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4015 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4018 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4020 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4025 isec->initialized = 1;
4028 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4029 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4030 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4031 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4037 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4038 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4039 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4041 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4043 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4047 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4052 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4053 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4054 * check the first address now.
4056 family = sk->sk_family;
4057 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4059 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4060 struct common_audit_data ad;
4061 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4062 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4063 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4064 unsigned short snum;
4067 if (family == PF_INET) {
4068 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4069 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4070 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4072 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4073 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4074 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4080 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4082 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4083 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4087 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4089 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4090 ad.u.net->family = family;
4091 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4093 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4099 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4100 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4101 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4104 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4105 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4108 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4109 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4113 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4117 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4121 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4123 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4124 ad.u.net->family = family;
4126 if (family == PF_INET)
4127 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4129 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4131 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4132 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4140 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4142 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4143 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4146 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4151 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4153 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4154 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4155 struct common_audit_data ad;
4156 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4157 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4158 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4159 unsigned short snum;
4162 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4163 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4164 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4166 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4168 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4169 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4171 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4174 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4178 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4179 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4181 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4183 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4184 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4185 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4190 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4196 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4198 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4201 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4204 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4205 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4207 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4211 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4213 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4214 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4215 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4216 newisec->initialized = 1;
4221 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4224 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4227 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4228 int size, int flags)
4230 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4233 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4235 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4238 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4240 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4243 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4247 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4251 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4254 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4257 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4260 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4262 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4265 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4269 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4270 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4271 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4272 struct common_audit_data ad;
4273 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4276 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4278 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4280 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4281 sksec_other->sclass,
4282 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4286 /* server child socket */
4287 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4288 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4293 /* connecting socket */
4294 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4299 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4300 struct socket *other)
4302 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4303 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4304 struct common_audit_data ad;
4305 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4307 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4309 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4311 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4315 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4316 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4317 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4323 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4326 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4327 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4331 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4334 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4335 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4338 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4342 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4343 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4344 struct common_audit_data ad;
4345 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4348 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4350 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4351 ad.u.net->family = family;
4352 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4356 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4357 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4363 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4366 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4371 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4374 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4375 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4376 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4377 struct common_audit_data ad;
4378 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4383 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4386 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4387 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4390 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4391 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4392 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4393 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4394 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4395 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4397 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4398 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4399 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4402 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4404 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4405 ad.u.net->family = family;
4406 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4410 if (peerlbl_active) {
4413 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4416 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4417 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4419 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4422 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4425 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4430 if (secmark_active) {
4431 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4440 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4441 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4446 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4447 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4449 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4450 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4451 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4452 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4453 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4455 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4459 if (scontext_len > len) {
4464 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4468 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4474 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4476 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4479 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4481 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4484 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4488 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4489 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4491 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4494 *secid = peer_secid;
4495 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4500 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4502 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4504 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4508 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4509 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4510 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4511 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4516 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4518 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4520 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4521 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4525 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4527 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4528 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4530 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4531 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4532 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4534 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4537 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4540 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4542 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4544 *secid = sksec->sid;
4548 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4550 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4551 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4553 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4554 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4555 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4556 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4559 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4560 struct request_sock *req)
4562 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4564 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4568 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4571 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4574 req->secid = connsid;
4575 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4577 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4580 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4581 const struct request_sock *req)
4583 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4585 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4586 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4587 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4588 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4589 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4590 time it will have been created and available. */
4592 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4593 * thread with access to newsksec */
4594 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4597 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4599 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4600 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4602 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4603 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4606 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4609 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4611 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4614 __tsec = current_security();
4617 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4620 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4622 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4625 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4627 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4630 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4633 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4636 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4638 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4640 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4643 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4649 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4654 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4656 u32 sid = current_sid();
4658 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4659 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4660 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4661 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4662 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4663 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4665 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4669 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4671 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4673 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4674 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4677 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4679 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4680 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4682 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4683 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4684 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4685 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4686 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4687 * protocols were being used */
4689 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4690 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4695 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4697 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4698 u32 sid = current_sid();
4701 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4702 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4705 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4706 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4714 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4718 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4719 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4721 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4725 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4727 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4729 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4731 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4732 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n",
4733 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
4734 secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name);
4735 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4745 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4750 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4752 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4753 const struct net_device *indev,
4759 struct common_audit_data ad;
4760 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4765 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4768 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4769 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4770 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4771 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4774 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4777 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4779 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4780 ad.u.net->family = family;
4781 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4784 if (peerlbl_active) {
4785 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4786 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4788 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4794 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4795 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4799 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4800 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4801 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4803 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4809 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4810 struct sk_buff *skb,
4811 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4813 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
4816 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4817 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4818 struct sk_buff *skb,
4819 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4821 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
4825 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4831 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4834 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4835 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4836 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4839 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4841 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4842 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4843 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4844 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4845 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4846 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4847 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4848 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4849 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4850 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4851 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4852 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4853 * best we can do. */
4856 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4857 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4860 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4861 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4867 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4868 struct sk_buff *skb,
4869 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4871 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4874 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4878 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4879 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4880 struct common_audit_data ad;
4881 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4887 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4889 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4891 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4892 ad.u.net->family = family;
4893 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4896 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4897 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4898 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4899 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4901 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4902 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4907 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
4908 const struct net_device *outdev,
4913 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
4915 struct common_audit_data ad;
4916 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4921 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4922 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4923 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4924 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4925 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4926 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4928 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4929 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4930 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4936 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4937 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4938 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4939 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4940 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4941 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4942 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4943 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4944 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4945 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4947 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4948 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
4953 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4954 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4955 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4956 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4958 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4959 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4962 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4963 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4965 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
4966 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
4967 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
4968 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
4969 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
4970 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
4971 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
4972 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
4973 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
4974 * for similar problems. */
4976 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4977 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
4979 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
4980 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
4981 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
4982 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
4983 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
4984 * pass the packet. */
4985 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4988 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4992 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4996 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4999 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5001 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5003 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5004 * associated socket. */
5005 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5006 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5007 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5010 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5012 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5013 ad.u.net->family = family;
5014 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5018 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5019 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5020 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5022 if (peerlbl_active) {
5026 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5028 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5029 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5030 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5032 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5034 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5035 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5036 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5042 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5043 struct sk_buff *skb,
5044 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5046 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5049 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5050 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5051 struct sk_buff *skb,
5052 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5054 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5058 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5060 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5062 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5065 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5066 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5069 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5072 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5076 sid = task_sid(task);
5077 isec->sclass = sclass;
5079 perm->security = isec;
5084 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5086 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5087 perm->security = NULL;
5091 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5093 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5095 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5099 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5100 msg->security = msec;
5105 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5107 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5109 msg->security = NULL;
5113 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5116 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5117 struct common_audit_data ad;
5118 u32 sid = current_sid();
5120 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5122 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5123 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5125 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5128 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5130 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5133 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5135 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5138 /* message queue security operations */
5139 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5141 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5142 struct common_audit_data ad;
5143 u32 sid = current_sid();
5146 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5150 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5152 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5153 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5155 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5158 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5164 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5166 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5169 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5171 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5172 struct common_audit_data ad;
5173 u32 sid = current_sid();
5175 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5177 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5178 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5180 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5181 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5184 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5192 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5193 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5196 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5199 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5202 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5208 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5212 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5214 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5215 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5216 struct common_audit_data ad;
5217 u32 sid = current_sid();
5220 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5221 msec = msg->security;
5224 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5226 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5228 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5229 * message queue this message will be stored in
5231 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5237 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5238 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5240 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5241 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5244 /* Can this process send the message */
5245 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5248 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5249 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5250 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5255 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5256 struct task_struct *target,
5257 long type, int mode)
5259 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5260 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5261 struct common_audit_data ad;
5262 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5265 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5266 msec = msg->security;
5268 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5269 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5271 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5272 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5274 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5275 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5279 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5280 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5282 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5283 struct common_audit_data ad;
5284 u32 sid = current_sid();
5287 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5291 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5293 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5294 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5296 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5299 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5305 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5307 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5310 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5312 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5313 struct common_audit_data ad;
5314 u32 sid = current_sid();
5316 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5318 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5319 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5321 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5322 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5325 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5326 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5334 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5335 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5338 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5341 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5348 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5354 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5358 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5359 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5363 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5366 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5368 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5371 /* Semaphore security operations */
5372 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5374 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5375 struct common_audit_data ad;
5376 u32 sid = current_sid();
5379 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5383 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5385 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5386 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5388 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5391 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5397 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5399 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5402 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5404 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5405 struct common_audit_data ad;
5406 u32 sid = current_sid();
5408 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5410 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5411 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5413 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5414 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5417 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5418 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5426 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5427 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5431 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5442 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5445 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5449 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5455 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5459 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5460 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5465 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5469 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5472 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5478 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5480 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5485 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5488 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5490 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5494 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5497 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5500 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5501 char *name, char **value)
5503 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5509 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5515 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5517 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5519 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5521 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5522 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5523 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5524 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5525 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5526 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5527 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5528 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5536 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5546 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5547 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5549 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5550 struct task_struct *tracer;
5557 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5558 security attributes. */
5563 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5564 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5565 * above restriction is ever removed.
5567 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5568 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5569 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5570 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5571 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5572 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5573 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5574 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5575 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5576 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5582 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5583 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5584 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5588 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5589 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5590 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5591 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5594 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5595 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5596 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5597 audit_size = size - 1;
5600 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5601 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5602 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5607 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5614 new = prepare_creds();
5618 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5619 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5620 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5621 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5622 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5623 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5624 tsec = new->security;
5625 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5626 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5627 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5628 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5629 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5630 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5633 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5634 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5635 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5636 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5641 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5643 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5644 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5649 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5650 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5651 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5655 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5656 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5659 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5661 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5665 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5666 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5685 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5687 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5690 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5692 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5695 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5697 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5700 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5706 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5708 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5710 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5714 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5716 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5718 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5721 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5724 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5733 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5734 unsigned long flags)
5736 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5737 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5739 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5743 tsec = cred->security;
5744 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5745 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5747 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5753 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5755 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5761 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5762 const struct cred *cred,
5766 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5769 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5770 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5771 appear to be created. */
5775 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5777 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5778 ksec = key->security;
5780 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5783 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5785 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5786 char *context = NULL;
5790 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5799 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
5800 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
5801 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
5802 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
5803 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
5805 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
5806 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
5807 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
5808 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
5809 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
5810 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
5811 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
5812 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
5813 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
5815 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
5817 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
5818 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
5819 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
5820 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec),
5822 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
5823 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
5824 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
5825 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
5826 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
5827 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
5828 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
5829 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
5830 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
5831 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
5832 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
5833 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
5835 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
5837 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
5838 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
5839 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
5840 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
5841 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
5842 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
5843 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
5844 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
5845 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
5846 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
5847 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
5848 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
5849 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
5850 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
5851 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
5852 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
5853 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
5854 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
5855 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
5856 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
5857 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
5858 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
5859 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
5860 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
5861 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
5863 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
5864 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
5865 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
5866 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
5867 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
5868 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
5869 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
5870 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
5871 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
5872 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
5873 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
5874 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
5876 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
5878 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create),
5879 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
5880 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
5881 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
5882 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
5883 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
5884 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
5885 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
5886 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
5887 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
5888 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
5889 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
5890 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
5891 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
5892 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
5893 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
5894 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
5895 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
5896 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
5897 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
5898 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait),
5899 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
5901 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
5902 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
5904 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
5905 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
5907 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
5908 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
5909 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
5910 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
5911 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
5912 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
5913 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
5915 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
5916 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
5917 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
5918 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
5919 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
5921 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
5922 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
5923 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
5924 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
5925 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
5927 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
5929 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
5930 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
5932 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
5933 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
5934 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
5935 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
5936 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
5937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
5938 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
5940 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
5941 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
5943 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
5944 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
5945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
5946 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
5947 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
5948 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
5949 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
5950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
5951 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
5952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
5953 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
5954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
5955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
5956 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
5957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
5958 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
5959 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
5960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
5961 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
5962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
5963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
5964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
5965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
5966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
5967 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
5968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
5969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
5970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
5971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
5972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
5973 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
5974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
5975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
5976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
5977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
5979 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
5981 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
5982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
5983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
5984 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
5985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
5986 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
5987 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
5988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
5989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
5990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5991 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
5992 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
5996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
5997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
5998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
5999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
6003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
6004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
6005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
6006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
6010 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6012 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
6013 selinux_enabled = 0;
6017 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6018 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6022 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6024 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6025 cred_init_security();
6027 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6029 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6030 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6031 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6034 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
6036 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6037 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6039 if (selinux_enforcing)
6040 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6042 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6047 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6049 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6052 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6054 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6056 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6057 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6058 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6061 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6062 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6063 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6065 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6067 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6069 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6070 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6072 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6073 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6076 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6077 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6079 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6080 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6083 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6084 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6086 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6087 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6089 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6091 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6092 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6094 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6095 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6098 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6099 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6101 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6102 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6107 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6111 if (!selinux_enabled)
6114 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6116 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6118 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6123 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6125 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6126 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6128 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6130 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6134 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6136 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6137 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6140 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6142 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6143 static int selinux_disabled;
6145 int selinux_disable(void)
6147 if (ss_initialized) {
6148 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6152 if (selinux_disabled) {
6153 /* Only do this once. */
6157 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6159 selinux_disabled = 1;
6160 selinux_enabled = 0;
6162 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
6164 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6167 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6168 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6170 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */