2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
64 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65 #include <net/netlink.h>
66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
67 #include <linux/udp.h>
68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
69 #include <linux/quota.h>
70 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
72 #include <linux/parser.h>
73 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
75 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
76 #include <linux/personality.h>
77 #include <linux/audit.h>
78 #include <linux/string.h>
79 #include <linux/selinux.h>
80 #include <linux/mutex.h>
81 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
82 #include <linux/syslog.h>
83 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
84 #include <linux/export.h>
85 #include <linux/msg.h>
86 #include <linux/shm.h>
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
129 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
139 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
142 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
144 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
148 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
151 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
152 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
153 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
154 * is always considered enabled.
157 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
159 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
162 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
164 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
174 * initialise the security for the init task
176 static void cred_init_security(void)
178 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
179 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
181 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
183 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
185 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
186 cred->security = tsec;
190 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
192 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
194 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
196 tsec = cred->security;
201 * get the objective security ID of a task
203 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
208 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
214 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
216 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
218 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
223 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
225 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
227 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
228 u32 sid = current_sid();
230 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
234 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
237 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
238 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
239 isec->task_sid = sid;
240 inode->i_security = isec;
245 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
247 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
249 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
250 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
253 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
255 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
256 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
258 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
259 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
260 list_del_init(&isec->list);
261 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
264 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
265 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
266 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
267 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
268 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
269 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
270 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
272 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
275 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
277 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
278 u32 sid = current_sid();
280 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
285 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
286 file->f_security = fsec;
291 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
293 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
294 file->f_security = NULL;
298 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
300 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
302 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
306 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
307 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
308 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
310 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
312 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
313 sb->s_security = sbsec;
318 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
320 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
321 sb->s_security = NULL;
325 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
327 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
329 "uses transition SIDs",
331 "uses genfs_contexts",
332 "not configured for labeling",
333 "uses mountpoint labeling",
334 "uses native labeling",
337 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
339 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
341 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
350 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
354 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
356 static const match_table_t tokens = {
357 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
358 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
359 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
365 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
367 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
368 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
369 const struct cred *cred)
371 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
374 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
375 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
379 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
380 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
384 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
385 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
386 const struct cred *cred)
388 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
390 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
391 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
395 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
396 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
400 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
402 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
404 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
405 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
406 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
407 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
408 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
409 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
410 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
411 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
414 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
416 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
417 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
418 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
421 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
422 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
423 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
424 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
425 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
426 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
427 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
428 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
429 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
433 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
434 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
435 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
436 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
437 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
438 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
440 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
441 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
442 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
447 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
448 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
449 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
451 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
452 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
453 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
455 /* Initialize the root inode. */
456 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
458 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
459 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
460 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
462 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
464 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
465 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
466 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
467 struct inode_security_struct, list);
468 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
469 list_del_init(&isec->list);
470 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
471 inode = igrab(inode);
473 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
477 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
480 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
486 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
487 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
488 * mount options, or whatever.
490 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
491 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
494 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
495 char *context = NULL;
499 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
501 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
507 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
508 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
510 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
511 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
512 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
514 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
517 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
518 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
519 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
521 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
527 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
528 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
534 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
535 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
538 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
539 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
541 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
542 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
545 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
546 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
548 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
549 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
552 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
553 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
555 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
556 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
557 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
559 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
562 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
563 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
565 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
566 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
567 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
570 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
575 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
579 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
580 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
582 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
584 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
585 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
586 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
587 (old_sid != new_sid))
590 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
591 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
593 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
594 if (mnt_flags & flag)
600 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
601 * labeling information.
603 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
604 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
605 unsigned long kern_flags,
606 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
608 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
610 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
611 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
612 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
613 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
614 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
615 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
616 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
617 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
618 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
620 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
622 if (!ss_initialized) {
624 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
625 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
626 server is ready to handle calls. */
630 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
631 "before the security server is initialized\n");
634 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
635 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
636 * place the results is not allowed */
642 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
643 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
644 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
645 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
647 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
648 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
649 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
650 * will be used for both mounts)
652 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
657 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
658 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
659 * than once with different security options.
661 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
664 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
666 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
667 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
669 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
670 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
671 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
678 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
680 goto out_double_mount;
682 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
687 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
689 goto out_double_mount;
691 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
693 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
694 rootcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
704 defcontext_sid = sid;
706 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
708 goto out_double_mount;
710 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
719 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
720 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
721 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
722 goto out_double_mount;
727 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
728 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
730 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
732 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
735 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
738 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
739 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
743 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
745 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
749 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
753 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
754 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
755 * the superblock context if not already set.
757 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
758 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
759 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
763 if (!fscontext_sid) {
764 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
768 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
770 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
775 if (!rootcontext_sid)
776 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
778 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
779 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
782 if (rootcontext_sid) {
783 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
788 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
789 root_isec->initialized = 1;
792 if (defcontext_sid) {
793 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
794 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
797 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
801 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
802 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
808 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
811 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
813 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
817 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
818 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
822 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
823 const struct super_block *newsb)
825 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
826 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
827 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
828 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
830 if (oldflags != newflags)
832 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
834 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
836 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
838 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
839 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = oldsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
840 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = newsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
841 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
846 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
847 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
848 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
852 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
853 struct super_block *newsb)
855 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
856 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
858 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
859 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
860 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
863 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
864 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
869 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
870 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
872 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
873 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
874 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
876 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
878 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
880 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
881 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
882 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
885 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
889 if (!set_rootcontext) {
890 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
891 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
894 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
896 if (set_rootcontext) {
897 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
898 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
899 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
900 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
902 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
905 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
906 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
910 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
911 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
914 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
915 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
916 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
918 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
920 /* Standard string-based options. */
921 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
923 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
928 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
932 if (context || defcontext) {
934 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
937 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
947 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
950 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
957 case Opt_rootcontext:
960 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
963 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
971 if (context || defcontext) {
973 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
976 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
982 case Opt_labelsupport:
986 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
993 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
997 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
998 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
999 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1004 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1005 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1008 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1009 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1012 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1013 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1016 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1017 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1020 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1031 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1033 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1036 char *options = data;
1037 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1039 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1044 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1046 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1051 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1054 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1058 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1059 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1064 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1067 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1068 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1072 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1074 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1077 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1079 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1080 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1082 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1083 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1087 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1093 /* we need a comma before each option */
1095 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1098 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1104 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1106 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1109 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1111 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1117 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1119 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1124 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1126 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1128 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1130 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1132 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1134 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1136 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1138 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1140 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1144 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1147 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1149 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1152 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1154 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1157 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1163 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1164 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1166 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1173 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1174 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1176 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1178 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1179 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1181 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1183 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1185 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1191 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1192 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1193 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1194 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1195 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1197 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1199 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1200 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1201 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1203 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1204 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1205 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1206 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1207 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1208 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1209 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1211 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1214 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1216 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1218 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1221 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1224 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1225 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1230 char *buffer, *path;
1232 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1236 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1240 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1241 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1242 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1243 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1247 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1249 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1253 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1261 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1262 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1264 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1265 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1267 struct dentry *dentry;
1268 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1269 char *context = NULL;
1273 if (isec->initialized)
1276 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1277 if (isec->initialized)
1280 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1281 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1282 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1283 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1284 server is ready to handle calls. */
1285 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1286 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1287 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1288 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1292 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1293 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1296 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1301 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1302 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1304 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1305 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1307 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1308 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1312 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1313 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1314 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1315 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1316 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1317 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1318 * be used again by userspace.
1323 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1324 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1330 context[len] = '\0';
1331 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1333 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1336 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1337 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1344 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1350 context[len] = '\0';
1351 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1357 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1358 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1359 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1360 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1364 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1365 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1368 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1372 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1373 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1375 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1376 if (printk_ratelimit())
1377 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1378 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1379 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1382 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1383 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1386 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1394 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1395 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1397 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1398 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1399 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1401 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1402 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1403 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1404 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1409 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1410 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1413 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1414 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1416 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1417 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1420 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1421 * d_splice_alias. */
1422 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1424 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1426 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1428 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1429 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1430 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1431 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1432 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1433 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1434 * could be used again by userspace.
1438 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1439 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
1448 isec->initialized = 1;
1451 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1453 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1454 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1458 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1459 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1465 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1466 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1469 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1470 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1473 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1474 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1477 /* All other signals. */
1478 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1486 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1487 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1489 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1490 const struct cred *target,
1493 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1495 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1499 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1500 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1501 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1502 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1504 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1505 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1508 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1512 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1513 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1515 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1519 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1520 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1521 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1522 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1524 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1529 sid = current_sid();
1530 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1531 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1534 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1535 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1538 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1539 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1542 struct common_audit_data ad;
1543 struct av_decision avd;
1545 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1546 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1549 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1552 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1554 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1557 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1561 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1566 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1567 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1568 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1575 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1576 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1579 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1581 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1582 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1585 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1586 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1587 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1588 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1589 struct inode *inode,
1591 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1593 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1596 validate_creds(cred);
1598 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1601 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1602 isec = inode->i_security;
1604 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1607 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1608 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1609 pathname if needed. */
1610 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1611 struct dentry *dentry,
1614 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1615 struct common_audit_data ad;
1617 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1618 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1619 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1622 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1623 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1624 pathname if needed. */
1625 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1629 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1630 struct common_audit_data ad;
1632 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1634 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1637 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1638 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1642 struct common_audit_data ad;
1644 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1645 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1646 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1649 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1650 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1651 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1652 check a particular permission to the file.
1653 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1654 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1655 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1656 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1657 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1661 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1662 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1663 struct common_audit_data ad;
1664 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1667 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1668 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1670 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1671 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1679 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1682 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1688 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1689 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1690 struct dentry *dentry,
1693 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1694 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1695 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1697 struct common_audit_data ad;
1700 dsec = dir->i_security;
1701 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1704 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1706 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1707 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1709 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1710 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1715 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1716 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1717 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1722 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1726 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1727 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1728 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1731 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1732 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1733 struct task_struct *ctx)
1735 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1737 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1741 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1744 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1745 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1746 struct dentry *dentry,
1750 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1751 struct common_audit_data ad;
1752 u32 sid = current_sid();
1756 dsec = dir->i_security;
1757 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1759 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1760 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1763 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1764 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1779 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1784 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1788 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1789 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1790 struct inode *new_dir,
1791 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1793 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1794 struct common_audit_data ad;
1795 u32 sid = current_sid();
1797 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1800 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1801 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1802 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1803 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1805 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1807 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1808 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1809 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1812 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1813 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1816 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1817 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1818 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1823 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1824 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1825 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1826 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1827 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1830 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1831 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1832 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1833 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1835 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1843 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1844 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1845 struct super_block *sb,
1847 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1849 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1850 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1852 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1853 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1856 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1857 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1861 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1862 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1863 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1864 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1867 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1869 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1873 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1875 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1877 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1884 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1885 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1889 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1891 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1892 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1899 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1908 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1911 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1913 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1915 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1921 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1923 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1928 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1932 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1933 u32 sid = current_sid();
1934 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1935 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1938 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1941 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1945 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1949 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1952 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1953 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1957 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1961 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1964 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1965 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1966 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1967 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1971 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1972 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1976 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1980 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1981 * which was removed).
1983 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1984 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1985 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1986 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1989 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1994 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1998 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2001 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2003 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2015 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2020 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2023 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2029 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2031 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2033 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2036 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2041 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2042 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2043 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2045 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2046 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2047 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2048 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2049 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2051 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2052 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2053 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2054 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2055 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2057 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2064 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2065 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2066 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2068 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2069 * processes that allocate mappings.
2071 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2073 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2075 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2076 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2080 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2083 /* binprm security operations */
2085 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2086 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2087 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2089 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2090 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2093 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2094 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2096 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2097 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2100 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2101 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2102 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2103 * of the current SID.
2105 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2108 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2109 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2110 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2120 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2122 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2123 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2124 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2125 struct common_audit_data ad;
2126 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2129 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2133 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2134 * the script interpreter */
2135 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2138 old_tsec = current_security();
2139 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2140 isec = inode->i_security;
2142 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2143 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2144 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2146 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2147 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2148 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2149 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2151 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2152 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2153 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2154 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2156 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2157 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2161 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2162 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2163 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2169 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2172 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2174 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2177 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2178 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2180 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2181 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2182 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2186 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2187 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2188 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2192 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2193 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2197 /* Check for shared state */
2198 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2199 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2200 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2206 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2207 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2209 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2210 struct task_struct *tracer;
2211 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2215 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2216 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2217 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2223 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2225 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2231 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2232 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2238 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2240 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2248 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2249 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2250 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2251 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2253 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2256 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2259 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2261 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2264 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2265 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2266 struct files_struct *files)
2268 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2269 struct tty_struct *tty;
2273 tty = get_current_tty();
2275 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2276 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2277 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2279 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2280 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2281 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2282 open file may belong to another process and we are
2283 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2284 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2285 struct tty_file_private, list);
2286 file = file_priv->file;
2287 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2290 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2293 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2297 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2298 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2299 if (!n) /* none found? */
2302 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2303 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2305 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2307 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2308 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2314 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2316 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2318 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2319 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2322 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2323 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2326 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2327 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2329 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2330 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2332 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2333 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2334 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2336 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2337 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2338 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2339 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2340 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2342 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2343 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2345 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2347 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2348 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2349 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2350 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2352 task_unlock(current);
2353 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2358 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2361 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2363 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2364 struct itimerval itimer;
2374 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2375 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2376 * flush and unblock signals.
2378 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2379 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2381 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2383 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2384 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2385 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2386 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2387 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2388 __flush_signals(current);
2389 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2390 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2392 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2395 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2396 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2397 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2398 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2399 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2402 /* superblock security operations */
2404 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2406 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2409 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2411 superblock_free_security(sb);
2414 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2419 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2422 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2424 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2425 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2426 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2427 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2428 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2431 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2438 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2442 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2445 int current_size = 0;
2453 while (current_size < len) {
2463 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2465 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2466 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2467 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2473 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2481 in_save = in_end = orig;
2485 open_quote = !open_quote;
2486 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2488 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2490 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2491 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2493 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2495 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2497 } while (*in_end++);
2499 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2500 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2505 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2508 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2509 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2510 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2512 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2518 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2521 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2522 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2525 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2527 goto out_free_secdata;
2529 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2531 goto out_free_secdata;
2533 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2534 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2536 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2540 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2542 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2543 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
2546 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2547 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2548 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2554 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2555 goto out_bad_option;
2558 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2559 goto out_bad_option;
2561 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2562 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2563 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2565 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2566 goto out_bad_option;
2569 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2570 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2571 goto out_bad_option;
2580 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2582 free_secdata(secdata);
2585 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2586 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2591 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2593 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2594 struct common_audit_data ad;
2597 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2601 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2602 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2605 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2606 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2607 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2610 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2612 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2613 struct common_audit_data ad;
2615 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2616 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2617 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2620 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2623 unsigned long flags,
2626 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2628 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2629 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2630 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2632 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2635 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2637 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2639 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2640 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2643 /* inode security operations */
2645 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2647 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2650 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2652 inode_free_security(inode);
2655 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2656 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2659 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2660 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2661 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2662 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2663 struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
2667 tsec = cred->security;
2668 dsec = dir->i_security;
2669 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2671 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2672 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2674 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2675 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2680 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2686 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2689 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2690 const struct qstr *qstr,
2692 void **value, size_t *len)
2694 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2695 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2696 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2697 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2701 dsec = dir->i_security;
2702 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2705 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2707 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2708 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2709 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2710 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2711 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2712 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2715 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2716 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2719 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2724 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2725 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2726 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2727 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2729 isec->initialized = 1;
2732 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2736 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2739 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2749 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2751 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2754 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2756 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2759 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2761 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2764 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2766 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2769 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2771 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2774 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2776 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2779 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2781 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2784 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2785 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2787 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2790 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2792 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2794 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2797 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2799 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2801 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2804 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2805 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2809 struct common_audit_data ad;
2810 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2813 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2816 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2817 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2823 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2825 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2828 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2829 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2831 struct av_decision avd;
2833 u32 audited, denied;
2835 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2836 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2838 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2842 validate_creds(cred);
2844 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2847 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2849 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2850 isec = inode->i_security;
2852 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2853 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2854 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2856 if (likely(!audited))
2859 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2865 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2867 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2868 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2869 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2871 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2872 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2873 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2879 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2880 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2881 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2883 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2886 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2889 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2891 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2894 path.dentry = dentry;
2897 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2900 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2902 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2904 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2905 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2906 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2907 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2909 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2910 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2911 Restrict to administrator. */
2916 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2917 ordinary setattr permission. */
2918 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2921 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2922 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2924 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2925 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2926 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2927 struct common_audit_data ad;
2928 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2931 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2932 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2934 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2935 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2938 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2941 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2942 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2944 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2945 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2949 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
2950 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2951 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2952 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2956 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2957 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2960 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2961 audit_size = size - 1;
2968 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2969 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2970 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2975 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2980 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2981 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2985 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2990 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2992 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2993 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2997 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2998 const void *value, size_t size,
3001 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
3002 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3006 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3007 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3011 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3013 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3014 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3015 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3019 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3021 isec->initialized = 1;
3026 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3028 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3030 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3033 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3035 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3037 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3040 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3042 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3043 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3045 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3046 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3051 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3053 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3055 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3059 char *context = NULL;
3060 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3062 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3066 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3067 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3068 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3069 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3070 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3071 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3072 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3074 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3075 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3077 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3080 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3093 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3094 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3096 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3100 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3103 if (!value || !size)
3106 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3110 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3112 isec->initialized = 1;
3116 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3118 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3119 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3120 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3124 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3126 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3130 /* file security operations */
3132 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3134 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3135 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3137 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3138 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3141 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3142 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3145 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3147 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3148 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3149 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3150 u32 sid = current_sid();
3153 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3156 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3157 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3158 /* No change since file_open check. */
3161 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3164 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3166 return file_alloc_security(file);
3169 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3171 file_free_security(file);
3174 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3177 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3187 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3189 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3190 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3193 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3195 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3196 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3199 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3203 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3208 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3209 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3212 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3213 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3216 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3221 static int default_noexec;
3223 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3225 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3228 if (default_noexec &&
3229 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3231 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3232 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3233 * This has an additional check.
3235 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3241 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3242 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3244 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3245 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3248 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3249 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3251 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3258 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3262 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3263 rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3267 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3268 u32 sid = current_sid();
3269 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3270 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3276 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3277 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3279 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3282 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3283 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3286 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3287 unsigned long reqprot,
3290 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3292 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3295 if (default_noexec &&
3296 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3298 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3299 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3300 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3301 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3302 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3303 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3304 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3305 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3307 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3308 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3309 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3310 * modified content. This typically should only
3311 * occur for text relocations.
3313 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3319 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3322 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3324 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3326 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3329 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3332 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3337 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3338 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3347 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3348 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3349 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3357 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3362 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3369 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3371 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3373 fsec = file->f_security;
3374 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3377 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3378 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3381 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3383 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3385 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3386 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3388 fsec = file->f_security;
3391 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3393 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3395 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3396 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3399 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3401 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3403 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3406 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3408 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3409 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3411 fsec = file->f_security;
3412 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3414 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3415 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3416 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3417 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3418 * struct as its SID.
3420 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3421 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3423 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3424 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3425 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3426 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3427 * new inode label or new policy.
3428 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3430 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3433 /* task security operations */
3435 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3437 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3441 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3443 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3445 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3447 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3451 cred->security = tsec;
3456 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3458 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3460 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3463 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3464 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3466 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3467 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3472 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3474 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3477 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3478 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3480 old_tsec = old->security;
3482 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3486 new->security = tsec;
3491 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3493 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3495 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3496 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3502 * set the security data for a kernel service
3503 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3505 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3507 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3508 u32 sid = current_sid();
3511 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3512 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3513 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3517 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3518 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3519 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3525 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3526 * objective context of the specified inode
3528 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3530 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3531 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3532 u32 sid = current_sid();
3535 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3536 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3537 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3541 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3545 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3548 struct common_audit_data ad;
3550 sid = task_sid(current);
3552 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3553 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3555 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3556 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3559 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3561 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3564 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3566 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3569 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3571 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3574 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3576 *secid = task_sid(p);
3579 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3583 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3587 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3590 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3594 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3598 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3601 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3603 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3606 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3607 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3609 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3611 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3612 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3613 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3614 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3615 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3616 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3621 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3625 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3629 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3632 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3634 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3637 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3639 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3642 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3649 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3651 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3653 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3654 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3656 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3660 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3662 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3665 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3666 struct inode *inode)
3668 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3669 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3672 isec->initialized = 1;
3675 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3676 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3677 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3679 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3680 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3682 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3683 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3687 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3688 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3691 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3692 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3696 *proto = ih->protocol;
3698 switch (ih->protocol) {
3700 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3702 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3706 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3710 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3711 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3716 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3718 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3722 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3726 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3727 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3731 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3732 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3734 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3738 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3742 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3743 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3754 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3756 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3757 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3758 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3761 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3762 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3765 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3766 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3770 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3771 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3774 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3775 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3776 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3785 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3787 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3791 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3792 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3797 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3799 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3803 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3804 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3808 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3809 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3811 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3815 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3816 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3820 /* includes fragments */
3830 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3831 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3836 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3838 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3841 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3842 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3845 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3847 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3850 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3851 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3861 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3862 " unable to parse packet\n");
3872 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3874 * @family: protocol family
3875 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3878 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3879 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3880 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3881 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3882 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3886 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3893 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3896 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3900 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3901 if (unlikely(err)) {
3903 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3904 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3912 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3913 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3914 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3915 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3917 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3918 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3919 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3920 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3923 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
3927 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
3928 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
3935 /* socket security operations */
3937 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3938 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3940 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3941 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3945 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3949 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3951 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3952 struct common_audit_data ad;
3953 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3954 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3956 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3959 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3963 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3966 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3967 int protocol, int kern)
3969 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3977 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3978 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3982 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3985 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3986 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3988 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3989 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3990 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3993 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3996 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3998 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4003 isec->initialized = 1;
4006 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4007 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4008 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4009 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4015 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4016 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4017 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4019 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4021 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4025 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4030 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4031 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4032 * check the first address now.
4034 family = sk->sk_family;
4035 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4037 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4038 struct common_audit_data ad;
4039 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4040 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4041 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4042 unsigned short snum;
4045 if (family == PF_INET) {
4046 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4047 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4048 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4050 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4051 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4052 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4058 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4060 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4061 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4065 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4067 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4068 ad.u.net->family = family;
4069 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4071 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4077 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4078 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4079 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4082 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4083 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4086 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4087 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4091 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4095 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4099 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4101 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4102 ad.u.net->family = family;
4104 if (family == PF_INET)
4105 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4107 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4109 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4110 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4118 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4120 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4121 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4124 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4129 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4131 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4132 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4133 struct common_audit_data ad;
4134 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4135 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4136 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4137 unsigned short snum;
4140 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4141 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4142 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4144 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4146 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4147 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4149 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4152 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4156 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4157 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4159 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4161 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4162 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4163 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4168 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4174 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4176 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4179 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4182 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4183 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4185 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4189 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4191 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4192 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4193 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4194 newisec->initialized = 1;
4199 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4202 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4205 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4206 int size, int flags)
4208 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4211 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4213 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4216 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4218 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4221 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4225 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4229 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4232 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4235 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4238 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4240 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4243 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4247 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4248 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4249 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4250 struct common_audit_data ad;
4251 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4254 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4256 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4258 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4259 sksec_other->sclass,
4260 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4264 /* server child socket */
4265 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4266 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4271 /* connecting socket */
4272 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4277 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4278 struct socket *other)
4280 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4281 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4282 struct common_audit_data ad;
4283 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4285 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4287 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4289 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4293 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4294 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4295 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4301 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4304 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4305 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4309 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4312 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4313 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4316 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4320 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4321 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4322 struct common_audit_data ad;
4323 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4326 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4328 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4329 ad.u.net->family = family;
4330 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4334 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4335 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4341 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4344 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4349 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4352 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4353 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4354 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4355 struct common_audit_data ad;
4356 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4361 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4364 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4365 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4368 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4369 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4370 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4371 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4372 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4373 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4375 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4376 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4377 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4380 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4382 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4383 ad.u.net->family = family;
4384 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4388 if (peerlbl_active) {
4391 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4394 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4395 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4397 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4400 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4403 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4408 if (secmark_active) {
4409 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4418 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4419 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4424 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4425 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4427 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4428 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4429 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4430 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4431 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4433 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4437 if (scontext_len > len) {
4442 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4446 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4452 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4454 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4457 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4459 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4462 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4466 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4467 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4469 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4472 *secid = peer_secid;
4473 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4478 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4480 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4482 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4486 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4487 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4488 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4489 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4494 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4496 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4498 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4499 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4503 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4505 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4506 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4508 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4509 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4510 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4512 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4515 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4518 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4520 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4522 *secid = sksec->sid;
4526 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4528 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4529 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4531 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4532 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4533 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4534 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4537 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4538 struct request_sock *req)
4540 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4542 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4546 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4549 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4552 req->secid = connsid;
4553 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4555 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4558 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4559 const struct request_sock *req)
4561 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4563 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4564 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4565 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4566 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4567 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4568 time it will have been created and available. */
4570 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4571 * thread with access to newsksec */
4572 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4575 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4577 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4578 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4580 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4581 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4584 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4587 static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
4589 skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
4592 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4594 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4597 __tsec = current_security();
4600 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4603 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4605 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4608 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4610 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4613 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4616 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4619 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4621 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4623 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4626 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4632 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4637 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4639 u32 sid = current_sid();
4641 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4642 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4643 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4644 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4645 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4646 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4648 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4652 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4654 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4656 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4657 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4660 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4662 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4663 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4665 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4666 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4667 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4668 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4669 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4670 * protocols were being used */
4672 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4673 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4678 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4680 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4681 u32 sid = current_sid();
4684 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4685 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4688 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4689 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4697 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4701 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4702 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4704 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4708 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4710 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4712 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4714 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4715 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
4716 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4717 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4727 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4732 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4734 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4735 const struct net_device *indev,
4741 struct common_audit_data ad;
4742 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4747 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4750 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4751 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4752 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4753 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4756 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4759 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4761 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4762 ad.u.net->family = family;
4763 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4766 if (peerlbl_active) {
4767 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4768 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4770 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4776 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4777 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4781 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4782 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4783 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4785 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4791 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4792 struct sk_buff *skb,
4793 const struct net_device *in,
4794 const struct net_device *out,
4795 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4797 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in, PF_INET);
4800 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4801 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4802 struct sk_buff *skb,
4803 const struct net_device *in,
4804 const struct net_device *out,
4805 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4807 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in, PF_INET6);
4811 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4817 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4820 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4821 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4822 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4825 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4827 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4828 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4829 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4830 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4831 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4832 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4833 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4834 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4835 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4836 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4837 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4838 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4839 * best we can do. */
4842 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4843 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4846 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4847 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4853 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4854 struct sk_buff *skb,
4855 const struct net_device *in,
4856 const struct net_device *out,
4857 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4859 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4862 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4866 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4867 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4868 struct common_audit_data ad;
4869 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4875 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4877 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4879 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4880 ad.u.net->family = family;
4881 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4884 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4885 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4886 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4887 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4889 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4890 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4895 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
4896 const struct net_device *outdev,
4901 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
4903 struct common_audit_data ad;
4904 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4909 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4910 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4911 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4912 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4913 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4914 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4916 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4917 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4918 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4924 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4925 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4926 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4927 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4928 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4929 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4930 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4931 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4932 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4933 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4935 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4936 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
4941 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4942 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4943 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4944 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4946 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4947 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4950 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4951 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4953 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
4954 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
4955 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
4956 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
4957 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
4958 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
4959 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
4960 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
4961 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
4962 * for similar problems. */
4964 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4965 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
4967 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
4968 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
4969 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
4970 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
4971 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
4972 * pass the packet. */
4973 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4976 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4980 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4984 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4987 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
4989 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4991 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
4992 * associated socket. */
4993 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4994 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4995 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4998 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5000 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5001 ad.u.net->family = family;
5002 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5006 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5007 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5008 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5010 if (peerlbl_active) {
5014 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5016 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5017 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5018 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5020 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5022 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5023 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5024 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5030 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5031 struct sk_buff *skb,
5032 const struct net_device *in,
5033 const struct net_device *out,
5034 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
5036 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out, PF_INET);
5039 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5040 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5041 struct sk_buff *skb,
5042 const struct net_device *in,
5043 const struct net_device *out,
5044 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
5046 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out, PF_INET6);
5050 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5052 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5056 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
5060 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5063 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5064 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5067 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5070 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5074 sid = task_sid(task);
5075 isec->sclass = sclass;
5077 perm->security = isec;
5082 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5084 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5085 perm->security = NULL;
5089 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5091 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5093 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5097 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5098 msg->security = msec;
5103 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5105 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5107 msg->security = NULL;
5111 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5114 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5115 struct common_audit_data ad;
5116 u32 sid = current_sid();
5118 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5120 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5121 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5123 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5126 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5128 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5131 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5133 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5136 /* message queue security operations */
5137 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5139 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5140 struct common_audit_data ad;
5141 u32 sid = current_sid();
5144 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5148 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5150 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5151 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5153 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5156 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5162 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5164 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5167 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5169 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5170 struct common_audit_data ad;
5171 u32 sid = current_sid();
5173 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5175 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5176 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5178 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5179 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5182 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5190 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5191 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5194 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5197 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5200 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5206 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5210 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5212 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5213 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5214 struct common_audit_data ad;
5215 u32 sid = current_sid();
5218 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5219 msec = msg->security;
5222 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5224 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5226 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5227 * message queue this message will be stored in
5229 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5235 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5236 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5238 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5239 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5242 /* Can this process send the message */
5243 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5246 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5247 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5248 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5253 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5254 struct task_struct *target,
5255 long type, int mode)
5257 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5258 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5259 struct common_audit_data ad;
5260 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5263 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5264 msec = msg->security;
5266 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5267 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5269 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5270 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5272 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5273 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5277 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5278 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5280 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5281 struct common_audit_data ad;
5282 u32 sid = current_sid();
5285 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5289 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5291 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5292 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5294 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5297 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5303 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5305 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5308 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5310 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5311 struct common_audit_data ad;
5312 u32 sid = current_sid();
5314 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5316 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5317 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5319 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5320 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5323 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5324 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5332 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5333 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5336 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5339 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5346 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5352 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5356 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5357 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5361 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5364 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5366 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5369 /* Semaphore security operations */
5370 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5372 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5373 struct common_audit_data ad;
5374 u32 sid = current_sid();
5377 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5381 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5383 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5384 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5386 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5389 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5395 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5397 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5400 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5402 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5403 struct common_audit_data ad;
5404 u32 sid = current_sid();
5406 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5408 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5409 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5411 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5412 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5415 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5416 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5424 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5425 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5429 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5440 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5443 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5447 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5453 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5457 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5458 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5463 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5467 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5470 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5476 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5478 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5483 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5486 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5488 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5492 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5495 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5498 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5499 char *name, char **value)
5501 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5507 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5513 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5515 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5517 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5519 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5520 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5521 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5522 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5523 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5524 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5525 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5526 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5534 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5544 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5545 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5547 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5548 struct task_struct *tracer;
5555 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5556 security attributes. */
5561 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5562 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5563 * above restriction is ever removed.
5565 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5566 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5567 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5568 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5569 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5570 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5571 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5572 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5573 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5574 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5580 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5581 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5582 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5586 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5587 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5588 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5589 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5592 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5593 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5594 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5595 audit_size = size - 1;
5598 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5599 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5600 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5605 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5612 new = prepare_creds();
5616 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5617 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5618 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5619 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5620 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5621 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5622 tsec = new->security;
5623 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5624 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5625 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5626 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5627 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5628 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5631 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5632 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5633 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5634 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5639 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5641 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5642 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5647 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5648 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5649 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5653 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5654 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5657 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5659 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5663 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5664 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5683 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5685 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5688 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5690 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5693 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5695 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5698 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5704 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5706 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5708 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5712 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5714 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5716 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5719 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5722 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5731 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5732 unsigned long flags)
5734 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5735 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5737 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5741 tsec = cred->security;
5742 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5743 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5745 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5751 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5753 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5759 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5760 const struct cred *cred,
5764 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5767 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5768 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5769 appear to be created. */
5773 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5775 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5776 ksec = key->security;
5778 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5781 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5783 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5784 char *context = NULL;
5788 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5797 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5800 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5801 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5802 .capget = selinux_capget,
5803 .capset = selinux_capset,
5804 .capable = selinux_capable,
5805 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5806 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5807 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5808 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5810 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5812 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5813 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5814 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5815 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5817 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5818 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5819 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5820 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5821 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5822 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5823 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5824 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5825 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5826 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5827 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5828 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5830 .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security,
5832 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5833 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5834 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5835 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5836 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5837 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5838 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5839 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5840 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5841 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5842 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5843 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5844 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5845 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5846 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5847 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5848 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5849 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5850 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5851 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5852 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5853 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5854 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5855 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5856 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5858 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5859 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5860 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5861 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5862 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5863 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5864 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5865 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5866 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5867 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5868 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5869 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5871 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5873 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5874 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5875 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5876 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5877 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5878 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5879 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5880 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5881 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5882 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5883 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5884 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5885 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5886 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5887 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5888 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5889 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5890 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5891 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5892 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5893 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5894 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5896 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5897 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5899 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5900 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5902 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5903 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5904 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5905 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5906 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5907 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5909 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5910 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5911 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5912 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5913 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5915 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5916 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5917 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5918 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5919 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5921 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5923 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5924 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5926 .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel,
5927 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5928 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5929 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5930 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5931 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5932 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5934 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5935 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5937 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5938 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5939 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5940 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5941 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5942 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5943 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5944 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5945 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5946 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5947 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5948 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5949 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5950 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5951 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5952 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5953 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5954 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5955 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5956 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5957 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5958 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5959 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5960 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5961 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5962 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5963 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5964 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5965 .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
5966 .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
5967 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5968 .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
5969 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5970 .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
5971 .skb_owned_by = selinux_skb_owned_by,
5973 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5974 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5975 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5976 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5977 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5978 .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5979 .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
5980 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5981 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5982 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5983 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5984 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5988 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5989 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5990 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5991 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5995 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5996 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5997 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5998 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
6002 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6004 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
6005 selinux_enabled = 0;
6009 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6010 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6014 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6016 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6017 cred_init_security();
6019 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6021 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6022 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6023 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6026 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
6027 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
6029 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6030 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6032 if (selinux_enforcing)
6033 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6035 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6040 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6042 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6045 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6047 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6049 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6050 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6051 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6054 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6055 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6056 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6058 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6060 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6062 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6063 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6065 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6066 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6069 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6070 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6072 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6073 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6076 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6077 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6079 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6080 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6082 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6084 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6085 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6087 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6088 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6091 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6092 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6094 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6095 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6100 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6104 if (!selinux_enabled)
6107 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6109 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6111 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6116 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6118 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6119 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6121 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6123 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6127 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6129 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6130 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6133 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6135 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6136 static int selinux_disabled;
6138 int selinux_disable(void)
6140 if (ss_initialized) {
6141 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6145 if (selinux_disabled) {
6146 /* Only do this once. */
6150 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6152 selinux_disabled = 1;
6153 selinux_enabled = 0;
6155 reset_security_ops();
6157 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6160 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6161 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6163 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */