2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing;
103 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 unsigned long enforcing;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
107 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 unsigned long enabled;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
120 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 int selinux_enabled = 1;
128 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
131 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
134 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
135 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
136 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
137 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
138 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
147 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
150 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
151 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
152 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
153 * is always considered enabled.
156 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
161 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
163 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
173 * initialise the security for the init task
175 static void cred_init_security(void)
177 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
178 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
182 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
185 cred->security = tsec;
189 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
195 tsec = cred->security;
200 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
207 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
213 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
217 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
222 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
226 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
227 u32 sid = current_sid();
229 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
233 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
234 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
236 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
237 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
238 isec->task_sid = sid;
239 inode->i_security = isec;
244 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
246 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
248 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
249 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
252 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
254 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
255 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
258 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
259 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
260 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
262 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
263 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
264 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
265 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
267 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
268 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
269 list_del_init(&isec->list);
270 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
274 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
275 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
276 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
277 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
278 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
279 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
280 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
282 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
285 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
287 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
288 u32 sid = current_sid();
290 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
295 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
296 file->f_security = fsec;
301 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
303 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
304 file->f_security = NULL;
308 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
310 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
312 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
316 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
317 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
318 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
320 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
321 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
322 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
323 sb->s_security = sbsec;
328 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
330 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
331 sb->s_security = NULL;
335 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
337 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
339 "uses transition SIDs",
341 "uses genfs_contexts",
342 "not configured for labeling",
343 "uses mountpoint labeling",
344 "uses native labeling",
347 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
349 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
351 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
360 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
364 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
366 static const match_table_t tokens = {
367 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
368 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
369 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
370 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
371 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
375 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
377 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
378 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
379 const struct cred *cred)
381 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
384 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
385 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
389 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
390 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
394 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
395 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
396 const struct cred *cred)
398 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
400 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
401 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
405 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
406 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
410 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
412 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
414 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
415 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
416 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
417 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
418 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
419 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
420 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
421 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
422 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
425 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
427 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
428 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
429 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
432 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
433 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
434 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
435 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
436 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
437 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
438 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
439 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
440 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
444 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
445 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
446 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
447 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
448 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
449 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
451 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
452 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
453 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
458 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
459 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
460 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
462 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
463 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
464 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
466 /* Initialize the root inode. */
467 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
469 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
470 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
471 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
475 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
476 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
477 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
478 struct inode_security_struct, list);
479 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
480 list_del_init(&isec->list);
481 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
482 inode = igrab(inode);
484 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
488 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
491 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
497 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
498 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
499 * mount options, or whatever.
501 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
502 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
505 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
506 char *context = NULL;
510 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
512 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
518 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
519 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
521 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
522 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
523 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
525 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
528 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
529 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
530 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
532 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
533 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
538 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
539 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
545 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
546 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
549 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
550 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
552 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
560 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
563 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
564 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
566 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
567 struct inode *root = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
568 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
570 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
573 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
574 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
576 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
577 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
578 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
581 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
586 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
590 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
591 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
593 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
595 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
596 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
597 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
598 (old_sid != new_sid))
601 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
602 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
604 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
605 if (mnt_flags & flag)
611 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
612 * labeling information.
614 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
615 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
616 unsigned long kern_flags,
617 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
619 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
621 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
622 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
623 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
624 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
625 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
626 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
627 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
628 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
629 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
631 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
633 if (!ss_initialized) {
635 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
636 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
637 server is ready to handle calls. */
641 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
642 "before the security server is initialized\n");
645 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
646 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
647 * place the results is not allowed */
653 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
654 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
655 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
656 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
658 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
659 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
660 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
661 * will be used for both mounts)
663 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
668 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
669 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
670 * than once with different security options.
672 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
675 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
677 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
678 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
680 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
681 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
682 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
689 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
691 goto out_double_mount;
693 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
698 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
700 goto out_double_mount;
702 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
704 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
705 rootcontext_sid = sid;
707 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
709 goto out_double_mount;
711 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
715 defcontext_sid = sid;
717 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
719 goto out_double_mount;
721 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
730 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
731 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
732 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
733 goto out_double_mount;
738 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
739 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
741 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
742 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
743 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
744 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
746 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
748 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
751 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
754 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
755 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
759 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
761 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
765 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
769 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
770 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
771 * the superblock context if not already set.
773 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
774 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
775 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
779 if (!fscontext_sid) {
780 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
784 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
786 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
791 if (!rootcontext_sid)
792 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
794 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
795 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
798 if (rootcontext_sid) {
799 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
804 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
805 root_isec->initialized = 1;
808 if (defcontext_sid) {
809 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
810 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
812 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
813 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
817 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
818 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
824 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
827 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
829 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
833 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
834 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
838 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
839 const struct super_block *newsb)
841 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
842 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
843 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
844 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
846 if (oldflags != newflags)
848 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
850 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
852 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
854 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
855 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root)->i_security;
856 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root)->i_security;
857 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
862 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
863 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
864 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
868 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
869 struct super_block *newsb)
871 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
872 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
874 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
875 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
876 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
879 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
880 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
885 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
886 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
888 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
889 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
890 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
892 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
894 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
896 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
897 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
898 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
901 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
905 if (!set_rootcontext) {
906 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
907 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
910 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
912 if (set_rootcontext) {
913 const struct inode *oldinode = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root);
914 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
915 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
916 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
918 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
921 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
922 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
926 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
927 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
930 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
931 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
932 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
934 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
936 /* Standard string-based options. */
937 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
939 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
944 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
948 if (context || defcontext) {
950 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
953 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
963 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
966 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
973 case Opt_rootcontext:
976 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
979 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
987 if (context || defcontext) {
989 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
992 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
998 case Opt_labelsupport:
1002 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1009 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
1010 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
1013 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
1014 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
1015 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1020 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1021 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1024 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1025 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1028 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1029 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1032 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1033 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1036 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1047 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1049 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1052 char *options = data;
1053 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1055 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1060 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1062 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1067 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1070 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1074 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1075 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1080 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1083 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1084 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1088 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1090 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1093 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1095 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1096 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1098 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1099 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1103 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1109 /* we need a comma before each option */
1111 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1114 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1120 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1122 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1125 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1127 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1133 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1135 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1140 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1142 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1144 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1146 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1148 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1150 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1152 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1154 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1156 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1160 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1163 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1165 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1168 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1170 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1173 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1179 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1180 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1182 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1189 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1190 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1192 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1194 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1195 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1197 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1199 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1201 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1207 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1208 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1209 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1211 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1213 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1214 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1215 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1217 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1219 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1220 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1221 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1222 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1223 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1224 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1225 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1226 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1227 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1228 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1229 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1230 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1231 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1232 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1233 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1235 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1236 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1237 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1239 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1242 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1244 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1246 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1249 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1252 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1258 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_inode->i_sb;
1259 char *buffer, *path;
1261 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1265 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1269 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1270 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1271 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1272 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1273 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1278 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid);
1280 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1284 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1285 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1287 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1288 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1290 struct dentry *dentry;
1291 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1292 char *context = NULL;
1296 if (isec->initialized)
1299 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1300 if (isec->initialized)
1303 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1304 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1305 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1306 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1307 server is ready to handle calls. */
1308 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1309 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1310 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1311 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1315 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1316 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1318 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1319 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1320 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1324 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1325 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1327 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1328 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1330 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1331 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1335 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1336 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1337 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1338 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1339 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1340 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1341 * be used again by userspace.
1346 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1347 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1353 context[len] = '\0';
1354 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1356 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1359 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1360 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1367 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1373 context[len] = '\0';
1374 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1380 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1382 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1383 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1387 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1388 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1391 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1395 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1396 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1398 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1399 if (printk_ratelimit())
1400 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1401 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1402 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1404 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1405 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1406 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1409 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1417 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1418 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1420 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1421 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1422 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1424 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1425 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1426 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1427 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1432 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1433 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1436 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1437 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1439 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1440 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1443 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1444 * d_splice_alias. */
1445 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1447 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1449 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1451 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1452 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1453 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1454 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1455 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1456 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1457 * could be used again by userspace.
1461 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1462 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass,
1463 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1472 isec->initialized = 1;
1475 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1477 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1478 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1482 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1483 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1489 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1490 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1493 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1494 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1497 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1498 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1501 /* All other signals. */
1502 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1510 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1511 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1513 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1514 const struct cred *target,
1517 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1519 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1523 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1524 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1525 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1526 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1528 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1529 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1532 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1536 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1537 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1539 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1543 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1544 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1545 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1546 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1548 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1553 sid = current_sid();
1554 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1555 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1558 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1559 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1562 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1563 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1566 struct common_audit_data ad;
1567 struct av_decision avd;
1569 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1570 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1573 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1576 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1578 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1581 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1585 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1590 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1591 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1592 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1599 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1600 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1603 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1605 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1606 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1609 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1610 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1611 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1612 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1613 struct inode *inode,
1615 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1617 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1620 validate_creds(cred);
1622 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1625 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1626 isec = inode->i_security;
1628 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1631 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1632 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1633 pathname if needed. */
1634 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1635 struct dentry *dentry,
1638 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1639 struct common_audit_data ad;
1641 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1642 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1643 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1646 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1647 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1648 pathname if needed. */
1649 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1650 const struct path *path,
1653 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1654 struct common_audit_data ad;
1656 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1658 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1661 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1662 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1666 struct common_audit_data ad;
1668 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1669 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1670 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1673 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1674 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1675 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1676 check a particular permission to the file.
1677 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1678 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1679 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1680 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1681 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1685 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1686 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1687 struct common_audit_data ad;
1688 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1691 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1692 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1694 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1695 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1703 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1706 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1712 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1713 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1714 struct dentry *dentry,
1717 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1718 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1719 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1721 struct common_audit_data ad;
1724 dsec = dir->i_security;
1725 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1728 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1730 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1731 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1734 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1739 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1740 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1741 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1746 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1750 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1751 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1752 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1755 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1756 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1757 struct task_struct *ctx)
1759 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1761 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1765 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1768 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1769 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1770 struct dentry *dentry,
1774 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1775 struct common_audit_data ad;
1776 u32 sid = current_sid();
1780 dsec = dir->i_security;
1781 isec = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1783 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1784 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1787 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1788 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1803 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1808 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1812 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1813 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1814 struct inode *new_dir,
1815 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1817 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1818 struct common_audit_data ad;
1819 u32 sid = current_sid();
1821 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1824 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1825 old_isec = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_security;
1826 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1827 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1829 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1831 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1832 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1833 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1836 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1837 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1840 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1841 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1842 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1847 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1848 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1849 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1850 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1851 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1854 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1855 new_isec = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_security;
1856 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1857 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1859 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1867 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1868 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1869 struct super_block *sb,
1871 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1873 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1874 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1876 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1877 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1880 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1881 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1885 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1886 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1887 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1888 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1891 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1893 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1897 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1899 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1901 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1908 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1909 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1913 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1915 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1916 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1923 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1932 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1935 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1937 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1939 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1945 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1947 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
1949 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1950 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
1952 return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1953 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
1956 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
1957 struct task_struct *to)
1959 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1960 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1961 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1964 if (mysid != fromsid) {
1965 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1966 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
1971 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
1975 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
1976 struct task_struct *to)
1978 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1979 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1981 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
1985 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
1986 struct task_struct *to,
1989 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
1990 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1991 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
1992 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1993 struct common_audit_data ad;
1996 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1997 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1999 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2000 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
2008 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2011 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2015 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2018 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
2019 u32 sid = current_sid();
2020 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2021 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2024 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2027 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2029 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2032 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2033 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2035 return current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
2038 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2039 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2040 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2041 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2043 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
2047 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2048 * which was removed).
2050 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2051 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2052 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2053 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2056 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2059 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2062 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2064 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2076 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2081 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2084 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2090 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2092 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2094 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2097 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2102 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2103 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2104 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2106 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2107 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2108 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2109 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2110 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2112 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2113 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2114 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2115 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2116 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2118 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2125 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2126 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2127 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2129 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2130 * processes that allocate mappings.
2132 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2134 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2136 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2137 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2141 return cap_sys_admin;
2144 /* binprm security operations */
2146 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2147 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2148 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2150 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2151 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2154 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2155 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2157 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2158 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2161 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2162 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2163 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2164 * of the current SID.
2166 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2169 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2170 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2171 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2181 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2183 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2184 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2185 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2186 struct common_audit_data ad;
2187 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2190 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2191 * the script interpreter */
2192 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2195 old_tsec = current_security();
2196 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2197 isec = inode->i_security;
2199 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2200 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2201 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2203 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2204 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2205 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2206 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2208 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2209 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2210 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2211 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2213 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2214 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2218 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2219 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2220 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2226 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2229 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2231 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2234 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2235 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2237 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2238 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2239 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2243 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2244 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2245 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2249 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2250 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2254 /* Check for shared state */
2255 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2256 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2257 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2263 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2264 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2266 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2267 struct task_struct *tracer;
2268 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2272 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2273 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2274 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2280 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2282 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2288 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2289 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2295 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2297 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2305 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2306 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2307 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2308 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2310 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2316 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2318 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2321 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2322 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2323 struct files_struct *files)
2325 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2326 struct tty_struct *tty;
2330 tty = get_current_tty();
2332 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2333 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2334 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2336 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2337 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2338 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2339 open file may belong to another process and we are
2340 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2341 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2342 struct tty_file_private, list);
2343 file = file_priv->file;
2344 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2347 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2350 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2354 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2355 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2356 if (!n) /* none found? */
2359 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2360 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2362 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2364 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2365 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2371 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2373 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2375 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2376 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2379 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2380 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2383 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2384 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2386 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2387 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2389 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2390 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2391 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2393 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2394 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2395 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2396 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2397 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2399 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2400 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2402 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2404 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2405 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2406 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2407 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2409 task_unlock(current);
2410 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2415 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2418 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2420 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2421 struct itimerval itimer;
2431 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2432 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2433 * flush and unblock signals.
2435 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2436 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2438 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2440 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2441 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2442 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2443 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2444 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2445 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2446 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2447 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2448 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2449 recalc_sigpending();
2451 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2454 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2455 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2456 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2457 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2458 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2461 /* superblock security operations */
2463 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2465 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2468 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2470 superblock_free_security(sb);
2473 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2478 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2481 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2483 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2484 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2485 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2486 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2487 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2490 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2497 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2501 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2504 int current_size = 0;
2512 while (current_size < len) {
2522 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2524 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2525 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2526 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2532 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2540 in_save = in_end = orig;
2544 open_quote = !open_quote;
2545 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2547 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2549 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2550 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2552 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2554 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2556 } while (*in_end++);
2558 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2559 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2564 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2567 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2568 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2569 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2571 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2577 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2580 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2581 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2584 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2586 goto out_free_secdata;
2588 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2590 goto out_free_secdata;
2592 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2593 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2595 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2599 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2601 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2602 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
2605 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2606 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2607 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2613 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2614 goto out_bad_option;
2617 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2618 goto out_bad_option;
2620 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2621 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2622 root_isec = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root)->i_security;
2624 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2625 goto out_bad_option;
2628 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2629 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2630 goto out_bad_option;
2639 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2641 free_secdata(secdata);
2644 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2645 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2650 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2652 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2653 struct common_audit_data ad;
2656 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2660 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2661 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2664 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2665 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2666 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2669 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2671 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2672 struct common_audit_data ad;
2674 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2675 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2676 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2679 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2682 unsigned long flags,
2685 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2687 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2688 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2689 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2691 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2694 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2696 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2698 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2699 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2702 /* inode security operations */
2704 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2706 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2709 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2711 inode_free_security(inode);
2714 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2715 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2718 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2719 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2720 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2721 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2722 struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent);
2726 tsec = cred->security;
2727 dsec = dir->i_security;
2728 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2730 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2731 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2733 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2734 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2739 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2745 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2748 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2749 const struct qstr *qstr,
2751 void **value, size_t *len)
2753 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2754 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2755 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2756 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2760 dsec = dir->i_security;
2761 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2764 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2766 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2767 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2768 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2769 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2770 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2771 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2774 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2775 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2778 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2783 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2784 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2785 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2786 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2788 isec->initialized = 1;
2791 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2795 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2798 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2808 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2810 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2813 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2815 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2818 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2820 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2823 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2825 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2828 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2830 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2833 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2835 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2838 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2840 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2843 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2844 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2846 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2849 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2851 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2853 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2856 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2858 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2860 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2863 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2864 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2868 struct common_audit_data ad;
2869 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2872 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2875 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2876 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2882 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2884 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2887 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2888 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2890 struct av_decision avd;
2892 u32 audited, denied;
2894 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2895 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2897 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2901 validate_creds(cred);
2903 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2906 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2908 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2909 isec = inode->i_security;
2911 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2912 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2913 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2915 if (likely(!audited))
2918 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2924 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2926 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2927 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2928 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2930 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2931 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2932 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2938 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2939 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2940 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2942 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2945 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2948 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
2950 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
2953 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2955 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2957 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2958 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2959 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2960 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2962 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2963 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2964 Restrict to administrator. */
2969 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2970 ordinary setattr permission. */
2971 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2974 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2975 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2977 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2978 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2979 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2980 struct common_audit_data ad;
2981 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2984 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2985 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2987 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2988 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2991 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2994 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2995 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2997 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2998 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3002 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3003 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3004 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3005 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3009 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3010 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3013 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3014 audit_size = size - 1;
3021 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3022 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3023 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3028 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3033 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3034 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3038 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3043 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3045 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3046 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3050 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3051 const void *value, size_t size,
3054 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3055 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3059 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3060 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3064 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3066 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3067 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3068 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3072 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3074 isec->initialized = 1;
3079 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3081 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3083 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3086 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3088 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3090 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3093 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3095 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3096 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3098 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3099 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3104 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3106 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3108 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3112 char *context = NULL;
3113 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3115 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3119 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3120 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3121 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3122 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3123 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3124 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3125 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3127 error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3128 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3130 error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3131 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3133 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3136 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3149 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3150 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3152 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3156 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3159 if (!value || !size)
3162 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3166 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3168 isec->initialized = 1;
3172 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3174 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3175 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3176 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3180 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3182 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3186 /* file security operations */
3188 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3190 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3191 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3193 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3194 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3197 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3198 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3201 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3203 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3204 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3205 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3206 u32 sid = current_sid();
3209 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3212 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3213 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3214 /* No change since file_open check. */
3217 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3220 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3222 return file_alloc_security(file);
3225 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3227 file_free_security(file);
3231 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3232 * operation to an inode.
3234 int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3235 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3237 struct common_audit_data ad;
3238 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3239 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3240 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3241 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3242 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3244 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3245 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3247 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3250 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3252 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3253 rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
3261 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3264 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3265 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3270 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3273 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3283 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3285 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3286 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3289 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3291 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3292 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3295 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3299 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3304 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3305 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3308 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3309 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3312 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3317 static int default_noexec;
3319 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3321 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3324 if (default_noexec &&
3325 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3326 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3328 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3329 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3330 * This has an additional check.
3332 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3338 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3339 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3341 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3342 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3345 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3346 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3348 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3355 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3359 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3360 u32 sid = current_sid();
3361 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3362 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3368 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3369 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3371 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3374 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3375 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3378 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3379 unsigned long reqprot,
3382 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3384 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3387 if (default_noexec &&
3388 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3390 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3391 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3392 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3393 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3394 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3395 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3396 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3397 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3399 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3400 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3401 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3402 * modified content. This typically should only
3403 * occur for text relocations.
3405 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3411 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3414 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3416 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3418 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3421 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3424 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3429 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3430 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3439 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3440 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3441 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3449 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3454 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3461 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3463 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3465 fsec = file->f_security;
3466 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3469 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3470 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3473 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3475 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3477 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3478 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3480 fsec = file->f_security;
3483 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3485 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3487 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3488 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3491 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3493 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3495 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3498 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3500 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3501 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3503 fsec = file->f_security;
3504 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3506 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3507 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3508 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3509 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3510 * struct as its SID.
3512 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3513 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3515 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3516 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3517 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3518 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3519 * new inode label or new policy.
3520 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3522 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3525 /* task security operations */
3527 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3529 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3533 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3535 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3537 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3539 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3543 cred->security = tsec;
3548 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3550 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3552 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3555 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3556 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3558 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3559 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3564 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3566 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3569 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3570 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3572 old_tsec = old->security;
3574 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3578 new->security = tsec;
3583 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3585 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3587 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3588 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3594 * set the security data for a kernel service
3595 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3597 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3599 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3600 u32 sid = current_sid();
3603 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3604 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3605 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3609 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3610 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3611 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3617 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3618 * objective context of the specified inode
3620 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3622 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3623 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3624 u32 sid = current_sid();
3627 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3628 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3629 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3633 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3637 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3640 struct common_audit_data ad;
3642 sid = task_sid(current);
3644 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3645 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3647 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3648 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3651 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3653 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3656 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3658 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3661 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3663 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3666 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3668 *secid = task_sid(p);
3671 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3673 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3676 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3678 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3681 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3683 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3686 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3687 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3689 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3691 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3692 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3693 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3694 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3695 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3696 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3701 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3703 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3706 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3708 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3711 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3713 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3716 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3723 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3725 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3727 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3728 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3730 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3734 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3736 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3739 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3740 struct inode *inode)
3742 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3743 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3746 isec->initialized = 1;
3749 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3750 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3751 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3753 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3754 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3756 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3757 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3761 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3762 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3765 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3766 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3770 *proto = ih->protocol;
3772 switch (ih->protocol) {
3774 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3776 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3780 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3784 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3785 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3790 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3792 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3796 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3800 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3801 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3805 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3806 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3808 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3812 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3816 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3817 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3828 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3830 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3831 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3832 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3835 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3836 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3839 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3840 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3844 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3845 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3848 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3849 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3850 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3859 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3861 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3865 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3866 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3871 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3873 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3877 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3878 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3882 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3883 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3885 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3889 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3890 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3894 /* includes fragments */
3904 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3905 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3910 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3912 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3915 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3916 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3919 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3921 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3924 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3925 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3935 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3936 " unable to parse packet\n");
3946 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3948 * @family: protocol family
3949 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3952 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3953 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3954 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3955 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3956 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3960 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3967 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3970 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3974 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3975 if (unlikely(err)) {
3977 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3978 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3986 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3987 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3988 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3989 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3991 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3992 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3993 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3994 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3997 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4001 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4002 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
4009 /* socket security operations */
4011 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4012 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4014 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4015 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4019 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
4023 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4025 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4026 struct common_audit_data ad;
4027 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4028 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
4030 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4033 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4037 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4040 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4041 int protocol, int kern)
4043 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4051 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4052 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4056 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4059 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4060 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4062 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4063 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4064 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4067 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4070 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4072 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4077 isec->initialized = 1;
4080 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4081 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4082 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4083 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4089 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4090 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4091 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4093 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4095 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4099 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4104 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4105 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4106 * check the first address now.
4108 family = sk->sk_family;
4109 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4111 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4112 struct common_audit_data ad;
4113 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4114 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4115 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4116 unsigned short snum;
4119 if (family == PF_INET) {
4120 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4121 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4122 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4124 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4125 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4126 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4132 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4134 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4135 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4139 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4141 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4142 ad.u.net->family = family;
4143 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4145 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4151 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4152 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4153 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4156 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4157 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4160 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4161 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4165 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4169 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4173 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4175 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4176 ad.u.net->family = family;
4178 if (family == PF_INET)
4179 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4181 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4183 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4184 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4192 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4194 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4195 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4198 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4203 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4205 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4206 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4207 struct common_audit_data ad;
4208 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4209 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4210 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4211 unsigned short snum;
4214 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4215 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4216 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4218 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4220 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4221 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4223 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4226 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4230 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4231 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4233 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4235 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4236 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4237 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4242 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4248 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4250 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4253 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4256 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4257 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4259 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4263 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4265 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4266 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4267 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4268 newisec->initialized = 1;
4273 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4276 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4279 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4280 int size, int flags)
4282 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4285 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4287 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4290 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4292 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4295 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4299 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4303 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4306 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4309 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4312 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4314 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4317 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4321 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4322 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4323 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4324 struct common_audit_data ad;
4325 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4328 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4330 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4332 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4333 sksec_other->sclass,
4334 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4338 /* server child socket */
4339 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4340 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4345 /* connecting socket */
4346 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4351 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4352 struct socket *other)
4354 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4355 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4356 struct common_audit_data ad;
4357 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4359 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4361 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4363 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4367 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4368 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4369 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4375 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4378 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4379 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4383 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4386 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4387 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4390 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4394 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4395 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4396 struct common_audit_data ad;
4397 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4400 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4402 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4403 ad.u.net->family = family;
4404 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4408 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4409 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4415 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4418 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4423 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4426 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4427 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4428 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4429 struct common_audit_data ad;
4430 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4435 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4438 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4439 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4442 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4443 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4444 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4445 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4446 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4447 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4449 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4450 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4451 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4454 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4456 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4457 ad.u.net->family = family;
4458 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4462 if (peerlbl_active) {
4465 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4468 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4469 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4471 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4474 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4477 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4482 if (secmark_active) {
4483 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4492 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4493 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4498 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4499 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4501 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4502 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4503 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4504 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4505 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4507 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4511 if (scontext_len > len) {
4516 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4520 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4526 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4528 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4531 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4533 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4536 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4540 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4541 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4543 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4546 *secid = peer_secid;
4547 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4552 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4554 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4556 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4560 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4561 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4562 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
4563 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4564 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4569 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4571 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4573 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4574 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4578 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4580 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4581 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4583 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4584 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4585 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4587 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4590 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4593 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4595 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4597 *secid = sksec->sid;
4601 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4603 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4604 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4606 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4607 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4608 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4609 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4612 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4613 struct request_sock *req)
4615 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4617 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4621 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4624 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4627 req->secid = connsid;
4628 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4630 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4633 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4634 const struct request_sock *req)
4636 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4638 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4639 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4640 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4641 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4642 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4643 time it will have been created and available. */
4645 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4646 * thread with access to newsksec */
4647 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4650 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4652 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4653 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4655 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4656 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4659 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4662 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4664 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4667 __tsec = current_security();
4670 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4673 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4675 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4678 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4680 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4683 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4686 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4689 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4691 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4693 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4696 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4702 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4707 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4709 u32 sid = current_sid();
4711 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4712 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4713 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4714 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4715 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4716 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4718 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4722 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4724 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4726 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4727 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4730 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4732 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4733 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4735 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4736 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4737 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4738 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4739 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4740 * protocols were being used */
4742 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4743 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4748 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4750 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4751 u32 sid = current_sid();
4754 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4755 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4758 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4759 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4767 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4771 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4772 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4774 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4778 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4780 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4782 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4784 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4785 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n",
4786 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
4787 secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name);
4788 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4798 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4803 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4805 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4806 const struct net_device *indev,
4812 struct common_audit_data ad;
4813 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4818 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4821 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4822 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4823 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4824 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4827 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4830 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4832 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4833 ad.u.net->family = family;
4834 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4837 if (peerlbl_active) {
4838 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4839 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4841 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4847 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4848 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4852 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4853 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4854 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4856 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4862 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4863 struct sk_buff *skb,
4864 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4866 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
4869 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4870 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4871 struct sk_buff *skb,
4872 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4874 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
4878 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4884 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4887 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4888 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4889 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4892 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4894 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4895 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4896 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4897 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4898 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4899 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4900 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4901 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4902 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4903 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4904 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4905 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4906 * best we can do. */
4909 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4910 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4913 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4914 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4920 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4921 struct sk_buff *skb,
4922 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4924 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4927 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4931 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4932 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4933 struct common_audit_data ad;
4934 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4940 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4942 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4944 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4945 ad.u.net->family = family;
4946 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4949 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4950 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4951 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4952 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4954 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4955 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4960 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
4961 const struct net_device *outdev,
4966 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
4968 struct common_audit_data ad;
4969 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4974 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4975 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4976 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4977 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4978 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4979 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4981 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4982 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4983 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4989 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4990 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4991 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4992 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4993 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4994 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4995 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4996 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4997 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4998 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5000 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5001 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
5006 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5007 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5008 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5009 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5011 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5012 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5015 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5016 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5018 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
5019 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5020 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5021 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5022 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5023 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5024 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5025 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5026 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5027 * for similar problems. */
5029 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5030 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5032 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5033 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5034 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5035 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5036 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5037 * pass the packet. */
5038 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5041 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5045 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5049 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5052 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5054 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5056 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5057 * associated socket. */
5058 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5059 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5060 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5063 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5065 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5066 ad.u.net->family = family;
5067 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5071 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5072 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5073 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5075 if (peerlbl_active) {
5079 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5081 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5082 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5083 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5085 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5087 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5088 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5089 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5095 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5096 struct sk_buff *skb,
5097 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5099 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5102 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5103 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5104 struct sk_buff *skb,
5105 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5107 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5111 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5113 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5115 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5118 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5119 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5122 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5125 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5129 sid = task_sid(task);
5130 isec->sclass = sclass;
5132 perm->security = isec;
5137 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5139 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5140 perm->security = NULL;
5144 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5146 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5148 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5152 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5153 msg->security = msec;
5158 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5160 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5162 msg->security = NULL;
5166 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5169 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5170 struct common_audit_data ad;
5171 u32 sid = current_sid();
5173 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5175 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5176 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5178 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5181 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5183 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5186 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5188 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5191 /* message queue security operations */
5192 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5194 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5195 struct common_audit_data ad;
5196 u32 sid = current_sid();
5199 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5203 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5205 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5206 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5208 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5211 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5217 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5219 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5222 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5224 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5225 struct common_audit_data ad;
5226 u32 sid = current_sid();
5228 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5230 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5231 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5233 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5234 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5237 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5245 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5246 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5249 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5252 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5255 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5261 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5265 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5267 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5268 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5269 struct common_audit_data ad;
5270 u32 sid = current_sid();
5273 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5274 msec = msg->security;
5277 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5279 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5281 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5282 * message queue this message will be stored in
5284 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5290 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5291 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5293 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5294 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5297 /* Can this process send the message */
5298 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5301 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5302 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5303 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5308 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5309 struct task_struct *target,
5310 long type, int mode)
5312 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5313 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5314 struct common_audit_data ad;
5315 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5318 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5319 msec = msg->security;
5321 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5322 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5324 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5325 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5327 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5328 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5332 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5333 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5335 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5336 struct common_audit_data ad;
5337 u32 sid = current_sid();
5340 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5344 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5346 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5347 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5349 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5352 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5358 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5360 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5363 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5365 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5366 struct common_audit_data ad;
5367 u32 sid = current_sid();
5369 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5371 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5372 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5374 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5375 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5378 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5379 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5387 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5388 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5391 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5394 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5401 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5407 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5411 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5412 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5416 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5419 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5421 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5424 /* Semaphore security operations */
5425 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5427 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5428 struct common_audit_data ad;
5429 u32 sid = current_sid();
5432 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5436 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5438 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5439 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5441 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5444 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5450 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5452 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5455 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5457 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5458 struct common_audit_data ad;
5459 u32 sid = current_sid();
5461 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5463 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5464 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5466 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5467 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5470 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5471 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5479 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5480 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5484 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5495 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5498 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5502 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5508 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5512 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5513 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5518 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5522 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5525 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5531 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5533 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5538 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5541 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5543 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5547 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5550 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5553 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5554 char *name, char **value)
5556 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5562 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5568 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5570 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5572 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5574 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5575 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5576 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5577 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5578 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5579 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5580 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5581 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5589 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5599 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5600 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5602 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5603 struct task_struct *tracer;
5610 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5611 security attributes. */
5616 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5617 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5618 * above restriction is ever removed.
5620 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5621 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5622 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5623 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5624 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5625 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5626 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5627 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5628 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5629 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5635 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5636 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5637 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5641 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5642 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5643 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5644 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5647 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5648 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5649 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5650 audit_size = size - 1;
5653 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5654 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5655 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5660 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5667 new = prepare_creds();
5671 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5672 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5673 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5674 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5675 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5676 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5677 tsec = new->security;
5678 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5679 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5680 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5681 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5682 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5683 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5686 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5687 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5688 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5689 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5694 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5696 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5697 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5702 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5703 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5704 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5708 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5709 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5712 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5714 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5718 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5719 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5738 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5740 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5743 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5745 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5748 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5750 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5753 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5759 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5761 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5763 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5767 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5769 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5771 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5774 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5777 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5786 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5787 unsigned long flags)
5789 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5790 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5792 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5796 tsec = cred->security;
5797 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5798 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5800 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5806 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5808 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5814 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5815 const struct cred *cred,
5819 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5822 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5823 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5824 appear to be created. */
5828 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5830 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5831 ksec = key->security;
5833 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5836 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5838 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5839 char *context = NULL;
5843 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5852 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = {
5853 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
5854 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
5855 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
5856 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
5858 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
5859 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
5860 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
5861 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
5862 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
5863 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
5864 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
5865 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
5866 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
5868 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
5870 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds),
5871 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
5872 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
5873 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec),
5875 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
5876 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security),
5877 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data),
5878 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
5879 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
5880 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
5881 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
5882 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
5883 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
5884 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
5885 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
5886 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str),
5888 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
5890 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
5891 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
5892 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
5893 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
5894 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
5895 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
5896 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
5897 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
5898 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
5899 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
5900 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
5901 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
5902 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
5903 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
5904 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
5905 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
5906 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
5907 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
5908 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
5909 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
5910 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
5911 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
5912 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
5913 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
5914 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
5916 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
5917 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
5918 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
5919 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
5920 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
5921 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
5922 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
5923 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
5924 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
5925 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
5926 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
5927 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
5929 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
5931 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create),
5932 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
5933 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
5934 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
5935 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
5936 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
5937 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
5938 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
5939 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
5940 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
5941 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
5942 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid),
5943 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
5944 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
5945 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
5946 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
5947 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
5948 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
5949 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
5950 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
5951 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait),
5952 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
5954 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
5955 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
5957 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
5958 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security),
5960 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
5961 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
5962 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security),
5963 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
5964 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
5965 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
5966 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
5968 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
5969 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security),
5970 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
5971 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
5972 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
5974 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
5975 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security),
5976 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
5977 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
5978 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
5980 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
5982 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
5983 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
5985 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
5986 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
5987 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
5988 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
5989 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
5990 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
5991 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
5993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
5994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
5996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
5997 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
5998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
5999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
6000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
6001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
6002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
6003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
6004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
6005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
6006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
6007 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
6008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
6009 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
6010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
6011 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
6012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
6013 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
6014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
6015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
6016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
6017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
6018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
6019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
6020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
6021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
6022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
6023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
6024 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
6025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
6026 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
6027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
6028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
6029 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
6030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
6032 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
6034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
6035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
6036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
6037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
6038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
6039 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
6040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
6041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
6042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
6043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
6044 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
6045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
6049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
6050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
6051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
6052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
6056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
6057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
6058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
6059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
6063 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6065 if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) {
6066 selinux_enabled = 0;
6070 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6071 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6075 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6077 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6078 cred_init_security();
6080 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6082 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6083 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6084 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6087 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
6089 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6090 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6092 if (selinux_enforcing)
6093 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6095 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6100 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6102 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6105 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6107 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6109 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6110 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6111 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6114 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6115 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6116 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6118 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6120 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6122 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6123 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6125 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6126 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6129 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6130 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6132 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6133 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6136 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6137 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6139 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6140 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6142 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6144 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6145 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6147 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6148 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6151 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6152 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6154 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6155 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6160 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6164 if (!selinux_enabled)
6167 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6169 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6171 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6176 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6178 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6179 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6181 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6183 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6187 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6189 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6190 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6193 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6195 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6196 static int selinux_disabled;
6198 int selinux_disable(void)
6200 if (ss_initialized) {
6201 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6205 if (selinux_disabled) {
6206 /* Only do this once. */
6210 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6212 selinux_disabled = 1;
6213 selinux_enabled = 0;
6215 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
6217 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6220 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6221 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6223 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */