2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
32 #include <linux/sched.h>
33 #include <linux/security.h>
34 #include <linux/xattr.h>
35 #include <linux/capability.h>
36 #include <linux/unistd.h>
38 #include <linux/mman.h>
39 #include <linux/slab.h>
40 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
41 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
42 #include <linux/swap.h>
43 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
44 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
45 #include <linux/dcache.h>
46 #include <linux/file.h>
47 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
48 #include <linux/namei.h>
49 #include <linux/mount.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52 #include <linux/tty.h>
54 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <asm/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <linux/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
93 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
129 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
147 * initialise the security for the init task
149 static void cred_init_security(void)
151 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
152 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
154 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
156 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
158 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
159 cred->security = tsec;
163 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
165 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
167 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
169 tsec = cred->security;
174 * get the objective security ID of a task
176 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
181 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
187 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
189 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
191 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
196 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
198 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
200 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
201 u32 sid = current_sid();
203 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
207 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
208 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
210 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
211 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
212 isec->task_sid = sid;
213 inode->i_security = isec;
218 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
220 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
223 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
224 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
225 list_del_init(&isec->list);
226 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
228 inode->i_security = NULL;
229 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
232 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
234 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
235 u32 sid = current_sid();
237 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
242 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
243 file->f_security = fsec;
248 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
250 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
251 file->f_security = NULL;
255 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
257 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
259 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
263 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
264 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
265 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
267 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
268 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
269 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sb->s_security = sbsec;
275 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
277 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
278 sb->s_security = NULL;
282 /* The security server must be initialized before
283 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
284 extern int ss_initialized;
286 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
288 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
290 "uses transition SIDs",
292 "uses genfs_contexts",
293 "not configured for labeling",
294 "uses mountpoint labeling",
297 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
299 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
301 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
310 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
313 static const match_table_t tokens = {
314 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
317 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
318 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
322 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
324 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
325 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
326 const struct cred *cred)
328 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
331 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
332 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
336 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
337 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
341 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
342 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
343 const struct cred *cred)
345 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
347 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
348 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
352 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
353 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
357 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
359 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
360 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
361 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
364 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
365 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
366 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
367 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
368 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
369 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
370 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
371 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
372 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
376 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
377 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
378 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
379 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
380 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
381 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
383 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
384 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
385 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
390 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
392 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
393 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
394 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
396 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
397 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
398 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
400 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
401 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
402 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
403 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
404 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
406 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
407 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
408 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
410 /* Initialize the root inode. */
411 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
413 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
414 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
415 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
417 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
419 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
420 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
421 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
422 struct inode_security_struct, list);
423 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
424 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
425 inode = igrab(inode);
427 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
431 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
432 list_del_init(&isec->list);
435 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
441 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
442 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
443 * mount options, or whatever.
445 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
446 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
449 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
450 char *context = NULL;
454 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
456 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
462 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
463 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
464 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
466 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
469 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
470 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
471 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
473 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
474 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
479 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
480 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
486 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
487 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
490 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
491 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
493 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
494 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
497 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
498 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
500 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
501 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
504 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
505 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
507 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
508 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
509 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
511 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
514 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
515 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
517 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
518 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
519 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
522 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
527 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
531 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
532 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
534 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
536 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
537 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
538 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
539 (old_sid != new_sid))
542 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
543 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
545 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
546 if (mnt_flags & flag)
552 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
553 * labeling information.
555 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
556 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
558 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
560 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
561 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
562 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
563 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
564 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
565 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
566 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
567 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
568 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
570 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
572 if (!ss_initialized) {
574 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
575 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
576 server is ready to handle calls. */
580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
596 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
605 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
608 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
610 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
611 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
613 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
614 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
615 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
622 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
624 goto out_double_mount;
626 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
631 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
633 goto out_double_mount;
635 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
637 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
638 rootcontext_sid = sid;
640 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
642 goto out_double_mount;
644 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
648 defcontext_sid = sid;
650 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
652 goto out_double_mount;
654 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
663 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
664 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
665 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
666 goto out_double_mount;
671 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
672 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
674 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
675 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
677 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
678 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
682 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
684 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
688 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
692 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
693 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
694 * the superblock context if not already set.
697 if (!fscontext_sid) {
698 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
702 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
704 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
709 if (!rootcontext_sid)
710 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
712 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
713 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
716 if (rootcontext_sid) {
717 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
722 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
723 root_isec->initialized = 1;
726 if (defcontext_sid) {
727 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
729 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
730 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
734 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
735 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
741 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
744 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
746 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
750 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
751 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
755 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
756 struct super_block *newsb)
758 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
759 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
761 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
762 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
763 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
766 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
767 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
772 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
773 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
775 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
776 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
779 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
781 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
783 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
784 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
785 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
788 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
792 if (!set_rootcontext) {
793 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
794 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
797 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
799 if (set_rootcontext) {
800 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
802 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
803 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
805 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
808 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
809 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
812 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
813 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
816 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
817 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
818 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
820 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
822 /* Standard string-based options. */
823 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
825 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
830 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
834 if (context || defcontext) {
836 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
839 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
849 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
852 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
859 case Opt_rootcontext:
862 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
865 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
873 if (context || defcontext) {
875 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
878 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
884 case Opt_labelsupport:
888 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
895 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
899 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
901 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
906 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
907 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
910 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
911 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
914 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
915 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
918 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
919 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
922 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
935 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
938 char *options = data;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
946 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
948 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
953 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
960 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
961 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
966 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
969 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
970 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
974 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
976 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
979 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
981 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
982 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
985 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
989 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
994 /* we need a comma before each option */
999 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1005 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1007 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1010 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1012 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1018 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1020 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1025 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1027 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1029 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1031 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1033 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1035 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1037 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1039 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1041 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1045 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1048 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1050 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1053 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1055 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1058 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1064 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1065 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1067 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1074 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1075 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1077 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1079 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1080 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1082 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1084 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1086 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1093 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1095 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1101 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1104 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1105 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1106 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1107 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1108 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1109 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1110 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1115 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1117 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1122 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1125 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1126 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1131 char *buffer, *path;
1133 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1137 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1141 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1142 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1143 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1144 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1148 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1150 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1154 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1162 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1163 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1165 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1166 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1168 struct dentry *dentry;
1169 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1170 char *context = NULL;
1174 if (isec->initialized)
1177 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1178 if (isec->initialized)
1181 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1182 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1183 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1184 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1185 server is ready to handle calls. */
1186 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1187 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1188 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1189 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1193 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1194 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1195 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1196 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1200 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1201 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1203 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1204 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1206 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1207 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1211 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1212 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1213 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1214 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1215 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1216 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1217 * be used again by userspace.
1222 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1223 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1229 context[len] = '\0';
1230 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1232 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1235 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1236 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1243 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1249 context[len] = '\0';
1250 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1256 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1257 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1258 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1259 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1263 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1264 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1267 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1271 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1272 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1274 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1275 if (printk_ratelimit())
1276 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1277 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1278 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1280 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1281 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1282 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1285 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1293 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1294 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1296 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1297 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1298 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1300 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1301 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1302 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1303 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1308 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1309 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1312 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1313 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1315 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1317 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1318 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1329 isec->initialized = 1;
1332 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1334 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1335 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1339 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1340 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1346 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1347 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1350 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1351 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1354 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1355 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1358 /* All other signals. */
1359 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1367 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1368 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1370 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1371 const struct cred *target,
1374 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1376 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1380 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1381 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1382 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1383 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1385 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1386 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1389 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1393 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1394 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1396 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1400 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1401 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1402 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1403 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1405 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1410 sid = current_sid();
1411 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1412 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1415 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1416 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1419 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1420 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1421 const struct cred *cred,
1424 struct common_audit_data ad;
1425 struct av_decision avd;
1427 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1428 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1431 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1435 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1437 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1440 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1444 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1448 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1449 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1450 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1454 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1455 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1458 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1460 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1461 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1464 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1465 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1466 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1467 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1468 struct inode *inode,
1470 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1472 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1473 struct common_audit_data ad;
1476 validate_creds(cred);
1478 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1481 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1482 isec = inode->i_security;
1486 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1487 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1490 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1493 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1494 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1495 pathname if needed. */
1496 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1497 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1498 struct dentry *dentry,
1501 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1502 struct common_audit_data ad;
1504 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1505 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1506 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1507 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1510 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1511 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1512 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1513 check a particular permission to the file.
1514 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1515 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1516 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1517 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1518 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1522 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1523 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1524 struct common_audit_data ad;
1525 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1528 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1529 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1531 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1532 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1540 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1543 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1549 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1550 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1551 struct dentry *dentry,
1554 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1555 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1556 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1558 struct common_audit_data ad;
1561 dsec = dir->i_security;
1562 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1565 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1567 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1568 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1570 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1571 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1576 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1577 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, NULL, &newsid);
1582 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1586 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1587 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1588 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1591 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1592 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1593 struct task_struct *ctx)
1595 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1597 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1601 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1604 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1605 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1606 struct dentry *dentry,
1610 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1611 struct common_audit_data ad;
1612 u32 sid = current_sid();
1616 dsec = dir->i_security;
1617 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1619 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1620 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1623 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1624 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1639 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1644 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1648 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1649 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1650 struct inode *new_dir,
1651 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1653 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1654 struct common_audit_data ad;
1655 u32 sid = current_sid();
1657 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1660 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1661 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1662 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1663 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1665 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1667 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1668 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1669 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1672 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1673 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1676 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1677 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1678 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1683 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1684 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1685 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1686 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1687 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1690 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1691 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1692 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1693 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1695 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1703 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1704 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1705 struct super_block *sb,
1707 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1709 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1710 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1712 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1713 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1716 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1717 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1721 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1722 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1723 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1724 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1727 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1729 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1733 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1735 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1737 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1744 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1745 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1749 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1751 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1752 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1759 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1768 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1771 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1773 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1775 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1781 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1783 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1788 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1792 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1793 u32 sid = current_sid();
1794 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1795 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1798 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1801 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1805 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1809 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1812 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1813 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1817 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1821 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1824 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1825 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1826 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1827 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1831 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1832 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1836 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1840 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1841 * which was removed).
1843 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1844 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1845 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1846 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1849 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1850 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
1854 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
1858 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1861 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1863 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1875 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1880 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1883 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1889 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1891 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1893 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1896 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1901 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1902 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1903 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1905 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1906 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1907 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1908 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1909 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1911 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1912 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1913 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1914 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1915 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1917 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1924 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1925 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1926 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1928 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1929 * processes that allocate mappings.
1931 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1933 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1935 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
1936 &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1937 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1941 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1944 /* binprm security operations */
1946 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1948 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1949 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1950 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1951 struct common_audit_data ad;
1952 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1955 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1959 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1960 * the script interpreter */
1961 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1964 old_tsec = current_security();
1965 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1966 isec = inode->i_security;
1968 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1969 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1970 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1972 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1973 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1974 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1975 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1977 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
1978 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
1979 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1980 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1982 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1983 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1984 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
1990 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1991 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
1993 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1994 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1996 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
1997 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1998 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2002 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2003 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2004 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2008 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2009 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2013 /* Check for shared state */
2014 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2015 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2016 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2022 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2023 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2025 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2026 struct task_struct *tracer;
2027 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2031 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2032 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2033 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2039 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2041 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2047 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2048 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2054 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2056 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2064 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2065 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2066 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2067 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2069 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2072 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2075 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2076 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2078 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2079 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2080 struct files_struct *files)
2082 struct common_audit_data ad;
2083 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2084 struct tty_struct *tty;
2085 struct fdtable *fdt;
2089 tty = get_current_tty();
2091 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2092 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2093 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2094 struct inode *inode;
2096 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2097 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2098 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2099 file may belong to another process and we are only
2100 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2101 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2102 struct tty_file_private, list);
2103 file = file_priv->file;
2104 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2105 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2106 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2110 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2113 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2117 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2119 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2121 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2123 unsigned long set, i;
2128 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2129 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2131 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2134 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2135 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2140 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2142 file_to_av(file))) {
2144 fd = get_unused_fd();
2154 devnull = dentry_open(
2156 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2158 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2165 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2170 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2173 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2177 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2179 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2181 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2182 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2185 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2186 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2189 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2190 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2192 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2193 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2195 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2196 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2197 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2199 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2200 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2201 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2202 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2203 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2205 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2206 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2208 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2210 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2211 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2212 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2213 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2215 task_unlock(current);
2216 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2221 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2224 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2226 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2227 struct itimerval itimer;
2237 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2238 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2239 * flush and unblock signals.
2241 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2242 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2244 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2246 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2247 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2248 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2249 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2250 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2251 __flush_signals(current);
2252 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2253 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2255 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2258 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2259 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2260 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2261 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2262 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2265 /* superblock security operations */
2267 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2269 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2272 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2274 superblock_free_security(sb);
2277 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2282 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2285 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2287 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2288 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2289 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2290 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2291 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2294 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2301 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2305 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2308 int current_size = 0;
2316 while (current_size < len) {
2326 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2328 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2329 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2330 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2336 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2344 in_save = in_end = orig;
2348 open_quote = !open_quote;
2349 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2351 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2353 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2354 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2356 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2358 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2360 } while (*in_end++);
2362 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2363 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2368 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2371 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2372 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2373 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2375 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2381 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2384 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2385 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2388 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2390 goto out_free_secdata;
2392 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2394 goto out_free_secdata;
2396 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2397 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2399 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2403 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2405 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2406 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2408 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2409 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2410 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2416 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2417 goto out_bad_option;
2420 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2421 goto out_bad_option;
2423 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2424 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2425 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2427 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2428 goto out_bad_option;
2431 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2432 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2433 goto out_bad_option;
2442 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2444 free_secdata(secdata);
2447 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2448 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2453 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2455 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2456 struct common_audit_data ad;
2459 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2463 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2464 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2467 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2468 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2469 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2472 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2474 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2475 struct common_audit_data ad;
2477 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2478 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2479 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2482 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2485 unsigned long flags,
2488 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2490 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2491 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2492 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2494 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2498 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2500 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2502 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2503 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2506 /* inode security operations */
2508 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2510 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2513 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2515 inode_free_security(inode);
2518 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2519 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2520 void **value, size_t *len)
2522 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2523 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2524 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2525 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2527 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2529 dsec = dir->i_security;
2530 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2533 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2535 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2536 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2537 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2538 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2539 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2540 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2543 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2544 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2547 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2552 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2553 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2554 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2555 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2557 isec->initialized = 1;
2560 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2564 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2571 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2583 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2585 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2588 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2590 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2593 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2595 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2598 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2600 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2603 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2605 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2608 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2610 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2613 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2615 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2618 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2619 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2621 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2624 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2626 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2628 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2631 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2633 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2635 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2638 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2640 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2641 struct common_audit_data ad;
2645 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2646 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2648 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2652 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2653 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
2656 ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2658 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2660 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
2663 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2665 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2666 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2668 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2669 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2670 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2676 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2677 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2678 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2680 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2683 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2685 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2687 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2690 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2692 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2694 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2695 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2696 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2697 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2699 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2700 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2701 Restrict to administrator. */
2706 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2707 ordinary setattr permission. */
2708 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2711 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2712 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2714 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2715 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2716 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2717 struct common_audit_data ad;
2718 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2721 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2722 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2724 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2725 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2728 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2731 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2732 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2734 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2735 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2739 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2740 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2741 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2743 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2748 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2749 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2753 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2758 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2760 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2761 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2765 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2766 const void *value, size_t size,
2769 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2770 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2774 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2775 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2779 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2781 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2782 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2783 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2791 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2793 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2795 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2798 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2800 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2802 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2805 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2807 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2808 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2810 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2811 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2816 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2818 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2820 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2824 char *context = NULL;
2825 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2827 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2831 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2832 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2833 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2834 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2835 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2836 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2837 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2839 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
2840 &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2841 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2843 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2846 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2859 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2860 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2862 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2866 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2869 if (!value || !size)
2872 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2877 isec->initialized = 1;
2881 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2883 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2884 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2885 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2889 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2891 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2895 /* file security operations */
2897 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2899 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2900 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2902 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2903 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2906 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2907 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2910 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2912 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2913 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2914 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2915 u32 sid = current_sid();
2918 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2921 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2922 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2923 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2926 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2929 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2931 return file_alloc_security(file);
2934 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2936 file_free_security(file);
2939 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2942 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2952 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2954 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2955 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2958 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2960 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2961 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2964 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2968 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
2973 error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
2974 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
2977 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2978 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2981 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2986 static int default_noexec;
2988 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2990 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2993 if (default_noexec &&
2994 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2996 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2997 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2998 * This has an additional check.
3000 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3006 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3007 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3009 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3010 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3013 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3014 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3016 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3023 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3024 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3025 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3028 u32 sid = current_sid();
3031 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3032 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3033 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3034 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3036 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3037 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3038 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3043 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3044 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3045 if (rc || addr_only)
3048 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3051 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3052 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3055 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3056 unsigned long reqprot,
3059 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3061 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3064 if (default_noexec &&
3065 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3067 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3068 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3069 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3070 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3071 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3072 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3073 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3074 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3076 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3077 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3078 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3079 * modified content. This typically should only
3080 * occur for text relocations.
3082 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3088 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3091 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3093 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3095 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3098 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3101 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3106 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3111 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3112 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3121 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3122 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3127 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3132 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3136 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3143 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3145 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3147 fsec = file->f_security;
3148 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3153 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3154 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3157 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3159 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3161 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3162 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3164 fsec = file->f_security;
3167 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3169 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3171 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3172 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3175 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3177 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3179 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3182 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3184 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3185 struct inode *inode;
3186 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3188 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3189 fsec = file->f_security;
3190 isec = inode->i_security;
3192 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3193 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3194 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3195 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3196 * struct as its SID.
3198 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3199 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3201 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3202 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3203 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3204 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3205 * new inode label or new policy.
3206 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3208 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3211 /* task security operations */
3213 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3215 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3219 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3221 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3223 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3225 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3229 cred->security = tsec;
3234 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3236 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3238 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3241 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3242 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3244 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3245 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3250 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3252 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3255 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3256 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3258 old_tsec = old->security;
3260 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3264 new->security = tsec;
3269 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3271 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3273 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3274 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3280 * set the security data for a kernel service
3281 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3283 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3285 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3286 u32 sid = current_sid();
3289 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3290 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3291 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3295 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3296 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3297 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3303 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3304 * objective context of the specified inode
3306 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3308 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3309 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3310 u32 sid = current_sid();
3313 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3314 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3315 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3319 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3323 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3326 struct common_audit_data ad;
3328 sid = task_sid(current);
3330 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3331 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3333 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3334 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3337 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3339 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3342 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3344 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3347 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3349 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3352 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3354 *secid = task_sid(p);
3357 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3361 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3365 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3368 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3372 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3376 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3379 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3381 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3384 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3385 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3387 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3389 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3390 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3391 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3392 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3393 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3394 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3399 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3403 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3407 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3410 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3412 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3415 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3417 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3420 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3427 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3429 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3431 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3432 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3434 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3438 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3440 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3443 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3444 struct inode *inode)
3446 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3447 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3450 isec->initialized = 1;
3453 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3454 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3455 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3457 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3458 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3460 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3461 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3465 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3466 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3469 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3470 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3474 *proto = ih->protocol;
3476 switch (ih->protocol) {
3478 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3480 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3484 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3488 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3489 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3494 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3496 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3500 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3504 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3505 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3509 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3510 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3512 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3516 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3520 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3521 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3532 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3534 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3535 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3536 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3539 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3540 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3542 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3543 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3547 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3548 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3551 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3552 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3553 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3562 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3564 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3568 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3569 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3574 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3576 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3580 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3581 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3585 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3586 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3588 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3592 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3593 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3597 /* includes fragments */
3607 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3608 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3613 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3615 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3618 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3619 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3622 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3624 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3627 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3628 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3638 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3639 " unable to parse packet\n");
3649 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3651 * @family: protocol family
3652 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3655 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3656 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3657 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3658 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3659 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3663 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3670 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3671 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3673 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3674 if (unlikely(err)) {
3676 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3677 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3684 /* socket security operations */
3686 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3687 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3689 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3690 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3694 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3698 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3700 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3701 struct common_audit_data ad;
3702 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3704 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3707 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3710 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3713 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3714 int protocol, int kern)
3716 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3724 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3725 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3729 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3732 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3733 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3735 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3736 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3737 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3740 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3743 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3745 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3750 isec->initialized = 1;
3753 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3754 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3755 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3756 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3762 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3763 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3764 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3766 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3768 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3772 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3777 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3778 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3779 * check the first address now.
3781 family = sk->sk_family;
3782 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3784 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3785 struct common_audit_data ad;
3786 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3787 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3788 unsigned short snum;
3791 if (family == PF_INET) {
3792 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3793 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3794 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3796 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3797 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3798 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3804 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3806 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3807 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3811 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3812 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3813 ad.u.net.family = family;
3814 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3816 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3822 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3823 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3824 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3827 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3828 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3831 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3832 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3836 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3840 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3844 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3845 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3846 ad.u.net.family = family;
3848 if (family == PF_INET)
3849 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3851 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3853 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3854 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3862 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3864 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3865 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3868 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3873 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3875 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3876 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3877 struct common_audit_data ad;
3878 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3879 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3880 unsigned short snum;
3883 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3884 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3885 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3887 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3889 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3890 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3892 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3895 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3899 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3900 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3902 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3903 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3904 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3905 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3910 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3916 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3918 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3921 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3924 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3925 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3927 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3931 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3933 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3934 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3935 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3936 newisec->initialized = 1;
3941 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3944 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3947 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3948 int size, int flags)
3950 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3953 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3955 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3958 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3960 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3963 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3967 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3971 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3974 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3977 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3980 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3982 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3985 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
3989 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
3990 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
3991 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
3992 struct common_audit_data ad;
3995 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3996 ad.u.net.sk = other;
3998 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
3999 sksec_other->sclass,
4000 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4004 /* server child socket */
4005 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4006 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4011 /* connecting socket */
4012 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4017 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4018 struct socket *other)
4020 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4021 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4022 struct common_audit_data ad;
4024 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4025 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4027 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4031 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4033 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4039 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4042 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4043 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4047 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4050 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4051 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4054 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4058 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4059 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4060 struct common_audit_data ad;
4063 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4064 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4065 ad.u.net.family = family;
4066 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4070 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4071 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4077 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4080 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4085 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4088 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4089 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4090 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4091 struct common_audit_data ad;
4096 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4099 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4100 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4103 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4104 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4105 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4106 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4107 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4108 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4110 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4111 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4112 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4115 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4116 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4117 ad.u.net.family = family;
4118 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4122 if (peerlbl_active) {
4125 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4128 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4131 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4134 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4137 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4140 if (secmark_active) {
4141 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4150 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4151 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4156 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4157 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4159 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4160 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4161 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4162 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4163 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4165 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4169 if (scontext_len > len) {
4174 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4178 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4184 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4186 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4189 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4191 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4194 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4198 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4199 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4201 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4204 *secid = peer_secid;
4205 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4210 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4212 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4214 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4218 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4219 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4220 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4221 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4226 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4228 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4230 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4231 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4235 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4237 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4238 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4240 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4241 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4242 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4244 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4247 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4250 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4252 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4254 *secid = sksec->sid;
4258 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4260 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4261 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4263 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4264 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4265 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4266 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4269 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4270 struct request_sock *req)
4272 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4274 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4278 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4279 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4282 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4285 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4286 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4287 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4289 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4292 req->secid = newsid;
4293 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4296 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4299 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4300 const struct request_sock *req)
4302 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4304 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4305 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4306 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4307 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4308 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4309 time it will have been created and available. */
4311 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4312 * thread with access to newsksec */
4313 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4316 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4318 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4319 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4321 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4322 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4325 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4328 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4330 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4333 __tsec = current_security();
4336 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4339 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4341 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4344 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4346 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4349 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4352 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4355 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4357 u32 sid = current_sid();
4359 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4360 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4361 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4362 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4363 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4364 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4366 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4370 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4372 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4374 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4375 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4376 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4377 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4378 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4379 * protocols were being used */
4381 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4382 * the sockcreate SID here */
4384 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4385 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4388 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4390 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4391 u32 sid = current_sid();
4394 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4395 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4398 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4399 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4408 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4412 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4413 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4415 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4419 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4421 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4423 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4424 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4425 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4426 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4427 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4428 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4438 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4443 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4445 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4451 struct common_audit_data ad;
4456 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4459 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4460 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4461 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4462 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4465 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4468 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4469 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4470 ad.u.net.family = family;
4471 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4474 if (peerlbl_active) {
4475 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4478 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4484 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4485 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4489 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4490 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4491 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4493 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4499 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4500 struct sk_buff *skb,
4501 const struct net_device *in,
4502 const struct net_device *out,
4503 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4505 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4508 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4509 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4510 struct sk_buff *skb,
4511 const struct net_device *in,
4512 const struct net_device *out,
4513 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4515 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4519 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4524 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4527 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4528 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4529 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4531 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4534 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4535 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4541 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4542 struct sk_buff *skb,
4543 const struct net_device *in,
4544 const struct net_device *out,
4545 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4547 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4550 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4554 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4555 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4556 struct common_audit_data ad;
4562 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4564 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4565 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4566 ad.u.net.family = family;
4567 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4570 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4571 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4572 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4573 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4575 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4576 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4581 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4587 struct common_audit_data ad;
4592 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4593 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4594 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4595 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4596 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4597 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4599 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4600 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4601 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4602 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4603 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4604 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4605 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4608 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4609 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4610 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4613 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4614 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4615 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4616 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4620 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4621 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4624 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4625 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4628 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4629 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4630 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4633 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4634 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4635 ad.u.net.family = family;
4636 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4640 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4641 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4642 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4644 if (peerlbl_active) {
4648 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4650 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4651 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4652 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4654 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4656 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4657 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4658 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4664 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4665 struct sk_buff *skb,
4666 const struct net_device *in,
4667 const struct net_device *out,
4668 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4670 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4673 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4674 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4675 struct sk_buff *skb,
4676 const struct net_device *in,
4677 const struct net_device *out,
4678 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4680 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4684 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4686 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4690 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4694 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4697 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4700 struct common_audit_data ad;
4703 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4707 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4708 ad.u.cap = capability;
4710 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
4711 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
4712 CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4715 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4716 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4719 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4722 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4726 sid = task_sid(task);
4727 isec->sclass = sclass;
4729 perm->security = isec;
4734 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4736 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4737 perm->security = NULL;
4741 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4743 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4745 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4749 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4750 msg->security = msec;
4755 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4757 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4759 msg->security = NULL;
4763 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4766 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4767 struct common_audit_data ad;
4768 u32 sid = current_sid();
4770 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4772 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4773 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4775 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4778 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4780 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4783 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4785 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4788 /* message queue security operations */
4789 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4791 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4792 struct common_audit_data ad;
4793 u32 sid = current_sid();
4796 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4800 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4802 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4803 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4805 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4808 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4814 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4816 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4819 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4821 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4822 struct common_audit_data ad;
4823 u32 sid = current_sid();
4825 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4827 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4828 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4830 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4831 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4834 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4842 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4843 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4846 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4849 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4852 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4858 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4862 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4864 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4865 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4866 struct common_audit_data ad;
4867 u32 sid = current_sid();
4870 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4871 msec = msg->security;
4874 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4876 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4878 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4879 * message queue this message will be stored in
4881 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4887 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4888 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4890 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4891 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4894 /* Can this process send the message */
4895 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4898 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4899 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4900 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4905 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4906 struct task_struct *target,
4907 long type, int mode)
4909 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4910 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4911 struct common_audit_data ad;
4912 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4915 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4916 msec = msg->security;
4918 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4919 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4921 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4922 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4924 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4925 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4929 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4930 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4932 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4933 struct common_audit_data ad;
4934 u32 sid = current_sid();
4937 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4941 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4943 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4944 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4946 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4949 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4955 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4957 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4960 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4962 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4963 struct common_audit_data ad;
4964 u32 sid = current_sid();
4966 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4968 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4969 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4971 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4972 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4975 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4976 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4984 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4985 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4988 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4991 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4998 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5004 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5008 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5009 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5013 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5016 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5018 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5021 /* Semaphore security operations */
5022 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5024 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5025 struct common_audit_data ad;
5026 u32 sid = current_sid();
5029 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5033 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5035 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5036 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5038 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5041 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5047 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5049 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5052 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5054 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5055 struct common_audit_data ad;
5056 u32 sid = current_sid();
5058 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5060 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5061 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5063 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5064 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5067 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5068 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5076 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5077 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5081 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5092 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5095 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5099 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5105 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5109 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5110 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5115 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5119 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5122 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5128 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5130 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5135 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5138 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5140 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5144 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5147 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5150 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5151 char *name, char **value)
5153 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5159 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5165 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5167 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5169 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5171 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5172 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5173 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5174 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5175 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5176 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5177 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5178 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5186 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5196 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5197 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5199 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5200 struct task_struct *tracer;
5207 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5208 security attributes. */
5213 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5214 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5215 * above restriction is ever removed.
5217 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5218 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5219 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5220 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5221 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5222 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5223 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5224 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5225 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5226 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5232 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5233 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5234 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5238 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5239 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5240 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5242 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5249 new = prepare_creds();
5253 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5254 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5255 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5256 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5257 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5258 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5259 tsec = new->security;
5260 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5261 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5262 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5263 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5264 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5265 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5268 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5269 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5270 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5271 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5276 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5278 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5279 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5284 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5285 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5286 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5290 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5291 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5294 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5296 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5300 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5301 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5320 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5322 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5325 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5327 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5330 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5336 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5338 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5340 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5344 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5346 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5348 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5351 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5354 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5363 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5364 unsigned long flags)
5366 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5367 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5369 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5373 tsec = cred->security;
5374 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5375 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5377 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5383 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5385 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5391 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5392 const struct cred *cred,
5396 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5399 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5400 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5401 appear to be created. */
5405 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5407 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5408 ksec = key->security;
5410 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5413 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5415 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5416 char *context = NULL;
5420 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5429 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5432 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5433 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5434 .capget = selinux_capget,
5435 .capset = selinux_capset,
5436 .capable = selinux_capable,
5437 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5438 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5439 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5440 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5442 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5443 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5445 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5446 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5447 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5448 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5450 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5451 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5452 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5453 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5454 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5455 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5456 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5457 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5458 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5459 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5460 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5461 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5464 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5465 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5466 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5467 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5468 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5469 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5470 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5471 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5472 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5473 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5474 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5475 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5476 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5477 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5478 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5479 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5480 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5481 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5482 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5483 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5484 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5485 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5486 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5487 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5488 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5490 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5491 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5492 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5493 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5494 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5495 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5496 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5497 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5498 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5499 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5500 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5502 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5504 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5505 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5506 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5507 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5508 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5509 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5510 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5511 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5512 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5513 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5514 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5515 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5516 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5517 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5518 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5519 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5520 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5521 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5522 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5523 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5524 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5525 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5527 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5528 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5530 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5531 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5533 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5534 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5535 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5536 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5537 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5538 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5540 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5541 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5542 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5543 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5544 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5546 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5547 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5548 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5549 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5550 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5552 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5554 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5555 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5557 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5558 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5559 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5560 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5561 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5562 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5564 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5565 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5567 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5568 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5569 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5570 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5571 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5572 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5573 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5574 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5575 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5576 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5577 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5578 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5579 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5580 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5581 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5582 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5583 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5584 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5585 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5586 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5587 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5588 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5589 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5590 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5591 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5592 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5593 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5594 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5595 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5596 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5597 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5599 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5600 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5601 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5602 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5603 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5604 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5605 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5606 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5607 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5608 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5609 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5613 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5614 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5615 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5616 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5620 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5621 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5622 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5623 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5627 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5629 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5630 selinux_enabled = 0;
5634 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5635 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5639 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5641 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5642 cred_init_security();
5644 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5646 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5647 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5648 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5651 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5652 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5654 if (selinux_enforcing)
5655 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5657 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5662 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5664 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5667 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5669 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5671 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5672 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5673 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5676 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5677 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5678 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5680 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5682 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5684 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5685 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5687 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5688 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5691 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5692 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5694 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5695 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5698 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5699 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5701 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5702 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5706 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5708 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5710 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5711 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5713 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5714 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5717 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5718 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5720 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5721 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5727 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5731 if (!selinux_enabled)
5734 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5736 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5738 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5740 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5741 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5743 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5750 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5752 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5753 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5755 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5757 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5758 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5759 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5764 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5766 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5767 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5770 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5772 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5773 static int selinux_disabled;
5775 int selinux_disable(void)
5777 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5779 if (ss_initialized) {
5780 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5784 if (selinux_disabled) {
5785 /* Only do this once. */
5789 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5791 selinux_disabled = 1;
5792 selinux_enabled = 0;
5794 reset_security_ops();
5796 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5799 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5800 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5802 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */