2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
32 #include <linux/sched.h>
33 #include <linux/security.h>
34 #include <linux/xattr.h>
35 #include <linux/capability.h>
36 #include <linux/unistd.h>
38 #include <linux/mman.h>
39 #include <linux/slab.h>
40 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
41 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
42 #include <linux/swap.h>
43 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
44 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
45 #include <linux/dcache.h>
46 #include <linux/file.h>
47 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
48 #include <linux/namei.h>
49 #include <linux/mount.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52 #include <linux/tty.h>
54 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <linux/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
95 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
130 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
133 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
136 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
137 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
138 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
139 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
142 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
144 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
148 * initialise the security for the init task
150 static void cred_init_security(void)
152 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
153 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
155 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
157 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
159 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
160 cred->security = tsec;
164 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
166 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
168 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
170 tsec = cred->security;
175 * get the objective security ID of a task
177 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
182 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
188 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
190 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
192 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
197 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
199 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
201 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
202 u32 sid = current_sid();
204 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
208 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
209 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
211 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
212 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
213 isec->task_sid = sid;
214 inode->i_security = isec;
219 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
221 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
222 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
224 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
225 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
226 list_del_init(&isec->list);
227 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
229 inode->i_security = NULL;
230 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
233 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
235 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
236 u32 sid = current_sid();
238 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
243 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
244 file->f_security = fsec;
249 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
251 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
252 file->f_security = NULL;
256 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
258 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
260 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
264 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
265 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
266 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
268 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
269 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
270 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
271 sb->s_security = sbsec;
276 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
278 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
279 sb->s_security = NULL;
283 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
285 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
287 "uses transition SIDs",
289 "uses genfs_contexts",
290 "not configured for labeling",
291 "uses mountpoint labeling",
294 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
296 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
298 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
307 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
310 static const match_table_t tokens = {
311 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
312 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
319 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
321 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
322 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
323 const struct cred *cred)
325 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
328 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
329 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
333 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
334 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
338 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 const struct cred *cred)
342 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
354 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
356 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
357 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
358 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
361 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
362 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
363 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
364 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
365 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
366 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
367 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
368 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
369 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
373 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
374 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
375 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
376 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
377 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
378 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
380 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
381 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
382 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
387 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
389 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
390 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
391 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
393 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
394 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
395 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
397 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
398 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
400 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
401 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
403 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
404 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
405 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
407 /* Initialize the root inode. */
408 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
410 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
411 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
412 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
414 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
416 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
417 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
418 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
419 struct inode_security_struct, list);
420 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
421 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
422 inode = igrab(inode);
424 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
428 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
429 list_del_init(&isec->list);
432 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
438 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
439 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
440 * mount options, or whatever.
442 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
443 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
446 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
447 char *context = NULL;
451 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
453 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
459 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
460 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
461 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
463 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
466 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
467 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
468 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
470 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
471 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
476 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
483 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
484 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
487 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
488 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
490 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
491 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
494 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
495 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
497 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
498 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
501 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
502 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
504 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
505 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
506 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
508 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
511 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
512 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
514 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
515 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
516 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
519 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
524 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
528 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
529 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
531 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
542 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
543 if (mnt_flags & flag)
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
552 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
555 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
577 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
578 "before the security server is initialized\n");
583 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
584 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
585 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
586 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
588 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
589 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
590 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
591 * will be used for both mounts)
593 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
598 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
599 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
600 * than once with different security options.
602 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
605 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
607 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
608 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
610 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
611 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
612 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
619 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
621 goto out_double_mount;
623 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
628 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
630 goto out_double_mount;
632 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
634 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
635 rootcontext_sid = sid;
637 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
639 goto out_double_mount;
641 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
645 defcontext_sid = sid;
647 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
649 goto out_double_mount;
651 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
660 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
661 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
662 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
663 goto out_double_mount;
668 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
669 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
671 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
672 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
674 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
675 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
679 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
681 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
685 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
689 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
690 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
691 * the superblock context if not already set.
694 if (!fscontext_sid) {
695 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
699 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
701 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
719 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
720 root_isec->initialized = 1;
723 if (defcontext_sid) {
724 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
726 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
727 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
731 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
732 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
738 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
741 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
743 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
747 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
748 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
752 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
753 struct super_block *newsb)
755 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
756 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
758 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
763 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
764 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
769 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
770 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
772 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
773 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
776 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
778 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
780 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
781 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
782 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
785 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
789 if (!set_rootcontext) {
790 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
791 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
794 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
796 if (set_rootcontext) {
797 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
798 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
799 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
800 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
802 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
805 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
806 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
809 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
810 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
813 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
814 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
815 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
817 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
819 /* Standard string-based options. */
820 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
822 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
827 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
831 if (context || defcontext) {
833 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
836 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
846 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
849 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
856 case Opt_rootcontext:
859 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
862 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
870 if (context || defcontext) {
872 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
875 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
881 case Opt_labelsupport:
885 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
892 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
896 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
898 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
903 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
904 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
919 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
930 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
932 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
935 char *options = data;
936 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
938 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
943 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
945 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
950 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
953 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
957 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
958 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
963 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
966 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
967 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
971 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
973 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
976 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
978 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
979 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
982 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
986 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
992 /* we need a comma before each option */
997 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1003 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1005 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1008 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1010 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1016 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1018 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1023 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1025 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1027 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1029 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1031 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1033 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1035 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1037 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1039 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1043 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1046 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1048 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1051 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1053 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1056 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1062 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1063 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1065 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1072 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1073 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1075 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1077 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1078 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1080 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1082 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1084 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1090 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1091 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1092 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1093 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1094 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1096 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1098 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1099 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1100 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1102 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1103 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1104 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1105 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1106 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1107 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1108 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1113 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1115 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1117 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1120 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1123 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1124 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1129 char *buffer, *path;
1131 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1135 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1139 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1140 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1141 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1142 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1146 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1148 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1152 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1160 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1161 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1163 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1164 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1166 struct dentry *dentry;
1167 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1168 char *context = NULL;
1172 if (isec->initialized)
1175 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1176 if (isec->initialized)
1179 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1180 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1181 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1182 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1183 server is ready to handle calls. */
1184 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1185 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1186 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1187 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1191 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1192 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1193 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1194 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1198 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1199 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1201 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1202 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1204 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1205 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1209 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1210 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1211 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1212 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1213 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1214 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1215 * be used again by userspace.
1220 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1221 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1227 context[len] = '\0';
1228 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1230 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1233 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1234 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1241 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1247 context[len] = '\0';
1248 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1254 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1255 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1256 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1257 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1261 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1262 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1265 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1269 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1270 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1272 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1273 if (printk_ratelimit())
1274 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1275 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1276 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1278 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1279 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1280 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1283 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1291 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1292 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1294 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1295 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1296 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1298 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1299 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1300 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1301 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1306 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1307 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1310 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1311 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1313 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1315 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1316 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1327 isec->initialized = 1;
1330 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1332 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1333 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1337 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1338 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1344 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1345 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1348 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1349 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1352 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1353 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1356 /* All other signals. */
1357 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1365 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1366 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1368 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1369 const struct cred *target,
1372 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1374 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1378 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1379 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1380 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1381 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1383 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1384 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1387 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1391 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1392 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1394 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1398 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1399 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1400 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1401 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1403 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1408 sid = current_sid();
1409 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1410 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1413 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1414 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1417 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1418 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1419 const struct cred *cred,
1422 struct common_audit_data ad;
1423 struct av_decision avd;
1425 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1426 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1429 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1433 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1435 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1438 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1442 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1447 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1448 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1449 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1456 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1457 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1460 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1462 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1463 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1466 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1467 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1468 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1469 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1470 struct inode *inode,
1472 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1475 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1478 validate_creds(cred);
1480 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1483 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1484 isec = inode->i_security;
1486 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1489 static int inode_has_perm_noadp(const struct cred *cred,
1490 struct inode *inode,
1494 struct common_audit_data ad;
1496 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
1498 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
1501 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1502 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1503 pathname if needed. */
1504 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1505 struct dentry *dentry,
1508 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1509 struct common_audit_data ad;
1511 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1512 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1513 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1516 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1517 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1518 pathname if needed. */
1519 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1523 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1524 struct common_audit_data ad;
1526 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1528 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1531 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1532 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1533 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1534 check a particular permission to the file.
1535 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1536 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1537 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1538 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1539 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1543 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1544 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1545 struct common_audit_data ad;
1546 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1549 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
1550 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1552 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1553 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1561 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1564 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1570 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1571 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1572 struct dentry *dentry,
1575 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1576 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1577 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1579 struct common_audit_data ad;
1582 dsec = dir->i_security;
1583 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1586 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1588 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1589 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1591 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1592 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1597 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1598 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1599 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1604 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1608 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1609 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1610 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1613 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1614 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1615 struct task_struct *ctx)
1617 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1619 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1623 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1626 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1627 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1628 struct dentry *dentry,
1632 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1633 struct common_audit_data ad;
1634 u32 sid = current_sid();
1638 dsec = dir->i_security;
1639 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1641 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1642 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1645 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1646 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1661 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1666 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1670 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1671 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1672 struct inode *new_dir,
1673 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1675 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1676 struct common_audit_data ad;
1677 u32 sid = current_sid();
1679 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1682 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1683 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1684 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1685 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1687 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
1689 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1690 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1691 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1694 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1695 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1698 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1699 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1700 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1705 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1706 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1707 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1708 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1709 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1712 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1713 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1714 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1715 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1717 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1725 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1726 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1727 struct super_block *sb,
1729 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1731 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1732 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1734 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1735 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1738 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1739 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1743 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1744 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1745 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1746 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1749 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1751 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1755 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1757 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1759 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1766 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1767 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1771 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1773 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1774 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1781 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1790 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1793 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1795 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1797 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1803 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1805 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1810 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1814 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1815 u32 sid = current_sid();
1816 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1817 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1820 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1823 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1827 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1831 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1834 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1835 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1839 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1843 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1846 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1847 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1848 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1849 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1853 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1854 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1858 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1862 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1863 * which was removed).
1865 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1866 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1867 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1868 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1871 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1872 struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
1876 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
1880 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1883 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1885 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1897 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1902 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1905 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1911 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1913 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1915 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1918 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1923 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1924 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1925 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1927 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1928 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1929 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1930 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1931 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1933 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1934 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1935 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1936 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1937 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1939 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1946 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1947 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1948 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1950 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1951 * processes that allocate mappings.
1953 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1955 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1957 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
1958 &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1959 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1963 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1966 /* binprm security operations */
1968 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1970 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1971 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1972 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1973 struct common_audit_data ad;
1974 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1977 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1981 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1982 * the script interpreter */
1983 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1986 old_tsec = current_security();
1987 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1988 isec = inode->i_security;
1990 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1991 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1992 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1994 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1995 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1996 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1997 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1999 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2000 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2001 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2002 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2004 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2005 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2006 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2012 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, PATH);
2013 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2015 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2016 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2018 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2019 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2020 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2024 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2025 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2026 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2030 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2031 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2035 /* Check for shared state */
2036 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2037 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2038 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2044 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2045 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2047 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2048 struct task_struct *tracer;
2049 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2053 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2054 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2055 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2061 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2063 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2069 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2070 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2076 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2078 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2086 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2087 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2088 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2089 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2091 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2094 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2097 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2098 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2099 struct files_struct *files)
2101 struct common_audit_data ad;
2102 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2103 struct tty_struct *tty;
2104 struct fdtable *fdt;
2108 tty = get_current_tty();
2110 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2111 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2112 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2113 struct inode *inode;
2115 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2116 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2117 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2118 file may belong to another process and we are only
2119 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2120 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2121 struct tty_file_private, list);
2122 file = file_priv->file;
2123 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2124 if (inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode,
2125 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, 0)) {
2129 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2132 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2136 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2138 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2140 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2142 unsigned long set, i;
2147 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2148 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2150 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2153 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2154 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2159 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2161 file_to_av(file))) {
2163 fd = get_unused_fd();
2173 devnull = dentry_open(
2175 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2177 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2184 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2189 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2192 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2196 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2198 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2200 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2201 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2204 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2205 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2208 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2209 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2211 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2212 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2214 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2215 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2216 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2218 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2219 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2220 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2221 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2222 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2224 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2225 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2227 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2229 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2230 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2231 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2232 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2234 task_unlock(current);
2235 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2240 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2243 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2245 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2246 struct itimerval itimer;
2256 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2257 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2258 * flush and unblock signals.
2260 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2261 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2263 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2265 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2266 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2267 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2268 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2269 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2270 __flush_signals(current);
2271 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2272 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2274 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2277 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2278 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2279 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2280 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2281 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2284 /* superblock security operations */
2286 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2288 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2291 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2293 superblock_free_security(sb);
2296 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2301 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2304 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2306 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2307 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2308 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2309 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2310 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2313 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2320 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2324 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2327 int current_size = 0;
2335 while (current_size < len) {
2345 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2347 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2348 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2349 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2355 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2363 in_save = in_end = orig;
2367 open_quote = !open_quote;
2368 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2370 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2372 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2373 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2375 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2377 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2379 } while (*in_end++);
2381 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2382 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2387 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2390 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2391 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2392 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2394 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2400 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2403 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2404 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2407 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2409 goto out_free_secdata;
2411 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2413 goto out_free_secdata;
2415 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2416 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2418 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2422 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2424 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2425 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2427 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2428 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2429 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2435 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2436 goto out_bad_option;
2439 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2440 goto out_bad_option;
2442 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2443 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2444 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2446 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2447 goto out_bad_option;
2450 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2451 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2452 goto out_bad_option;
2461 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2463 free_secdata(secdata);
2466 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2467 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2472 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2474 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2475 struct common_audit_data ad;
2478 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2482 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2483 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2486 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2487 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2488 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2491 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2493 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2494 struct common_audit_data ad;
2496 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2497 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2498 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2501 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2504 unsigned long flags,
2507 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2509 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2510 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2511 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2513 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2516 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2518 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2520 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2521 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2524 /* inode security operations */
2526 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2528 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2531 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2533 inode_free_security(inode);
2536 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2537 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2538 void **value, size_t *len)
2540 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2541 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2542 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2543 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2545 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2547 dsec = dir->i_security;
2548 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2551 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2553 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2554 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2555 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2556 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2557 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2558 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2561 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2562 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2565 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2570 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2571 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2572 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2573 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2575 isec->initialized = 1;
2578 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2582 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2589 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2601 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2603 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2606 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2608 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2611 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2613 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2616 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2618 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2621 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2623 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2626 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2628 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2631 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2633 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2636 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2637 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2639 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2642 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2644 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2646 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2649 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2651 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2653 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2656 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2658 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2659 struct common_audit_data ad;
2662 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2664 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2665 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2667 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2671 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, INODE);
2675 ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2677 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2679 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad, flags);
2682 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2684 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2685 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2687 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2688 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2689 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2695 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2696 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2697 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2699 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2702 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2704 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2707 path.dentry = dentry;
2710 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2713 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2715 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2717 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2718 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2719 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2720 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2722 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2723 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2724 Restrict to administrator. */
2729 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2730 ordinary setattr permission. */
2731 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2734 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2735 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2737 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2738 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2739 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2740 struct common_audit_data ad;
2741 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2744 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2745 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2747 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2748 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2751 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2754 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
2755 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2757 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2758 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2762 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2763 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2764 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2766 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2771 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2772 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2776 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2781 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2783 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2784 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2788 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2789 const void *value, size_t size,
2792 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2793 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2797 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2798 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2802 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2804 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2805 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2806 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2814 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2816 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2818 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2821 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2823 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2825 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2828 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2830 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2831 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2833 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2834 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2839 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2841 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2843 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2847 char *context = NULL;
2848 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2850 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2854 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2855 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2856 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2857 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2858 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2859 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2860 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2862 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
2863 &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2864 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2866 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2869 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2882 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2883 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2885 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2889 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2892 if (!value || !size)
2895 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2900 isec->initialized = 1;
2904 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2906 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2907 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2908 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2912 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2914 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2918 /* file security operations */
2920 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2922 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2923 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2925 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2926 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2929 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2930 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2933 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2935 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2936 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2937 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2938 u32 sid = current_sid();
2941 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2944 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2945 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2946 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2949 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2952 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2954 return file_alloc_security(file);
2957 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2959 file_free_security(file);
2962 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2965 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2975 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2977 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2978 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2981 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2983 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2984 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2987 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2991 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
2996 error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
2997 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3000 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3001 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3004 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3009 static int default_noexec;
3011 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3013 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3016 if (default_noexec &&
3017 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3019 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3020 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3021 * This has an additional check.
3023 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3029 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3030 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3032 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3033 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3036 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3037 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3039 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3046 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3047 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3048 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3051 u32 sid = current_sid();
3054 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3055 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3056 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3057 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3059 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3060 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3061 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3066 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3067 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3068 if (rc || addr_only)
3071 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3074 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3075 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3078 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3079 unsigned long reqprot,
3082 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3084 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3087 if (default_noexec &&
3088 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3090 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3091 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3092 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3093 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3094 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3095 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3096 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3097 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3099 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3100 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3101 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3102 * modified content. This typically should only
3103 * occur for text relocations.
3105 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3111 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3114 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3116 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3118 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3121 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3124 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3129 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3134 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3135 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3144 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3145 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3150 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3155 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3159 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3166 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3168 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3170 fsec = file->f_security;
3171 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3176 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3177 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3180 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3182 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3184 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3185 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3187 fsec = file->f_security;
3190 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3192 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3194 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3195 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3198 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3200 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3202 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3205 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3207 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3208 struct inode *inode;
3209 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3211 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3212 fsec = file->f_security;
3213 isec = inode->i_security;
3215 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3216 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3217 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3218 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3219 * struct as its SID.
3221 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3222 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3224 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3225 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3226 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3227 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3228 * new inode label or new policy.
3229 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3231 return inode_has_perm_noadp(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), 0);
3234 /* task security operations */
3236 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3238 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3242 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3244 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3246 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3248 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3252 cred->security = tsec;
3257 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3259 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3261 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3264 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3265 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3267 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3268 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3273 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3275 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3278 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3279 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3281 old_tsec = old->security;
3283 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3287 new->security = tsec;
3292 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3294 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3296 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3297 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3303 * set the security data for a kernel service
3304 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3306 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3308 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3309 u32 sid = current_sid();
3312 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3313 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3314 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3318 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3319 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3320 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3326 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3327 * objective context of the specified inode
3329 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3331 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3332 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3333 u32 sid = current_sid();
3336 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3337 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3338 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3342 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3346 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3349 struct common_audit_data ad;
3351 sid = task_sid(current);
3353 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3354 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3356 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3357 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3360 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3362 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3365 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3367 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3370 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3372 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3375 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3377 *secid = task_sid(p);
3380 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3384 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3388 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3391 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3395 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3399 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3402 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3404 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3407 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3408 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3410 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3412 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3413 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3414 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3415 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3416 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3417 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3422 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3426 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3430 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3433 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3435 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3438 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3440 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3443 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3450 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3452 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3454 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3455 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3457 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3461 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3463 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3466 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3467 struct inode *inode)
3469 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3470 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3473 isec->initialized = 1;
3476 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3477 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3478 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3480 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3481 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3483 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3484 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3488 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3489 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3492 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3493 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3497 *proto = ih->protocol;
3499 switch (ih->protocol) {
3501 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3503 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3507 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3511 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3512 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3517 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3519 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3523 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3527 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3528 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3532 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3533 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3535 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3539 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3543 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3544 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3555 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3557 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3558 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3559 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3562 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3563 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3566 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3567 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3571 ad->u.net.v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3572 ad->u.net.v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3575 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3576 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3577 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3586 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3588 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3592 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3593 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3598 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3600 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3604 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3605 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3609 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3610 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3612 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3616 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3617 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3621 /* includes fragments */
3631 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3632 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3637 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3639 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3642 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3643 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3646 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3648 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3651 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3652 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3662 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3663 " unable to parse packet\n");
3673 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3675 * @family: protocol family
3676 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3679 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3680 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3681 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3682 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3683 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3687 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3694 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3695 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3697 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3698 if (unlikely(err)) {
3700 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3701 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3708 /* socket security operations */
3710 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3711 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3713 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3714 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3718 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3722 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3724 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3725 struct common_audit_data ad;
3726 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3728 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3731 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3734 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3737 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3738 int protocol, int kern)
3740 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3748 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3749 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3753 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3756 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3757 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3759 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3760 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3761 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3764 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3767 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3769 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3774 isec->initialized = 1;
3777 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3778 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3779 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3780 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3786 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3787 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3788 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3790 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3792 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3796 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3801 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3802 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3803 * check the first address now.
3805 family = sk->sk_family;
3806 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3808 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3809 struct common_audit_data ad;
3810 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3811 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3812 unsigned short snum;
3815 if (family == PF_INET) {
3816 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3817 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3818 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3820 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3821 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3822 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3828 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3830 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3831 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3835 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3836 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3837 ad.u.net.family = family;
3838 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3840 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3846 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3847 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3848 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3851 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3852 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3855 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3856 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3860 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3864 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3868 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3869 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3870 ad.u.net.family = family;
3872 if (family == PF_INET)
3873 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3875 ad.u.net.v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3877 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3878 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3886 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3888 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3889 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3892 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3897 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3899 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3900 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3901 struct common_audit_data ad;
3902 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3903 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3904 unsigned short snum;
3907 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3908 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3909 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3911 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3913 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3914 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3916 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3919 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3923 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3924 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3926 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3927 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3928 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3929 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3934 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3940 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3942 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3945 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3948 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3949 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3951 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3955 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3957 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3958 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3959 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3960 newisec->initialized = 1;
3965 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3968 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3971 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3972 int size, int flags)
3974 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3977 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3979 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3982 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3984 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3987 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3991 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3995 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3998 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4001 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4004 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4006 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4009 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4013 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4014 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4015 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4016 struct common_audit_data ad;
4019 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4020 ad.u.net.sk = other;
4022 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4023 sksec_other->sclass,
4024 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4028 /* server child socket */
4029 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4030 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4035 /* connecting socket */
4036 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4041 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4042 struct socket *other)
4044 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4045 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4046 struct common_audit_data ad;
4048 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4049 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4051 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4055 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4057 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4063 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4066 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4067 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4071 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4074 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4075 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4078 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4082 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4083 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4084 struct common_audit_data ad;
4087 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4088 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4089 ad.u.net.family = family;
4090 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4094 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4095 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4101 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4104 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4109 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4112 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4113 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4114 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4115 struct common_audit_data ad;
4120 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4123 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4124 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4127 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4128 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4129 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4130 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4131 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4132 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4134 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4135 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4136 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4139 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4140 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4141 ad.u.net.family = family;
4142 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4146 if (peerlbl_active) {
4149 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4152 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4155 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4158 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4161 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4164 if (secmark_active) {
4165 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4174 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4175 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4180 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4181 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4183 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4184 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4185 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4186 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4187 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4189 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4193 if (scontext_len > len) {
4198 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4202 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4208 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4210 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4213 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4215 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4218 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4222 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4223 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4225 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4228 *secid = peer_secid;
4229 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4234 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4236 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4238 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4242 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4243 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4244 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4245 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4250 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4252 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4254 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4255 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4259 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4261 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4262 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4264 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4265 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4266 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4268 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4271 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4274 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4276 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4278 *secid = sksec->sid;
4282 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4284 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4285 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4287 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4288 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4289 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4290 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4293 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4294 struct request_sock *req)
4296 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4298 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4302 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4303 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4306 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4309 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4310 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4311 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4313 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4316 req->secid = newsid;
4317 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4320 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4323 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4324 const struct request_sock *req)
4326 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4328 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4329 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4330 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4331 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4332 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4333 time it will have been created and available. */
4335 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4336 * thread with access to newsksec */
4337 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4340 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4342 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4343 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4345 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4346 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4349 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4352 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4354 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4357 __tsec = current_security();
4360 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4363 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4365 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4368 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4370 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4373 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4376 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4379 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4381 u32 sid = current_sid();
4383 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4384 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4385 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4386 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4387 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4388 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4390 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4394 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4396 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4398 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4399 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4400 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4401 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4402 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4403 * protocols were being used */
4405 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4406 * the sockcreate SID here */
4408 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4409 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4412 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4414 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4415 u32 sid = current_sid();
4418 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4419 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4422 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4423 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4432 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4436 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4437 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4439 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4443 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4445 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4447 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4448 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4449 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4450 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4451 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4452 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4462 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4467 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4469 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4475 struct common_audit_data ad;
4480 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4483 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4484 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4485 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4486 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4489 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4492 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4493 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4494 ad.u.net.family = family;
4495 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4498 if (peerlbl_active) {
4499 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4502 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4508 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4509 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4513 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4514 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4515 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4517 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4523 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4524 struct sk_buff *skb,
4525 const struct net_device *in,
4526 const struct net_device *out,
4527 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4529 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4532 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4533 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4534 struct sk_buff *skb,
4535 const struct net_device *in,
4536 const struct net_device *out,
4537 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4539 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4543 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4548 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4551 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4552 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4553 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4555 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4558 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4559 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4565 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4566 struct sk_buff *skb,
4567 const struct net_device *in,
4568 const struct net_device *out,
4569 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4571 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4574 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4578 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4579 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4580 struct common_audit_data ad;
4586 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4588 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4589 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4590 ad.u.net.family = family;
4591 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4594 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4595 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4596 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4597 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4599 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4600 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4605 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4611 struct common_audit_data ad;
4616 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4617 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4618 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4619 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4620 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4621 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4623 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4624 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4625 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4626 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4627 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4628 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4629 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4632 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4633 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4634 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4637 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4638 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4639 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4640 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4644 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4645 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4648 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4649 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4652 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4653 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4654 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4657 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4658 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4659 ad.u.net.family = family;
4660 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4664 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4665 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4666 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4668 if (peerlbl_active) {
4672 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4674 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4675 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4676 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4678 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4680 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4681 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4682 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4688 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4689 struct sk_buff *skb,
4690 const struct net_device *in,
4691 const struct net_device *out,
4692 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4694 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4697 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4698 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4699 struct sk_buff *skb,
4700 const struct net_device *in,
4701 const struct net_device *out,
4702 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4704 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4708 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4710 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4714 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4718 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4721 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4724 struct common_audit_data ad;
4727 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4731 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4732 ad.u.cap = capability;
4734 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
4735 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
4736 CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4739 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4740 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4743 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4746 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4750 sid = task_sid(task);
4751 isec->sclass = sclass;
4753 perm->security = isec;
4758 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4760 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4761 perm->security = NULL;
4765 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4767 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4769 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4773 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4774 msg->security = msec;
4779 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4781 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4783 msg->security = NULL;
4787 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4790 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4791 struct common_audit_data ad;
4792 u32 sid = current_sid();
4794 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4796 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4797 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4799 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4802 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4804 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4807 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4809 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4812 /* message queue security operations */
4813 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4815 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4816 struct common_audit_data ad;
4817 u32 sid = current_sid();
4820 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4824 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4826 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4827 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4829 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4832 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4838 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4840 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4843 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4845 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4846 struct common_audit_data ad;
4847 u32 sid = current_sid();
4849 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4851 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4852 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4854 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4855 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4858 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4866 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4867 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4870 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4873 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4876 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4882 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4886 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4888 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4889 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4890 struct common_audit_data ad;
4891 u32 sid = current_sid();
4894 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4895 msec = msg->security;
4898 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4900 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4902 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4903 * message queue this message will be stored in
4905 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4911 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4912 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4914 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4915 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4918 /* Can this process send the message */
4919 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4922 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4923 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4924 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4929 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4930 struct task_struct *target,
4931 long type, int mode)
4933 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4934 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4935 struct common_audit_data ad;
4936 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4939 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4940 msec = msg->security;
4942 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4943 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4945 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4946 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4948 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4949 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4953 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4954 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4956 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4957 struct common_audit_data ad;
4958 u32 sid = current_sid();
4961 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4965 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4967 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4968 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4970 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4973 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4979 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4981 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4984 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4986 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4987 struct common_audit_data ad;
4988 u32 sid = current_sid();
4990 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4992 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4993 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4995 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4996 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4999 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5000 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5008 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5009 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5012 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5015 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5022 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5028 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5032 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5033 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5037 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5040 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5042 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5045 /* Semaphore security operations */
5046 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5048 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5049 struct common_audit_data ad;
5050 u32 sid = current_sid();
5053 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5057 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5059 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5060 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5062 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5065 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5071 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5073 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5076 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5078 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5079 struct common_audit_data ad;
5080 u32 sid = current_sid();
5082 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5084 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5085 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5087 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5088 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5091 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5092 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5100 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5101 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5105 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5116 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5119 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5123 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5129 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5133 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5134 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5139 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5143 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5146 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5152 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5154 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5159 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5162 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5164 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5168 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5171 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5174 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5175 char *name, char **value)
5177 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5183 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5189 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5191 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5193 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5195 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5196 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5197 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5198 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5199 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5200 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5201 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5202 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5210 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5220 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5221 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5223 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5224 struct task_struct *tracer;
5231 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5232 security attributes. */
5237 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5238 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5239 * above restriction is ever removed.
5241 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5242 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5243 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5244 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5245 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5246 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5247 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5248 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5249 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5250 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5256 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5257 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5258 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5262 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5263 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5264 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5266 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5273 new = prepare_creds();
5277 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5278 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5279 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5280 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5281 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5282 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5283 tsec = new->security;
5284 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5285 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5286 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5287 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5288 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5289 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5292 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5293 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5294 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5295 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5300 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5302 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5303 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5308 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5309 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5310 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5314 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5315 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5318 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5320 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5324 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5325 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5344 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5346 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5349 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5351 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5354 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5360 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5362 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5364 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5368 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5370 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5372 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5375 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5378 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5387 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5388 unsigned long flags)
5390 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5391 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5393 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5397 tsec = cred->security;
5398 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5399 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5401 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5407 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5409 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5415 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5416 const struct cred *cred,
5420 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5423 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5424 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5425 appear to be created. */
5429 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5431 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5432 ksec = key->security;
5434 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5437 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5439 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5440 char *context = NULL;
5444 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5453 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5456 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5457 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5458 .capget = selinux_capget,
5459 .capset = selinux_capset,
5460 .capable = selinux_capable,
5461 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5462 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5463 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5464 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5466 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5467 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5469 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5470 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5471 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5472 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5474 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5475 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5476 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5477 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5478 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5479 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5480 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5481 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5482 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5483 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5484 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5485 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5488 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5489 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5490 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5491 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5492 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5493 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5494 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5495 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5496 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5497 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5498 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5499 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5500 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5501 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5502 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5503 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5504 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5505 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5506 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5507 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5508 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5509 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5510 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5511 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5512 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5514 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5515 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5516 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5517 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5518 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5519 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5520 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5521 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5522 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5523 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5524 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5526 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5528 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5529 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5530 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5531 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5532 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5533 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5534 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5535 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5536 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5537 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5538 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5539 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5540 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5541 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5542 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5543 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5544 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5545 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5546 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5547 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5548 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5549 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5551 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5552 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5554 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5555 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5557 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5558 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5559 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5560 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5561 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5562 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5564 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5565 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5566 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5567 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5568 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5570 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5571 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5572 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5573 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5574 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5576 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5578 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5579 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5581 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5582 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5583 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5584 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5585 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5586 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5588 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5589 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5591 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5592 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5593 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5594 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5595 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5596 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5597 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5598 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5599 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5600 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5601 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5602 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5603 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5604 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5605 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5606 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5607 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5608 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5609 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5610 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5611 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5612 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5613 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5614 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5615 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5616 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5617 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5618 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5619 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5620 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5621 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5623 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5624 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5625 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5626 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5627 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5628 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5629 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5630 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5631 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5632 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5633 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5637 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5638 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5639 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5640 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5644 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5645 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5646 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5647 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5651 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5653 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5654 selinux_enabled = 0;
5658 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5659 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5663 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5665 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5666 cred_init_security();
5668 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5670 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5671 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5672 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5675 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5676 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5678 if (selinux_enforcing)
5679 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5681 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5686 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5688 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5691 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5693 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5695 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5696 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5697 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5700 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5701 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5702 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5704 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5706 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5708 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5709 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5711 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5712 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5715 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5716 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5718 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5719 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5722 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5723 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5725 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5726 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5730 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5732 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5734 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5735 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5737 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5738 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5741 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5742 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5744 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5745 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5751 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5755 if (!selinux_enabled)
5758 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5760 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5762 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5764 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5765 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5767 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5774 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5776 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5777 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5779 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5781 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5782 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5783 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5788 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5790 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5791 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5794 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5796 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5797 static int selinux_disabled;
5799 int selinux_disable(void)
5801 if (ss_initialized) {
5802 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5806 if (selinux_disabled) {
5807 /* Only do this once. */
5811 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5813 selinux_disabled = 1;
5814 selinux_enabled = 0;
5816 reset_security_ops();
5818 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5821 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5822 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5824 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */