2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
64 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65 #include <net/netlink.h>
66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
67 #include <linux/udp.h>
68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
69 #include <linux/quota.h>
70 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
72 #include <linux/parser.h>
73 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
75 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
76 #include <linux/personality.h>
77 #include <linux/audit.h>
78 #include <linux/string.h>
79 #include <linux/selinux.h>
80 #include <linux/mutex.h>
81 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
82 #include <linux/syslog.h>
83 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
84 #include <linux/export.h>
85 #include <linux/security.h>
86 #include <linux/msg.h>
87 #include <linux/shm.h>
99 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
101 /* SECMARK reference count */
102 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
104 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
105 int selinux_enforcing;
107 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
109 unsigned long enforcing;
110 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
111 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
114 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
117 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
118 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
120 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
122 unsigned long enabled;
123 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
124 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
127 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
129 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
135 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
138 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
139 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
140 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
141 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
142 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
145 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
147 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
151 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
154 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
155 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
156 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
157 * is always considered enabled.
160 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
162 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
166 * initialise the security for the init task
168 static void cred_init_security(void)
170 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
171 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
173 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
175 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
177 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
178 cred->security = tsec;
182 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
184 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
186 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
188 tsec = cred->security;
193 * get the objective security ID of a task
195 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
200 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
206 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
208 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
210 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
215 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
217 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
219 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
220 u32 sid = current_sid();
222 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
226 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
227 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
229 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
230 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
231 isec->task_sid = sid;
232 inode->i_security = isec;
237 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
239 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
241 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
247 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
248 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
250 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
252 list_del_init(&isec->list);
253 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
256 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
257 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
258 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
259 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
260 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
261 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
262 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
264 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
267 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
269 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
270 u32 sid = current_sid();
272 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
277 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
278 file->f_security = fsec;
283 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
285 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
286 file->f_security = NULL;
290 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
292 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
294 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
298 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
299 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
300 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
302 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
303 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
304 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
305 sb->s_security = sbsec;
310 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
312 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
313 sb->s_security = NULL;
317 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
319 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
321 "uses transition SIDs",
323 "uses genfs_contexts",
324 "not configured for labeling",
325 "uses mountpoint labeling",
326 "uses native labeling",
329 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
331 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
333 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
342 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
346 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
348 static const match_table_t tokens = {
349 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
350 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
351 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
352 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
353 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
357 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
359 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
360 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
361 const struct cred *cred)
363 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
366 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
367 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
371 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
372 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
376 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
377 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
378 const struct cred *cred)
380 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
387 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
388 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
392 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
394 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
396 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
397 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
398 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
401 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
402 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
407 * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
409 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
415 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
417 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
418 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
419 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
422 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
423 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
424 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
425 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
426 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
427 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
428 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
430 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
434 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
435 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
436 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
437 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
438 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
439 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
441 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
442 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
443 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
448 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
449 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
450 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
452 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
453 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
454 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
456 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
457 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
458 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
460 /* Initialize the root inode. */
461 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
463 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
464 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
465 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
467 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
469 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
470 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
471 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
472 struct inode_security_struct, list);
473 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
474 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
475 inode = igrab(inode);
477 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
481 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
482 list_del_init(&isec->list);
485 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
491 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
492 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
493 * mount options, or whatever.
495 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
496 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
499 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
500 char *context = NULL;
504 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
506 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
512 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
513 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
515 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
516 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
517 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
519 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
522 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
523 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
524 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
526 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
527 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
532 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
533 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
539 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
540 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
543 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
544 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
546 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
547 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
550 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
551 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
553 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
554 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
557 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
558 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
560 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
561 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
562 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
564 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
567 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
568 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
570 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
571 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
572 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
575 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
580 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
584 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
585 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
587 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
589 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
590 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
591 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
592 (old_sid != new_sid))
595 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
596 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
598 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
599 if (mnt_flags & flag)
605 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
606 * labeling information.
608 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
609 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
610 unsigned long kern_flags,
611 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
613 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
615 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
616 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
617 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
618 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
619 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
620 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
621 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
622 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
623 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
625 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
627 if (!ss_initialized) {
629 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
630 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
631 server is ready to handle calls. */
635 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
636 "before the security server is initialized\n");
639 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
640 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
641 * place the results is not allowed */
647 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
648 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
649 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
650 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
652 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
653 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
654 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
655 * will be used for both mounts)
657 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
662 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
663 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
664 * than once with different security options.
666 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
669 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
671 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
672 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
674 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
675 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
676 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
683 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
685 goto out_double_mount;
687 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
692 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
694 goto out_double_mount;
696 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
698 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
699 rootcontext_sid = sid;
701 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
703 goto out_double_mount;
705 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
709 defcontext_sid = sid;
711 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
713 goto out_double_mount;
715 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
724 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
725 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
726 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
727 goto out_double_mount;
732 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
733 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
735 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
737 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
740 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
743 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
744 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
748 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
750 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
754 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
758 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
759 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
760 * the superblock context if not already set.
762 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
763 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
764 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
768 if (!fscontext_sid) {
769 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
773 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
775 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
780 if (!rootcontext_sid)
781 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
783 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
784 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
787 if (rootcontext_sid) {
788 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
793 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
794 root_isec->initialized = 1;
797 if (defcontext_sid) {
798 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
799 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
801 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
802 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
806 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
807 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
813 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
816 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
818 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
822 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
823 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
827 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
828 const struct super_block *newsb)
830 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
831 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
832 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
833 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
835 if (oldflags != newflags)
837 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
839 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
841 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
843 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
844 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = oldsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
845 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = newsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
846 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
851 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
852 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
853 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
857 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
858 struct super_block *newsb)
860 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
861 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
863 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
864 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
865 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
868 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
869 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
874 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
875 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
877 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
878 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
879 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
881 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
883 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
885 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
886 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
887 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
890 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
894 if (!set_rootcontext) {
895 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
896 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
899 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
901 if (set_rootcontext) {
902 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
903 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
904 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
905 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
907 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
910 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
911 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
915 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
916 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
919 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
920 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
921 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
923 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
925 /* Standard string-based options. */
926 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
928 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
933 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
937 if (context || defcontext) {
939 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
942 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
952 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
955 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
962 case Opt_rootcontext:
965 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
968 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
976 if (context || defcontext) {
978 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
981 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
987 case Opt_labelsupport:
991 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
998 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
1002 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
1003 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
1004 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1009 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1010 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1013 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1014 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1017 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1018 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1021 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1022 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1025 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1036 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1038 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1041 char *options = data;
1042 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1044 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1049 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1051 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1056 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1059 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1063 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1064 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1069 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1072 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1073 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1077 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1079 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1082 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1084 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1085 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1087 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1088 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1092 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1098 /* we need a comma before each option */
1100 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1103 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1109 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1111 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1114 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1116 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1122 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1124 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1129 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1131 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1133 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1135 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1137 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1139 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1141 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1143 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1145 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1149 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1152 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1154 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1157 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1159 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1162 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1168 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1169 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1178 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1179 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1181 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1183 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1184 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1186 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1188 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1190 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1197 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1199 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1205 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1208 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1209 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1210 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1211 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1212 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1213 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1214 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1216 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1219 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1221 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1223 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1226 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1229 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1230 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1235 char *buffer, *path;
1237 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1241 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1245 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1246 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1247 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1248 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1252 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1254 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1258 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1266 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1267 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1269 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1270 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1272 struct dentry *dentry;
1273 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1274 char *context = NULL;
1278 if (isec->initialized)
1281 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1282 if (isec->initialized)
1285 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1286 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1287 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1288 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1289 server is ready to handle calls. */
1290 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1291 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1292 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1293 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1297 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1298 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1300 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1301 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1302 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1306 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1307 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1309 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1310 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1312 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1313 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1317 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1318 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1319 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1320 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1321 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1322 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1323 * be used again by userspace.
1328 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1329 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1335 context[len] = '\0';
1336 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1338 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1341 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1342 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1349 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1355 context[len] = '\0';
1356 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1362 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1363 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1364 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1365 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1369 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1370 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1373 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1377 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1378 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1380 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1381 if (printk_ratelimit())
1382 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1383 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1384 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1386 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1387 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1388 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1391 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1399 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1400 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1402 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1403 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1404 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1406 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1407 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1408 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1409 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1414 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1415 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1418 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1419 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1421 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1423 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1424 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1435 isec->initialized = 1;
1438 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1440 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1441 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1445 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1446 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1452 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1453 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1456 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1457 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1460 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1461 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1464 /* All other signals. */
1465 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1473 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1474 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1476 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1477 const struct cred *target,
1480 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1482 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1486 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1487 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1488 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1489 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1491 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1492 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1495 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1499 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1500 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1502 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1506 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1507 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1508 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1509 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1511 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1516 sid = current_sid();
1517 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1518 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1521 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1522 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1525 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1526 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1529 struct common_audit_data ad;
1530 struct av_decision avd;
1532 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1533 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1536 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1539 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1541 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1544 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1548 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1553 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1554 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1555 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1562 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1563 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1566 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1568 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1569 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1572 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1573 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1574 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1575 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1576 struct inode *inode,
1578 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1580 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1583 validate_creds(cred);
1585 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1588 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1589 isec = inode->i_security;
1591 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1594 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1595 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1596 pathname if needed. */
1597 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1598 struct dentry *dentry,
1601 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1602 struct common_audit_data ad;
1604 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1605 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1606 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1609 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1610 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1611 pathname if needed. */
1612 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1616 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1617 struct common_audit_data ad;
1619 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1621 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1624 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1625 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1629 struct common_audit_data ad;
1631 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1632 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1633 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1636 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1637 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1638 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1639 check a particular permission to the file.
1640 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1641 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1642 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1643 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1644 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1648 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1649 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1650 struct common_audit_data ad;
1651 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1654 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1655 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1657 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1658 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1666 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1669 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1675 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1676 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1677 struct dentry *dentry,
1680 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1681 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1682 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1684 struct common_audit_data ad;
1687 dsec = dir->i_security;
1688 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1691 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1693 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1694 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1696 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1697 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1702 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1703 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1704 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1709 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1713 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1714 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1715 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1718 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1719 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1720 struct task_struct *ctx)
1722 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1724 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1728 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1731 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1732 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1733 struct dentry *dentry,
1737 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1738 struct common_audit_data ad;
1739 u32 sid = current_sid();
1743 dsec = dir->i_security;
1744 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1746 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1747 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1750 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1751 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1766 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1771 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1775 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1776 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1777 struct inode *new_dir,
1778 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1780 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1781 struct common_audit_data ad;
1782 u32 sid = current_sid();
1784 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1787 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1788 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1789 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1790 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1792 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1794 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1795 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1796 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1799 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1800 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1803 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1804 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1805 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1810 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1811 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1812 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1813 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1814 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1817 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1818 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1819 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1820 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1822 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1830 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1831 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1832 struct super_block *sb,
1834 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1836 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1837 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1839 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1840 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1843 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1844 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1848 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1849 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1850 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1851 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1854 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1856 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1860 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1862 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1864 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1871 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1872 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1876 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1878 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1879 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1886 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1895 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1898 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1900 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1902 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1908 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1910 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1915 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1919 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1920 u32 sid = current_sid();
1921 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1922 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1925 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1928 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1932 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1936 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1939 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1940 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1944 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1948 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1951 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1952 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1953 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1954 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1958 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1959 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1963 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1967 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1968 * which was removed).
1970 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1971 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1972 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1973 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1976 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1981 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1985 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1988 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1990 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2002 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2007 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2010 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2016 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2018 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2020 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2023 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2028 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2029 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2030 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2032 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2033 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2034 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2035 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2036 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2038 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2039 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2040 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2041 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2042 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2044 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2051 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2052 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2053 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2055 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2056 * processes that allocate mappings.
2058 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2060 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2062 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2063 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2067 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2070 /* binprm security operations */
2072 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2074 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2075 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2076 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2077 struct common_audit_data ad;
2078 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2081 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2085 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2086 * the script interpreter */
2087 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2090 old_tsec = current_security();
2091 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2092 isec = inode->i_security;
2094 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2095 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2096 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2098 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2099 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2100 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2101 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2103 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2104 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2105 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2106 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2109 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
2110 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
2112 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
2115 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2116 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2117 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2123 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2124 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2126 if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
2127 (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
2128 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2130 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2131 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2132 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2136 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2137 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2138 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2142 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2143 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2147 /* Check for shared state */
2148 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2149 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2150 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2156 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2157 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2159 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2160 struct task_struct *tracer;
2161 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2165 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2166 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2167 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2173 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2175 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2181 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2182 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2188 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2190 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2198 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2199 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2200 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2201 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2203 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2206 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2209 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2211 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2214 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2215 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2216 struct files_struct *files)
2218 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2219 struct tty_struct *tty;
2223 tty = get_current_tty();
2225 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2226 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2227 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2229 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2230 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2231 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2232 open file may belong to another process and we are
2233 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2234 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2235 struct tty_file_private, list);
2236 file = file_priv->file;
2237 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2240 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2243 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2247 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2248 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2249 if (!n) /* none found? */
2252 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2253 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2255 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2257 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2258 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2264 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2266 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2268 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2269 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2272 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2273 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2276 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2277 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2279 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2280 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2282 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2283 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2284 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2286 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2287 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2288 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2289 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2290 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2292 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2293 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2295 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2297 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2298 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2299 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2300 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2302 task_unlock(current);
2303 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2308 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2311 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2313 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2314 struct itimerval itimer;
2324 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2325 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2326 * flush and unblock signals.
2328 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2329 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2331 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2333 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2334 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2335 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2336 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2337 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2338 __flush_signals(current);
2339 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2340 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2342 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2345 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2346 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2347 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2348 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2349 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2352 /* superblock security operations */
2354 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2356 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2359 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2361 superblock_free_security(sb);
2364 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2369 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2372 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2374 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2375 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2376 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2377 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2378 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2381 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2388 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2392 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2395 int current_size = 0;
2403 while (current_size < len) {
2413 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2415 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2416 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2417 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2423 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2431 in_save = in_end = orig;
2435 open_quote = !open_quote;
2436 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2438 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2440 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2441 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2443 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2445 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2447 } while (*in_end++);
2449 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2450 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2455 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2458 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2459 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2460 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2462 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2468 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2471 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2472 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2475 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2477 goto out_free_secdata;
2479 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2481 goto out_free_secdata;
2483 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2484 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2486 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2490 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2492 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2493 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2495 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2496 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2497 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2503 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2504 goto out_bad_option;
2507 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2508 goto out_bad_option;
2510 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2511 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2512 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2514 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2515 goto out_bad_option;
2518 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2519 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2520 goto out_bad_option;
2529 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2531 free_secdata(secdata);
2534 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2535 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2540 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2542 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2543 struct common_audit_data ad;
2546 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2550 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2551 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2554 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2555 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2556 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2559 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2561 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2562 struct common_audit_data ad;
2564 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2565 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2566 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2569 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2572 unsigned long flags,
2575 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2577 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2578 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2579 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2581 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2584 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2586 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2588 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2589 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2592 /* inode security operations */
2594 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2596 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2599 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2601 inode_free_security(inode);
2604 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2605 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2608 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2609 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2610 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2611 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2612 struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
2616 tsec = cred->security;
2617 dsec = dir->i_security;
2618 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2620 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2621 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2623 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2624 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2629 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2635 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2638 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2639 const struct qstr *qstr,
2641 void **value, size_t *len)
2643 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2644 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2645 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2646 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2650 dsec = dir->i_security;
2651 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2654 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2656 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2657 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2658 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2659 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2660 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2661 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2664 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2665 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2668 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2673 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2674 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2675 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2676 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2678 isec->initialized = 1;
2681 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2685 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2688 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2698 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2700 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2703 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2705 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2708 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2710 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2713 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2715 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2718 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2720 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2723 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2725 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2728 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2730 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2733 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2734 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2736 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2739 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2741 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2743 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2746 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2748 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2750 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2753 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2754 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2757 struct common_audit_data ad;
2758 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2761 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2764 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2765 audited, denied, &ad, flags);
2771 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2773 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2776 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2777 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2779 struct av_decision avd;
2781 u32 audited, denied;
2783 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2784 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2786 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2790 validate_creds(cred);
2792 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2795 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2797 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2798 isec = inode->i_security;
2800 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2801 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2802 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2804 if (likely(!audited))
2807 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
2813 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2815 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2816 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2817 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2819 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2820 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2821 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2827 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2828 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2829 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2831 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2834 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2837 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2839 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2842 path.dentry = dentry;
2845 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2848 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2850 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2852 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2853 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2854 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2855 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2857 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2858 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2859 Restrict to administrator. */
2864 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2865 ordinary setattr permission. */
2866 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2869 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2870 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2872 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2873 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2874 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2875 struct common_audit_data ad;
2876 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2879 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2880 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2882 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2883 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2886 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2889 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2890 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2892 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2893 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2897 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2898 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2899 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2900 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2904 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2905 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2908 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2909 audit_size = size - 1;
2916 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2917 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2918 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2923 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2928 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2929 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2933 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2938 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2940 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2941 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2945 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2946 const void *value, size_t size,
2949 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2950 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2954 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2955 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2959 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2961 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2962 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2963 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2967 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2969 isec->initialized = 1;
2974 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2976 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2978 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2981 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2983 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2985 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2988 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2990 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2991 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2993 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2994 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2999 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3001 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3003 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3007 char *context = NULL;
3008 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3010 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3014 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3015 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3016 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3017 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3018 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3019 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3020 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3022 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3023 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3025 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3028 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3041 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3042 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3044 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3048 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3051 if (!value || !size)
3054 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
3058 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3060 isec->initialized = 1;
3064 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3066 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3067 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3068 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3072 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3074 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3078 /* file security operations */
3080 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3082 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3083 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3085 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3086 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3089 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3090 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3093 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3095 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3096 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3097 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3098 u32 sid = current_sid();
3101 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3104 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3105 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3106 /* No change since file_open check. */
3109 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3112 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3114 return file_alloc_security(file);
3117 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3119 file_free_security(file);
3122 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3125 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3135 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3137 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3138 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3141 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3143 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3144 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3147 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3151 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3156 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3157 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3160 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3161 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3164 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3169 static int default_noexec;
3171 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3173 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3176 if (default_noexec &&
3177 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3179 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3180 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3181 * This has an additional check.
3183 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3189 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3190 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3192 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3193 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3196 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3197 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3199 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3206 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3209 u32 sid = current_sid();
3212 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3213 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3214 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3215 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3217 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3218 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3219 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3224 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3225 return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3228 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3229 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3231 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3234 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3235 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3238 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3239 unsigned long reqprot,
3242 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3244 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3247 if (default_noexec &&
3248 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3250 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3251 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3252 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3253 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3254 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3255 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3256 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3257 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3259 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3260 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3261 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3262 * modified content. This typically should only
3263 * occur for text relocations.
3265 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3271 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3274 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3276 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3278 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3281 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3284 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3289 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3290 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3299 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3300 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3301 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3306 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3311 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3318 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3320 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3322 fsec = file->f_security;
3323 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3328 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3329 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3332 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3334 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3336 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3337 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3339 fsec = file->f_security;
3342 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3344 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3346 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3347 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3350 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3352 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3354 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3357 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3359 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3360 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3362 fsec = file->f_security;
3363 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3365 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3366 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3367 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3368 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3369 * struct as its SID.
3371 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3372 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3374 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3375 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3376 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3377 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3378 * new inode label or new policy.
3379 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3381 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3384 /* task security operations */
3386 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3388 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3392 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3394 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3396 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3398 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3402 cred->security = tsec;
3407 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3409 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3411 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3414 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3415 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3417 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3418 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3423 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3425 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3428 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3429 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3431 old_tsec = old->security;
3433 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3437 new->security = tsec;
3442 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3444 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3446 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3447 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3453 * set the security data for a kernel service
3454 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3456 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3458 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3459 u32 sid = current_sid();
3462 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3463 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3464 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3468 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3469 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3470 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3476 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3477 * objective context of the specified inode
3479 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3481 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3482 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3483 u32 sid = current_sid();
3486 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3487 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3488 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3492 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3496 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3499 struct common_audit_data ad;
3501 sid = task_sid(current);
3503 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3504 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3506 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3507 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3510 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3512 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3515 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3517 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3520 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3522 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3525 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3527 *secid = task_sid(p);
3530 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3534 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3538 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3541 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3545 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3549 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3552 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3554 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3557 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3558 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3560 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3562 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3563 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3564 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3565 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3566 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3567 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3572 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3576 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3580 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3583 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3585 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3588 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3590 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3593 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3600 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3602 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3604 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3605 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3607 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3611 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3613 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3616 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3617 struct inode *inode)
3619 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3620 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3623 isec->initialized = 1;
3626 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3627 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3628 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3630 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3631 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3633 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3634 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3638 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3639 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3642 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3643 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3647 *proto = ih->protocol;
3649 switch (ih->protocol) {
3651 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3653 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3657 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3661 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3662 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3667 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3669 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3673 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3677 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3678 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3682 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3683 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3685 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3689 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3693 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3694 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3705 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3707 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3708 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3709 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3712 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3713 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3716 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3717 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3721 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3722 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3725 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3726 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3727 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3736 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3738 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3742 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3743 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3748 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3750 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3754 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3755 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3759 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3760 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3762 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3766 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3767 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3771 /* includes fragments */
3781 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3782 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3787 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3789 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3792 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3793 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3796 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3798 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3801 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3802 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3812 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3813 " unable to parse packet\n");
3823 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3825 * @family: protocol family
3826 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3829 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3830 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3831 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3832 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3833 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3837 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3844 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3847 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3851 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3852 if (unlikely(err)) {
3854 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3855 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3863 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3864 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3865 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3866 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3868 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3869 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3870 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3871 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3874 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
3878 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
3879 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
3886 /* socket security operations */
3888 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3889 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3891 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3892 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3896 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3900 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3902 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3903 struct common_audit_data ad;
3904 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3905 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3907 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3910 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3914 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3917 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3918 int protocol, int kern)
3920 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3928 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3929 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3933 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3936 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3937 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3939 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3940 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3941 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3944 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3947 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3949 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3954 isec->initialized = 1;
3957 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3958 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3959 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3960 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3966 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3967 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3968 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3970 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3972 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3976 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3981 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3982 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3983 * check the first address now.
3985 family = sk->sk_family;
3986 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3988 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3989 struct common_audit_data ad;
3990 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3991 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3992 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3993 unsigned short snum;
3996 if (family == PF_INET) {
3997 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3998 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3999 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4001 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4002 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4003 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4009 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4011 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4012 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4016 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4018 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4019 ad.u.net->family = family;
4020 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4022 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4028 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4029 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4030 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4033 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4034 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4037 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4038 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4042 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4046 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4050 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4052 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4053 ad.u.net->family = family;
4055 if (family == PF_INET)
4056 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4058 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4060 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4061 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4069 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4071 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4072 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4075 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4080 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4082 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4083 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4084 struct common_audit_data ad;
4085 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4086 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4087 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4088 unsigned short snum;
4091 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4092 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4093 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4095 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4097 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4098 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4100 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4103 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4107 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4108 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4110 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4112 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4113 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4114 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4119 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4125 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4127 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4130 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4133 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4134 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4136 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4140 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4142 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4143 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4144 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4145 newisec->initialized = 1;
4150 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4153 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4156 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4157 int size, int flags)
4159 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4162 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4164 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4167 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4169 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4172 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4176 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4180 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4183 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4186 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4189 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4191 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4194 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4198 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4199 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4200 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4201 struct common_audit_data ad;
4202 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4205 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4207 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4209 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4210 sksec_other->sclass,
4211 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4215 /* server child socket */
4216 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4217 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4222 /* connecting socket */
4223 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4228 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4229 struct socket *other)
4231 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4232 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4233 struct common_audit_data ad;
4234 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4236 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4238 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4240 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4244 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4246 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4252 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4255 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4256 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4260 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4263 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4264 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4267 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4271 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4272 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4273 struct common_audit_data ad;
4274 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4277 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4279 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4280 ad.u.net->family = family;
4281 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4285 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4286 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4292 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4295 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4300 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4303 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4304 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4305 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4306 struct common_audit_data ad;
4307 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4312 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4315 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4316 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4319 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4320 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4321 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4322 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4323 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4324 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4326 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4327 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4328 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4331 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4333 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4334 ad.u.net->family = family;
4335 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4339 if (peerlbl_active) {
4342 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4345 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4348 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4351 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4354 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4359 if (secmark_active) {
4360 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4369 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4370 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4375 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4376 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4378 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4379 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4380 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4381 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4382 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4384 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4388 if (scontext_len > len) {
4393 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4397 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4403 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4405 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4408 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4410 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4413 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4417 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4418 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4420 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4423 *secid = peer_secid;
4424 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4429 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4431 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4433 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4437 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4438 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4439 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4440 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4445 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4447 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4449 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4450 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4454 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4456 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4457 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4459 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4460 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4461 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4463 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4466 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4469 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4471 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4473 *secid = sksec->sid;
4477 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4479 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4480 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4482 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4483 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4484 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4485 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4488 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4489 struct request_sock *req)
4491 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4493 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4497 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4498 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4501 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4504 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4507 req->secid = connsid;
4508 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4510 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4513 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4514 const struct request_sock *req)
4516 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4518 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4519 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4520 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4521 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4522 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4523 time it will have been created and available. */
4525 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4526 * thread with access to newsksec */
4527 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4530 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4532 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4533 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4535 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4536 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4539 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4542 static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
4544 skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
4547 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4549 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4552 __tsec = current_security();
4555 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4558 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4560 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4563 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4565 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4568 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4571 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4574 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4576 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4578 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4581 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4587 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4592 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4594 u32 sid = current_sid();
4596 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4597 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4598 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4599 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4600 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4601 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4603 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4607 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4609 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4611 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4612 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4615 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4617 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4618 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4620 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4621 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4622 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4623 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4624 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4625 * protocols were being used */
4627 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4628 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4633 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4635 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4636 u32 sid = current_sid();
4639 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4640 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4643 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4644 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4652 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4656 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4657 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4659 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4663 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4665 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4667 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4668 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4669 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4670 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4671 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4672 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4682 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4687 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4689 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4695 struct common_audit_data ad;
4696 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4701 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4704 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4705 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4706 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4707 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4710 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4713 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4715 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4716 ad.u.net->family = family;
4717 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4720 if (peerlbl_active) {
4721 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4724 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4730 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4731 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4735 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4736 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4737 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4739 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4745 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4746 struct sk_buff *skb,
4747 const struct net_device *in,
4748 const struct net_device *out,
4749 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4751 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4754 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4755 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4756 struct sk_buff *skb,
4757 const struct net_device *in,
4758 const struct net_device *out,
4759 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4761 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4765 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4771 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4774 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4775 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4776 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4779 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4781 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4782 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4783 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4784 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4785 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4786 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4787 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4788 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4789 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4790 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4791 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4792 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4793 * best we can do. */
4796 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4797 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4800 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4801 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4807 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4808 struct sk_buff *skb,
4809 const struct net_device *in,
4810 const struct net_device *out,
4811 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4813 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4816 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4820 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4821 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4822 struct common_audit_data ad;
4823 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4829 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4831 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4833 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4834 ad.u.net->family = family;
4835 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4838 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4839 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4840 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4841 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4843 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4844 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4849 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4855 struct common_audit_data ad;
4856 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4861 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4862 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4863 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4864 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4865 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4866 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4868 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4869 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4870 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4876 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4877 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4878 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4879 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4880 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4881 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4882 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4883 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4884 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4885 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4887 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4888 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
4893 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4894 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4895 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4896 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4898 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4899 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4902 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4903 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4905 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
4906 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
4907 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
4908 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
4909 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
4910 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
4911 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
4912 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
4913 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
4914 * for similar problems. */
4916 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4917 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
4919 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
4920 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
4921 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
4922 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
4923 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
4924 * pass the packet. */
4925 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4928 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4932 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4935 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4938 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
4940 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4942 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
4943 * associated socket. */
4944 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4945 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4946 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4949 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4951 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4952 ad.u.net->family = family;
4953 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4957 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4958 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4959 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4961 if (peerlbl_active) {
4965 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4967 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4968 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4969 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4971 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4973 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4974 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4975 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4981 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4982 struct sk_buff *skb,
4983 const struct net_device *in,
4984 const struct net_device *out,
4985 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4987 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4990 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4991 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4992 struct sk_buff *skb,
4993 const struct net_device *in,
4994 const struct net_device *out,
4995 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4997 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
5001 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5003 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5007 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
5011 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5014 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5015 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5018 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5021 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5025 sid = task_sid(task);
5026 isec->sclass = sclass;
5028 perm->security = isec;
5033 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5035 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5036 perm->security = NULL;
5040 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5042 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5044 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5048 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5049 msg->security = msec;
5054 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5056 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5058 msg->security = NULL;
5062 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5065 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5066 struct common_audit_data ad;
5067 u32 sid = current_sid();
5069 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5071 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5072 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5074 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5077 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5079 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5082 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5084 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5087 /* message queue security operations */
5088 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5090 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5091 struct common_audit_data ad;
5092 u32 sid = current_sid();
5095 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5099 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5101 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5102 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5104 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5107 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5113 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5115 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5118 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5120 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5121 struct common_audit_data ad;
5122 u32 sid = current_sid();
5124 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5126 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5127 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5129 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5130 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5133 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5141 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5142 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5145 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5148 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5151 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5157 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5161 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5163 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5164 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5165 struct common_audit_data ad;
5166 u32 sid = current_sid();
5169 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5170 msec = msg->security;
5173 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5175 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5177 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5178 * message queue this message will be stored in
5180 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5186 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5187 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5189 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5190 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5193 /* Can this process send the message */
5194 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5197 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5198 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5199 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5204 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5205 struct task_struct *target,
5206 long type, int mode)
5208 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5209 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5210 struct common_audit_data ad;
5211 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5214 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5215 msec = msg->security;
5217 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5218 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5220 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5221 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5223 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5224 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5228 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5229 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5231 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5232 struct common_audit_data ad;
5233 u32 sid = current_sid();
5236 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5240 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5242 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5243 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5245 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5248 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5254 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5256 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5259 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5261 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5262 struct common_audit_data ad;
5263 u32 sid = current_sid();
5265 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5267 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5268 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5270 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5271 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5274 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5275 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5283 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5284 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5287 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5290 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5297 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5303 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5307 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5308 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5312 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5315 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5317 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5320 /* Semaphore security operations */
5321 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5323 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5324 struct common_audit_data ad;
5325 u32 sid = current_sid();
5328 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5332 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5334 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5335 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5337 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5340 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5346 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5348 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5351 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5353 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5354 struct common_audit_data ad;
5355 u32 sid = current_sid();
5357 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5359 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5360 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5362 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5363 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5366 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5367 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5375 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5376 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5380 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5391 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5394 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5398 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5404 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5408 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5409 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5414 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5418 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5421 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5427 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5429 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5434 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5437 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5439 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5443 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5446 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5449 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5450 char *name, char **value)
5452 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5458 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5464 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5466 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5468 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5470 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5471 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5472 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5473 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5474 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5475 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5476 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5477 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5485 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5495 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5496 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5498 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5499 struct task_struct *tracer;
5506 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5507 security attributes. */
5512 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5513 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5514 * above restriction is ever removed.
5516 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5517 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5518 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5519 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5520 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5521 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5522 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5523 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5524 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5525 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5531 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5532 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5533 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5537 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5538 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5539 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5540 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5543 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5544 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5545 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5546 audit_size = size - 1;
5549 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5550 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5551 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5556 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5563 new = prepare_creds();
5567 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5568 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5569 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5570 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5571 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5572 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5573 tsec = new->security;
5574 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5575 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5576 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5577 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5578 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5579 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5582 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5583 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5584 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5585 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5590 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5592 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5593 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5598 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5599 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5600 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5604 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5605 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5608 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5610 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5614 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5615 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5634 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5636 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5639 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5641 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5644 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5646 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5649 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5655 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5657 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5659 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5663 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5665 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5667 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5670 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5673 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5682 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5683 unsigned long flags)
5685 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5686 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5688 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5692 tsec = cred->security;
5693 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5694 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5696 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5702 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5704 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5710 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5711 const struct cred *cred,
5715 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5718 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5719 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5720 appear to be created. */
5724 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5726 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5727 ksec = key->security;
5729 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5732 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5734 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5735 char *context = NULL;
5739 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5748 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5751 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5752 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5753 .capget = selinux_capget,
5754 .capset = selinux_capset,
5755 .capable = selinux_capable,
5756 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5757 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5758 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5759 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5761 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5763 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5764 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5765 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5766 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5768 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5769 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5770 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5771 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5772 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5773 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5774 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5775 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5776 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5777 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5778 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5779 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5781 .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security,
5783 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5784 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5785 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5786 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5787 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5788 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5789 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5790 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5791 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5792 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5793 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5794 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5795 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5796 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5797 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5798 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5799 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5800 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5801 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5802 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5803 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5804 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5805 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5806 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5807 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5809 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5810 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5811 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5812 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5813 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5814 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5815 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5816 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5817 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5818 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5819 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5820 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5822 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5824 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5825 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5826 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5827 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5828 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5829 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5830 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5831 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5832 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5833 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5834 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5835 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5836 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5837 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5838 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5839 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5840 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5841 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5842 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5843 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5844 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5845 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5847 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5848 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5850 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5851 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5853 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5854 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5855 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5856 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5857 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5858 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5860 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5861 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5862 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5863 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5864 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5866 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5867 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5868 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5869 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5870 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5872 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5874 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5875 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5877 .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel,
5878 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5879 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5880 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5881 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5882 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5883 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5885 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5886 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5888 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5889 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5890 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5891 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5892 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5893 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5894 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5895 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5896 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5897 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5898 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5899 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5900 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5901 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5902 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5903 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5904 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5905 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5906 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5907 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5908 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5909 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5910 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5911 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5912 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5913 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5914 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5915 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5916 .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
5917 .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
5918 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5919 .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
5920 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5921 .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
5922 .skb_owned_by = selinux_skb_owned_by,
5924 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5925 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5926 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5927 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5928 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5929 .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5930 .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
5931 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5932 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5933 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5934 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5935 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5939 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5940 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5941 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5942 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5946 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5947 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5948 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5949 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5953 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5955 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5956 selinux_enabled = 0;
5960 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5961 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5965 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5967 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5968 cred_init_security();
5970 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5972 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5973 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5974 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5977 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5978 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5980 if (selinux_enforcing)
5981 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5983 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5988 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5990 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5993 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5995 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5997 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5998 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5999 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6002 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6003 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6004 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6006 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6008 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
6010 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6011 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6013 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6014 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6017 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6018 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6020 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6021 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6024 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6025 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6027 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6028 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6032 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6034 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
6036 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6037 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6039 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6040 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6043 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6044 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6046 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6047 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6053 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6057 if (!selinux_enabled)
6060 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6062 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
6064 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
6066 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6067 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
6069 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
6076 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6078 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6079 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6081 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6083 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
6084 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6085 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
6090 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6092 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6093 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6096 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6098 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6099 static int selinux_disabled;
6101 int selinux_disable(void)
6103 if (ss_initialized) {
6104 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6108 if (selinux_disabled) {
6109 /* Only do this once. */
6113 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6115 selinux_disabled = 1;
6116 selinux_enabled = 0;
6118 reset_security_ops();
6120 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6123 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6124 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6126 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */