2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2006 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
16 * Paul Moore, <paul.moore@hp.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
18 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
21 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
22 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
25 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched.h>
30 #include <linux/security.h>
31 #include <linux/xattr.h>
32 #include <linux/capability.h>
33 #include <linux/unistd.h>
35 #include <linux/mman.h>
36 #include <linux/slab.h>
37 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
38 #include <linux/swap.h>
39 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
40 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
41 #include <linux/file.h>
42 #include <linux/namei.h>
43 #include <linux/mount.h>
44 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
45 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/dccp.h>
62 #include <linux/quota.h>
63 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
65 #include <linux/parser.h>
66 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
68 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
69 #include <linux/personality.h>
70 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
71 #include <linux/audit.h>
72 #include <linux/string.h>
73 #include <linux/selinux.h>
74 #include <linux/mutex.h>
82 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
83 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
85 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
86 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
87 extern int selinux_compat_net;
88 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
90 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
91 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
93 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
95 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
98 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
102 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
104 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
106 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
109 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
111 int selinux_enabled = 1;
114 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
115 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
117 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
118 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
119 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
120 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
121 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
123 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
124 before the policy was loaded. */
125 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
126 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
128 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
130 /* Return security context for a given sid or just the context
131 length if the buffer is null or length is 0 */
132 static int selinux_getsecurity(u32 sid, void *buffer, size_t size)
138 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
142 if (!buffer || !size)
143 goto getsecurity_exit;
147 goto getsecurity_exit;
149 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
156 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
158 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
160 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
162 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
167 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
168 task->security = tsec;
173 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
175 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
176 task->security = NULL;
180 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
182 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
183 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
185 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
189 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
190 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
192 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
193 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
194 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
195 inode->i_security = isec;
200 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
203 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
205 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
206 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
207 list_del_init(&isec->list);
208 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
210 inode->i_security = NULL;
211 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
214 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
216 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
217 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
219 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
281 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
283 sk->sk_security = ssec;
285 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_init(ssec, family);
290 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
292 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
294 sk->sk_security = NULL;
298 /* The security server must be initialized before
299 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
300 extern int ss_initialized;
302 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
304 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
306 "uses transition SIDs",
308 "uses genfs_contexts",
309 "not configured for labeling",
310 "uses mountpoint labeling",
313 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
315 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
317 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
328 static match_table_t tokens = {
329 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
330 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
331 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
332 {Opt_rootcontext, "rootcontext=%s"},
336 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
338 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
354 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
355 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
356 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
359 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
360 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
364 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
365 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
369 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
371 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
372 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
375 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
376 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
377 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
382 name = sb->s_type->name;
384 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
386 /* NFS we understand. */
387 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
388 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
390 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
394 context = d->context;
401 /* Standard string-based options. */
402 char *p, *options = data;
404 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
406 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
411 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
415 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
420 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
431 if (seen & Opt_fscontext) {
433 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
436 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
443 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
446 case Opt_rootcontext:
447 if (seen & Opt_rootcontext) {
449 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
452 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
459 seen |= Opt_rootcontext;
463 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
465 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
466 "defcontext option is invalid "
467 "for this filesystem type\n");
470 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
472 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
475 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
482 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
487 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
498 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
500 rc = security_context_to_sid(fscontext, strlen(fscontext), &sid);
502 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
503 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
504 fscontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
508 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
516 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
517 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
518 * the superblock context if not already set.
521 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
523 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
524 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
525 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
530 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
535 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
539 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
541 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
545 struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
546 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
547 rc = security_context_to_sid(rootcontext, strlen(rootcontext), &sid);
549 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
550 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
551 rootcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
555 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
560 isec->initialized = 1;
564 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
566 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
567 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
568 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
572 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
575 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
579 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
593 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
595 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
596 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
597 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
600 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
601 if (sbsec->initialized)
604 if (!ss_initialized) {
605 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
606 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
607 server is ready to handle calls. */
608 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
609 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
610 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
611 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
615 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
616 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
618 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
619 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
623 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
627 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
628 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
629 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
630 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
631 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
632 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
633 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
634 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
635 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
639 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
640 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
641 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
642 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
643 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
644 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
646 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
647 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
648 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
653 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
656 sbsec->initialized = 1;
658 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
659 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
660 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
663 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
664 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
665 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
668 /* Initialize the root inode. */
669 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
671 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
672 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
673 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
675 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
677 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
678 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
679 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
680 struct inode_security_struct, list);
681 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
682 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
683 inode = igrab(inode);
685 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
689 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
690 list_del_init(&isec->list);
693 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
695 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
699 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
701 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
703 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
705 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
707 return SECCLASS_FILE;
709 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
713 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
715 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
719 return SECCLASS_FILE;
722 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
724 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
727 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
729 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
732 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
739 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
741 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
748 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
749 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
751 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
753 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
754 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
756 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
758 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
760 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
766 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
767 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
768 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
769 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
770 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
772 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
774 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
775 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
776 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
778 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
780 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
781 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
782 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
783 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
784 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
786 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
789 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
791 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
793 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
796 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
799 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
800 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
805 char *buffer, *path, *end;
807 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
817 while (de && de != de->parent) {
818 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
822 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
827 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
828 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
832 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
840 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
841 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
843 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
844 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
846 struct dentry *dentry;
847 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
848 char *context = NULL;
852 if (isec->initialized)
855 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
856 if (isec->initialized)
859 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
860 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
861 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
862 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
863 server is ready to handle calls. */
864 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
865 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
866 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
867 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
871 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
872 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
873 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
874 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
878 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
879 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
881 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
882 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
884 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
885 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
888 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
889 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
894 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
895 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
901 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
904 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
905 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
913 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
919 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
925 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
926 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
927 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
928 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
932 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
933 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
936 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
939 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
940 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
941 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
942 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
944 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
952 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
953 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
955 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
956 /* Default to the fs SID. */
957 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
959 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
960 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
961 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
969 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
970 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
973 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
974 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
977 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
979 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
980 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
991 isec->initialized = 1;
994 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
996 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
997 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1001 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1002 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1008 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1009 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1012 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1013 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1016 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1017 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1020 /* All other signals. */
1021 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1028 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1029 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1030 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1031 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1034 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1036 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1037 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1038 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1039 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1042 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1043 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1046 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1047 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1049 tsec = tsk->security;
1051 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
1055 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1056 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
1059 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1060 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1063 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1065 tsec = tsk->security;
1067 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1068 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1071 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1072 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1073 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1074 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1075 struct inode *inode,
1077 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1079 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1080 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1081 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1083 if (unlikely (IS_PRIVATE (inode)))
1086 tsec = tsk->security;
1087 isec = inode->i_security;
1091 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1092 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1095 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1098 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1099 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1100 pathname if needed. */
1101 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1102 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1103 struct dentry *dentry,
1106 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1107 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1108 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1110 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1111 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1114 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1115 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1116 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1117 check a particular permission to the file.
1118 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1119 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1120 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1121 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1122 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1126 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1127 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1128 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_path.mnt;
1129 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
1130 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1131 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1134 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1136 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1138 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1139 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1147 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1149 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1154 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1155 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1156 struct dentry *dentry,
1159 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1160 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1161 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1163 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1166 tsec = current->security;
1167 dsec = dir->i_security;
1168 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1170 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1171 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1173 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1174 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1179 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1180 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1182 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1188 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1192 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1193 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1194 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1197 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1198 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1199 struct task_struct *ctx)
1201 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1203 tsec = ctx->security;
1205 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1209 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1212 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1213 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1214 struct dentry *dentry,
1218 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1219 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1220 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1224 tsec = current->security;
1225 dsec = dir->i_security;
1226 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1228 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1229 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1232 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1233 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1248 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1252 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1256 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1257 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1258 struct inode *new_dir,
1259 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1261 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1262 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1263 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1265 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1268 tsec = current->security;
1269 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1270 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1271 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1272 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1274 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1276 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1277 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1278 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1281 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1282 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1285 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1286 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1287 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1292 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1293 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1294 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1295 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1296 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1299 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1300 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1301 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1302 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1304 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1312 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1313 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1314 struct super_block *sb,
1316 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1318 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1319 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1321 tsec = tsk->security;
1322 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1323 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1327 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1328 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1332 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1333 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1334 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1335 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1338 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1340 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1344 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1346 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1348 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1355 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1356 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1360 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1362 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1363 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1372 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1374 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1376 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1377 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1380 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1384 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1385 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1386 if (!(child->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && !rc)
1387 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1391 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1392 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1396 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1400 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1403 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1404 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1408 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1412 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1415 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1416 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1418 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1421 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1425 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1429 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1432 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1435 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1438 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1443 end = buffer+buflen;
1449 const char *name = table->procname;
1450 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1451 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1455 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1458 table = table->parent;
1464 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1466 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1468 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1473 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1477 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1481 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1485 tsec = current->security;
1487 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1488 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1490 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1491 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1494 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1495 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1497 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1498 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1506 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1507 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1513 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1526 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1528 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1533 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1535 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1538 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1544 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1546 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1549 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1553 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1558 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1559 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1560 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1562 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1563 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1564 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1565 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1567 case 0: /* Close log */
1568 case 1: /* Open log */
1569 case 2: /* Read from log */
1570 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1571 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1573 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1580 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1581 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1582 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1584 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1585 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1586 * the capability is granted.
1588 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1589 * processes that allocate mappings.
1591 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1593 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1594 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1596 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1598 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1599 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1600 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1607 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1610 /* binprm security operations */
1612 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1614 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1616 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1621 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1624 bprm->security = bsec;
1628 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1630 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1631 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1632 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1633 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1635 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1638 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1642 bsec = bprm->security;
1647 tsec = current->security;
1648 isec = inode->i_security;
1650 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1651 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1653 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1654 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1655 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1656 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1658 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1659 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1660 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1663 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1664 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1665 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1670 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1671 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_path.mnt;
1672 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
1674 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1677 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1678 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1679 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1683 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1685 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1689 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1690 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1694 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1695 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1697 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1705 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1707 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1711 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1713 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1716 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1717 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1718 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1719 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1720 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1722 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1725 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1728 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1730 kfree(bprm->security);
1731 bprm->security = NULL;
1734 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1735 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1737 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1738 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1740 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1741 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1742 struct tty_struct *tty;
1743 struct fdtable *fdt;
1747 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
1748 tty = get_current_tty();
1751 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
1753 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1754 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1755 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1756 file may belong to another process and we are only
1757 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1758 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1759 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1760 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1766 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
1767 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1771 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1773 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1775 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1777 unsigned long set, i;
1782 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
1783 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
1785 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1788 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1789 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1794 if (file_has_perm(current,
1796 file_to_av(file))) {
1798 fd = get_unused_fd();
1808 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1809 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
1816 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1821 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1824 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1827 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1829 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1830 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1834 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1836 tsec = current->security;
1838 bsec = bprm->security;
1841 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1843 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1844 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1845 unchanged and kill. */
1846 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1847 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1848 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1855 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1856 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1857 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1858 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1859 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1871 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1873 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1875 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1876 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1877 struct itimerval itimer;
1878 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1881 tsec = current->security;
1882 bsec = bprm->security;
1885 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1888 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1891 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1892 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1894 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1895 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1896 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1897 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1898 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1899 will be checked against the new SID. */
1900 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1901 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1903 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1904 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1905 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1906 flush_signals(current);
1907 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1908 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1909 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
1910 recalc_sigpending();
1911 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1914 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
1915 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
1917 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1918 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1919 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1920 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1921 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1922 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1923 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1924 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1925 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1927 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1928 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1930 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1931 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1932 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1933 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1935 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1937 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1940 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1944 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1945 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1946 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1949 /* superblock security operations */
1951 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1953 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1956 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1958 superblock_free_security(sb);
1961 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1966 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1969 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1971 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1972 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1973 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1974 match_prefix("rootcontext=", sizeof("rootcontext=")-1, option, len));
1977 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1984 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1988 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
1991 int current_size = 0;
2000 while (current_size < len) {
2010 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
2012 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2013 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2014 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2020 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
2021 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
2022 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
2026 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2034 in_save = in_end = orig;
2038 open_quote = !open_quote;
2039 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2041 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2043 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2044 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2046 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2048 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2050 } while (*in_end++);
2052 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2053 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2058 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2060 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2063 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2067 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2068 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
2069 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2072 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2074 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2076 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2077 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2078 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2081 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
2082 struct nameidata *nd,
2084 unsigned long flags,
2089 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
2093 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2094 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
2095 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2097 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
2101 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2105 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2109 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
2110 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
2113 /* inode security operations */
2115 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2117 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2120 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2122 inode_free_security(inode);
2125 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2126 char **name, void **value,
2129 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2130 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2131 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2134 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2136 tsec = current->security;
2137 dsec = dir->i_security;
2138 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2140 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2141 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2143 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2144 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2147 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2148 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2151 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2156 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2157 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2158 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2159 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2161 isec->initialized = 1;
2164 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2168 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
2175 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
2187 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2189 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2192 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2196 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2199 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2202 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2206 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2209 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2212 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2214 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2217 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2219 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2222 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2224 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2227 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2231 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2235 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2238 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2239 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2241 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2244 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2246 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2249 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2253 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2256 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2259 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2260 struct nameidata *nd)
2264 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2269 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2273 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2274 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2277 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2281 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2285 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2288 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2289 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2290 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2292 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2295 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2297 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2300 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2302 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2303 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2304 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2305 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2307 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2308 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2309 Restrict to administrator. */
2314 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2315 ordinary setattr permission. */
2316 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2319 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2321 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2322 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2323 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2324 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2325 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2329 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2330 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2332 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2333 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2336 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2339 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2340 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2342 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2343 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2347 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2351 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2352 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2356 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2361 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2363 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2364 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2368 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2369 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2371 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2372 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2376 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2377 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2381 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2383 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2384 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2392 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2394 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2397 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2399 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2402 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2404 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2405 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2407 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2408 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2412 static const char *selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix(void)
2414 return XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2418 * Copy the in-core inode security context value to the user. If the
2419 * getxattr() prior to this succeeded, check to see if we need to
2420 * canonicalize the value to be finally returned to the user.
2422 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2424 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size, int err)
2426 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2428 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2431 return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
2434 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2435 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2437 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2441 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2444 if (!value || !size)
2447 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2455 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2457 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2458 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2459 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2463 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2465 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2468 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2470 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2473 /* file security operations */
2475 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2478 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2481 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2485 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2486 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2489 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2490 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2494 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2497 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2499 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2500 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2501 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2502 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2505 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2509 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2510 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2511 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2513 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2516 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2518 return file_alloc_security(file);
2521 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2523 file_free_security(file);
2526 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2538 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2540 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2541 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2544 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2546 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2547 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2550 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2554 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2559 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2562 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2563 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2566 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2572 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2574 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2575 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2577 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2578 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2579 * This has an additional check.
2581 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2588 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2589 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2591 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2592 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2595 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2596 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2598 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2603 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2604 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2605 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2608 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct*)(current->security))->sid;
2610 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
2611 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2612 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
2613 if (rc || addr_only)
2616 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2619 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2620 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2623 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2624 unsigned long reqprot,
2629 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2633 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2636 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2637 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
2639 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2640 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
2641 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
2643 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
2644 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2645 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2646 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2647 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
2649 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2650 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
2651 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
2652 * modified content. This typically should only
2653 * occur for text relocations.
2655 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
2663 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2666 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2668 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2671 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2678 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
2683 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2684 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2693 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2694 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2699 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2704 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
2708 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2715 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2717 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2718 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2720 tsec = current->security;
2721 fsec = file->f_security;
2722 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2727 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2728 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2732 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2733 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2735 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2736 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
2738 tsec = tsk->security;
2739 fsec = file->f_security;
2742 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2744 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2746 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2747 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2750 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2752 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2755 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
2757 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2758 struct inode *inode;
2759 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2760 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2761 fsec = file->f_security;
2762 isec = inode->i_security;
2764 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
2765 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
2766 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
2767 * Task label is already saved in the file security
2768 * struct as its SID.
2770 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
2771 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
2773 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
2774 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
2775 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
2776 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
2777 * new inode label or new policy.
2778 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
2780 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
2783 /* task security operations */
2785 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2789 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2793 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2796 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2798 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2801 tsec1 = current->security;
2803 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2806 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2808 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2809 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2811 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
2812 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2813 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2814 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
2815 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
2817 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2818 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2819 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2820 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2825 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2827 task_free_security(tsk);
2830 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2832 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2833 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2834 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2835 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2836 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2841 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2843 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2846 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2848 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2852 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2854 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2857 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2859 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2862 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2864 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2867 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
2869 selinux_get_task_sid(p, secid);
2872 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2874 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2878 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2882 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2886 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2889 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
2893 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
2897 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2900 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
2902 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2905 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2907 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2910 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2914 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2915 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2916 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2917 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2918 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2919 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2924 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2928 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
2932 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2935 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2937 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2940 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
2942 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2945 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
2950 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2952 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
2956 if (info != SEND_SIG_NOINFO && (is_si_special(info) || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2960 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2962 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2965 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2967 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2971 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2977 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2978 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2979 the state of the current process. */
2983 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2987 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2989 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2992 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2994 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2996 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2999 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3000 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3004 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3005 struct inode *inode)
3007 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3008 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3010 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3011 isec->initialized = 1;
3015 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3016 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3017 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3019 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3020 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3022 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3023 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3027 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3028 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3031 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3032 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3036 *proto = ih->protocol;
3038 switch (ih->protocol) {
3040 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3042 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3046 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3050 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3051 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3056 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3058 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3062 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3066 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3067 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3071 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3072 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3074 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3078 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3082 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3083 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3094 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3096 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3097 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3098 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3101 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3102 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3104 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3105 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3109 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3110 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3113 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3114 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3115 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3124 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3126 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3130 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3131 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3136 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3138 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3142 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3143 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3147 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3148 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3150 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3154 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3155 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3159 /* includes fragments */
3169 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3170 char **addrp, int *len, int src, u8 *proto)
3174 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3176 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3180 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3181 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3184 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3186 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3190 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3191 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3202 * selinux_skb_extlbl_sid - Determine the external label of a packet
3204 * @sid: the packet's SID
3207 * Check the various different forms of external packet labeling and determine
3208 * the external SID for the packet. If only one form of external labeling is
3209 * present then it is used, if both labeled IPsec and NetLabel labels are
3210 * present then the SELinux type information is taken from the labeled IPsec
3211 * SA and the MLS sensitivity label information is taken from the NetLabel
3212 * security attributes. This bit of "magic" is done in the call to
3213 * selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid().
3216 static void selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
3221 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3222 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb,
3223 (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL ?
3224 SECINITSID_NETMSG : xfrm_sid),
3226 nlbl_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3227 *sid = (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL ? xfrm_sid : nlbl_sid);
3230 /* socket security operations */
3231 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3234 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3235 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3236 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3239 tsec = task->security;
3240 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3242 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3245 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3246 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3247 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3253 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3254 int protocol, int kern)
3257 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3263 tsec = current->security;
3264 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3265 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3266 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3267 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3273 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3274 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3277 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3278 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3279 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3282 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3284 tsec = current->security;
3285 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3286 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3287 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3288 isec->initialized = 1;
3291 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3292 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3293 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3299 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3300 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3301 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3303 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3308 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3313 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3314 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3315 * check the first address now.
3317 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3318 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3320 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3321 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3322 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3323 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3324 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3325 unsigned short snum;
3326 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3327 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
3329 tsec = current->security;
3330 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3332 if (family == PF_INET) {
3333 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3334 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3335 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3336 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3338 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3339 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3340 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3341 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3347 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3349 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3350 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3352 sk->sk_protocol, snum,
3356 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3357 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3358 ad.u.net.family = family;
3359 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3361 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3367 switch(isec->sclass) {
3368 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3369 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3372 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3373 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3376 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3377 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3381 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3385 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3389 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3390 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3391 ad.u.net.family = family;
3393 if (family == PF_INET)
3394 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3396 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3398 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3399 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3407 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3409 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3412 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3417 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3419 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3420 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3421 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3422 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3423 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3424 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3425 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3426 unsigned short snum;
3429 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3430 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3431 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3433 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3435 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3436 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3438 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3441 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3442 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3446 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3447 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3449 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3450 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3451 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3452 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3461 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3463 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3466 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3469 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3470 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3472 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3476 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3478 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3479 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3480 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3481 newisec->initialized = 1;
3486 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3491 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3495 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3498 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3499 int size, int flags)
3501 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3504 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3506 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3509 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3511 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3514 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3518 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3522 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3525 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3528 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3531 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3533 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3536 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3537 struct socket *other,
3540 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3541 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3542 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3543 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3546 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3550 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3551 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3553 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3554 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3556 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3558 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3562 /* connecting socket */
3563 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3564 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3566 /* server child socket */
3567 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3568 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3569 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3574 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3575 struct socket *other)
3577 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3578 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3579 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3582 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3583 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3585 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3586 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3588 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3589 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3596 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3597 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3600 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3601 struct socket *sock;
3605 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3606 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3608 struct inode *inode;
3609 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3611 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3612 isec = inode->i_security;
3613 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3614 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3617 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3624 err = sel_netif_sids(skb->dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3628 switch (sock_class) {
3629 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3630 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3631 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3632 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3635 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3636 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3637 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3638 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3641 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3642 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
3643 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
3644 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3648 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3649 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3653 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3657 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3661 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3668 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3669 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad->u.net.sport),
3674 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3675 sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
3682 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3687 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3688 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3690 family = sk->sk_family;
3691 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3694 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3695 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3698 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3699 ad.u.net.netif = skb->dev ? skb->dev->name : "[unknown]";
3700 ad.u.net.family = family;
3702 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1, NULL);
3706 if (selinux_compat_net)
3707 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad, family,
3710 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
3715 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
3719 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
3724 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3725 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3730 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3731 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3732 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
3734 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3736 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
3737 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3738 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3739 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3741 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
3746 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3751 if (scontext_len > len) {
3756 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3760 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3768 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3770 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3773 if (sock && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3774 selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
3776 selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peer_secid);
3778 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
3780 *secid = peer_secid;
3785 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
3787 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3790 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3792 sk_free_security(sk);
3795 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
3797 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
3798 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
3800 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
3801 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
3803 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_clone(ssec, newssec);
3806 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
3809 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
3811 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3813 *secid = sksec->sid;
3817 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock* sk, struct socket *parent)
3819 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
3820 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3822 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
3823 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
3824 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
3826 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
3829 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3830 struct request_sock *req)
3832 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3837 selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &peersid);
3838 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
3839 req->secid = sksec->sid;
3840 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
3844 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
3848 req->secid = newsid;
3849 req->peer_secid = peersid;
3853 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
3854 const struct request_sock *req)
3856 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
3858 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
3859 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
3860 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
3861 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
3862 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
3863 time it will have been created and available. */
3865 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
3866 * thread with access to newsksec */
3867 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
3870 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
3871 struct sk_buff *skb)
3873 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3875 selinux_skb_extlbl_sid(skb, &sksec->peer_sid);
3878 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
3881 fl->secid = req->secid;
3884 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3888 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3889 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3890 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3892 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3896 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
3898 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3900 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3901 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3902 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3903 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3904 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3905 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3915 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3920 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3922 static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
3923 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3924 u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
3927 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3928 struct socket *sock;
3929 struct inode *inode;
3930 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3932 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3936 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3940 isec = inode->i_security;
3942 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3946 switch (isec->sclass) {
3947 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3948 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3949 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3950 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3953 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3954 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3955 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3956 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3959 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3960 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
3961 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
3962 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3966 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3967 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3971 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
3975 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3979 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
3986 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3989 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport),
3994 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
4001 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
4002 struct sk_buff *skb,
4003 const struct net_device *in,
4004 const struct net_device *out,
4005 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
4011 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4012 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
4013 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4020 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4022 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4023 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
4024 ad.u.net.family = family;
4026 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 0, &proto);
4030 if (selinux_compat_net)
4031 err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
4032 family, addrp, len);
4034 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4040 err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto);
4042 return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
4045 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
4046 struct sk_buff *skb,
4047 const struct net_device *in,
4048 const struct net_device *out,
4049 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4051 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, skb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
4054 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4056 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
4057 struct sk_buff *skb,
4058 const struct net_device *in,
4059 const struct net_device *out,
4060 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4062 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, skb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
4067 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4069 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4073 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4077 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4078 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4083 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4086 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4088 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4092 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4093 ad.u.cap = capability;
4095 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4096 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4099 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4100 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4103 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4104 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4106 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4110 isec->sclass = sclass;
4111 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
4112 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4113 perm->security = isec;
4118 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4120 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4121 perm->security = NULL;
4125 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4127 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4129 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4134 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4135 msg->security = msec;
4140 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4142 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4144 msg->security = NULL;
4148 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4151 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4152 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4153 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4155 tsec = current->security;
4156 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4158 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4159 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4161 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4164 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4166 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4169 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4171 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4174 /* message queue security operations */
4175 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4177 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4178 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4179 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4182 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4186 tsec = current->security;
4187 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4189 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4190 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4192 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4195 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4201 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4203 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4206 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4208 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4209 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4210 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4212 tsec = current->security;
4213 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4215 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4216 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4218 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4219 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4222 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4230 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4231 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4234 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4237 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4240 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4246 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4250 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4252 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4253 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4254 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4255 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4258 tsec = current->security;
4259 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4260 msec = msg->security;
4263 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4265 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4267 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4268 * message queue this message will be stored in
4270 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4278 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4279 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4281 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4282 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4285 /* Can this process send the message */
4286 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4287 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4289 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4290 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4291 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4296 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4297 struct task_struct *target,
4298 long type, int mode)
4300 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4301 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4302 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4303 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4306 tsec = target->security;
4307 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4308 msec = msg->security;
4310 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4311 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4313 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4314 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4316 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4317 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4321 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4322 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4324 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4325 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4326 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4329 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4333 tsec = current->security;
4334 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4336 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4337 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4339 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4342 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4348 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4350 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4353 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4355 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4356 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4357 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4359 tsec = current->security;
4360 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4362 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4363 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4365 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4366 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4369 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4370 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4378 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4379 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4382 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4385 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4392 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4398 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4402 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4403 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4408 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4412 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4415 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4417 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4420 /* Semaphore security operations */
4421 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4423 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4424 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4425 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4428 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4432 tsec = current->security;
4433 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4435 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4436 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4438 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4441 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4447 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4449 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4452 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4454 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4455 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4456 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4458 tsec = current->security;
4459 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4461 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4462 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4464 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4465 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4468 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
4469 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
4477 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4478 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4482 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
4493 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
4496 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4500 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4506 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4510 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4511 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4516 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4520 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4523 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4529 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4531 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4536 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4539 /* module stacking operations */
4540 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4542 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4543 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4544 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4548 secondary_ops = ops;
4550 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4557 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4559 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4560 printk(KERN_ERR "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4561 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4565 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4570 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4573 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4576 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4577 char *name, char **value)
4579 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4585 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4592 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4594 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4596 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4597 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4598 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4599 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4600 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4601 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4602 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4603 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4610 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
4616 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4617 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4619 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4625 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4626 security attributes. */
4631 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4632 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4633 * above restriction is ever removed.
4635 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4636 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4637 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4638 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4639 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
4640 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
4641 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4642 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
4643 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4644 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4650 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4651 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4652 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4656 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4661 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4662 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4663 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4664 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4665 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4666 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4668 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4669 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4670 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4671 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4672 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
4673 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
4676 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
4677 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
4678 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
4679 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4680 struct av_decision avd;
4685 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4686 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4687 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4688 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4689 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4690 do_each_thread(g, t)
4691 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4692 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4695 while_each_thread(g, t);
4696 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4699 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4700 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4701 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4705 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4706 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4708 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4709 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4711 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
4715 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4716 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4730 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
4732 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
4735 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
4742 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
4743 unsigned long flags)
4745 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
4746 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4748 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4753 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
4754 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
4756 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
4762 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
4764 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
4770 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
4771 struct task_struct *ctx,
4775 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4776 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
4778 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
4780 tsec = ctx->security;
4781 ksec = key->security;
4783 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
4784 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
4785 appear to be created. */
4789 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
4790 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
4795 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4796 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4797 .capget = selinux_capget,
4798 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4799 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4800 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4801 .capable = selinux_capable,
4802 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4803 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4804 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4805 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4807 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4808 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4810 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4811 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4812 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4813 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4814 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4815 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4816 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4818 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4819 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4820 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4821 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4822 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4823 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4824 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4826 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4827 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4828 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4829 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4830 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4831 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4832 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4833 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4834 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4835 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4836 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4837 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4838 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4839 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4840 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4841 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4842 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4843 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4844 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4845 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4846 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4847 .inode_xattr_getsuffix = selinux_inode_xattr_getsuffix,
4848 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4849 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4850 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4851 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
4852 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
4854 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4855 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4856 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4857 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4858 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4859 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4860 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4861 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4862 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4863 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4864 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4866 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
4868 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4869 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4870 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4871 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4872 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4873 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4874 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4875 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4876 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4877 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
4878 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4879 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4880 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
4881 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
4882 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4883 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4884 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4885 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
4886 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4887 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4888 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4889 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4890 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4892 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4894 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4895 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4897 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4898 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4899 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4900 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4901 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4902 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4904 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4905 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4906 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4907 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4908 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4910 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4911 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4912 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4913 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4914 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4916 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4917 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4919 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4921 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4922 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4924 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
4925 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
4927 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4928 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4930 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4931 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4932 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4933 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4934 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4935 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4936 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4937 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4938 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4939 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4940 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4941 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4942 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4943 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4944 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
4945 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
4946 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4947 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4948 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
4949 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
4950 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
4951 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
4952 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
4953 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
4954 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
4956 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
4957 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
4958 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
4959 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
4960 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
4961 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
4962 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
4963 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
4964 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
4965 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
4966 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
4970 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
4971 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
4972 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
4976 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4978 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4980 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4981 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4985 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4987 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4988 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4989 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4990 tsec = current->security;
4991 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4993 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
4994 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
4995 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
4998 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
5000 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5001 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
5002 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5004 if (selinux_enforcing) {
5005 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5007 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5011 /* Add security information to initial keyrings */
5012 selinux_key_alloc(&root_user_keyring, current,
5013 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
5014 selinux_key_alloc(&root_session_keyring, current,
5015 KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA);
5021 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5023 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5025 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5026 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5027 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5028 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5030 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5031 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5032 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5033 struct superblock_security_struct,
5035 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5037 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5038 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5039 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5041 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5043 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5044 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5045 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5048 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5049 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5052 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5053 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5054 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5056 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5058 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
5059 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
5060 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5062 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
5063 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5066 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5068 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
5069 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
5070 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5072 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
5073 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5078 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5082 if (!selinux_enabled)
5085 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5087 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
5089 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5091 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5093 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
5095 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5103 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5105 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5106 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5108 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5110 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
5111 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5112 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
5117 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5119 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5120 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5123 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5125 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5126 int selinux_disable(void)
5128 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5129 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
5131 if (ss_initialized) {
5132 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5136 if (selinux_disabled) {
5137 /* Only do this once. */
5141 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5143 selinux_disabled = 1;
5144 selinux_enabled = 0;
5146 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5147 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5149 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5150 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5152 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */