2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing;
103 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 unsigned long enforcing;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
107 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 unsigned long enabled;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
120 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 int selinux_enabled = 1;
128 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
131 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
134 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
135 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
136 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
137 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
138 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
147 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
150 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
151 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
152 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
153 * is always considered enabled.
156 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
161 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
163 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
173 * initialise the security for the init task
175 static void cred_init_security(void)
177 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
178 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
182 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
185 cred->security = tsec;
189 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
195 tsec = cred->security;
200 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
207 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
213 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
217 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
222 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
226 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
227 u32 sid = current_sid();
229 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
233 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
234 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
236 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
237 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
238 isec->task_sid = sid;
239 inode->i_security = isec;
244 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
246 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
248 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
249 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
252 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
254 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
255 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
257 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
258 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
259 list_del_init(&isec->list);
260 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
263 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
264 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
265 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
266 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
267 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
268 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
269 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
271 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
274 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
276 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
277 u32 sid = current_sid();
279 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
284 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
285 file->f_security = fsec;
290 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
292 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
293 file->f_security = NULL;
297 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
299 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
301 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
305 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
306 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
307 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
309 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
311 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sb->s_security = sbsec;
317 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
319 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
320 sb->s_security = NULL;
324 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
326 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
328 "uses transition SIDs",
330 "uses genfs_contexts",
331 "not configured for labeling",
332 "uses mountpoint labeling",
333 "uses native labeling",
336 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
338 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
340 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
349 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
353 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
355 static const match_table_t tokens = {
356 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
357 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
358 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
359 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
364 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
366 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
367 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
368 const struct cred *cred)
370 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
373 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
374 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
378 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
379 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
383 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
384 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
385 const struct cred *cred)
387 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
389 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
390 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
394 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
395 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
399 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
401 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
403 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
404 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
405 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
406 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
407 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
408 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
409 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
410 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
413 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
415 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
416 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
417 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
420 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
421 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
422 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
423 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
424 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
425 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
426 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
427 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
428 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
432 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
433 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
434 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
435 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
436 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
437 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
439 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
440 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
441 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
446 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
447 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
448 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
450 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
451 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
452 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
454 /* Initialize the root inode. */
455 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
457 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
458 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
459 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
461 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
463 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
464 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
465 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
466 struct inode_security_struct, list);
467 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
468 list_del_init(&isec->list);
469 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
470 inode = igrab(inode);
472 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
476 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
479 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
485 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
486 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
487 * mount options, or whatever.
489 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
490 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
493 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
494 char *context = NULL;
498 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
500 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
506 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
507 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
509 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
510 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
511 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
516 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
517 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
518 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
520 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
521 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
526 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
527 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
533 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
534 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
537 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
538 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
540 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
541 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
544 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
545 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
547 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
548 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
551 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
552 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
554 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
555 struct inode *root = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
556 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
558 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
561 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
562 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
564 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
565 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
566 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
569 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
574 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
578 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
579 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
581 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
583 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
584 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
585 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
586 (old_sid != new_sid))
589 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
590 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
592 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
593 if (mnt_flags & flag)
599 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
600 * labeling information.
602 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
603 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
604 unsigned long kern_flags,
605 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
607 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
609 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
610 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
611 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
612 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
613 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
614 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
615 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
616 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
617 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
619 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
621 if (!ss_initialized) {
623 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
624 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
625 server is ready to handle calls. */
629 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
630 "before the security server is initialized\n");
633 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
634 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
635 * place the results is not allowed */
641 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
642 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
643 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
644 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
646 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
647 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
648 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
649 * will be used for both mounts)
651 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
656 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
657 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
658 * than once with different security options.
660 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
663 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
665 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
666 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
668 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
669 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
670 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
692 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
693 rootcontext_sid = sid;
695 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
697 goto out_double_mount;
699 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
703 defcontext_sid = sid;
705 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
707 goto out_double_mount;
709 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
718 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
719 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
720 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
721 goto out_double_mount;
726 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
727 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
729 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
731 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
734 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
737 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
738 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
742 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
748 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
752 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
753 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
754 * the superblock context if not already set.
756 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
757 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
758 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
762 if (!fscontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
767 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
769 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
774 if (!rootcontext_sid)
775 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
777 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
778 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
781 if (rootcontext_sid) {
782 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
787 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
788 root_isec->initialized = 1;
791 if (defcontext_sid) {
792 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
793 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
795 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
796 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
800 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
801 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
807 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
810 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
812 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
816 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
817 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
821 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
822 const struct super_block *newsb)
824 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
825 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
826 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
827 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
829 if (oldflags != newflags)
831 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
833 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
835 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
837 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
838 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root)->i_security;
839 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root)->i_security;
840 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
845 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
846 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
847 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
851 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
852 struct super_block *newsb)
854 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
855 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
857 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
858 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
859 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
862 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
863 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
868 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
869 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
871 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
872 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
873 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
875 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
877 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
879 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
880 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
881 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
884 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
888 if (!set_rootcontext) {
889 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
890 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
893 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
895 if (set_rootcontext) {
896 const struct inode *oldinode = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root);
897 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
898 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
899 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
901 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
904 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
905 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
909 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
910 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
913 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
914 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
915 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
917 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
919 /* Standard string-based options. */
920 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
922 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
927 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
931 if (context || defcontext) {
933 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
936 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
946 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
949 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
956 case Opt_rootcontext:
959 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
962 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
970 if (context || defcontext) {
972 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
975 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
981 case Opt_labelsupport:
985 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
992 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
996 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
997 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
998 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1003 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1004 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1007 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1008 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1011 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1012 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1015 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1016 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1019 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1030 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1032 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1035 char *options = data;
1036 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1038 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1043 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1045 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1050 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1053 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1057 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1058 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1063 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1066 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1067 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1071 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1073 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1076 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1078 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1079 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1081 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1082 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1086 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1092 /* we need a comma before each option */
1094 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1097 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1103 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1105 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1108 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1110 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1116 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1118 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1123 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1125 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1127 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1129 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1131 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1133 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1135 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1137 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1139 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1143 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1146 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1148 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1151 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1153 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1156 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1162 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1163 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1165 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1172 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1173 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1175 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1177 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1178 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1180 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1182 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1184 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1190 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1191 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1192 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1193 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1194 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1199 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1203 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1205 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1207 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1208 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1210 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1213 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1215 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1217 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1220 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1223 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1224 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1229 char *buffer, *path;
1231 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1235 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1239 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1240 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1241 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1242 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1246 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1248 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1252 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1260 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1261 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1263 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1264 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1266 struct dentry *dentry;
1267 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1268 char *context = NULL;
1272 if (isec->initialized)
1275 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1276 if (isec->initialized)
1279 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1280 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1281 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1282 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1283 server is ready to handle calls. */
1284 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1285 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1286 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1287 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1291 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1294 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1295 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1296 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1300 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1301 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1303 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1304 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1306 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1307 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1311 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1312 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1313 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1314 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1315 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1316 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1317 * be used again by userspace.
1322 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1323 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1329 context[len] = '\0';
1330 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1332 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1335 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1336 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1343 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1349 context[len] = '\0';
1350 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1356 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1357 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1358 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1359 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1363 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1364 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1367 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1371 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1372 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1374 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1375 if (printk_ratelimit())
1376 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1377 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1378 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1380 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1381 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1382 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1385 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1393 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1394 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1396 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1397 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1398 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1400 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1401 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1402 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1403 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1408 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1409 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1412 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1413 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1415 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1416 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1419 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1420 * d_splice_alias. */
1421 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1423 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1425 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1427 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1428 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1429 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1430 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1431 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1432 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1433 * could be used again by userspace.
1437 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1438 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
1447 isec->initialized = 1;
1450 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1452 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1453 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1457 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1458 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1464 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1465 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1468 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1469 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1472 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1473 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1476 /* All other signals. */
1477 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1485 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1486 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1488 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1489 const struct cred *target,
1492 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1494 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1498 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1499 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1500 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1501 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1503 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1504 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1507 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1511 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1512 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1514 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1518 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1519 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1520 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1521 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1523 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1528 sid = current_sid();
1529 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1530 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1533 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1534 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1537 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1538 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1541 struct common_audit_data ad;
1542 struct av_decision avd;
1544 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1545 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1548 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1551 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1553 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1556 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1560 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1565 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1566 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1567 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1574 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1575 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1578 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1580 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1581 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1584 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1585 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1586 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1587 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1588 struct inode *inode,
1590 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1592 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1595 validate_creds(cred);
1597 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1600 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1601 isec = inode->i_security;
1603 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1606 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1607 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1608 pathname if needed. */
1609 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1610 struct dentry *dentry,
1613 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1614 struct common_audit_data ad;
1616 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1617 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1618 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1621 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1622 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1623 pathname if needed. */
1624 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1625 const struct path *path,
1628 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1629 struct common_audit_data ad;
1631 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1633 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1636 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1637 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1641 struct common_audit_data ad;
1643 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1644 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1645 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1648 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1649 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1650 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1651 check a particular permission to the file.
1652 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1653 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1654 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1655 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1656 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1660 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1661 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1662 struct common_audit_data ad;
1663 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1666 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1667 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1669 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1670 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1678 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1681 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1687 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1688 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1689 struct dentry *dentry,
1692 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1693 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1694 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1696 struct common_audit_data ad;
1699 dsec = dir->i_security;
1700 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1703 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1705 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1706 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1708 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1714 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1715 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1716 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1721 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1725 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1726 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1727 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1730 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1731 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1732 struct task_struct *ctx)
1734 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1736 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1740 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1743 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1744 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1745 struct dentry *dentry,
1749 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1750 struct common_audit_data ad;
1751 u32 sid = current_sid();
1755 dsec = dir->i_security;
1756 isec = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1758 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1759 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1762 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1763 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1778 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1783 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1787 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1788 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1789 struct inode *new_dir,
1790 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1792 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1793 struct common_audit_data ad;
1794 u32 sid = current_sid();
1796 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1799 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1800 old_isec = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_security;
1801 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1802 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1804 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1806 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1807 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1808 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1811 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1812 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1815 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1816 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1817 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1822 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1823 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1824 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1825 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1826 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1829 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1830 new_isec = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_security;
1831 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1832 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1834 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1842 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1843 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1844 struct super_block *sb,
1846 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1848 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1849 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1851 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1852 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1855 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1856 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1860 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1861 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1862 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1863 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1866 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1868 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1872 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1874 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1876 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1883 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1884 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1888 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1890 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1891 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1898 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1907 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1910 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1912 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1914 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1920 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1922 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
1924 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1925 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
1927 return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1928 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
1931 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
1932 struct task_struct *to)
1934 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1935 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1936 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1939 if (mysid != fromsid) {
1940 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1941 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
1946 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
1950 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
1951 struct task_struct *to)
1953 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1954 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1956 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
1960 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
1961 struct task_struct *to,
1964 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
1965 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1966 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
1967 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1968 struct common_audit_data ad;
1971 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1972 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1974 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1975 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1983 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1986 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
1990 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1995 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1999 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
2000 u32 sid = current_sid();
2001 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2002 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2005 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2008 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2012 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
2016 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2019 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2020 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2024 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
2028 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
2031 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2032 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2033 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2034 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2038 error = cap_capset(new, old,
2039 effective, inheritable, permitted);
2043 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
2047 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2048 * which was removed).
2050 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2051 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2052 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2053 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2056 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2061 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
2065 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2068 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2070 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2082 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2087 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2090 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2096 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2098 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2100 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2103 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2108 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2109 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2110 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2112 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2113 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2114 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2115 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2116 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2118 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2119 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2120 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2121 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2122 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2124 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2131 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2132 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2133 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2135 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2136 * processes that allocate mappings.
2138 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2140 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2142 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2143 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2147 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2150 /* binprm security operations */
2152 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2153 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2154 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2156 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2157 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2160 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2161 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2163 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2164 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2167 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2168 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2169 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2170 * of the current SID.
2172 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2175 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2176 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2177 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2187 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2189 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2190 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2191 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2192 struct common_audit_data ad;
2193 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2196 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2200 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2201 * the script interpreter */
2202 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2205 old_tsec = current_security();
2206 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2207 isec = inode->i_security;
2209 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2210 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2211 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2213 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2214 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2215 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2216 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2218 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2219 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2220 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2221 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2223 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2224 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2228 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2229 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2230 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2236 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2239 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2241 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2244 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2245 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2247 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2248 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2249 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2253 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2254 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2255 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2259 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2260 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2264 /* Check for shared state */
2265 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2266 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2267 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2273 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2274 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2276 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2277 struct task_struct *tracer;
2278 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2282 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2283 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2284 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2290 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2292 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2298 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2299 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2305 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2307 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2315 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2316 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2317 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2318 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2320 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2323 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2326 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2328 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2331 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2332 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2333 struct files_struct *files)
2335 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2336 struct tty_struct *tty;
2340 tty = get_current_tty();
2342 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2343 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2344 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2346 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2347 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2348 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2349 open file may belong to another process and we are
2350 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2351 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2352 struct tty_file_private, list);
2353 file = file_priv->file;
2354 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2357 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2360 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2364 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2365 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2366 if (!n) /* none found? */
2369 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2370 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2372 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2374 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2375 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2381 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2383 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2385 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2386 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2389 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2390 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2393 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2394 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2396 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2397 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2399 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2400 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2401 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2403 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2404 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2405 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2406 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2407 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2409 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2410 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2412 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2414 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2415 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2416 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2417 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2419 task_unlock(current);
2420 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2425 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2428 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2430 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2431 struct itimerval itimer;
2441 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2442 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2443 * flush and unblock signals.
2445 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2446 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2448 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2450 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2451 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2452 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2453 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2454 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2455 __flush_signals(current);
2456 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2457 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2459 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2462 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2463 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2464 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2465 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2466 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2469 /* superblock security operations */
2471 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2473 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2476 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2478 superblock_free_security(sb);
2481 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2486 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2489 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2491 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2492 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2493 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2494 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2495 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2498 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2505 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2509 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2512 int current_size = 0;
2520 while (current_size < len) {
2530 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2532 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2533 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2534 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2540 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2548 in_save = in_end = orig;
2552 open_quote = !open_quote;
2553 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2555 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2557 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2558 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2560 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2562 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2564 } while (*in_end++);
2566 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2567 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2572 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2575 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2576 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2577 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2579 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2585 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2588 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2589 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2592 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2594 goto out_free_secdata;
2596 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2598 goto out_free_secdata;
2600 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2601 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2603 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2607 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2609 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2610 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
2613 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2614 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2615 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2621 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2622 goto out_bad_option;
2625 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2626 goto out_bad_option;
2628 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2629 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2630 root_isec = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root)->i_security;
2632 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2633 goto out_bad_option;
2636 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2637 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2638 goto out_bad_option;
2647 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2649 free_secdata(secdata);
2652 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2653 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2658 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2660 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2661 struct common_audit_data ad;
2664 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2668 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2669 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2672 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2673 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2674 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2677 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2679 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2680 struct common_audit_data ad;
2682 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2683 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2684 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2687 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2690 unsigned long flags,
2693 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2695 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2696 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2697 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2699 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2702 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2704 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2706 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2707 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2710 /* inode security operations */
2712 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2714 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2717 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2719 inode_free_security(inode);
2722 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2723 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2726 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2727 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2728 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2729 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2730 struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent);
2734 tsec = cred->security;
2735 dsec = dir->i_security;
2736 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2738 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2739 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2741 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2742 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2747 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2753 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2756 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2757 const struct qstr *qstr,
2759 void **value, size_t *len)
2761 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2762 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2763 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2764 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2768 dsec = dir->i_security;
2769 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2772 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2774 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2775 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2776 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2777 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2778 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2779 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2782 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2783 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2786 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2791 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2792 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2793 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2794 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2796 isec->initialized = 1;
2799 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2803 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2806 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2816 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2818 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2821 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2823 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2826 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2828 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2831 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2833 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2836 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2838 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2841 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2843 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2846 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2848 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2851 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2852 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2854 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2857 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2859 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2861 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2864 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2866 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2868 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2871 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2872 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2876 struct common_audit_data ad;
2877 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2880 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2883 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2884 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2890 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2892 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2895 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2896 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2898 struct av_decision avd;
2900 u32 audited, denied;
2902 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2903 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2905 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2909 validate_creds(cred);
2911 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2914 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2916 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2917 isec = inode->i_security;
2919 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2920 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2921 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2923 if (likely(!audited))
2926 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2932 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2934 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2935 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2936 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2938 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2939 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2940 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2946 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2947 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2948 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2950 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2953 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2956 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
2958 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
2961 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2963 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2965 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2966 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2967 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2968 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2970 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2971 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2972 Restrict to administrator. */
2977 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2978 ordinary setattr permission. */
2979 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2982 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2983 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2985 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2986 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2987 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2988 struct common_audit_data ad;
2989 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2992 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2993 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2995 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2996 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2999 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3002 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3003 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3005 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3006 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3010 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3011 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3012 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3013 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3017 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3018 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3021 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3022 audit_size = size - 1;
3029 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3030 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3031 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3036 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3041 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3042 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3046 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3051 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3053 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3054 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3058 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3059 const void *value, size_t size,
3062 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3063 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3067 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3068 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3072 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3074 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3075 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3076 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3080 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3082 isec->initialized = 1;
3087 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3089 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3091 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3094 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3096 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3098 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3101 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3103 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3104 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3106 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3107 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3112 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3114 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3116 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3120 char *context = NULL;
3121 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3123 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3127 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3128 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3129 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3130 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3131 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3132 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3133 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3135 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3136 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3138 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3141 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3154 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3155 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3157 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3161 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3164 if (!value || !size)
3167 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3171 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3173 isec->initialized = 1;
3177 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3179 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3180 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3181 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3185 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3187 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3191 /* file security operations */
3193 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3195 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3196 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3198 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3199 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3202 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3203 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3206 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3208 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3209 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3210 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3211 u32 sid = current_sid();
3214 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3217 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3218 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3219 /* No change since file_open check. */
3222 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3225 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3227 return file_alloc_security(file);
3230 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3232 file_free_security(file);
3235 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3238 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3248 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3250 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3251 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3254 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3256 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3257 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3260 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3264 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3269 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3270 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3273 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3274 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3277 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3282 static int default_noexec;
3284 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3286 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3289 if (default_noexec &&
3290 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3292 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3293 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3294 * This has an additional check.
3296 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3302 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3303 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3305 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3306 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3309 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3310 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3312 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3319 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3323 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3324 rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3328 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3329 u32 sid = current_sid();
3330 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3331 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3337 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3338 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3340 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3343 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3344 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3347 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3348 unsigned long reqprot,
3351 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3353 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3356 if (default_noexec &&
3357 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3359 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3360 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3361 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3362 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3363 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3364 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3365 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3366 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3368 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3369 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3370 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3371 * modified content. This typically should only
3372 * occur for text relocations.
3374 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3380 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3383 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3385 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3387 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3390 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3393 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3398 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3399 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3408 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3409 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3410 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3418 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3423 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3430 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3432 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3434 fsec = file->f_security;
3435 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3438 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3439 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3442 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3444 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3446 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3447 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3449 fsec = file->f_security;
3452 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3454 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3456 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3457 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3460 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3462 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3464 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3467 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3469 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3470 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3472 fsec = file->f_security;
3473 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3475 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3476 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3477 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3478 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3479 * struct as its SID.
3481 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3482 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3484 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3485 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3486 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3487 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3488 * new inode label or new policy.
3489 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3491 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3494 /* task security operations */
3496 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3498 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3502 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3504 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3506 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3508 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3512 cred->security = tsec;
3517 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3519 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3521 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3524 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3525 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3527 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3528 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3533 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3535 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3538 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3539 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3541 old_tsec = old->security;
3543 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3547 new->security = tsec;
3552 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3554 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3556 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3557 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3563 * set the security data for a kernel service
3564 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3566 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3568 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3569 u32 sid = current_sid();
3572 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3573 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3574 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3578 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3579 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3580 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3586 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3587 * objective context of the specified inode
3589 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3591 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3592 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3593 u32 sid = current_sid();
3596 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3597 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3598 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3602 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3606 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3609 struct common_audit_data ad;
3611 sid = task_sid(current);
3613 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3614 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3616 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3617 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3620 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3622 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3625 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3627 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3630 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3632 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3635 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3637 *secid = task_sid(p);
3640 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3644 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3648 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3651 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3655 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3659 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3662 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3664 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3667 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3668 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3670 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3672 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3673 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3674 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3675 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3676 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3677 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3682 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3686 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3690 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3693 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3695 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3698 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3700 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3703 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3710 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3712 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3714 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3715 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3717 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3721 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3723 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3726 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3727 struct inode *inode)
3729 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3730 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3733 isec->initialized = 1;
3736 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3737 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3738 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3740 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3741 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3743 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3744 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3748 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3749 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3752 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3753 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3757 *proto = ih->protocol;
3759 switch (ih->protocol) {
3761 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3763 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3767 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3771 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3772 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3777 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3779 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3783 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3787 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3788 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3792 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3793 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3795 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3799 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3803 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3804 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3815 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3817 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3818 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3819 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3822 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3823 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3826 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3827 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3831 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3832 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3835 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3836 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3837 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3846 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3848 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3852 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3853 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3858 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3860 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3864 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3865 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3869 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3870 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3872 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3876 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3877 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3881 /* includes fragments */
3891 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3892 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3897 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3899 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3902 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3903 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3906 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3908 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3911 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3912 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3922 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3923 " unable to parse packet\n");
3933 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3935 * @family: protocol family
3936 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3939 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3940 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3941 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3942 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3943 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3947 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3954 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3957 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3961 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3962 if (unlikely(err)) {
3964 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3965 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3973 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3974 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3975 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3976 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3978 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3979 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3980 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3981 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3984 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
3988 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
3989 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
3996 /* socket security operations */
3998 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3999 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4001 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4002 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4006 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
4010 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4012 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4013 struct common_audit_data ad;
4014 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4015 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
4017 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4020 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4024 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4027 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4028 int protocol, int kern)
4030 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4038 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4039 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4043 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4046 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4047 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4049 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4050 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4051 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4054 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4057 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4059 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4064 isec->initialized = 1;
4067 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4068 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4069 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4070 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4076 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4077 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4078 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4080 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4082 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4086 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4091 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4092 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4093 * check the first address now.
4095 family = sk->sk_family;
4096 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4098 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4099 struct common_audit_data ad;
4100 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4101 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4102 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4103 unsigned short snum;
4106 if (family == PF_INET) {
4107 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4108 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4109 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4111 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4112 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4113 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4119 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4121 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4122 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4126 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4128 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4129 ad.u.net->family = family;
4130 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4132 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4138 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4139 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4140 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4143 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4144 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4147 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4148 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4152 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4156 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4160 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4162 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4163 ad.u.net->family = family;
4165 if (family == PF_INET)
4166 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4168 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4170 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4171 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4179 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4181 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4182 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4185 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4190 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4192 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4193 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4194 struct common_audit_data ad;
4195 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4196 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4197 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4198 unsigned short snum;
4201 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4202 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4203 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4205 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4207 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4208 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4210 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4213 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4217 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4218 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4220 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4222 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4223 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4224 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4229 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4235 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4237 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4240 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4243 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4244 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4246 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4250 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4252 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4253 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4254 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4255 newisec->initialized = 1;
4260 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4263 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4266 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4267 int size, int flags)
4269 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4272 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4274 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4277 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4279 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4282 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4286 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4290 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4293 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4296 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4299 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4301 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4304 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4308 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4309 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4310 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4311 struct common_audit_data ad;
4312 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4315 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4317 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4319 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4320 sksec_other->sclass,
4321 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4325 /* server child socket */
4326 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4327 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4332 /* connecting socket */
4333 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4338 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4339 struct socket *other)
4341 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4342 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4343 struct common_audit_data ad;
4344 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4346 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4348 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4350 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4354 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4355 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4356 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4362 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4365 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4366 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4370 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4373 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4374 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4377 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4381 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4382 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4383 struct common_audit_data ad;
4384 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4387 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4389 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4390 ad.u.net->family = family;
4391 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4395 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4396 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4402 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4405 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4410 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4413 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4414 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4415 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4416 struct common_audit_data ad;
4417 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4422 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4425 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4426 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4429 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4430 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4431 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4432 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4433 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4434 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4436 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4437 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4438 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4441 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4443 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4444 ad.u.net->family = family;
4445 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4449 if (peerlbl_active) {
4452 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4455 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4456 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4458 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4461 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4464 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4469 if (secmark_active) {
4470 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4479 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4480 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4485 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4486 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4488 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4489 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4490 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4491 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4492 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4494 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4498 if (scontext_len > len) {
4503 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4507 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4513 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4515 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4518 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4520 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4523 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4527 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4528 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4530 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4533 *secid = peer_secid;
4534 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4539 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4541 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4543 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4547 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4548 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4549 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4550 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4555 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4557 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4559 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4560 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4564 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4566 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4567 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4569 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4570 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4571 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4573 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4576 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4579 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4581 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4583 *secid = sksec->sid;
4587 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4589 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4590 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4592 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4593 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4594 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4595 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4598 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4599 struct request_sock *req)
4601 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4603 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4607 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4610 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4613 req->secid = connsid;
4614 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4616 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4619 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4620 const struct request_sock *req)
4622 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4624 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4625 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4626 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4627 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4628 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4629 time it will have been created and available. */
4631 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4632 * thread with access to newsksec */
4633 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4636 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4638 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4639 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4641 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4642 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4645 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4648 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4650 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4653 __tsec = current_security();
4656 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4659 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4661 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4664 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4666 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4669 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4672 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4675 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4677 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4679 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4682 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4688 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4693 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4695 u32 sid = current_sid();
4697 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4698 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4699 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4700 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4701 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4702 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4704 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4708 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4710 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4712 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4713 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4716 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4718 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4719 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4721 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4722 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4723 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4724 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4725 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4726 * protocols were being used */
4728 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4729 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4734 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4736 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4737 u32 sid = current_sid();
4740 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4741 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4744 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4745 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4753 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4757 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4758 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4760 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4764 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4766 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4768 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4770 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4771 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
4772 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4773 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4783 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4788 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4790 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4791 const struct net_device *indev,
4797 struct common_audit_data ad;
4798 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4803 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4806 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4807 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4808 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4809 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4812 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4815 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4817 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4818 ad.u.net->family = family;
4819 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4822 if (peerlbl_active) {
4823 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4824 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4826 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4832 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4833 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4837 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4838 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4839 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4841 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4847 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4848 struct sk_buff *skb,
4849 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4851 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
4854 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4855 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4856 struct sk_buff *skb,
4857 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4859 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
4863 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4869 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4872 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4873 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4874 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4877 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4879 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4880 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4881 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4882 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4883 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4884 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4885 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4886 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4887 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4888 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4889 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4890 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4891 * best we can do. */
4894 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4895 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4898 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4899 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4905 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4906 struct sk_buff *skb,
4907 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4909 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4912 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4916 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4917 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4918 struct common_audit_data ad;
4919 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4925 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4927 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4929 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4930 ad.u.net->family = family;
4931 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4934 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4935 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4936 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4937 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4939 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4940 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4945 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
4946 const struct net_device *outdev,
4951 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
4953 struct common_audit_data ad;
4954 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4959 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4960 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4961 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4962 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4963 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4964 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4966 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4967 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4968 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4974 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4975 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4976 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4977 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4978 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4979 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4980 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4981 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4982 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4983 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4985 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4986 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
4991 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4992 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4993 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4994 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4996 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4997 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5000 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5001 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5003 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
5004 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5005 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5006 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5007 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5008 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5009 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5010 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5011 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5012 * for similar problems. */
5014 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5015 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5017 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5018 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5019 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5020 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5021 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5022 * pass the packet. */
5023 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5026 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5030 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5034 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5037 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5039 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5041 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5042 * associated socket. */
5043 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5044 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5045 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5048 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5050 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5051 ad.u.net->family = family;
5052 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5056 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5057 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5058 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5060 if (peerlbl_active) {
5064 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5066 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5067 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5068 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5070 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5072 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5073 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5074 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5080 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5081 struct sk_buff *skb,
5082 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5084 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5087 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5088 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5089 struct sk_buff *skb,
5090 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5092 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5096 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5098 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5102 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
5106 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5109 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5110 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5113 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5116 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5120 sid = task_sid(task);
5121 isec->sclass = sclass;
5123 perm->security = isec;
5128 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5130 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5131 perm->security = NULL;
5135 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5137 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5139 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5143 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5144 msg->security = msec;
5149 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5151 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5153 msg->security = NULL;
5157 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5160 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5161 struct common_audit_data ad;
5162 u32 sid = current_sid();
5164 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5166 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5167 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5169 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5172 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5174 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5177 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5179 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5182 /* message queue security operations */
5183 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5185 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5186 struct common_audit_data ad;
5187 u32 sid = current_sid();
5190 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5194 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5196 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5197 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5199 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5202 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5208 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5210 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5213 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5215 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5216 struct common_audit_data ad;
5217 u32 sid = current_sid();
5219 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5221 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5222 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5224 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5225 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5228 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5236 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5237 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5240 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5243 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5246 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5252 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5256 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5258 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5259 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5260 struct common_audit_data ad;
5261 u32 sid = current_sid();
5264 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5265 msec = msg->security;
5268 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5270 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5272 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5273 * message queue this message will be stored in
5275 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5281 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5282 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5284 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5285 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5288 /* Can this process send the message */
5289 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5292 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5293 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5294 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5299 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5300 struct task_struct *target,
5301 long type, int mode)
5303 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5304 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5305 struct common_audit_data ad;
5306 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5309 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5310 msec = msg->security;
5312 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5313 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5315 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5316 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5318 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5319 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5323 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5324 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5326 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5327 struct common_audit_data ad;
5328 u32 sid = current_sid();
5331 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5335 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5337 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5338 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5340 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5343 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5349 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5351 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5354 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5356 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5357 struct common_audit_data ad;
5358 u32 sid = current_sid();
5360 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5362 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5363 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5365 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5366 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5369 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5370 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5378 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5379 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5382 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5385 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5392 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5398 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5402 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5403 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5407 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5410 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5412 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5415 /* Semaphore security operations */
5416 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5418 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5419 struct common_audit_data ad;
5420 u32 sid = current_sid();
5423 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5427 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5429 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5430 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5432 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5435 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5441 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5443 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5446 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5448 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5449 struct common_audit_data ad;
5450 u32 sid = current_sid();
5452 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5454 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5455 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5457 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5458 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5461 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5462 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5470 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5471 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5475 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5486 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5489 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5493 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5499 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5503 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5504 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5509 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5513 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5516 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5522 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5524 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5529 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5532 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5534 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5538 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5541 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5544 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5545 char *name, char **value)
5547 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5553 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5559 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5561 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5563 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5565 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5566 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5567 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5568 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5569 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5570 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5571 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5572 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5580 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5590 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5591 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5593 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5594 struct task_struct *tracer;
5601 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5602 security attributes. */
5607 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5608 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5609 * above restriction is ever removed.
5611 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5612 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5613 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5614 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5615 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5616 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5617 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5618 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5619 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5620 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5626 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5627 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5628 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5632 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5633 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5634 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5635 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5638 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5639 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5640 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5641 audit_size = size - 1;
5644 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5645 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5646 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5651 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5658 new = prepare_creds();
5662 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5663 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5664 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5665 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5666 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5667 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5668 tsec = new->security;
5669 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5670 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5671 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5672 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5673 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5674 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5677 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5678 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5679 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5680 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5685 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5687 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5688 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5693 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5694 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5695 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5699 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5700 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5703 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5705 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5709 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5710 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5729 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5731 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5734 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5736 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5739 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5741 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5744 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5750 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5752 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5754 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5758 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5760 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5762 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5765 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5768 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5777 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5778 unsigned long flags)
5780 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5781 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5783 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5787 tsec = cred->security;
5788 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5789 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5791 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5797 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5799 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5805 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5806 const struct cred *cred,
5810 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5813 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5814 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5815 appear to be created. */
5819 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5821 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5822 ksec = key->security;
5824 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5827 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5829 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5830 char *context = NULL;
5834 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5843 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5846 .binder_set_context_mgr = selinux_binder_set_context_mgr,
5847 .binder_transaction = selinux_binder_transaction,
5848 .binder_transfer_binder = selinux_binder_transfer_binder,
5849 .binder_transfer_file = selinux_binder_transfer_file,
5851 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5852 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5853 .capget = selinux_capget,
5854 .capset = selinux_capset,
5855 .capable = selinux_capable,
5856 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5857 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5858 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5859 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5861 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5863 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5864 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5865 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5866 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5868 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5869 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5870 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5871 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5872 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5873 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5874 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5875 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5876 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5877 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5878 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5879 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5881 .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security,
5883 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5884 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5885 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5886 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5887 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5888 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5889 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5890 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5891 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5892 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5893 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5894 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5895 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5896 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5897 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5898 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5899 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5900 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5901 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5902 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5903 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5904 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5905 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5906 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5907 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5909 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5910 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5911 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5912 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5913 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5914 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5915 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5916 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5917 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5918 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5919 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5920 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5922 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5924 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5925 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5926 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5927 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5928 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5929 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5930 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5931 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5932 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5933 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5934 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5935 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5936 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5937 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5938 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5939 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5940 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5941 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5942 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5943 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5944 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5945 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5947 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5948 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5950 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5951 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5953 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5954 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5955 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5956 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5957 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5958 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5960 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5961 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5962 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5963 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5964 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5966 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5967 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5968 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5969 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5970 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5972 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5974 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5975 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5977 .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel,
5978 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5979 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5980 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5981 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5982 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5983 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5985 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5986 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5988 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5989 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5990 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5991 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5992 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5993 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5994 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5995 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5996 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5997 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5998 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5999 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
6000 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
6001 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
6002 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
6003 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
6004 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
6005 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
6006 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
6007 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
6008 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
6009 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
6010 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
6011 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
6012 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
6013 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
6014 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
6015 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
6016 .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
6017 .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
6018 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
6019 .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
6020 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
6021 .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
6023 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6024 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
6025 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
6026 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
6027 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
6028 .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
6029 .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
6030 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
6031 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
6032 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
6033 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
6034 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
6038 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
6039 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
6040 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
6041 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
6045 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
6046 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
6047 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
6048 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
6052 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6054 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
6055 selinux_enabled = 0;
6059 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6060 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6064 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6066 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6067 cred_init_security();
6069 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6071 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6072 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6073 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6076 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
6077 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
6079 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6080 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6082 if (selinux_enforcing)
6083 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6085 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6090 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6092 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6095 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6097 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6099 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6100 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6101 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6104 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6105 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6106 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6108 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6110 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6112 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6113 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6115 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6116 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6119 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6120 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6122 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6123 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6126 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6127 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6129 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6130 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6132 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6134 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6135 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6137 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6138 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6141 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6142 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6144 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6145 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6150 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6154 if (!selinux_enabled)
6157 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6159 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6161 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6166 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6168 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6169 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6171 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6173 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6177 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6179 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6180 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6183 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6185 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6186 static int selinux_disabled;
6188 int selinux_disable(void)
6190 if (ss_initialized) {
6191 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6195 if (selinux_disabled) {
6196 /* Only do this once. */
6200 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6202 selinux_disabled = 1;
6203 selinux_enabled = 0;
6205 reset_security_ops();
6207 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6210 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6211 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6213 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */