2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing;
103 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 unsigned long enforcing;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
107 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 unsigned long enabled;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
120 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 int selinux_enabled = 1;
128 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
131 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
134 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
135 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
136 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
137 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
138 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
147 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
150 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
151 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
152 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
153 * is always considered enabled.
156 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
161 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
163 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
173 * initialise the security for the init task
175 static void cred_init_security(void)
177 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
178 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
182 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
185 cred->security = tsec;
189 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
195 tsec = cred->security;
200 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
207 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
213 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
217 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
222 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
226 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
227 u32 sid = current_sid();
229 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
233 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
234 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
236 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
237 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
238 isec->task_sid = sid;
239 inode->i_security = isec;
244 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
246 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
248 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
249 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
252 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
254 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
255 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
257 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
258 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
259 list_del_init(&isec->list);
260 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
263 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
264 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
265 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
266 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
267 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
268 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
269 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
271 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
274 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
276 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
277 u32 sid = current_sid();
279 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
284 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
285 file->f_security = fsec;
290 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
292 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
293 file->f_security = NULL;
297 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
299 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
301 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
305 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
306 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
307 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
309 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
311 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sb->s_security = sbsec;
317 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
319 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
320 sb->s_security = NULL;
324 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
326 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
328 "uses transition SIDs",
330 "uses genfs_contexts",
331 "not configured for labeling",
332 "uses mountpoint labeling",
333 "uses native labeling",
336 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
338 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
340 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
349 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
353 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
355 static const match_table_t tokens = {
356 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
357 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
358 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
359 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
364 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
366 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
367 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
368 const struct cred *cred)
370 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
373 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
374 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
378 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
379 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
383 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
384 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
385 const struct cred *cred)
387 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
389 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
390 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
394 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
395 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
399 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
401 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
403 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
404 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
405 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
406 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
407 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
408 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
409 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
410 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
413 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
415 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
416 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
417 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
420 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
421 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
422 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
423 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
424 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
425 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
426 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
427 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
428 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
432 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
433 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
434 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
435 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
436 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
437 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
439 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
440 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
441 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
446 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
447 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
448 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
450 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
451 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
452 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
454 /* Initialize the root inode. */
455 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
457 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
458 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
459 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
461 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
463 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
464 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
465 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
466 struct inode_security_struct, list);
467 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
468 list_del_init(&isec->list);
469 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
470 inode = igrab(inode);
472 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
476 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
479 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
485 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
486 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
487 * mount options, or whatever.
489 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
490 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
493 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
494 char *context = NULL;
498 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
500 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
506 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
507 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
509 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
510 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
511 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
516 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
517 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
518 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
520 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
521 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
526 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
527 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
533 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
534 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
537 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
538 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
540 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
541 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
544 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
545 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
547 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
548 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
551 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
552 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
554 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
555 struct inode *root = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
556 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
558 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
561 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
562 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
564 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
565 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
566 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
569 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
574 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
578 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
579 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
581 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
583 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
584 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
585 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
586 (old_sid != new_sid))
589 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
590 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
592 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
593 if (mnt_flags & flag)
599 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
600 * labeling information.
602 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
603 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
604 unsigned long kern_flags,
605 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
607 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
609 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
610 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
611 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
612 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
613 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
614 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
615 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
616 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
617 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
619 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
621 if (!ss_initialized) {
623 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
624 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
625 server is ready to handle calls. */
629 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
630 "before the security server is initialized\n");
633 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
634 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
635 * place the results is not allowed */
641 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
642 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
643 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
644 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
646 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
647 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
648 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
649 * will be used for both mounts)
651 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
656 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
657 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
658 * than once with different security options.
660 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
663 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
665 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
666 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
668 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
669 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
670 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
692 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
693 rootcontext_sid = sid;
695 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
697 goto out_double_mount;
699 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
703 defcontext_sid = sid;
705 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
707 goto out_double_mount;
709 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
718 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
719 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
720 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
721 goto out_double_mount;
726 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
727 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
729 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
731 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
734 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
737 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
738 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
742 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
748 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
752 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
753 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
754 * the superblock context if not already set.
756 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
757 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
758 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
762 if (!fscontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
767 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
769 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
774 if (!rootcontext_sid)
775 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
777 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
778 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
781 if (rootcontext_sid) {
782 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
787 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
788 root_isec->initialized = 1;
791 if (defcontext_sid) {
792 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
793 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
795 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
796 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
800 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
801 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
807 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
810 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
812 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
816 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
817 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
821 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
822 const struct super_block *newsb)
824 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
825 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
826 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
827 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
829 if (oldflags != newflags)
831 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
833 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
835 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
837 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
838 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root)->i_security;
839 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root)->i_security;
840 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
845 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
846 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
847 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
851 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
852 struct super_block *newsb)
854 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
855 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
857 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
858 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
859 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
862 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
863 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
868 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
869 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
871 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
872 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
873 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
875 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
877 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
879 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
880 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
881 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
884 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
888 if (!set_rootcontext) {
889 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
890 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
893 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
895 if (set_rootcontext) {
896 const struct inode *oldinode = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root);
897 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
898 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
899 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
901 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
904 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
905 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
909 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
910 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
913 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
914 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
915 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
917 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
919 /* Standard string-based options. */
920 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
922 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
927 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
931 if (context || defcontext) {
933 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
936 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
946 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
949 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
956 case Opt_rootcontext:
959 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
962 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
970 if (context || defcontext) {
972 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
975 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
981 case Opt_labelsupport:
985 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
992 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
996 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
997 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
998 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1003 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1004 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1007 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1008 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1011 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1012 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1015 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1016 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1019 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1030 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1032 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1035 char *options = data;
1036 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1038 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1043 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1045 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1050 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1053 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1057 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1058 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1063 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1066 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1067 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1071 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1073 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1076 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1078 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1079 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1081 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1082 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1086 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1092 /* we need a comma before each option */
1094 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1097 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1103 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1105 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1108 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1110 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1116 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1118 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1123 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1125 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1127 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1129 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1131 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1133 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1135 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1137 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1139 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1143 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1146 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1148 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1151 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1153 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1156 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1162 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1163 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1165 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1172 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1173 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1175 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1177 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1178 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1180 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1182 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1184 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1190 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1191 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1192 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1193 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1194 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1199 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1203 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1205 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1207 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1208 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1210 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1213 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1215 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1217 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1220 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1223 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1224 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1229 char *buffer, *path;
1231 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1235 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1239 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1240 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1241 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1242 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1246 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1248 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1252 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1260 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1261 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1263 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1264 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1266 struct dentry *dentry;
1267 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1268 char *context = NULL;
1272 if (isec->initialized)
1275 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1276 if (isec->initialized)
1279 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1280 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1281 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1282 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1283 server is ready to handle calls. */
1284 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1285 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1286 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1287 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1291 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1294 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1295 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1296 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1300 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1301 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1303 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1304 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1306 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1307 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1311 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1312 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1313 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1314 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1315 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1316 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1317 * be used again by userspace.
1322 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1323 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1329 context[len] = '\0';
1330 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1332 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1335 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1336 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1343 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1349 context[len] = '\0';
1350 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1356 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1357 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1358 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1359 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1363 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1364 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1367 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1371 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1372 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1374 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1375 if (printk_ratelimit())
1376 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1377 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1378 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1380 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1381 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1382 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1385 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1393 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1394 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1396 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1397 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1398 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1400 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1401 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1402 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1403 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1408 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1409 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1412 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1413 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1415 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1416 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1419 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1420 * d_splice_alias. */
1421 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1423 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1425 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1427 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1428 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1429 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1430 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1431 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1432 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1433 * could be used again by userspace.
1437 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1438 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
1447 isec->initialized = 1;
1450 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1452 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1453 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1457 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1458 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1464 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1465 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1468 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1469 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1472 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1473 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1476 /* All other signals. */
1477 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1485 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1486 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1488 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1489 const struct cred *target,
1492 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1494 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1498 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1499 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1500 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1501 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1503 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1504 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1507 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1511 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1512 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1514 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1518 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1519 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1520 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1521 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1523 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1528 sid = current_sid();
1529 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1530 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1533 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1534 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1537 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1538 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1541 struct common_audit_data ad;
1542 struct av_decision avd;
1544 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1545 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1548 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1551 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1553 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1556 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1560 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1565 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1566 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1567 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1574 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1575 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1578 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1580 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1581 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1584 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1585 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1586 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1587 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1588 struct inode *inode,
1590 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1592 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1595 validate_creds(cred);
1597 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1600 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1601 isec = inode->i_security;
1603 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1606 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1607 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1608 pathname if needed. */
1609 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1610 struct dentry *dentry,
1613 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1614 struct common_audit_data ad;
1616 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1617 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1618 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1621 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1622 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1623 pathname if needed. */
1624 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1625 const struct path *path,
1628 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1629 struct common_audit_data ad;
1631 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1633 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1636 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1637 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1641 struct common_audit_data ad;
1643 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1644 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1645 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1648 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1649 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1650 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1651 check a particular permission to the file.
1652 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1653 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1654 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1655 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1656 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1660 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1661 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1662 struct common_audit_data ad;
1663 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1666 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1667 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1669 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1670 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1678 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1681 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1687 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1688 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1689 struct dentry *dentry,
1692 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1693 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1694 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1696 struct common_audit_data ad;
1699 dsec = dir->i_security;
1700 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1703 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1705 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1706 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1708 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1714 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1715 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1716 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1721 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1725 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1726 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1727 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1730 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1731 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1732 struct task_struct *ctx)
1734 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1736 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1740 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1743 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1744 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1745 struct dentry *dentry,
1749 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1750 struct common_audit_data ad;
1751 u32 sid = current_sid();
1755 dsec = dir->i_security;
1756 isec = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1758 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1759 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1762 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1763 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1778 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1783 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1787 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1788 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1789 struct inode *new_dir,
1790 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1792 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1793 struct common_audit_data ad;
1794 u32 sid = current_sid();
1796 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1799 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1800 old_isec = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_security;
1801 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1802 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1804 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1806 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1807 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1808 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1811 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1812 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1815 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1816 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1817 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1822 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1823 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1824 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1825 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1826 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1829 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1830 new_isec = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_security;
1831 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1832 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1834 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1842 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1843 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1844 struct super_block *sb,
1846 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1848 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1849 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1851 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1852 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1855 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1856 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1860 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1861 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1862 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1863 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1866 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1868 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1872 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1874 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1876 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1883 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1884 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1888 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1890 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1891 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1898 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1907 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1910 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1912 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1914 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1920 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1922 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
1924 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1925 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
1927 return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1928 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
1931 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
1932 struct task_struct *to)
1934 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1935 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1936 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1939 if (mysid != fromsid) {
1940 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1941 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
1946 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
1950 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
1951 struct task_struct *to)
1953 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1954 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1956 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
1960 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
1961 struct task_struct *to,
1964 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
1965 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1966 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
1967 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1968 struct common_audit_data ad;
1971 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1972 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1974 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1975 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1983 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1986 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
1990 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1995 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1999 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
2000 u32 sid = current_sid();
2001 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2002 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2005 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2008 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2012 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
2016 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2019 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2020 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2024 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
2028 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
2031 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2032 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2033 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2034 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2038 error = cap_capset(new, old,
2039 effective, inheritable, permitted);
2043 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
2047 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2048 * which was removed).
2050 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2051 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2052 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2053 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2056 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2061 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
2065 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2068 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2070 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2082 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2087 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2090 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2096 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2098 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2100 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2103 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2108 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2109 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2110 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2112 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2113 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2114 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2115 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2116 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2118 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2119 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2120 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2121 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2122 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2124 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2131 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2132 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2133 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2135 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2136 * processes that allocate mappings.
2138 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2140 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2142 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2143 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2147 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2150 /* binprm security operations */
2152 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2153 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2154 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2156 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2157 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2160 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2161 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2163 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2164 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2167 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2168 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2169 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2170 * of the current SID.
2172 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2175 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2176 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2177 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2187 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2189 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2190 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2191 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2192 struct common_audit_data ad;
2193 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2196 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2200 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2201 * the script interpreter */
2202 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2205 old_tsec = current_security();
2206 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2207 isec = inode->i_security;
2209 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2210 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2211 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2213 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2214 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2215 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2216 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2218 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2219 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2220 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2221 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2223 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2224 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2228 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2229 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2230 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2236 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2239 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2241 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2244 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2245 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2247 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2248 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2249 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2253 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2254 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2255 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2259 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2260 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2264 /* Check for shared state */
2265 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2266 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2267 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2273 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2274 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2276 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2277 struct task_struct *tracer;
2278 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2282 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2283 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2284 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2290 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2292 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2298 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2299 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2305 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2307 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2315 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2316 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2317 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2318 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2320 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2323 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2326 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2328 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2331 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2332 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2333 struct files_struct *files)
2335 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2336 struct tty_struct *tty;
2340 tty = get_current_tty();
2342 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2343 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2344 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2346 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2347 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2348 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2349 open file may belong to another process and we are
2350 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2351 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2352 struct tty_file_private, list);
2353 file = file_priv->file;
2354 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2357 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2360 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2364 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2365 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2366 if (!n) /* none found? */
2369 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2370 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2372 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2374 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2375 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2381 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2383 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2385 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2386 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2389 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2390 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2393 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2394 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2396 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2397 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2399 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2400 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2401 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2403 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2404 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2405 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2406 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2407 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2409 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2410 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2412 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2414 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2415 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2416 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2417 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2419 task_unlock(current);
2420 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2425 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2428 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2430 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2431 struct itimerval itimer;
2441 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2442 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2443 * flush and unblock signals.
2445 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2446 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2448 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2450 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2451 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2452 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2453 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2454 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2455 __flush_signals(current);
2456 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2457 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2459 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2462 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2463 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2464 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2465 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2466 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2469 /* superblock security operations */
2471 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2473 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2476 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2478 superblock_free_security(sb);
2481 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2486 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2489 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2491 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2492 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2493 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2494 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2495 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2498 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2505 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2509 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2512 int current_size = 0;
2520 while (current_size < len) {
2530 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2532 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2533 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2534 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2540 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2548 in_save = in_end = orig;
2552 open_quote = !open_quote;
2553 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2555 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2557 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2558 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2560 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2562 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2564 } while (*in_end++);
2566 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2567 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2572 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2575 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2576 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2577 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2579 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2585 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2588 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2589 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2592 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2594 goto out_free_secdata;
2596 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2598 goto out_free_secdata;
2600 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2601 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2603 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2607 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2609 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2610 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
2613 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2614 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2615 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2621 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2622 goto out_bad_option;
2625 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2626 goto out_bad_option;
2628 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2629 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2630 root_isec = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root)->i_security;
2632 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2633 goto out_bad_option;
2636 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2637 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2638 goto out_bad_option;
2647 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2649 free_secdata(secdata);
2652 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2653 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2658 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2660 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2661 struct common_audit_data ad;
2664 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2668 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2669 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2672 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2673 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2674 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2677 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2679 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2680 struct common_audit_data ad;
2682 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2683 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2684 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2687 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2690 unsigned long flags,
2693 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2695 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2696 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2697 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2699 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2702 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2704 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2706 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2707 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2710 /* inode security operations */
2712 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2714 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2717 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2719 inode_free_security(inode);
2722 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2723 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2726 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2727 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2728 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2729 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2730 struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent);
2734 tsec = cred->security;
2735 dsec = dir->i_security;
2736 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2738 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2739 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2741 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2742 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2747 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2753 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2756 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2757 const struct qstr *qstr,
2759 void **value, size_t *len)
2761 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2762 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2763 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2764 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2768 dsec = dir->i_security;
2769 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2772 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2774 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2775 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2776 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2777 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2778 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2779 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2782 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2783 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2786 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2791 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2792 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2793 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2794 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2796 isec->initialized = 1;
2799 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2803 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2806 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2816 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2818 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2821 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2823 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2826 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2828 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2831 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2833 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2836 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2838 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2841 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2843 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2846 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2848 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2851 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2852 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2854 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2857 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2859 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2861 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2864 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
2867 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2868 struct common_audit_data ad;
2869 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2872 validate_creds(cred);
2874 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2875 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2876 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2877 isec = inode->i_security;
2879 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
2880 rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
2883 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2884 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2888 struct common_audit_data ad;
2889 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2892 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2895 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2896 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2902 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2904 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2907 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2908 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2910 struct av_decision avd;
2912 u32 audited, denied;
2914 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2915 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2917 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2921 validate_creds(cred);
2923 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2926 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2928 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2929 isec = inode->i_security;
2931 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2932 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2933 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2935 if (likely(!audited))
2938 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2944 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2946 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2947 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2948 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2950 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2951 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2952 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2958 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2959 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2960 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2962 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2965 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2968 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
2970 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
2973 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2975 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2977 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2978 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2979 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2980 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2982 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2983 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2984 Restrict to administrator. */
2989 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2990 ordinary setattr permission. */
2991 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2994 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2995 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2997 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2998 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2999 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3000 struct common_audit_data ad;
3001 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3004 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3005 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3007 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
3008 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3011 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3014 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3015 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3017 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3018 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3022 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3023 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3024 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3025 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3029 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3030 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3033 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3034 audit_size = size - 1;
3041 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3042 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3043 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3048 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3053 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3054 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3058 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3063 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3065 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3066 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3070 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3071 const void *value, size_t size,
3074 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3075 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3079 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3080 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3084 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3086 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3087 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3088 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3092 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3094 isec->initialized = 1;
3099 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3101 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3103 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3106 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3108 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3110 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3113 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3115 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3116 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3118 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3119 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3124 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3126 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3128 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3132 char *context = NULL;
3133 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3135 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3139 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3140 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3141 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3142 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3143 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3144 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3145 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3147 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3148 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3150 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3153 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3166 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3167 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3169 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3173 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3176 if (!value || !size)
3179 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3183 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3185 isec->initialized = 1;
3189 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3191 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3192 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3193 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3197 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3199 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3203 /* file security operations */
3205 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3207 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3208 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3210 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3211 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3214 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3215 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3218 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3220 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3221 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3223 u32 sid = current_sid();
3226 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3229 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3230 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3231 /* No change since file_open check. */
3234 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3237 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3239 return file_alloc_security(file);
3242 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3244 file_free_security(file);
3247 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3250 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3260 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3262 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3263 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3266 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3268 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3269 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3272 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3276 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3281 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3282 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3285 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3286 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3289 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3294 static int default_noexec;
3296 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3298 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3301 if (default_noexec &&
3302 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3304 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3305 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3306 * This has an additional check.
3308 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3314 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3315 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3317 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3318 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3321 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3322 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3324 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3331 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3335 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3336 rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3340 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3341 u32 sid = current_sid();
3342 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3343 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3349 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3350 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3352 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3355 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3356 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3359 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3360 unsigned long reqprot,
3363 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3365 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3368 if (default_noexec &&
3369 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3371 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3372 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3373 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3374 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3375 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3376 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3377 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3378 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3380 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3381 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3382 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3383 * modified content. This typically should only
3384 * occur for text relocations.
3386 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3392 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3395 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3397 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3399 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3402 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3405 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3410 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3411 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3420 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3421 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3422 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3430 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3435 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3442 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3444 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3446 fsec = file->f_security;
3447 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3450 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3451 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3454 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3456 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3458 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3459 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3461 fsec = file->f_security;
3464 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3466 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3468 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3469 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3472 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3474 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3476 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3479 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3481 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3482 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3484 fsec = file->f_security;
3485 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3487 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3488 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3489 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3490 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3491 * struct as its SID.
3493 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3494 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3496 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3497 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3498 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3499 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3500 * new inode label or new policy.
3501 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3503 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3506 /* task security operations */
3508 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3510 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3514 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3516 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3518 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3520 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3524 cred->security = tsec;
3529 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3531 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3533 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3536 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3537 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3539 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3540 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3545 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3547 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3550 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3551 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3553 old_tsec = old->security;
3555 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3559 new->security = tsec;
3564 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3566 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3568 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3569 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3575 * set the security data for a kernel service
3576 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3578 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3580 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3581 u32 sid = current_sid();
3584 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3585 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3586 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3590 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3591 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3592 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3598 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3599 * objective context of the specified inode
3601 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3603 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3604 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3605 u32 sid = current_sid();
3608 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3609 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3610 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3614 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3618 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3621 struct common_audit_data ad;
3623 sid = task_sid(current);
3625 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3626 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3628 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3629 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3632 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3634 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3637 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3639 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3642 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3644 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3647 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3649 *secid = task_sid(p);
3652 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3656 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3660 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3663 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3667 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3671 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3674 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3676 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3679 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3680 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3682 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3684 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3685 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3686 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3687 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3688 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3689 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3694 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3698 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3702 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3705 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3707 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3710 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3712 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3715 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3722 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3724 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3726 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3727 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3729 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3733 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3735 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3738 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3739 struct inode *inode)
3741 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3742 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3745 isec->initialized = 1;
3748 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3749 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3750 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3752 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3753 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3755 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3756 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3760 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3761 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3764 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3765 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3769 *proto = ih->protocol;
3771 switch (ih->protocol) {
3773 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3775 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3779 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3783 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3784 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3789 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3791 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3795 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3799 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3800 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3804 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3805 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3807 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3811 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3815 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3816 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3827 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3829 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3830 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3831 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3834 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3835 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3838 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3839 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3843 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3844 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3847 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3848 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3849 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3858 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3860 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3864 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3865 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3870 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3872 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3876 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3877 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3881 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3882 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3884 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3888 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3889 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3893 /* includes fragments */
3903 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3904 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3909 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3911 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3914 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3915 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3918 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3920 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3923 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3924 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3934 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3935 " unable to parse packet\n");
3945 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3947 * @family: protocol family
3948 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3951 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3952 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3953 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3954 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3955 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3959 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3966 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3969 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3973 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3974 if (unlikely(err)) {
3976 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3977 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3985 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3986 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3987 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3988 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3990 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3991 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3992 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3993 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3996 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4000 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4001 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
4008 /* socket security operations */
4010 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4011 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4013 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4014 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4018 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
4022 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4024 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4025 struct common_audit_data ad;
4026 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4027 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
4029 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4032 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4036 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4039 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4040 int protocol, int kern)
4042 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4050 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4051 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4055 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4058 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4059 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4061 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4062 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4063 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4066 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4069 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4071 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4076 isec->initialized = 1;
4079 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4080 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4081 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4082 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4088 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4089 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4090 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4092 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4094 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4098 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4103 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4104 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4105 * check the first address now.
4107 family = sk->sk_family;
4108 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4110 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4111 struct common_audit_data ad;
4112 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4113 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4114 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4115 unsigned short snum;
4118 if (family == PF_INET) {
4119 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4120 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4121 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4123 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4124 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4125 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4131 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4133 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4134 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4138 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4140 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4141 ad.u.net->family = family;
4142 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4144 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4150 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4151 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4152 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4155 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4156 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4159 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4160 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4164 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4168 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4172 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4174 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4175 ad.u.net->family = family;
4177 if (family == PF_INET)
4178 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4180 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4182 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4183 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4191 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4193 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4194 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4197 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4202 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4204 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4205 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4206 struct common_audit_data ad;
4207 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4208 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4209 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4210 unsigned short snum;
4213 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4214 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4215 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4217 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4219 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4220 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4222 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4225 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4229 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4230 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4232 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4234 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4235 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4236 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4241 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4247 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4249 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4252 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4255 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4256 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4258 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4262 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4264 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4265 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4266 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4267 newisec->initialized = 1;
4272 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4275 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4278 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4279 int size, int flags)
4281 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4284 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4286 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4289 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4291 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4294 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4298 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4302 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4305 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4308 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4311 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4313 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4316 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4320 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4321 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4322 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4323 struct common_audit_data ad;
4324 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4327 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4329 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4331 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4332 sksec_other->sclass,
4333 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4337 /* server child socket */
4338 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4339 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4344 /* connecting socket */
4345 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4350 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4351 struct socket *other)
4353 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4354 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4355 struct common_audit_data ad;
4356 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4358 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4360 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4362 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4366 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4367 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4368 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4374 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4377 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4378 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4382 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4385 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4386 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4389 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4393 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4394 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4395 struct common_audit_data ad;
4396 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4399 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4401 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4402 ad.u.net->family = family;
4403 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4407 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4408 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4414 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4417 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4422 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4425 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4426 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4427 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4428 struct common_audit_data ad;
4429 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4434 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4437 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4438 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4441 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4442 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4443 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4444 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4445 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4446 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4448 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4449 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4450 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4453 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4455 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4456 ad.u.net->family = family;
4457 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4461 if (peerlbl_active) {
4464 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4467 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4468 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4470 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4473 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4476 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4481 if (secmark_active) {
4482 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4491 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4492 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4497 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4498 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4500 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4501 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4502 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4503 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4504 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4506 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4510 if (scontext_len > len) {
4515 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4519 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4525 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4527 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4530 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4532 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4535 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4539 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4540 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4542 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4545 *secid = peer_secid;
4546 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4551 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4553 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4555 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4559 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4560 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4561 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4562 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4567 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4569 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4571 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4572 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4576 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4578 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4579 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4581 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4582 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4583 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4585 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4588 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4591 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4593 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4595 *secid = sksec->sid;
4599 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4601 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4602 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4604 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4605 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4606 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4607 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4610 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4611 struct request_sock *req)
4613 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4615 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4619 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4622 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4625 req->secid = connsid;
4626 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4628 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4631 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4632 const struct request_sock *req)
4634 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4636 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4637 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4638 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4639 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4640 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4641 time it will have been created and available. */
4643 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4644 * thread with access to newsksec */
4645 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4648 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4650 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4651 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4653 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4654 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4657 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4660 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4662 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4665 __tsec = current_security();
4668 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4671 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4673 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4676 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4678 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4681 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4684 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4687 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4689 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4691 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4694 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4700 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4705 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4707 u32 sid = current_sid();
4709 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4710 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4711 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4712 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4713 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4714 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4716 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4720 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4722 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4724 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4725 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4728 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4730 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4731 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4733 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4734 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4735 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4736 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4737 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4738 * protocols were being used */
4740 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4741 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4746 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4748 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4749 u32 sid = current_sid();
4752 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4753 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4756 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4757 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4765 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4769 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4770 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4772 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4776 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4778 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4780 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4782 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4783 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
4784 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4785 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4795 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4800 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4802 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4803 const struct net_device *indev,
4809 struct common_audit_data ad;
4810 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4815 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4818 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4819 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4820 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4821 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4824 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4827 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4829 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4830 ad.u.net->family = family;
4831 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4834 if (peerlbl_active) {
4835 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4836 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4838 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4844 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4845 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4849 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4850 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4851 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4853 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4859 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4860 struct sk_buff *skb,
4861 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4863 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
4866 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4867 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4868 struct sk_buff *skb,
4869 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4871 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
4875 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4881 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4884 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4885 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4886 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4889 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4891 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4892 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4893 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4894 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4895 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4896 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4897 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4898 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4899 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4900 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4901 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4902 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4903 * best we can do. */
4906 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4907 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4910 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4911 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4917 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4918 struct sk_buff *skb,
4919 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4921 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4924 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4928 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4929 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4930 struct common_audit_data ad;
4931 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4937 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4939 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4941 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4942 ad.u.net->family = family;
4943 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4946 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4947 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4948 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4949 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4951 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4952 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4957 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
4958 const struct net_device *outdev,
4963 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
4965 struct common_audit_data ad;
4966 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4971 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4972 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4973 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4974 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4975 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4976 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4978 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4979 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4980 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4986 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4987 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4988 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4989 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4990 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4991 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4992 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4993 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4994 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4995 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4997 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4998 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
5003 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5004 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5005 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5006 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5008 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5009 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5012 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5013 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5015 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
5016 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5017 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5018 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5019 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5020 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5021 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5022 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5023 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5024 * for similar problems. */
5026 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5027 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5029 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5030 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5031 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5032 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5033 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5034 * pass the packet. */
5035 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5038 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5042 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5046 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5049 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5051 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5053 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5054 * associated socket. */
5055 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5056 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5057 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5060 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5062 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5063 ad.u.net->family = family;
5064 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5068 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5069 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5070 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5072 if (peerlbl_active) {
5076 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5078 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5079 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5080 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5082 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5084 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5085 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5086 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5092 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5093 struct sk_buff *skb,
5094 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5096 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5099 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5100 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5101 struct sk_buff *skb,
5102 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5104 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5108 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5110 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5114 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
5118 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5121 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5122 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5125 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5128 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5132 sid = task_sid(task);
5133 isec->sclass = sclass;
5135 perm->security = isec;
5140 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5142 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5143 perm->security = NULL;
5147 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5149 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5151 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5155 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5156 msg->security = msec;
5161 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5163 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5165 msg->security = NULL;
5169 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5172 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5173 struct common_audit_data ad;
5174 u32 sid = current_sid();
5176 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5178 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5179 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5181 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5184 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5186 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5189 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5191 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5194 /* message queue security operations */
5195 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5197 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5198 struct common_audit_data ad;
5199 u32 sid = current_sid();
5202 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5206 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5208 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5209 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5211 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5214 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5220 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5222 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5225 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5227 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5228 struct common_audit_data ad;
5229 u32 sid = current_sid();
5231 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5233 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5234 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5236 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5237 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5240 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5248 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5249 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5252 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5255 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5258 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5264 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5268 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5270 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5271 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5272 struct common_audit_data ad;
5273 u32 sid = current_sid();
5276 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5277 msec = msg->security;
5280 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5282 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5284 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5285 * message queue this message will be stored in
5287 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5293 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5294 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5296 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5297 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5300 /* Can this process send the message */
5301 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5304 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5305 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5306 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5311 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5312 struct task_struct *target,
5313 long type, int mode)
5315 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5316 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5317 struct common_audit_data ad;
5318 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5321 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5322 msec = msg->security;
5324 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5325 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5327 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5328 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5330 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5331 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5335 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5336 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5338 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5339 struct common_audit_data ad;
5340 u32 sid = current_sid();
5343 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5347 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5349 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5350 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5352 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5355 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5361 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5363 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5366 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5368 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5369 struct common_audit_data ad;
5370 u32 sid = current_sid();
5372 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5374 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5375 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5377 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5378 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5381 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5382 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5390 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5391 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5394 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5397 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5404 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5410 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5414 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5415 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5419 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5422 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5424 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5427 /* Semaphore security operations */
5428 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5430 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5431 struct common_audit_data ad;
5432 u32 sid = current_sid();
5435 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5439 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5441 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5442 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5444 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5447 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5453 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5455 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5458 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5460 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5461 struct common_audit_data ad;
5462 u32 sid = current_sid();
5464 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5466 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5467 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5469 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5470 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5473 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5474 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5482 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5483 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5487 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5498 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5501 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5505 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5511 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5515 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5516 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5521 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5525 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5528 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5534 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5536 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5541 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5544 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5546 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5550 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5553 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5556 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5557 char *name, char **value)
5559 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5565 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5571 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5573 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5575 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5577 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5578 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5579 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5580 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5581 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5582 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5583 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5584 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5592 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5602 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5603 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5605 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5606 struct task_struct *tracer;
5613 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5614 security attributes. */
5619 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5620 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5621 * above restriction is ever removed.
5623 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5624 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5625 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5626 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5627 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5628 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5629 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5630 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5631 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5632 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5638 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5639 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5640 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5644 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5645 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5646 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5647 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5650 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5651 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5652 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5653 audit_size = size - 1;
5656 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5657 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5658 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5663 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5670 new = prepare_creds();
5674 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5675 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5676 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5677 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5678 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5679 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5680 tsec = new->security;
5681 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5682 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5683 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5684 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5685 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5686 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5689 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5690 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5691 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5692 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5697 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5699 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5700 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5705 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5706 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5707 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5711 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5712 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5715 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5717 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5721 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5722 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5741 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5743 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5746 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5748 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5751 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5753 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5756 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5762 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5764 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5766 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5770 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5772 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5774 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5777 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5780 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5789 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5790 unsigned long flags)
5792 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5793 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5795 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5799 tsec = cred->security;
5800 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5801 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5803 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5809 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5811 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5817 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5818 const struct cred *cred,
5822 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5825 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5826 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5827 appear to be created. */
5831 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5833 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5834 ksec = key->security;
5836 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5839 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5841 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5842 char *context = NULL;
5846 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5855 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5858 .binder_set_context_mgr = selinux_binder_set_context_mgr,
5859 .binder_transaction = selinux_binder_transaction,
5860 .binder_transfer_binder = selinux_binder_transfer_binder,
5861 .binder_transfer_file = selinux_binder_transfer_file,
5863 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5864 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5865 .capget = selinux_capget,
5866 .capset = selinux_capset,
5867 .capable = selinux_capable,
5868 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5869 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5870 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5871 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5873 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5875 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5876 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5877 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5878 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5880 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5881 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5882 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5883 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5884 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5885 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5886 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5887 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5888 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5889 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5890 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5891 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5893 .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security,
5895 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5896 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5897 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5898 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5899 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5900 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5901 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5902 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5903 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5904 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5905 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5906 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5907 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5908 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5909 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5910 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5911 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5912 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5913 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5914 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5915 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5916 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5917 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5918 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5919 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5921 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5922 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5923 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5924 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5925 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5926 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5927 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5928 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5929 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5930 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5931 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5932 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5934 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5936 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5937 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5938 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5939 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5940 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5941 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5942 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5943 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5944 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5945 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5946 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5947 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5948 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5949 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5950 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5951 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5952 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5953 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5954 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5955 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5956 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5957 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5959 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5960 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5962 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5963 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5965 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5966 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5967 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5968 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5969 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5970 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5972 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5973 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5974 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5975 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5976 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5978 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5979 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5980 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5981 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5982 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5984 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5986 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5987 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5989 .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel,
5990 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5991 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5992 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5993 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5994 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5995 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5997 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5998 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
6000 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
6001 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
6002 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
6003 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
6004 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
6005 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
6006 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
6007 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
6008 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
6009 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
6010 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
6011 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
6012 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
6013 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
6014 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
6015 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
6016 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
6017 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
6018 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
6019 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
6020 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
6021 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
6022 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
6023 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
6024 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
6025 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
6026 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
6027 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
6028 .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
6029 .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
6030 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
6031 .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
6032 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
6033 .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
6035 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6036 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
6037 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
6038 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
6039 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
6040 .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
6041 .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
6042 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
6043 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
6044 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
6045 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
6046 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
6050 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
6051 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
6052 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
6053 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
6057 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
6058 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
6059 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
6060 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
6064 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6066 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
6067 selinux_enabled = 0;
6071 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6072 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6076 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6078 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6079 cred_init_security();
6081 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6083 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6084 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6085 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6088 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
6089 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
6091 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6092 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6094 if (selinux_enforcing)
6095 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6097 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6102 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6104 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6107 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6109 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6111 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6112 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6113 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6116 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6117 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6118 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6120 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6122 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6124 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6125 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6127 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6128 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6131 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6132 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6134 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6135 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6138 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6139 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6141 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6142 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6144 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6146 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6147 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6149 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6150 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6153 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6154 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6156 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6157 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6162 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6166 if (!selinux_enabled)
6169 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6171 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6173 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6178 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6180 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6181 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6183 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6185 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6189 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6191 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6192 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6195 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6197 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6198 static int selinux_disabled;
6200 int selinux_disable(void)
6202 if (ss_initialized) {
6203 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6207 if (selinux_disabled) {
6208 /* Only do this once. */
6212 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6214 selinux_disabled = 1;
6215 selinux_enabled = 0;
6217 reset_security_ops();
6219 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6222 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6223 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6225 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */