2 * Implementation of the security services.
4 * Authors : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
5 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
7 * Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
9 * Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
10 * Support for context based audit filters.
12 * Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
14 * Added conditional policy language extensions
16 * Updated: Hewlett-Packard <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Added support for NetLabel
19 * Added support for the policy capability bitmap
21 * Updated: Chad Sellers <csellers@tresys.com>
23 * Added validation of kernel classes and permissions
25 * Updated: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
27 * Added support for bounds domain and audit messaged on masked permissions
29 * Updated: Guido Trentalancia <guido@trentalancia.com>
31 * Added support for runtime switching of the policy type
33 * Copyright (C) 2008, 2009 NEC Corporation
34 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
35 * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
36 * Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004, 2006 Tresys Technology, LLC
37 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
38 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
39 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
40 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
42 #include <linux/kernel.h>
43 #include <linux/slab.h>
44 #include <linux/string.h>
45 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
46 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
47 #include <linux/errno.h>
49 #include <linux/sched.h>
50 #include <linux/audit.h>
51 #include <linux/mutex.h>
52 #include <linux/selinux.h>
53 #include <linux/flex_array.h>
54 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
55 #include <net/netlabel.h>
65 #include "conditional.h"
73 int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
74 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
75 int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
77 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
79 static struct sidtab sidtab;
80 struct policydb policydb;
84 * The largest sequence number that has been used when
85 * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
86 * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
89 static u32 latest_granting;
91 /* Forward declaration. */
92 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
95 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
96 struct context *tcontext,
98 struct av_decision *avd);
100 struct selinux_mapping {
101 u16 value; /* policy value */
103 u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
106 static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
107 static u16 current_mapping_size;
109 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
110 struct security_class_mapping *map,
111 struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
114 struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
115 size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
118 bool print_unknown_handle = false;
120 /* Find number of classes in the input mapping */
127 /* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
128 out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
132 /* Store the raw class and permission values */
134 while (map[j].name) {
135 struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
136 struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
138 /* An empty class string skips ahead */
139 if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
140 p_out->num_perms = 0;
144 p_out->value = string_to_security_class(pol, p_in->name);
147 "SELinux: Class %s not defined in policy.\n",
149 if (pol->reject_unknown)
151 p_out->num_perms = 0;
152 print_unknown_handle = true;
157 while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) {
158 /* An empty permission string skips ahead */
159 if (!*p_in->perms[k]) {
163 p_out->perms[k] = string_to_av_perm(pol, p_out->value,
165 if (!p_out->perms[k]) {
167 "SELinux: Permission %s in class %s not defined in policy.\n",
168 p_in->perms[k], p_in->name);
169 if (pol->reject_unknown)
171 print_unknown_handle = true;
176 p_out->num_perms = k;
179 if (print_unknown_handle)
180 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
181 pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
183 *out_map_p = out_map;
192 * Get real, policy values from mapped values
195 static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
197 if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
198 return current_mapping[tclass].value;
204 * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
206 static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
210 for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
211 if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
215 return SECCLASS_NULL;
218 static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
221 if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
222 unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
225 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
226 if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
228 if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
231 avd->allowed = result;
233 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
234 if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
236 avd->auditallow = result;
238 for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
239 if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
241 if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
245 * In case the kernel has a bug and requests a permission
246 * between num_perms and the maximum permission number, we
247 * should audit that denial
249 for (; i < (sizeof(u32)*8); i++)
251 avd->auditdeny = result;
255 int security_mls_enabled(void)
257 return policydb.mls_enabled;
261 * Return the boolean value of a constraint expression
262 * when it is applied to the specified source and target
265 * xcontext is a special beast... It is used by the validatetrans rules
266 * only. For these rules, scontext is the context before the transition,
267 * tcontext is the context after the transition, and xcontext is the context
268 * of the process performing the transition. All other callers of
269 * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
271 static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
272 struct context *tcontext,
273 struct context *xcontext,
274 struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
278 struct role_datum *r1, *r2;
279 struct mls_level *l1, *l2;
280 struct constraint_expr *e;
281 int s[CEXPR_MAXDEPTH];
284 for (e = cexpr; e; e = e->next) {
285 switch (e->expr_type) {
301 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
305 val1 = scontext->user;
306 val2 = tcontext->user;
309 val1 = scontext->type;
310 val2 = tcontext->type;
313 val1 = scontext->role;
314 val2 = tcontext->role;
315 r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
316 r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
319 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
323 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
327 s[++sp] = (!ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
329 !ebitmap_get_bit(&r2->dominates,
337 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
338 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
341 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
342 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
345 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
346 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
349 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
350 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
353 l1 = &(scontext->range.level[0]);
354 l2 = &(scontext->range.level[1]);
357 l1 = &(tcontext->range.level[0]);
358 l2 = &(tcontext->range.level[1]);
363 s[++sp] = mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
366 s[++sp] = !mls_level_eq(l1, l2);
369 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l1, l2);
372 s[++sp] = mls_level_dom(l2, l1);
375 s[++sp] = mls_level_incomp(l2, l1);
389 s[++sp] = (val1 == val2);
392 s[++sp] = (val1 != val2);
400 if (sp == (CEXPR_MAXDEPTH-1))
403 if (e->attr & CEXPR_TARGET)
405 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_XTARGET) {
412 if (e->attr & CEXPR_USER)
414 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_ROLE)
416 else if (e->attr & CEXPR_TYPE)
425 s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
428 s[++sp] = !ebitmap_get_bit(&e->names, val1 - 1);
446 * security_dump_masked_av - dumps masked permissions during
447 * security_compute_av due to RBAC, MLS/Constraint and Type bounds.
449 static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
451 struct perm_datum *pdatum = d;
452 char **permission_names = args;
454 BUG_ON(pdatum->value < 1 || pdatum->value > 32);
456 permission_names[pdatum->value - 1] = (char *)k;
461 static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
462 struct context *tcontext,
467 struct common_datum *common_dat;
468 struct class_datum *tclass_dat;
469 struct audit_buffer *ab;
471 char *scontext_name = NULL;
472 char *tcontext_name = NULL;
473 char *permission_names[32];
476 bool need_comma = false;
481 tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
482 tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
483 common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
485 /* init permission_names */
487 hashtab_map(common_dat->permissions.table,
488 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
491 if (hashtab_map(tclass_dat->permissions.table,
492 dump_masked_av_helper, permission_names) < 0)
495 /* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
496 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
497 &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
500 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
501 &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
504 /* audit a message */
505 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context,
506 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
510 audit_log_format(ab, "op=security_compute_av reason=%s "
511 "scontext=%s tcontext=%s tclass=%s perms=",
512 reason, scontext_name, tcontext_name, tclass_name);
514 for (index = 0; index < 32; index++) {
515 u32 mask = (1 << index);
517 if ((mask & permissions) == 0)
520 audit_log_format(ab, "%s%s",
521 need_comma ? "," : "",
522 permission_names[index]
523 ? permission_names[index] : "????");
528 /* release scontext/tcontext */
529 kfree(tcontext_name);
530 kfree(scontext_name);
536 * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
537 * on boundary constraint.
539 static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
540 struct context *tcontext,
542 struct av_decision *avd)
544 struct context lo_scontext;
545 struct context lo_tcontext;
546 struct av_decision lo_avd;
547 struct type_datum *source;
548 struct type_datum *target;
551 source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
555 target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
559 if (source->bounds) {
560 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
562 memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
563 lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
565 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
569 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
570 return; /* no masked permission */
571 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
574 if (target->bounds) {
575 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
577 memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
578 lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
580 context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
584 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
585 return; /* no masked permission */
586 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
589 if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
590 memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
592 * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
596 context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
600 if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
601 return; /* no masked permission */
602 masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
606 /* mask violated permissions */
607 avd->allowed &= ~masked;
609 /* audit masked permissions */
610 security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
611 tclass, masked, "bounds");
616 * Compute access vectors based on a context structure pair for
617 * the permissions in a particular class.
619 static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
620 struct context *tcontext,
622 struct av_decision *avd)
624 struct constraint_node *constraint;
625 struct role_allow *ra;
626 struct avtab_key avkey;
627 struct avtab_node *node;
628 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
629 struct ebitmap *sattr, *tattr;
630 struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode;
635 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
637 if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
638 if (printk_ratelimit())
639 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
643 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
646 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
647 * this permission check, then use it.
649 avkey.target_class = tclass;
650 avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV;
651 sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
653 tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
655 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
656 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
657 avkey.source_type = i + 1;
658 avkey.target_type = j + 1;
659 for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
661 node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
662 if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
663 avd->allowed |= node->datum.data;
664 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITALLOW)
665 avd->auditallow |= node->datum.data;
666 else if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_AUDITDENY)
667 avd->auditdeny &= node->datum.data;
670 /* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
671 cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey, avd);
677 * Remove any permissions prohibited by a constraint (this includes
680 constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
682 if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
683 !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
685 avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
687 constraint = constraint->next;
691 * If checking process transition permission and the
692 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
695 if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
696 (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
697 scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
698 for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
699 if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
700 tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
704 avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
708 * If the given source and target types have boundary
709 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
710 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
712 type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
716 static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
717 struct context *ncontext,
718 struct context *tcontext,
721 char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
722 u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
724 if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
726 if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
728 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
730 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
731 "security_validate_transition: denied for"
732 " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
733 o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
739 if (!selinux_enforcing)
744 int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
747 struct context *ocontext;
748 struct context *ncontext;
749 struct context *tcontext;
750 struct class_datum *tclass_datum;
751 struct constraint_node *constraint;
758 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
760 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
762 if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
763 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %d\n",
768 tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
770 ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
772 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
778 ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
780 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
786 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
788 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
794 constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
796 if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
798 rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext, ncontext,
802 constraint = constraint->next;
806 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
811 * security_bounded_transition - check whether the given
812 * transition is directed to bounded, or not.
813 * It returns 0, if @newsid is bounded by @oldsid.
814 * Otherwise, it returns error code.
816 * @oldsid : current security identifier
817 * @newsid : destinated security identifier
819 int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
821 struct context *old_context, *new_context;
822 struct type_datum *type;
826 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
829 old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
831 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
837 new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
839 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
845 /* type/domain unchanged */
846 if (old_context->type == new_context->type)
849 index = new_context->type;
851 type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
855 /* not bounded anymore */
860 /* @newsid is bounded by @oldsid */
862 if (type->bounds == old_context->type)
865 index = type->bounds;
869 char *old_name = NULL;
870 char *new_name = NULL;
873 if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
874 &old_name, &length) &&
875 !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
876 &new_name, &length)) {
877 audit_log(current->audit_context,
878 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
879 "op=security_bounded_transition "
881 "oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s",
888 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
893 static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
897 avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
898 avd->seqno = latest_granting;
904 * security_compute_av - Compute access vector decisions.
905 * @ssid: source security identifier
906 * @tsid: target security identifier
907 * @tclass: target security class
908 * @avd: access vector decisions
910 * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
911 * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
913 void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
916 struct av_decision *avd)
919 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
921 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
926 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
928 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
933 /* permissive domain? */
934 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
935 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
937 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
939 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
944 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
945 if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
946 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
950 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
951 map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
953 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
956 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
960 void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
963 struct av_decision *avd)
965 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
967 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
972 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
974 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
979 /* permissive domain? */
980 if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
981 avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
983 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
985 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
990 if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
991 if (policydb.allow_unknown)
996 context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd);
998 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1001 avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
1006 * Write the security context string representation of
1007 * the context structure `context' into a dynamically
1008 * allocated string of the correct size. Set `*scontext'
1009 * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
1010 * the length of the string.
1012 static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1021 *scontext_len = context->len;
1023 *scontext = kstrdup(context->str, GFP_ATOMIC);
1030 /* Compute the size of the context. */
1031 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
1032 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
1033 *scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
1034 *scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
1039 /* Allocate space for the context; caller must free this space. */
1040 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1043 *scontext = scontextp;
1046 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
1048 sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
1049 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
1050 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
1051 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
1052 scontextp += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) +
1053 1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) +
1054 1 + strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
1056 mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
1063 #include "initial_sid_to_string.h"
1065 const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
1067 if (unlikely(sid > SECINITSID_NUM))
1069 return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
1072 static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
1073 u32 *scontext_len, int force)
1075 struct context *context;
1082 if (!ss_initialized) {
1083 if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
1086 *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
1089 scontextp = kmalloc(*scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
1094 strcpy(scontextp, initial_sid_to_string[sid]);
1095 *scontext = scontextp;
1098 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: called before initial "
1099 "load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
1103 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1105 context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
1107 context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
1109 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1114 rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
1116 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1123 * security_sid_to_context - Obtain a context for a given SID.
1124 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1125 * @scontext: security context
1126 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1128 * Write the string representation of the context associated with @sid
1129 * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size. Set @scontext
1130 * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
1132 int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1134 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
1137 int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
1139 return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
1143 * Caveat: Mutates scontext.
1145 static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol,
1146 struct sidtab *sidtabp,
1149 struct context *ctx,
1152 struct role_datum *role;
1153 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1154 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1155 char *scontextp, *p, oldc;
1160 /* Parse the security context. */
1163 scontextp = (char *) scontext;
1165 /* Extract the user. */
1167 while (*p && *p != ':')
1175 usrdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_users.table, scontextp);
1179 ctx->user = usrdatum->value;
1183 while (*p && *p != ':')
1191 role = hashtab_search(pol->p_roles.table, scontextp);
1194 ctx->role = role->value;
1198 while (*p && *p != ':')
1203 typdatum = hashtab_search(pol->p_types.table, scontextp);
1204 if (!typdatum || typdatum->attribute)
1207 ctx->type = typdatum->value;
1209 rc = mls_context_to_sid(pol, oldc, &p, ctx, sidtabp, def_sid);
1214 if ((p - scontext) < scontext_len)
1217 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1218 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(pol, ctx))
1223 context_destroy(ctx);
1227 static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1228 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
1231 char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
1232 struct context context;
1235 /* An empty security context is never valid. */
1239 if (!ss_initialized) {
1242 for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
1243 if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext)) {
1248 *sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
1253 /* Copy the string so that we can modify the copy as we parse it. */
1254 scontext2 = kmalloc(scontext_len + 1, gfp_flags);
1257 memcpy(scontext2, scontext, scontext_len);
1258 scontext2[scontext_len] = 0;
1261 /* Save another copy for storing in uninterpreted form */
1263 str = kstrdup(scontext2, gfp_flags);
1268 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1269 rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
1270 scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
1271 if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
1273 context.len = scontext_len;
1277 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
1278 context_destroy(&context);
1280 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1288 * security_context_to_sid - Obtain a SID for a given security context.
1289 * @scontext: security context
1290 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1291 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1292 * @gfp: context for the allocation
1294 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1295 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1296 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1297 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1299 int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
1302 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1303 sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
1307 * security_context_to_sid_default - Obtain a SID for a given security context,
1308 * falling back to specified default if needed.
1310 * @scontext: security context
1311 * @scontext_len: length in bytes
1312 * @sid: security identifier, SID
1313 * @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
1315 * Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
1316 * has the string representation specified by @scontext.
1317 * The default SID is passed to the MLS layer to be used to allow
1318 * kernel labeling of the MLS field if the MLS field is not present
1319 * (for upgrading to MLS without full relabel).
1320 * Implicitly forces adding of the context even if it cannot be mapped yet.
1321 * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
1322 * memory is available, or 0 on success.
1324 int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1325 u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1327 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1328 sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
1331 int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
1334 return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
1335 sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
1338 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
1339 struct context *scontext,
1340 struct context *tcontext,
1342 struct context *newcontext)
1344 char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
1345 u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
1347 if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
1349 if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
1351 if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
1353 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
1354 "security_compute_sid: invalid context %s"
1358 n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
1363 if (!selinux_enforcing)
1368 static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
1369 u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
1370 const char *objname)
1372 struct filename_trans ft;
1373 struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
1376 * Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
1377 * like /dev or /var/run. This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
1378 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
1380 if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
1388 otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
1390 newcontext->type = otype->otype;
1393 static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
1397 const char *objname,
1401 struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
1402 struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
1403 struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
1404 struct avtab_key avkey;
1405 struct avtab_datum *avdatum;
1406 struct avtab_node *node;
1411 if (!ss_initialized) {
1412 switch (orig_tclass) {
1413 case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
1423 context_init(&newcontext);
1425 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1428 tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
1429 sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
1431 tclass = orig_tclass;
1432 sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
1435 scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
1437 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1442 tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
1444 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
1450 if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
1451 cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
1453 /* Set the user identity. */
1454 switch (specified) {
1455 case AVTAB_TRANSITION:
1457 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_user == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1458 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1460 /* notice this gets both DEFAULT_SOURCE and unset */
1461 /* Use the process user identity. */
1462 newcontext.user = scontext->user;
1466 /* Use the related object owner. */
1467 newcontext.user = tcontext->user;
1471 /* Set the role to default values. */
1472 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1473 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1474 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1475 newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
1477 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
1478 newcontext.role = scontext->role;
1480 newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
1483 /* Set the type to default values. */
1484 if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) {
1485 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1486 } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
1487 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1489 if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
1490 /* Use the type of process. */
1491 newcontext.type = scontext->type;
1493 /* Use the type of the related object. */
1494 newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
1498 /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */
1499 avkey.source_type = scontext->type;
1500 avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
1501 avkey.target_class = tclass;
1502 avkey.specified = specified;
1503 avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
1505 /* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
1507 node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
1508 for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
1509 if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
1510 avdatum = &node->datum;
1517 /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */
1518 newcontext.type = avdatum->data;
1521 /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
1523 filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
1524 tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
1526 /* Check for class-specific changes. */
1527 if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
1528 /* Look for a role transition rule. */
1529 for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
1530 if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
1531 (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
1532 (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
1533 /* Use the role transition rule. */
1534 newcontext.role = roletr->new_role;
1540 /* Set the MLS attributes.
1541 This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
1542 rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
1547 /* Check the validity of the context. */
1548 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
1549 rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
1556 /* Obtain the sid for the context. */
1557 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
1559 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1560 context_destroy(&newcontext);
1566 * security_transition_sid - Compute the SID for a new subject/object.
1567 * @ssid: source security identifier
1568 * @tsid: target security identifier
1569 * @tclass: target security class
1570 * @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
1572 * Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
1573 * class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1574 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1575 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
1576 * computed successfully.
1578 int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1579 const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
1581 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1582 qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
1585 int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
1586 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
1588 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
1589 objname, out_sid, false);
1593 * security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
1594 * @ssid: source security identifier
1595 * @tsid: target security identifier
1596 * @tclass: target security class
1597 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1599 * Compute a SID to use when selecting a member of a polyinstantiated
1600 * object of class @tclass based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1601 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1602 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1603 * computed successfully.
1605 int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
1610 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
1615 * security_change_sid - Compute the SID for object relabeling.
1616 * @ssid: source security identifier
1617 * @tsid: target security identifier
1618 * @tclass: target security class
1619 * @out_sid: security identifier for selected member
1621 * Compute a SID to use for relabeling an object of class @tclass
1622 * based on a SID pair (@ssid, @tsid).
1623 * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid, -%ENOMEM
1624 * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
1625 * computed successfully.
1627 int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
1632 return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
1636 /* Clone the SID into the new SID table. */
1637 static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
1638 struct context *context,
1641 struct sidtab *s = arg;
1643 if (sid > SECINITSID_NUM)
1644 return sidtab_insert(s, sid, context);
1649 static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
1654 if (selinux_enforcing)
1657 if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
1658 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
1664 struct convert_context_args {
1665 struct policydb *oldp;
1666 struct policydb *newp;
1670 * Convert the values in the security context
1671 * structure `c' from the values specified
1672 * in the policy `p->oldp' to the values specified
1673 * in the policy `p->newp'. Verify that the
1674 * context is valid under the new policy.
1676 static int convert_context(u32 key,
1680 struct convert_context_args *args;
1681 struct context oldc;
1682 struct ocontext *oc;
1683 struct mls_range *range;
1684 struct role_datum *role;
1685 struct type_datum *typdatum;
1686 struct user_datum *usrdatum;
1691 if (key <= SECINITSID_NUM)
1700 s = kstrdup(c->str, GFP_KERNEL);
1704 rc = string_to_context_struct(args->newp, NULL, s,
1705 c->len, &ctx, SECSID_NULL);
1708 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became valid (mapped).\n",
1710 /* Replace string with mapped representation. */
1712 memcpy(c, &ctx, sizeof(*c));
1714 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1715 /* Retain string representation for later mapping. */
1719 /* Other error condition, e.g. ENOMEM. */
1720 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: Unable to map context %s, rc = %d.\n",
1726 rc = context_cpy(&oldc, c);
1730 /* Convert the user. */
1732 usrdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_users.table,
1733 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_USERS, c->user - 1));
1736 c->user = usrdatum->value;
1738 /* Convert the role. */
1740 role = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_roles.table,
1741 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_ROLES, c->role - 1));
1744 c->role = role->value;
1746 /* Convert the type. */
1748 typdatum = hashtab_search(args->newp->p_types.table,
1749 sym_name(args->oldp, SYM_TYPES, c->type - 1));
1752 c->type = typdatum->value;
1754 /* Convert the MLS fields if dealing with MLS policies */
1755 if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1756 rc = mls_convert_context(args->oldp, args->newp, c);
1759 } else if (args->oldp->mls_enabled && !args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1761 * Switching between MLS and non-MLS policy:
1762 * free any storage used by the MLS fields in the
1763 * context for all existing entries in the sidtab.
1765 mls_context_destroy(c);
1766 } else if (!args->oldp->mls_enabled && args->newp->mls_enabled) {
1768 * Switching between non-MLS and MLS policy:
1769 * ensure that the MLS fields of the context for all
1770 * existing entries in the sidtab are filled in with a
1771 * suitable default value, likely taken from one of the
1774 oc = args->newp->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
1775 while (oc && oc->sid[0] != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
1779 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to look up"
1780 " the initial SIDs list\n");
1783 range = &oc->context[0].range;
1784 rc = mls_range_set(c, range);
1789 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
1790 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
1791 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
1796 context_destroy(&oldc);
1802 /* Map old representation to string and save it. */
1803 rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
1806 context_destroy(&oldc);
1810 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Context %s became invalid (unmapped).\n",
1816 static void security_load_policycaps(void)
1818 selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1819 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
1820 selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1821 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
1822 selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
1823 POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
1826 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
1829 * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
1830 * @data: binary policy data
1831 * @len: length of data in bytes
1833 * Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
1834 * validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
1835 * This function will flush the access vector cache after
1836 * loading the new policy.
1838 int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
1840 struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
1841 struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
1842 struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
1843 struct convert_context_args args;
1847 struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
1849 oldpolicydb = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(*oldpolicydb), GFP_KERNEL);
1854 newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
1856 if (!ss_initialized) {
1858 rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
1860 avtab_cache_destroy();
1865 rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
1867 ¤t_mapping_size);
1869 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1870 avtab_cache_destroy();
1874 rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
1876 policydb_destroy(&policydb);
1877 avtab_cache_destroy();
1881 security_load_policycaps();
1883 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1884 selinux_complete_init();
1885 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1886 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1887 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
1888 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1889 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1894 sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
1897 rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
1901 newpolicydb->len = len;
1902 /* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
1903 if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
1904 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
1905 else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
1906 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
1908 rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
1910 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to load the initial SIDs\n");
1911 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
1915 rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
1919 rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
1921 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to preserve booleans\n");
1925 /* Clone the SID table. */
1926 sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
1928 rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
1933 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
1934 * in the new SID table.
1936 args.oldp = &policydb;
1937 args.newp = newpolicydb;
1938 rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
1940 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to convert the internal"
1941 " representation of contexts in the new SID"
1946 /* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
1947 memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
1948 sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
1950 /* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
1951 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1952 memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
1953 sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
1954 security_load_policycaps();
1955 oldmap = current_mapping;
1956 current_mapping = map;
1957 current_mapping_size = map_size;
1958 seqno = ++latest_granting;
1959 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
1961 /* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
1962 policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
1963 sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
1966 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
1967 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
1968 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
1969 selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
1970 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
1977 sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
1978 policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
1985 size_t security_policydb_len(void)
1989 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
1991 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
1997 * security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
1998 * @protocol: protocol number
1999 * @port: port number
2000 * @out_sid: security identifier
2002 int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
2007 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2009 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
2011 if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
2012 c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
2013 c->u.port.high_port >= port)
2020 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2026 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2028 *out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
2032 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2037 * security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
2038 * @name: interface name
2039 * @if_sid: interface SID
2041 int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
2046 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2048 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
2050 if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
2056 if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
2057 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2062 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2068 *if_sid = c->sid[0];
2070 *if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
2073 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2077 static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
2081 for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
2082 if (addr[i] != (input[i] & mask[i])) {
2091 * security_node_sid - Obtain the SID for a node (host).
2092 * @domain: communication domain aka address family
2094 * @addrlen: address length in bytes
2095 * @out_sid: security identifier
2097 int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
2105 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2112 if (addrlen != sizeof(u32))
2115 addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
2117 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
2119 if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
2128 if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
2130 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
2132 if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
2141 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2147 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
2153 *out_sid = c->sid[0];
2155 *out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
2160 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2167 * security_get_user_sids - Obtain reachable SIDs for a user.
2168 * @fromsid: starting SID
2169 * @username: username
2170 * @sids: array of reachable SIDs for user
2171 * @nel: number of elements in @sids
2173 * Generate the set of SIDs for legal security contexts
2174 * for a given user that can be reached by @fromsid.
2175 * Set *@sids to point to a dynamically allocated
2176 * array containing the set of SIDs. Set *@nel to the
2177 * number of elements in the array.
2180 int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
2185 struct context *fromcon, usercon;
2186 u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
2187 u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
2188 struct user_datum *user;
2189 struct role_datum *role;
2190 struct ebitmap_node *rnode, *tnode;
2196 if (!ss_initialized)
2199 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2201 context_init(&usercon);
2204 fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
2209 user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
2213 usercon.user = user->value;
2216 mysids = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids), GFP_ATOMIC);
2220 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
2221 role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
2222 usercon.role = i + 1;
2223 ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
2224 usercon.type = j + 1;
2226 if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
2229 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
2232 if (mynel < maxnel) {
2233 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2237 mysids2 = kcalloc(maxnel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_ATOMIC);
2240 memcpy(mysids2, mysids, mynel * sizeof(*mysids2));
2243 mysids[mynel++] = sid;
2249 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2256 mysids2 = kcalloc(mynel, sizeof(*mysids2), GFP_KERNEL);
2261 for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
2262 struct av_decision dummy_avd;
2263 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
2264 SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
2265 PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
2268 mysids2[j++] = mysids[i];
2280 * security_genfs_sid - Obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
2281 * @fstype: filesystem type
2282 * @path: path from root of mount
2283 * @sclass: file security class
2284 * @sid: SID for path
2286 * Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
2287 * cannot support xattr or use a fixed labeling behavior like
2288 * transition SIDs or task SIDs.
2290 int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
2297 struct genfs *genfs;
2301 while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
2304 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2306 sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
2307 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2309 for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
2310 cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
2319 for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
2320 len = strlen(c->u.name);
2321 if ((!c->v.sclass || sclass == c->v.sclass) &&
2322 (strncmp(c->u.name, path, len) == 0))
2331 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
2339 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2344 * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
2345 * @sb: superblock in question
2347 int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
2351 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2352 const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
2354 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2356 c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
2358 if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
2364 sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
2366 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
2371 sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
2373 rc = security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
2375 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
2378 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
2383 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2387 int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
2391 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2396 *len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2401 *names = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
2406 *values = kcalloc(*len, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
2410 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
2413 (*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
2414 name_len = strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i)) + 1;
2417 (*names)[i] = kmalloc(sizeof(char) * name_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
2421 strncpy((*names)[i], sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), name_len);
2422 (*names)[i][name_len - 1] = 0;
2426 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2430 for (i = 0; i < *len; i++)
2438 int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
2441 int lenp, seqno = 0;
2442 struct cond_node *cur;
2444 write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2447 lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2451 for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
2452 if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
2453 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
2454 AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
2455 "bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
2456 sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
2458 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
2459 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
2460 audit_get_sessionid(current));
2463 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
2465 policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
2468 for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2469 rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
2474 seqno = ++latest_granting;
2477 write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
2479 avc_ss_reset(seqno);
2480 selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
2481 selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
2482 selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
2487 int security_get_bool_value(int bool)
2492 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2495 len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
2499 rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[bool]->state;
2501 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2505 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
2507 int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
2508 char **bnames = NULL;
2509 struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
2510 struct cond_node *cur;
2512 rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
2515 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
2516 booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
2518 booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
2520 for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
2521 rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
2528 for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++)
2537 * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
2538 * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
2540 int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
2542 struct context *context1;
2543 struct context *context2;
2544 struct context newcon;
2550 if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
2555 context_init(&newcon);
2557 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2560 context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2562 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2568 context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
2570 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2575 newcon.user = context1->user;
2576 newcon.role = context1->role;
2577 newcon.type = context1->type;
2578 rc = mls_context_cpy(&newcon, context2);
2582 /* Check the validity of the new context. */
2583 if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
2584 rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
2586 if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
2587 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
2588 "security_sid_mls_copy: invalid context %s", s);
2595 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
2597 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2598 context_destroy(&newcon);
2604 * security_net_peersid_resolve - Compare and resolve two network peer SIDs
2605 * @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
2606 * @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
2607 * @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
2610 * Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
2611 * resolved into a single SID it is returned via @peer_sid and the function
2612 * returns zero. Otherwise @peer_sid is set to SECSID_NULL and the function
2613 * returns a negative value. A table summarizing the behavior is below:
2615 * | function return | @sid
2616 * ------------------------------+-----------------+-----------------
2617 * no peer labels | 0 | SECSID_NULL
2618 * single peer label | 0 | <peer_label>
2619 * multiple, consistent labels | 0 | <peer_label>
2620 * multiple, inconsistent labels | -<errno> | SECSID_NULL
2623 int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
2628 struct context *nlbl_ctx;
2629 struct context *xfrm_ctx;
2631 *peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
2633 /* handle the common (which also happens to be the set of easy) cases
2634 * right away, these two if statements catch everything involving a
2635 * single or absent peer SID/label */
2636 if (xfrm_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
2637 *peer_sid = nlbl_sid;
2640 /* NOTE: an nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED is a "fallback" label
2641 * and is treated as if nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL when a XFRM SID/label
2643 if (nlbl_sid == SECSID_NULL || nlbl_type == NETLBL_NLTYPE_UNLABELED) {
2644 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2648 /* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
2649 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
2650 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
2651 if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
2654 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2657 nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
2659 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2660 __func__, nlbl_sid);
2664 xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
2666 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2667 __func__, xfrm_sid);
2670 rc = (mls_context_cmp(nlbl_ctx, xfrm_ctx) ? 0 : -EACCES);
2674 /* at present NetLabel SIDs/labels really only carry MLS
2675 * information so if the MLS portion of the NetLabel SID
2676 * matches the MLS portion of the labeled XFRM SID/label
2677 * then pass along the XFRM SID as it is the most
2679 *peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
2681 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2685 static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2687 struct class_datum *datum = d;
2688 char *name = k, **classes = args;
2689 int value = datum->value - 1;
2691 classes[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2692 if (!classes[value])
2698 int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
2702 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2705 *nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
2706 *classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
2710 rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
2714 for (i = 0; i < *nclasses; i++)
2715 kfree((*classes)[i]);
2720 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2724 static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
2726 struct perm_datum *datum = d;
2727 char *name = k, **perms = args;
2728 int value = datum->value - 1;
2730 perms[value] = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC);
2737 int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
2740 struct class_datum *match;
2742 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2745 match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
2747 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized class %s\n",
2753 *nperms = match->permissions.nprim;
2754 *perms = kcalloc(*nperms, sizeof(**perms), GFP_ATOMIC);
2758 if (match->comdatum) {
2759 rc = hashtab_map(match->comdatum->permissions.table,
2760 get_permissions_callback, *perms);
2765 rc = hashtab_map(match->permissions.table, get_permissions_callback,
2771 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2775 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2776 for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
2782 int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
2784 return policydb.reject_unknown;
2787 int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
2789 return policydb.allow_unknown;
2793 * security_policycap_supported - Check for a specific policy capability
2794 * @req_cap: capability
2797 * This function queries the currently loaded policy to see if it supports the
2798 * capability specified by @req_cap. Returns true (1) if the capability is
2799 * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
2802 int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
2806 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2807 rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
2808 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2813 struct selinux_audit_rule {
2815 struct context au_ctxt;
2818 void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
2820 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2823 context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
2828 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
2830 struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
2831 struct role_datum *roledatum;
2832 struct type_datum *typedatum;
2833 struct user_datum *userdatum;
2834 struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule **)vrule;
2839 if (!ss_initialized)
2843 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2844 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2845 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2846 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2847 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2848 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2849 /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
2850 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
2853 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2854 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2855 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2856 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2857 /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
2858 if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
2862 /* only the above fields are valid */
2866 tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
2870 context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
2872 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2874 tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
2877 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2878 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2880 userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
2883 tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
2885 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2886 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2888 roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
2891 tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
2893 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2894 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2896 typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
2899 tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
2901 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2902 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2903 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2904 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2905 rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
2912 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
2915 selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
2924 /* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields */
2925 int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
2929 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
2930 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
2932 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2933 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2934 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
2935 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
2936 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
2937 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2938 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2939 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
2940 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
2941 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
2949 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
2950 struct audit_context *actx)
2952 struct context *ctxt;
2953 struct mls_level *level;
2954 struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
2957 if (unlikely(!rule)) {
2958 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
2962 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
2964 if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
2969 ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
2970 if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
2971 WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
2977 /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
2980 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
2981 case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
2984 match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
2986 case Audit_not_equal:
2987 match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
2991 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
2992 case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
2995 match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
2997 case Audit_not_equal:
2998 match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
3002 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
3003 case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
3006 match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
3008 case Audit_not_equal:
3009 match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
3013 case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
3014 case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
3015 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
3016 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
3017 level = ((field == AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN ||
3018 field == AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW) ?
3019 &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
3022 match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3025 case Audit_not_equal:
3026 match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3030 match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3032 !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3036 match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
3040 match = (mls_level_dom(level,
3041 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
3042 !mls_level_eq(level,
3043 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
3046 match = mls_level_dom(level,
3047 &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
3053 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3057 static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_update_lsm_rules;
3059 static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event)
3063 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
3064 err = aurule_callback();
3068 static int __init aurule_init(void)
3072 err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET);
3074 panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
3078 __initcall(aurule_init);
3080 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
3082 * security_netlbl_cache_add - Add an entry to the NetLabel cache
3083 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3084 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3087 * Attempt to cache the context in @ctx, which was derived from the packet in
3088 * @skb, in the NetLabel subsystem cache. This function assumes @secattr has
3089 * already been initialized.
3092 static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3097 sid_cache = kmalloc(sizeof(*sid_cache), GFP_ATOMIC);
3098 if (sid_cache == NULL)
3100 secattr->cache = netlbl_secattr_cache_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
3101 if (secattr->cache == NULL) {
3107 secattr->cache->free = kfree;
3108 secattr->cache->data = sid_cache;
3109 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE;
3113 * security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid - Convert a NetLabel secattr to a SELinux SID
3114 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3115 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3118 * Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
3119 * SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
3120 * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
3121 * 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
3122 * allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
3123 * conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
3127 int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
3131 struct context *ctx;
3132 struct context ctx_new;
3134 if (!ss_initialized) {
3139 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3141 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
3142 *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
3143 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID)
3144 *sid = secattr->attr.secid;
3145 else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
3147 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
3151 context_init(&ctx_new);
3152 ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
3153 ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
3154 ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
3155 mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
3156 if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
3157 rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3158 secattr->attr.mls.cat);
3161 memcpy(&ctx_new.range.level[1].cat,
3162 &ctx_new.range.level[0].cat,
3163 sizeof(ctx_new.range.level[0].cat));
3166 if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
3169 rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
3173 security_netlbl_cache_add(secattr, *sid);
3175 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3179 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3182 ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
3184 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3189 * security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr - Convert a SELinux SID to a NetLabel secattr
3190 * @sid: the SELinux SID
3191 * @secattr: the NetLabel packet security attributes
3194 * Convert the given SELinux SID in @sid into a NetLabel security attribute.
3195 * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3198 int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
3201 struct context *ctx;
3203 if (!ss_initialized)
3206 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3209 ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
3214 secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
3216 if (secattr->domain == NULL)
3219 secattr->attr.secid = sid;
3220 secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
3221 mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
3222 rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
3224 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3227 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
3230 * security_read_policy - read the policy.
3231 * @data: binary policy data
3232 * @len: length of data in bytes
3235 int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
3238 struct policy_file fp;
3240 if (!ss_initialized)
3243 *len = security_policydb_len();
3245 *data = vmalloc_user(*len);
3252 read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
3253 rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
3254 read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
3259 *len = (unsigned long)fp.data - (unsigned long)*data;