2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
14 * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 #include <linux/xattr.h>
22 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
23 #include <linux/mount.h>
24 #include <linux/stat.h>
26 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
28 #include <linux/tcp.h>
29 #include <linux/udp.h>
30 #include <linux/slab.h>
31 #include <linux/mutex.h>
32 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
33 #include <net/netlabel.h>
34 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
35 #include <linux/audit.h>
36 #include <linux/magic.h>
37 #include <linux/dcache.h>
38 #include <linux/personality.h>
39 #include <linux/msg.h>
40 #include <linux/shm.h>
41 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
44 #define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
46 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
47 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
50 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
51 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
52 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
54 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
55 * or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
57 static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
60 char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
62 if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
65 rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, in, SMK_LABELLEN);
69 return smk_import(in, rc);
73 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
74 * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
76 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
78 struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
80 struct inode_smack *isp;
82 isp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
86 isp->smk_inode = smack;
88 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
94 * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
95 * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
97 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
99 static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp)
101 struct task_smack *tsp;
103 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
107 tsp->smk_task = task;
108 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
109 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
110 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
116 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
117 * @nhead - new rules header pointer
118 * @ohead - old rules header pointer
120 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
122 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
125 struct smack_rule *nrp;
126 struct smack_rule *orp;
129 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
131 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
132 nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
138 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
145 * We he, that is fun!
149 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
150 * @ctp: child task pointer
151 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
153 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
155 * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
157 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
160 struct smk_audit_info ad;
163 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
167 tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
168 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
169 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
171 rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
176 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
177 * @ptp: parent task pointer
179 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
181 * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
183 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
186 struct smk_audit_info ad;
189 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
193 tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
194 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
195 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
197 rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
202 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
203 * @type: message type
205 * Require that the task has the floor label
207 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
209 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
212 char *sp = smk_of_current();
214 if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
217 if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
229 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
230 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
232 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
234 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
236 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
238 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
243 sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
244 sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
245 sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
246 sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
247 sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
248 spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock);
250 sb->s_security = sbsp;
256 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
257 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
260 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
262 kfree(sb->s_security);
263 sb->s_security = NULL;
267 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
268 * @orig: where to start
269 * @smackopts: mount options string
271 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
273 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
276 static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
278 char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
280 otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
281 if (otheropts == NULL)
284 for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
285 if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
287 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
289 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
291 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
296 commap = strchr(cp, ',');
305 strcpy(orig, otheropts);
306 free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
312 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
313 * @sb: the file system superblock
314 * @flags: the mount flags
315 * @data: the smack mount options
317 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
319 static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
321 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
322 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
323 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
324 struct inode_smack *isp;
329 spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock);
330 if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) {
331 spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
334 sp->smk_initialized = 1;
335 spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
337 for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
338 commap = strchr(op, ',');
342 if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
343 op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
344 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
347 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
348 op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
349 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
352 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
353 strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
354 op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
355 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
357 sp->smk_default = nsp;
358 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
359 op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
360 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
367 * Initialize the root inode.
369 isp = inode->i_security;
371 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
373 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
379 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
380 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
382 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
383 * and error code otherwise
385 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
387 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
389 struct smk_audit_info ad;
391 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
392 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
394 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
399 * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting
406 * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
407 * being mounted on, an error code otherwise.
409 static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
410 char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
412 struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->dentry->d_sb->s_security;
413 struct smk_audit_info ad;
415 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
416 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
418 return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
422 * smack_sb_umount - Smack check for unmounting
423 * @mnt: file system to unmount
426 * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
427 * being unmounted, an error code otherwise.
429 static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
431 struct superblock_smack *sbp;
432 struct smk_audit_info ad;
435 path.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
438 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
439 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
441 sbp = path.dentry->d_sb->s_security;
442 return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
450 * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
451 * @bprm: the exec information
453 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
455 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
457 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
458 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
459 struct inode_smack *isp;
462 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
466 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
469 isp = inode->i_security;
470 if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
476 bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
477 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
483 * smack_bprm_committing_creds - Prepare to install the new credentials
486 * @bprm: binprm for exec
488 static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
490 struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
492 if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
493 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
497 * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
498 * @bprm: binprm for exec
500 * Returns 0 on success.
502 static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
504 struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
505 int ret = cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm);
507 if (!ret && (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked))
518 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
519 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
521 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
523 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
525 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current());
526 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
532 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
533 * @inode: the inode with a blob
535 * Clears the blob pointer in inode
537 static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
539 kfree(inode->i_security);
540 inode->i_security = NULL;
544 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
548 * @name: where to put the attribute name
549 * @value: where to put the attribute value
550 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
552 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
554 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
555 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
556 void **value, size_t *len)
558 struct smack_known *skp;
559 struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
560 char *csp = smk_of_current();
561 char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
562 char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
566 *name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
572 skp = smk_find_entry(csp);
574 may = smk_access_entry(csp, dsp, &skp->smk_rules);
578 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
579 * the directory requests transmutation then
580 * by all means transmute.
581 * Mark the inode as changed.
583 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
584 smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
586 issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
589 *value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
595 *len = strlen(isp) + 1;
601 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
602 * @old_dentry: the existing object
604 * @new_dentry: the new object
606 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
608 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
609 struct dentry *new_dentry)
612 struct smk_audit_info ad;
615 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
616 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
618 isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
619 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
621 if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
622 isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
623 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
624 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
631 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
632 * @dir: containing directory object
633 * @dentry: file to unlink
635 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
636 * and the object, error code otherwise
638 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
640 struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode;
641 struct smk_audit_info ad;
644 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
645 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
648 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
650 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
653 * You also need write access to the containing directory
655 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
656 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
657 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
663 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
664 * @dir: containing directory object
665 * @dentry: directory to unlink
667 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
668 * and the directory, error code otherwise
670 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
672 struct smk_audit_info ad;
675 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
676 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
679 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
681 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
684 * You also need write access to the containing directory
686 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
687 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
688 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
695 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
696 * @old_inode: the old directory
697 * @old_dentry: unused
698 * @new_inode: the new directory
699 * @new_dentry: unused
701 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
704 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
706 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
707 struct dentry *old_dentry,
708 struct inode *new_inode,
709 struct dentry *new_dentry)
713 struct smk_audit_info ad;
715 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
716 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
718 isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
719 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
721 if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
722 isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
723 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
724 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
730 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
731 * @inode: the inode in question
732 * @mask: the access requested
734 * This is the important Smack hook.
736 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
738 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
740 struct smk_audit_info ad;
741 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
743 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
745 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
750 /* May be droppable after audit */
753 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
754 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
755 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
759 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
760 * @dentry: the object
761 * @iattr: for the force flag
763 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
765 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
767 struct smk_audit_info ad;
769 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
771 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
773 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
774 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
776 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
780 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
782 * @dentry: the object
784 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
786 static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
788 struct smk_audit_info ad;
791 path.dentry = dentry;
794 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
795 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
796 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
800 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
801 * @dentry: the object
802 * @name: name of the attribute
807 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
809 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
811 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
812 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
814 struct smk_audit_info ad;
817 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
818 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
819 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
820 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
821 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
822 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
825 * check label validity here so import wont fail on
828 if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
829 smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
831 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
832 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
834 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
835 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
838 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
840 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
841 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
844 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
850 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
852 * @name: attribute name
853 * @value: attribute value
854 * @size: attribute size
857 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
858 * in the master label list.
860 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
861 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
864 struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
866 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
867 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
869 isp->smk_inode = nsp;
871 isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
872 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
873 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
877 isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
878 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
879 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
883 isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
884 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
885 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
891 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
892 * @dentry: the object
895 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
897 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
899 struct smk_audit_info ad;
901 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
902 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
904 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
908 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
909 * @dentry: the object
910 * @name: name of the attribute
912 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
914 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
916 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
918 struct inode_smack *isp;
919 struct smk_audit_info ad;
922 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
923 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
924 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
925 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
926 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
927 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
928 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
931 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
933 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
934 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
936 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
939 isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
940 isp->smk_task = NULL;
941 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
948 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
950 * @name: attribute name
951 * @buffer: where to put the result
954 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
956 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
957 const char *name, void **buffer,
960 struct socket_smack *ssp;
962 struct super_block *sbp;
963 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
968 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
969 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
970 ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
976 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
979 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
983 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
986 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
988 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
990 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
995 ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
1006 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
1007 * @inode: the object
1008 * @buffer: where they go
1009 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
1011 * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
1013 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
1016 int len = strlen(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
1018 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size) {
1019 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
1026 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
1027 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
1028 * @secid: where result will be saved
1030 static void smack_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
1032 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1034 *secid = smack_to_secid(isp->smk_inode);
1042 * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
1048 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1049 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1050 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1052 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1053 * label changing that SELinux does.
1055 static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
1061 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1064 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1065 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1069 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1071 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1076 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1079 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1080 * label list, so no memory is freed.
1082 static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1084 file->f_security = NULL;
1088 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1093 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1095 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1097 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1101 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1103 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1104 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1106 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
1107 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1109 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ))
1110 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
1116 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1120 * Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise
1122 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1124 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1126 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1127 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1128 return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1132 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1134 * @cmd: what action to check
1137 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1138 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1139 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1141 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1143 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1146 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1156 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1157 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1158 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1169 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1170 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1171 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1172 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1173 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1174 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1175 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1177 static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
1178 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1179 unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
1180 unsigned long addr_only)
1182 struct smack_known *skp;
1183 struct smack_rule *srp;
1184 struct task_smack *tsp;
1188 struct inode_smack *isp;
1195 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
1196 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
1197 if (rc || addr_only)
1200 if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
1203 dp = file->f_dentry;
1205 if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
1208 isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
1209 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1211 msmack = isp->smk_mmap;
1213 tsp = current_security();
1214 sp = smk_of_current();
1215 skp = smk_find_entry(sp);
1220 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1221 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1222 * to that rule's object label.
1224 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1225 osmack = srp->smk_object;
1227 * Matching labels always allows access.
1229 if (msmack == osmack)
1232 * If there is a matching local rule take
1233 * that into account as well.
1235 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack,
1238 may = srp->smk_access;
1240 may &= srp->smk_access;
1242 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1243 * possibly have less access.
1249 * Fetch the global list entry.
1250 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1251 * can't have as much access as current.
1253 skp = smk_find_entry(msmack);
1254 mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &skp->smk_rules);
1255 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1260 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1261 * potential access, too.
1263 tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules);
1264 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1268 * If there is any access available to current that is
1269 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1272 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1284 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1285 * @file: object in question
1288 * Further research may be required on this one.
1290 static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1292 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1297 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1298 * @tsk: The target task
1299 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1302 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1304 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1305 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1307 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1308 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1312 char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1313 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1316 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1318 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1320 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1321 rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
1322 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1325 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1326 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1327 smack_log(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
1332 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1335 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1337 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1340 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1342 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1343 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1345 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1347 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1349 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1352 return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad);
1356 * smack_dentry_open - Smack dentry open processing
1360 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1364 static int smack_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
1366 struct inode_smack *isp = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1368 file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
1378 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1379 * @new: the new credentials
1380 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1382 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1383 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1384 * complete without error.
1386 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1388 struct task_smack *tsp;
1390 tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1394 cred->security = tsp;
1401 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1402 * @cred: the credentials in question
1405 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1407 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1408 struct smack_rule *rp;
1409 struct list_head *l;
1410 struct list_head *n;
1414 cred->security = NULL;
1416 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
1417 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
1418 list_del(&rp->list);
1425 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
1426 * @new: the new credentials
1427 * @old: the original credentials
1428 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1430 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
1432 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1435 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
1436 struct task_smack *new_tsp;
1439 new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
1440 if (new_tsp == NULL)
1443 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
1447 new->security = new_tsp;
1452 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
1453 * @new: the new credentials
1454 * @old: the original credentials
1456 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
1458 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
1460 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
1461 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
1463 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
1464 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
1465 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
1466 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
1469 /* cbs copy rule list */
1473 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
1474 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
1475 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
1477 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
1479 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
1481 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
1482 char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
1487 new_tsp->smk_task = smack;
1492 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
1493 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
1494 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
1496 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
1497 * as the objective context of the specified inode
1499 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
1500 struct inode *inode)
1502 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1503 struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
1505 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
1506 tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
1511 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
1512 * @p: the task object
1513 * @access: the access requested
1514 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
1516 * Return 0 if access is permitted
1518 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
1521 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1523 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1524 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
1525 return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad);
1529 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
1530 * @p: the task object
1533 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1535 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
1537 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
1541 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
1542 * @p: the object task
1544 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
1546 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
1548 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
1552 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
1553 * @p: the object task
1555 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
1557 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
1559 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
1563 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
1564 * @p: the object task
1565 * @secid: where to put the result
1567 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
1569 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
1571 *secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p)));
1575 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
1576 * @p: the task object
1579 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1581 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
1585 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
1587 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
1592 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
1593 * @p: the task object
1596 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1598 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
1602 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
1604 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
1609 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
1610 * @p: the task object
1612 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1614 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
1616 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
1620 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
1621 * @p: the task object
1625 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1627 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
1631 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
1633 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
1638 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
1639 * @p: the task object
1641 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1643 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
1645 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
1649 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
1650 * @p: the task object
1652 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1654 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
1656 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
1660 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
1661 * @p: the task object
1664 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
1666 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1668 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
1669 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
1671 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
1674 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1676 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1677 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
1679 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
1680 * can write the receiver.
1683 return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE,
1686 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
1687 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
1688 * we can't take privilege into account.
1690 return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid),
1691 smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1695 * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
1696 * @p: task to wait for
1698 * Returns 0 if current can wait for p, error code otherwise
1700 static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
1702 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1703 char *sp = smk_of_current();
1704 char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p));
1707 /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
1708 rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
1713 * Allow the operation to succeed if either task
1714 * has privilege to perform operations that might
1715 * account for the smack labels having gotten to
1716 * be different in the first place.
1718 * This breaks the strict subject/object access
1719 * control ideal, taking the object's privilege
1720 * state into account in the decision as well as
1723 if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1725 /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
1727 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1728 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
1729 smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
1734 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
1735 * @p: task to copy from
1736 * @inode: inode to copy to
1738 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
1740 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
1742 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1743 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
1751 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
1754 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
1756 * Assign Smack pointers to current
1758 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
1760 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1762 char *csp = smk_of_current();
1763 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1765 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
1771 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
1773 sk->sk_security = ssp;
1779 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
1782 * Clears the blob pointer
1784 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
1786 kfree(sk->sk_security);
1790 * smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
1791 * @sip: the object end
1793 * looks for host based access restrictions
1795 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
1796 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
1797 * taken before calling this function.
1799 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
1801 static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
1803 struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
1804 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
1806 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
1809 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list)
1811 * we break after finding the first match because
1812 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
1813 * so we have found the most specific match
1815 if ((&snp->smk_host.sin_addr)->s_addr ==
1816 (siap->s_addr & (&snp->smk_mask)->s_addr)) {
1817 /* we have found the special CIPSO option */
1818 if (snp->smk_label == smack_cipso_option)
1820 return snp->smk_label;
1827 * smack_set_catset - convert a capset to netlabel mls categories
1828 * @catset: the Smack categories
1829 * @sap: where to put the netlabel categories
1831 * Allocates and fills attr.mls.cat
1833 static void smack_set_catset(char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap)
1844 sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
1845 sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
1846 sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
1848 for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < SMK_LABELLEN; cp++, byte++)
1849 for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1, cat++) {
1852 rc = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(sap->attr.mls.cat,
1858 * smack_to_secattr - fill a secattr from a smack value
1859 * @smack: the smack value
1860 * @nlsp: where the result goes
1862 * Casey says that CIPSO is good enough for now.
1863 * It can be used to effect.
1864 * It can also be abused to effect when necessary.
1865 * Apologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
1867 static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
1869 struct smack_cipso cipso;
1872 nlsp->domain = smack;
1873 nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
1875 rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
1877 nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
1878 smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
1880 nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
1881 smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
1886 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
1888 * @labeled: socket label scheme
1890 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
1891 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
1893 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
1895 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
1897 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
1898 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
1902 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
1903 * packet labeling based on the label.
1904 * The case of a single label host is different, because
1905 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
1906 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
1910 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
1912 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
1913 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
1914 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
1916 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
1917 smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
1918 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
1919 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
1929 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
1931 * @sap: the destination address
1933 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
1934 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
1936 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
1939 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
1944 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
1945 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1948 hostsp = smack_host_label(sap);
1949 if (hostsp != NULL) {
1951 struct lsm_network_audit net;
1953 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
1954 ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
1955 ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
1956 ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
1958 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
1959 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1961 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
1968 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
1972 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
1973 * @inode: the object
1974 * @name: attribute name
1975 * @value: attribute value
1976 * @size: size of the attribute
1979 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
1981 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
1983 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
1984 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1987 struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
1988 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1989 struct socket *sock;
1992 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LABELLEN || size == 0)
1995 sp = smk_import(value, size);
1999 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
2000 nsp->smk_inode = sp;
2001 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2005 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
2007 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2010 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
2011 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
2014 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2016 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
2018 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
2020 if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) {
2021 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2024 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
2034 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
2036 * @family: protocol family
2041 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2043 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2045 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2046 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2048 if (family != PF_INET || sock->sk == NULL)
2051 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2053 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2057 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2059 * @sap: the other end
2060 * @addrlen: size of sap
2062 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2064 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2066 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2069 if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
2071 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2074 return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2078 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2079 * @flags: the S_ value
2081 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2083 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2087 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2089 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2091 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2098 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2103 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2105 msg->security = smk_of_current();
2110 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2113 * Clears the blob pointer
2115 static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2117 msg->security = NULL;
2121 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2124 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2126 static char *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2128 return (char *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2132 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2137 static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2139 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2141 isp->security = smk_of_current();
2146 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
2149 * Clears the blob pointer
2151 static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2153 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2155 isp->security = NULL;
2159 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2161 * @access : access requested
2163 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2165 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
2167 char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
2168 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2171 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2172 ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
2174 return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2178 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2180 * @shmflg: access requested
2182 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2184 static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
2188 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2189 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2193 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
2195 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2197 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2199 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
2212 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2217 * System level information.
2223 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2227 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
2230 * @shmflg: access requested
2232 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2234 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
2239 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2240 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2244 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
2247 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2249 static char *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
2251 return (char *)sma->sem_perm.security;
2255 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
2260 static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
2262 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
2264 isp->security = smk_of_current();
2269 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
2272 * Clears the blob pointer
2274 static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
2276 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
2278 isp->security = NULL;
2282 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
2284 * @access : access requested
2286 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2288 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
2290 char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
2291 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2294 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2295 ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
2297 return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2301 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
2303 * @semflg: access requested
2305 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2307 static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
2311 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
2312 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
2316 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
2318 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2320 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2322 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
2340 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2345 * System level information
2352 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
2356 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
2362 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
2364 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
2366 static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
2367 unsigned nsops, int alter)
2369 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
2373 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
2378 static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
2380 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
2382 kisp->security = smk_of_current();
2387 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
2390 * Clears the blob pointer
2392 static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
2394 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
2396 kisp->security = NULL;
2400 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
2403 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2405 static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
2407 return (char *)msq->q_perm.security;
2411 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
2413 * @access : access requested
2415 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
2417 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
2419 char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
2420 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2423 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2424 ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
2426 return smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
2430 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
2432 * @msqflg: access requested
2434 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2436 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
2440 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
2441 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
2445 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
2447 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2449 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2451 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
2462 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2467 * System level information
2474 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
2478 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
2481 * @msqflg: access requested
2483 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2485 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
2490 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
2491 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
2495 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
2502 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
2504 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
2505 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
2507 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
2511 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
2512 * @ipp: the object permissions
2513 * @flag: access requested
2515 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
2517 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
2519 char *isp = ipp->security;
2520 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
2521 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2524 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2525 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
2527 return smk_curacc(isp, may, &ad);
2531 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
2532 * @ipp: the object permissions
2533 * @secid: where result will be saved
2535 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
2537 char *smack = ipp->security;
2539 *secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
2543 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
2544 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
2545 * @inode: the object
2547 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
2549 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
2551 struct super_block *sbp;
2552 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
2553 struct inode_smack *isp;
2554 char *csp = smk_of_current();
2557 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
2565 isp = inode->i_security;
2567 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
2569 * If the inode is already instantiated
2570 * take the quick way out
2572 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
2576 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
2578 * We're going to use the superblock default label
2579 * if there's no label on the file.
2581 final = sbsp->smk_default;
2584 * If this is the root inode the superblock
2585 * may be in the process of initialization.
2586 * If that is the case use the root value out
2587 * of the superblock.
2589 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
2590 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
2591 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2596 * This is pretty hackish.
2597 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
2598 * file system specific code, but it does help
2599 * with keeping it simple.
2601 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
2604 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
2605 * that the smack file system doesn't do
2606 * extended attributes.
2608 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2612 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
2614 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2616 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
2618 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
2619 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
2626 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
2627 * structures associated with the task involved.
2629 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2631 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
2633 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
2634 * The superblock default suffices.
2639 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
2640 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
2641 * getting recreated on every reboot.
2643 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2647 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
2648 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
2649 * to set mount options simulate setting the
2650 * superblock default.
2654 * This isn't an understood special case.
2655 * Get the value from the xattr.
2659 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
2661 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
2662 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2666 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
2667 * Use the aforeapplied default.
2668 * It would be curious if the label of the task
2669 * does not match that assigned.
2671 if (inode->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
2674 * Get the dentry for xattr.
2676 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
2677 fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
2678 if (fetched != NULL)
2682 * Transmuting directory
2684 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
2686 * If this is a new directory and the label was
2687 * transmuted when the inode was initialized
2688 * set the transmute attribute on the directory
2689 * and mark the inode.
2691 * If there is a transmute attribute on the
2692 * directory mark the inode.
2694 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
2695 isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
2696 rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dp,
2697 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
2698 TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
2701 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dp,
2702 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
2704 if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
2705 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
2709 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
2711 isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
2712 isp->smk_mmap = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
2719 isp->smk_inode = csp;
2721 isp->smk_inode = final;
2723 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
2726 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
2731 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
2732 * @p: the object task
2733 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
2734 * @value: where to put the result
2736 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
2738 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
2740 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
2745 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
2748 cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL);
2758 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
2759 * @p: the object task
2760 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
2761 * @value: the value to set
2762 * @size: the size of the value
2764 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
2765 * is permitted and only with privilege
2767 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
2769 static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
2770 void *value, size_t size)
2773 struct task_smack *tsp;
2774 struct task_smack *oldtsp;
2779 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
2780 * and supports no sane use case.
2785 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2788 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
2791 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
2794 newsmack = smk_import(value, size);
2795 if (newsmack == NULL)
2799 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
2801 if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
2804 oldtsp = p->cred->security;
2805 new = prepare_creds();
2809 tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL);
2814 rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL);
2818 new->security = tsp;
2824 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
2826 * @other: the other sock
2829 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
2830 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
2832 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
2833 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
2835 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
2836 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
2837 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
2838 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2842 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2844 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2845 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
2848 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
2849 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2852 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
2855 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
2856 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
2863 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
2865 * @other: the other socket
2867 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
2868 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
2870 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
2872 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2873 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
2874 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2878 struct lsm_network_audit net;
2880 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
2881 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
2884 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
2885 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2891 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
2894 * @size: the size of the message
2896 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
2897 * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single
2900 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
2903 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
2906 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
2908 if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
2911 return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
2915 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
2916 * @sap: netlabel secattr
2917 * @ssp: socket security information
2919 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label found on the label list.
2921 static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
2922 struct socket_smack *ssp)
2924 struct smack_known *skp;
2925 char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
2929 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
2931 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
2932 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
2933 * behaving the way we expect it to.
2935 * Get the categories, if any
2936 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
2937 * for the packet fall back on the network
2940 memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
2941 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
2943 pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
2944 sap->attr.mls.cat, pcat + 1);
2947 smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
2950 * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
2951 * we are already done. WeeHee.
2953 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
2955 * The label sent is usually on the label list.
2957 * If it is not we may still want to allow the
2960 * If the recipient is accepting all packets
2961 * because it is using the star ("*") label
2962 * for SMACK64IPIN provide the web ("@") label
2963 * so that a directed response will succeed.
2964 * This is not very correct from a MAC point
2965 * of view, but gets around the problem that
2966 * locking prevents adding the newly discovered
2967 * label to the list.
2968 * The case where the recipient is not using
2969 * the star label should obviously fail.
2970 * The easy way to do this is to provide the
2971 * star label as the subject label.
2973 skp = smk_find_entry(smack);
2975 return skp->smk_known;
2977 ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
2978 return smack_known_web.smk_known;
2979 return smack_known_star.smk_known;
2982 * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not
2985 sp = smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack);
2988 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
2989 return smack_known_web.smk_known;
2990 return smack_known_star.smk_known;
2992 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
2994 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
2996 sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
2998 * This has got to be a bug because it is
2999 * impossible to specify a fallback without
3000 * specifying the label, which will ensure
3001 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
3002 * secid is from a fallback.
3008 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
3009 * for the packet fall back on the network
3012 return smack_net_ambient;
3016 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
3020 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
3022 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3024 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3025 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3028 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3030 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3032 if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
3036 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3038 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3040 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
3042 csp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3044 csp = smack_net_ambient;
3046 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3049 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3050 ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
3051 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3052 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3055 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
3056 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
3057 * This is the simplist possible security model
3060 rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3062 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
3067 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
3069 * @optval: user's destination
3070 * @optlen: size thereof
3073 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
3075 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
3076 char __user *optval,
3077 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3079 struct socket_smack *ssp;
3084 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3085 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
3086 rcp = ssp->smk_packet;
3087 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
3092 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
3095 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
3103 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
3104 * @sock: the peer socket
3106 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
3108 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
3110 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
3111 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3114 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3115 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
3117 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
3118 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
3122 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3124 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
3127 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
3128 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3130 if (family == PF_UNIX) {
3131 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3132 s = smack_to_secid(ssp->smk_out);
3133 } else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3135 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3137 if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
3138 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3139 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3140 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
3142 sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3143 s = smack_to_secid(sp);
3145 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3154 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
3156 * @parent: parent socket
3158 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
3159 * is creating the new socket.
3161 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
3163 struct socket_smack *ssp;
3166 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
3169 ssp = sk->sk_security;
3170 ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current();
3171 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
3175 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
3176 * @sk: socket involved
3180 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
3181 * the socket, otherwise an error code
3183 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3184 struct request_sock *req)
3186 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
3187 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3188 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3189 struct sockaddr_in addr;
3193 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3195 struct lsm_network_audit net;
3198 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3199 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3202 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3203 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
3205 sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3207 sp = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
3208 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3211 smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
3212 ad.a.u.net->family = family;
3213 ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
3214 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3217 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
3218 * here. Read access is not required.
3220 rc = smk_access(sp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3225 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
3226 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
3228 req->peer_secid = smack_to_secid(sp);
3231 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
3232 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
3233 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
3236 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
3238 if (smack_host_label(&addr) == NULL) {
3240 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3241 smack_to_secattr(sp, &secattr);
3242 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
3243 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3246 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
3253 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
3254 * @sk: the new socket
3255 * @req: the connection's request_sock
3257 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
3259 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
3260 const struct request_sock *req)
3262 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3264 if (req->peer_secid != 0)
3265 ssp->smk_packet = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
3267 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
3271 * Key management security hooks
3273 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
3274 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
3275 * If you care about keys please have a look.
3280 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
3282 * @cred: the credentials to use
3285 * No allocation required
3289 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
3290 unsigned long flags)
3292 key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security);
3297 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
3300 * Clear the blob pointer
3302 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
3304 key->security = NULL;
3308 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
3309 * @key_ref: gets to the object
3310 * @cred: the credentials to use
3313 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
3314 * an error code otherwise
3316 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
3317 const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
3320 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3321 char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
3323 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
3327 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
3330 if (keyp->security == NULL)
3333 * This should not occur
3338 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
3339 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
3340 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
3342 return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security,
3343 MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
3345 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
3350 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
3351 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
3352 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
3353 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
3355 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
3356 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
3357 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
3358 * model where nearly everything is a label.
3363 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
3364 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
3365 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
3366 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
3367 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
3369 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
3370 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
3372 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
3374 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
3377 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3380 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
3383 *rule = smk_import(rulestr, 0);
3389 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
3390 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
3392 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
3393 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
3394 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
3396 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
3398 struct audit_field *f;
3401 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
3402 f = &krule->fields[i];
3404 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3412 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
3413 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
3414 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
3415 * @op: required testing operator
3416 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
3417 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
3419 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
3420 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
3422 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
3423 struct audit_context *actx)
3429 audit_log(actx, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3430 "Smack: missing rule\n");
3434 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3437 smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
3440 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
3441 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
3444 if (op == Audit_equal)
3445 return (rule == smack);
3446 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
3447 return (rule != smack);
3453 * smack_audit_rule_free - free smack rule representation
3454 * @vrule: rule to be freed.
3456 * No memory was allocated.
3458 static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
3463 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3466 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
3467 * @secid: incoming integer
3468 * @secdata: destination
3469 * @seclen: how long it is
3471 * Exists for networking code.
3473 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
3475 char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid);
3479 *seclen = strlen(sp);
3484 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
3485 * @secdata: smack label
3486 * @seclen: how long result is
3487 * @secid: outgoing integer
3489 * Exists for audit and networking code.
3491 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
3493 *secid = smack_to_secid(secdata);
3498 * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
3502 * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
3504 static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
3508 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
3510 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
3513 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
3515 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
3518 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
3521 len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
3529 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
3532 .ptrace_access_check = smack_ptrace_access_check,
3533 .ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
3534 .syslog = smack_syslog,
3536 .sb_alloc_security = smack_sb_alloc_security,
3537 .sb_free_security = smack_sb_free_security,
3538 .sb_copy_data = smack_sb_copy_data,
3539 .sb_kern_mount = smack_sb_kern_mount,
3540 .sb_statfs = smack_sb_statfs,
3541 .sb_mount = smack_sb_mount,
3542 .sb_umount = smack_sb_umount,
3544 .bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds,
3545 .bprm_committing_creds = smack_bprm_committing_creds,
3546 .bprm_secureexec = smack_bprm_secureexec,
3548 .inode_alloc_security = smack_inode_alloc_security,
3549 .inode_free_security = smack_inode_free_security,
3550 .inode_init_security = smack_inode_init_security,
3551 .inode_link = smack_inode_link,
3552 .inode_unlink = smack_inode_unlink,
3553 .inode_rmdir = smack_inode_rmdir,
3554 .inode_rename = smack_inode_rename,
3555 .inode_permission = smack_inode_permission,
3556 .inode_setattr = smack_inode_setattr,
3557 .inode_getattr = smack_inode_getattr,
3558 .inode_setxattr = smack_inode_setxattr,
3559 .inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr,
3560 .inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr,
3561 .inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr,
3562 .inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity,
3563 .inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity,
3564 .inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity,
3565 .inode_getsecid = smack_inode_getsecid,
3567 .file_permission = smack_file_permission,
3568 .file_alloc_security = smack_file_alloc_security,
3569 .file_free_security = smack_file_free_security,
3570 .file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl,
3571 .file_lock = smack_file_lock,
3572 .file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl,
3573 .file_mmap = smack_file_mmap,
3574 .file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner,
3575 .file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
3576 .file_receive = smack_file_receive,
3578 .dentry_open = smack_dentry_open,
3580 .cred_alloc_blank = smack_cred_alloc_blank,
3581 .cred_free = smack_cred_free,
3582 .cred_prepare = smack_cred_prepare,
3583 .cred_transfer = smack_cred_transfer,
3584 .kernel_act_as = smack_kernel_act_as,
3585 .kernel_create_files_as = smack_kernel_create_files_as,
3586 .task_setpgid = smack_task_setpgid,
3587 .task_getpgid = smack_task_getpgid,
3588 .task_getsid = smack_task_getsid,
3589 .task_getsecid = smack_task_getsecid,
3590 .task_setnice = smack_task_setnice,
3591 .task_setioprio = smack_task_setioprio,
3592 .task_getioprio = smack_task_getioprio,
3593 .task_setscheduler = smack_task_setscheduler,
3594 .task_getscheduler = smack_task_getscheduler,
3595 .task_movememory = smack_task_movememory,
3596 .task_kill = smack_task_kill,
3597 .task_wait = smack_task_wait,
3598 .task_to_inode = smack_task_to_inode,
3600 .ipc_permission = smack_ipc_permission,
3601 .ipc_getsecid = smack_ipc_getsecid,
3603 .msg_msg_alloc_security = smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
3604 .msg_msg_free_security = smack_msg_msg_free_security,
3606 .msg_queue_alloc_security = smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
3607 .msg_queue_free_security = smack_msg_queue_free_security,
3608 .msg_queue_associate = smack_msg_queue_associate,
3609 .msg_queue_msgctl = smack_msg_queue_msgctl,
3610 .msg_queue_msgsnd = smack_msg_queue_msgsnd,
3611 .msg_queue_msgrcv = smack_msg_queue_msgrcv,
3613 .shm_alloc_security = smack_shm_alloc_security,
3614 .shm_free_security = smack_shm_free_security,
3615 .shm_associate = smack_shm_associate,
3616 .shm_shmctl = smack_shm_shmctl,
3617 .shm_shmat = smack_shm_shmat,
3619 .sem_alloc_security = smack_sem_alloc_security,
3620 .sem_free_security = smack_sem_free_security,
3621 .sem_associate = smack_sem_associate,
3622 .sem_semctl = smack_sem_semctl,
3623 .sem_semop = smack_sem_semop,
3625 .d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate,
3627 .getprocattr = smack_getprocattr,
3628 .setprocattr = smack_setprocattr,
3630 .unix_stream_connect = smack_unix_stream_connect,
3631 .unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send,
3633 .socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create,
3634 .socket_connect = smack_socket_connect,
3635 .socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg,
3636 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
3637 .socket_getpeersec_stream = smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
3638 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
3639 .sk_alloc_security = smack_sk_alloc_security,
3640 .sk_free_security = smack_sk_free_security,
3641 .sock_graft = smack_sock_graft,
3642 .inet_conn_request = smack_inet_conn_request,
3643 .inet_csk_clone = smack_inet_csk_clone,
3645 /* key management security hooks */
3647 .key_alloc = smack_key_alloc,
3648 .key_free = smack_key_free,
3649 .key_permission = smack_key_permission,
3650 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
3654 .audit_rule_init = smack_audit_rule_init,
3655 .audit_rule_known = smack_audit_rule_known,
3656 .audit_rule_match = smack_audit_rule_match,
3657 .audit_rule_free = smack_audit_rule_free,
3658 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3660 .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx,
3661 .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid,
3662 .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx,
3663 .inode_notifysecctx = smack_inode_notifysecctx,
3664 .inode_setsecctx = smack_inode_setsecctx,
3665 .inode_getsecctx = smack_inode_getsecctx,
3669 static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
3672 * Initialize CIPSO locks
3674 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock);
3675 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock);
3676 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock);
3677 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_cipsolock);
3678 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_cipsolock);
3679 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_web.smk_cipsolock);
3681 * Initialize rule list locks
3683 mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
3684 mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
3685 mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
3686 mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
3687 mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock);
3688 mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
3690 * Initialize rule lists
3692 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
3693 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
3694 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
3695 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
3696 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules);
3697 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
3699 * Create the known labels list
3701 list_add(&smack_known_huh.list, &smack_known_list);
3702 list_add(&smack_known_hat.list, &smack_known_list);
3703 list_add(&smack_known_star.list, &smack_known_list);
3704 list_add(&smack_known_floor.list, &smack_known_list);
3705 list_add(&smack_known_invalid.list, &smack_known_list);
3706 list_add(&smack_known_web.list, &smack_known_list);
3710 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
3714 static __init int smack_init(void)
3717 struct task_smack *tsp;
3719 if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
3722 tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known,
3723 smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3727 printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
3730 * Set the security state for the initial task.
3732 cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
3733 cred->security = tsp;
3735 /* initialize the smack_known_list */
3736 init_smack_known_list();
3741 if (register_security(&smack_ops))
3742 panic("smack: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
3748 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
3749 * all processes and objects when they are created.
3751 security_initcall(smack_init);