xen-netback: disable rogue vif in kthread context

[firefly-linux-kernel-4.4.55.git] / drivers / net / xen-netback / common.h

diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
index 0355f8767e3bdf17b27c34669ac617554ddb154e..89d1d0556b6e83a44fc6986d080072d6e93c2045 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/common.h
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ struct xenvif_rx_meta {
 
 #define MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET PAGE_SIZE
 
-#define MAX_PENDING_REQS 256
+#define MAX_PENDING_REQS XEN_NETIF_TX_RING_SIZE
 
 /* It's possible for an skb to have a maximal number of frags
  * but still be less than MAX_BUFFER_OFFSET in size. Thus the
@@ -104,6 +104,11 @@ struct xenvif {
        domid_t          domid;
        unsigned int     handle;
 
+       /* Is this interface disabled? True when backend discovers
+        * frontend is rogue.
+        */
+       bool disabled;
+
        /* Use NAPI for guest TX */
        struct napi_struct napi;
        /* When feature-split-event-channels = 0, tx_irq = rx_irq. */
@@ -251,12 +256,6 @@ static inline pending_ring_idx_t nr_pending_reqs(struct xenvif *vif)
                vif->pending_prod + vif->pending_cons;
 }
 
-static inline bool xenvif_tx_pending_slots_available(struct xenvif *vif)
-{
-       return nr_pending_reqs(vif) + XEN_NETBK_LEGACY_SLOTS_MAX
-               < MAX_PENDING_REQS;
-}
-
 /* Callback from stack when TX packet can be released */
 void xenvif_zerocopy_callback(struct ubuf_info *ubuf, bool zerocopy_success);