Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dtor/input

[firefly-linux-kernel-4.4.55.git] / fs / namei.c

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 1b464390dde85ecd783eb45f64aee1f89f6c3ff1..a856e7f7b6e32ea624327a96b2865f90099e2328 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -352,6 +352,7 @@ int __inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 /**
  * sb_permission - Check superblock-level permissions
  * @sb: Superblock of inode to check permission on
+ * @inode: Inode to check permission on
  * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
  *
  * Separate out file-system wide checks from inode-specific permission checks.
@@ -656,6 +657,7 @@ int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1;
 /**
  * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
  * @link: The path of the symlink
+ * @nd: nameidata pathwalk data
  *
  * In the case of the sysctl_protected_symlinks sysctl being enabled,
  * CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE needs to be specifically ignored if the symlink is
@@ -678,7 +680,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
 
        /* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
        inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
-       if (current_cred()->fsuid == inode->i_uid)
+       if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
                return 0;
 
        /* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */
@@ -687,7 +689,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd)
                return 0;
 
        /* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
-       if (parent->i_uid == inode->i_uid)
+       if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
                return 0;
 
        path_put_conditional(link, nd);
@@ -757,7 +759,7 @@ static int may_linkat(struct path *link)
        /* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
         * otherwise, it must be a safe source.
         */
-       if (cred->fsuid == inode->i_uid || safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
+       if (uid_eq(cred->fsuid, inode->i_uid) || safe_hardlink_source(inode) ||
            capable(CAP_FOWNER))
                return 0;
 
@@ -2414,7 +2416,7 @@ static int atomic_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry,
                goto out;
        }
 
-       mode = op->mode & S_IALLUGO;
+       mode = op->mode;
        if ((open_flag & O_CREAT) && !IS_POSIXACL(dir))
                mode &= ~current_umask();
 
@@ -2452,7 +2454,7 @@ static int atomic_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry,
        }
 
        if (open_flag & O_CREAT) {
-               error = may_o_create(&nd->path, dentry, op->mode);
+               error = may_o_create(&nd->path, dentry, mode);
                if (error) {
                        create_error = error;
                        if (open_flag & O_EXCL)
@@ -2489,6 +2491,10 @@ static int atomic_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct dentry *dentry,
                        dput(dentry);
                        dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
                }
+               if (create_error && dentry->d_inode == NULL) {
+                       error = create_error;
+                       goto out;
+               }
                goto looked_up;
        }