void *sk_security;
#endif
__u32 sk_mark;
+ kuid_t sk_uid;
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID
u32 sk_classid;
#endif
void (*destroy_cgroup)(struct mem_cgroup *memcg);
struct cg_proto *(*proto_cgroup)(struct mem_cgroup *memcg);
#endif
+ int (*diag_destroy)(struct sock *sk, int err);
};
int proto_register(struct proto *prot, int alloc_slab);
if (!sk_has_account(sk))
return;
sk->sk_forward_alloc += size;
+
+ /* Avoid a possible overflow.
+ * TCP send queues can make this happen, if sk_mem_reclaim()
+ * is not called and more than 2 GBytes are released at once.
+ *
+ * If we reach 2 MBytes, reclaim 1 MBytes right now, there is
+ * no need to hold that much forward allocation anyway.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(sk->sk_forward_alloc >= 1 << 21))
+ __sk_mem_reclaim(sk, 1 << 20);
}
static inline void sk_wmem_free_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
sk->sk_wq = parent->wq;
parent->sk = sk;
sk_set_socket(sk, parent);
+ sk->sk_uid = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_uid;
security_sock_graft(sk, parent);
write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
}
kuid_t sock_i_uid(struct sock *sk);
unsigned long sock_i_ino(struct sock *sk);
+static inline kuid_t sock_net_uid(const struct net *net, const struct sock *sk)
+{
+ return sk ? sk->sk_uid : make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
+}
+
static inline u32 net_tx_rndhash(void)
{
u32 v = prandom_u32();