LR097: enable reboot system when shutdown with dc plug in

[firefly-linux-kernel-4.4.55.git] / security / commoncap.c

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index a93b3b73307991c69738bc0dab712e56330ba932..8bfbd13497467522462738226117d54c06044c68 100644 (file)
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -28,6 +28,11 @@
 #include <linux/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/securebits.h>
 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK
+#include <linux/android_aid.h>
+#endif
 
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -83,6 +88,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
 int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
                struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK
+       if (cap == CAP_NET_RAW && in_egroup_p(AID_NET_RAW))
+               return 0;
+       if (cap == CAP_NET_ADMIN && in_egroup_p(AID_NET_ADMIN))
+               return 0;
+#endif
+
        for (;;) {
                /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
                if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user)
@@ -510,6 +522,11 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
        }
 skip:
 
+       /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
+       if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+               bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+
        /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
         * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit
         */