sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes
authorDan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Sat, 25 Dec 2010 21:23:40 +0000 (16:23 -0500)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Fri, 7 Jan 2011 21:58:45 +0000 (13:58 -0800)
commit203d86c28cd29846ff66e2d9178f870063d8de83
tree5163293bf9998212397a667687c35b9a412d2ea3
parente606509bc1d7f19fccf078907d5421b3a95bd659
sound: Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes

commit d81a12bc29ae4038770e05dce4ab7f26fd5880fb upstream.

The load_mixer_volumes() function, which can be triggered by
unprivileged users via the SOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELS ioctl, is vulnerable to
a buffer overflow.  Because the provided "name" argument isn't
guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible
to overflow past the end of the last element in the mixer_vols array.
Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via
subsequent calls to load_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege
escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads via get_mixer_levels().  In
addition, the strcmp() may leak bytes beyond the mixer_vols array.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
sound/oss/soundcard.c