xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto
authorSteffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Tue, 4 Sep 2012 00:03:29 +0000 (00:03 +0000)
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Fri, 12 Oct 2012 20:28:03 +0000 (05:28 +0900)
commit7218addc4b8bec641937e8236099f52974cf5687
treec652c211b50e88e846cc079de2d669c5855c04d0
parent21de4eb26ec0b1b9c484da823fbcd1d3a48afec9
xfrm: Workaround incompatibility of ESN and async crypto

[ Upstream commit 3b59df46a449ec9975146d71318c4777ad086744 ]

ESN for esp is defined in RFC 4303. This RFC assumes that the
sequence number counters are always up to date. However,
this is not true if an async crypto algorithm is employed.

If the sequence number counters are not up to date on sequence
number check, we may incorrectly update the upper 32 bit of
the sequence number. This leads to a DOS.

We workaround this by comparing the upper sequence number,
(used for authentication) with the upper sequence number
computed after the async processing. We drop the packet
if these numbers are different.

To do this, we introduce a recheck function that does this
check in the ESN case.

Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
include/net/xfrm.h
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c
net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c