ANDROID: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace
authorKirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Mon, 9 Mar 2015 21:11:12 +0000 (23:11 +0200)
committerHuang, Tao <huangtao@rock-chips.com>
Sun, 22 Jan 2017 10:12:52 +0000 (18:12 +0800)
commitf662f0e62417d66d9ae4ca40abf9f0309d266746
treee07741bfee922eb3384bcdd63ad9ce10eb693b4d
parent292ff06061ea99588871b6107c65de4b1006110c
ANDROID: pagemap: do not leak physical addresses to non-privileged userspace

As pointed by recent post[1] on exploiting DRAM physical imperfection,
/proc/PID/pagemap exposes sensitive information which can be used to do
attacks.

This disallows anybody without CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read the pagemap.

[1] http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2015/03/exploiting-dram-rowhammer-bug-to-gain.html

[ Eventually we might want to do anything more finegrained, but for now
  this is the simple model.   - Linus ]

We add this patch again for pass CTS
FileSystemPermissionTest: Assert /proc/self/pagemap not readable

Change-Id: Id4bf9ea27af000734356b921cd723868802b4335
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mark Seaborn <mseaborn@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Huang, Tao <huangtao@rock-chips.com>
fs/proc/task_mmu.c