drm: do not leak kernel addresses via /proc/dri/*/vma

In the continuing effort to avoid kernel addresses leaking to unprivileged
users, this patch switches to %pK for /proc/dri/*/vma.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>

diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_info.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_info.c
index 3cdbaf379bb51324110d5d0ace0c9dc2dd24059e..be9a9c07d15205bba1b974d8c6c20998a6df21f5 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_info.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/drm_info.c
@@ -283,17 +283,18 @@ int drm_vma_info(struct seq_file *m, void *data)
 #endif
 
        mutex_lock(&dev->struct_mutex);
-       seq_printf(m, "vma use count: %d, high_memory = %p, 0x%08llx\n",
+       seq_printf(m, "vma use count: %d, high_memory = %pK, 0x%pK\n",
                   atomic_read(&dev->vma_count),
-                  high_memory, (u64)virt_to_phys(high_memory));
+                  high_memory, (void *)virt_to_phys(high_memory));
 
        list_for_each_entry(pt, &dev->vmalist, head) {
                vma = pt->vma;
                if (!vma)
                        continue;
                seq_printf(m,
-                          "\n%5d 0x%08lx-0x%08lx %c%c%c%c%c%c 0x%08lx000",
-                          pt->pid, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_end,
+                          "\n%5d 0x%pK-0x%pK %c%c%c%c%c%c 0x%08lx000",
+                          pt->pid,
+                          (void *)vma->vm_start, (void *)vma->vm_end,
                           vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? 'r' : '-',
                           vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
                           vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? 'x' : '-',