stm class: Prevent user-controllable allocations

Currently, the character device write method allocates a temporary buffer
for user's data, but the user's data size is not sanitized and can cause
arbitrarily large allocations via kzalloc() or an integer overflow that
will then result in overwriting kernel memory.

This patch trims the input buffer size to avoid these issues.

Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit f08b18266c7116e2ec6885dd53a928f580060a71)

diff --git a/drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c b/drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c
index ddcb606acea61c713b0068ab6976ddddd80d0920..76697ad59f2d32baffa3f31ae8709c07509a7fa4 100644 (file)
--- a/drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c
+++ b/drivers/hwtracing/stm/core.c
@@ -406,6 +406,9 @@ static ssize_t stm_char_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
        char *kbuf;
        int err;
 
+       if (count + 1 > PAGE_SIZE)
+               count = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
+
        /*
         * if no m/c have been assigned to this writer up to this
         * point, use "default" policy entry