TEA/XTEA algorithm contributors:
Aaron Grothe
+ Michael Ringe
Khazad algorithm contributors:
Aaron Grothe
described in RFC2612.
config CRYPTO_TEA
- tristate "TEA and XTEA cipher algorithms"
+ tristate "TEA, XTEA and XETA cipher algorithms"
depends on CRYPTO
help
TEA cipher algorithm.
the TEA algorithm to address a potential key weakness
in the TEA algorithm.
+ Xtendend Encryption Tiny Algorithm is a mis-implementation
+ of the XTEA algorithm for compatibility purposes.
+
config CRYPTO_ARC4
tristate "ARC4 cipher algorithm"
depends on CRYPTO
static int crypto_init_flags(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 flags)
{
- tfm->crt_flags = 0;
+ tfm->crt_flags = flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
+ flags &= ~CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK;
switch (crypto_tfm_alg_type(tfm)) {
case CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER:
int crypto_init_cipher_flags(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 flags)
{
u32 mode = flags & CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_MASK;
-
tfm->crt_cipher.cit_mode = mode ? mode : CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB;
- if (flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY)
- tfm->crt_flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY;
-
return 0;
}
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <asm/kmap_types.h>
extern enum km_type crypto_km_types[];
static inline void crypto_yield(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
- if (!in_atomic())
+ if (tfm->crt_flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)
cond_resched();
}
"des", "md5", "des3_ede", "rot13", "sha1", "sha256", "blowfish",
"twofish", "serpent", "sha384", "sha512", "md4", "aes", "cast6",
"arc4", "michael_mic", "deflate", "crc32c", "tea", "xtea",
- "khazad", "wp512", "wp384", "wp256", "tnepres", NULL
+ "khazad", "wp512", "wp384", "wp256", "tnepres", "xeta", NULL
};
static void hexdump(unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len)
test_cipher ("anubis", MODE_CBC, ENCRYPT, anubis_cbc_enc_tv_template, ANUBIS_CBC_ENC_TEST_VECTORS);
test_cipher ("anubis", MODE_CBC, DECRYPT, anubis_cbc_dec_tv_template, ANUBIS_CBC_ENC_TEST_VECTORS);
+ //XETA
+ test_cipher ("xeta", MODE_ECB, ENCRYPT, xeta_enc_tv_template, XETA_ENC_TEST_VECTORS);
+ test_cipher ("xeta", MODE_ECB, DECRYPT, xeta_dec_tv_template, XETA_DEC_TEST_VECTORS);
+
test_hash("sha384", sha384_tv_template, SHA384_TEST_VECTORS);
test_hash("sha512", sha512_tv_template, SHA512_TEST_VECTORS);
test_hash("wp512", wp512_tv_template, WP512_TEST_VECTORS);
case 29:
test_hash("tgr128", tgr128_tv_template, TGR128_TEST_VECTORS);
break;
+
+ case 30:
+ test_cipher ("xeta", MODE_ECB, ENCRYPT, xeta_enc_tv_template, XETA_ENC_TEST_VECTORS);
+ test_cipher ("xeta", MODE_ECB, DECRYPT, xeta_dec_tv_template, XETA_DEC_TEST_VECTORS);
+ break;
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC
case 100:
.klen = 16,
.input = { [0 ... 8] = 0x00 },
.ilen = 8,
- .result = { 0xaa, 0x22, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x6c, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x45 },
+ .result = { 0xd8, 0xd4, 0xe9, 0xde, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0x13, 0xf7 },
.rlen = 8,
}, {
.key = { 0x2b, 0x02, 0x05, 0x68, 0x06, 0x14, 0x49, 0x76,
.klen = 16,
.input = { 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x2e },
.ilen = 8,
- .result = { 0x82, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x35, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0xc3 },
+ .result = { 0x94, 0xeb, 0xc8, 0x96, 0x84, 0x6a, 0x49, 0xa8 },
.rlen = 8,
}, {
.key = { 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0x11, 0x66, 0x44, 0x39, 0x25,
0x51, 0x3a, 0x16, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x12, 0x6e },
.klen = 16,
- .input = { 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x74,
+ .input = { 0x3e, 0xce, 0xae, 0x22, 0x60, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x9d,
0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74 },
.ilen = 16,
- .result = { 0xe2, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x85, 0x9e, 0xea,
+ .result = { 0xe2, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x85, 0x9e, 0xea,
0x61, 0x35, 0xaa, 0xed, 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x71, 0x2c },
.rlen = 16,
}, {
.key = { 0x4d, 0x76, 0x32, 0x17, 0x05, 0x3f, 0x75, 0x2c,
0x5d, 0x04, 0x16, 0x36, 0x15, 0x72, 0x63, 0x2f },
.klen = 16,
- .input = { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67,
- 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20,
- 0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72,
+ .input = { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67,
+ 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20,
+ 0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72,
0x65, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21 },
.ilen = 32,
- .result = { 0x0b, 0x03, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0xbe, 0x95, 0xfd, 0xb1,
- 0xc1, 0x44, 0x91, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0xc9, 0x1b, 0xb4,
- 0xa9, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0xb1, 0x3e, 0x2a, 0x8f,
- 0xea, 0xa5, 0x6a, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0xa5 },
+ .result = { 0x99, 0x81, 0x9f, 0x5d, 0x6f, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x3a,
+ 0x86, 0xff, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xe3, 0x87, 0x70, 0x07,
+ 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xcf, 0xf3, 0x99, 0x50, 0xb3, 0xd4,
+ 0x73, 0xa2, 0xfa, 0xc9, 0x16, 0x59, 0x5d, 0x81 },
.rlen = 32,
}
};
{
.key = { [0 ... 15] = 0x00 },
.klen = 16,
- .input = { 0xaa, 0x22, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x6c, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x45 },
+ .input = { 0xd8, 0xd4, 0xe9, 0xde, 0xd9, 0x1e, 0x13, 0xf7 },
.ilen = 8,
.result = { [0 ... 8] = 0x00 },
.rlen = 8,
.key = { 0x2b, 0x02, 0x05, 0x68, 0x06, 0x14, 0x49, 0x76,
0x77, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x26, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x78, 0x43 },
.klen = 16,
- .input = { 0x82, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x35, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0xc3 },
+ .input = { 0x94, 0xeb, 0xc8, 0x96, 0x84, 0x6a, 0x49, 0xa8 },
.ilen = 8,
.result = { 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x2e },
.rlen = 8,
.key = { 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0x11, 0x66, 0x44, 0x39, 0x25,
0x51, 0x3a, 0x16, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x12, 0x6e },
.klen = 16,
- .input = { 0xe2, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x85, 0x9e, 0xea,
- 0x61, 0x35, 0xaa, 0xed, 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x71, 0x2c },
+ .input = { 0x3e, 0xce, 0xae, 0x22, 0x60, 0x56, 0xa8, 0x9d,
+ 0x77, 0x4d, 0xd4, 0xb4, 0x87, 0x24, 0xe3, 0x9a },
.ilen = 16,
- .result = { 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x74,
+ .result = { 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x74,
0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74 },
.rlen = 16,
}, {
.key = { 0x4d, 0x76, 0x32, 0x17, 0x05, 0x3f, 0x75, 0x2c,
0x5d, 0x04, 0x16, 0x36, 0x15, 0x72, 0x63, 0x2f },
.klen = 16,
- .input = { 0x0b, 0x03, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0xbe, 0x95, 0xfd, 0xb1,
- 0xc1, 0x44, 0x91, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0xc9, 0x1b, 0xb4,
- 0xa9, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0xb1, 0x3e, 0x2a, 0x8f,
- 0xea, 0xa5, 0x6a, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0xa5 },
+ .input = { 0x99, 0x81, 0x9f, 0x5d, 0x6f, 0x4b, 0x31, 0x3a,
+ 0x86, 0xff, 0x6f, 0xd0, 0xe3, 0x87, 0x70, 0x07,
+ 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xcf, 0xf3, 0x99, 0x50, 0xb3, 0xd4,
+ 0x73, 0xa2, 0xfa, 0xc9, 0x16, 0x59, 0x5d, 0x81 },
.ilen = 32,
- .result = { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67,
- 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20,
- 0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72,
+ .result = { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67,
+ 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20,
+ 0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72,
0x65, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21 },
.rlen = 32,
}
},
};
+/*
+ * XETA test vectors
+ */
+#define XETA_ENC_TEST_VECTORS 4
+#define XETA_DEC_TEST_VECTORS 4
+
+static struct cipher_testvec xeta_enc_tv_template[] = {
+ {
+ .key = { [0 ... 15] = 0x00 },
+ .klen = 16,
+ .input = { [0 ... 8] = 0x00 },
+ .ilen = 8,
+ .result = { 0xaa, 0x22, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x6c, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x45 },
+ .rlen = 8,
+ }, {
+ .key = { 0x2b, 0x02, 0x05, 0x68, 0x06, 0x14, 0x49, 0x76,
+ 0x77, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x26, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x78, 0x43 },
+ .klen = 16,
+ .input = { 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x2e },
+ .ilen = 8,
+ .result = { 0x82, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x35, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0xc3 },
+ .rlen = 8,
+ }, {
+ .key = { 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0x11, 0x66, 0x44, 0x39, 0x25,
+ 0x51, 0x3a, 0x16, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x12, 0x6e },
+ .klen = 16,
+ .input = { 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x74,
+ 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74 },
+ .ilen = 16,
+ .result = { 0xe2, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x85, 0x9e, 0xea,
+ 0x61, 0x35, 0xaa, 0xed, 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x71, 0x2c },
+ .rlen = 16,
+ }, {
+ .key = { 0x4d, 0x76, 0x32, 0x17, 0x05, 0x3f, 0x75, 0x2c,
+ 0x5d, 0x04, 0x16, 0x36, 0x15, 0x72, 0x63, 0x2f },
+ .klen = 16,
+ .input = { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67,
+ 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20,
+ 0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72,
+ 0x65, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21 },
+ .ilen = 32,
+ .result = { 0x0b, 0x03, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0xbe, 0x95, 0xfd, 0xb1,
+ 0xc1, 0x44, 0x91, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0xc9, 0x1b, 0xb4,
+ 0xa9, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0xb1, 0x3e, 0x2a, 0x8f,
+ 0xea, 0xa5, 0x6a, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0xa5 },
+ .rlen = 32,
+ }
+};
+
+static struct cipher_testvec xeta_dec_tv_template[] = {
+ {
+ .key = { [0 ... 15] = 0x00 },
+ .klen = 16,
+ .input = { 0xaa, 0x22, 0x96, 0xe5, 0x6c, 0x61, 0xf3, 0x45 },
+ .ilen = 8,
+ .result = { [0 ... 8] = 0x00 },
+ .rlen = 8,
+ }, {
+ .key = { 0x2b, 0x02, 0x05, 0x68, 0x06, 0x14, 0x49, 0x76,
+ 0x77, 0x5d, 0x0e, 0x26, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x78, 0x43 },
+ .klen = 16,
+ .input = { 0x82, 0x3e, 0xeb, 0x35, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0xd9, 0xc3 },
+ .ilen = 8,
+ .result = { 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x65, 0x2e },
+ .rlen = 8,
+ }, {
+ .key = { 0x09, 0x65, 0x43, 0x11, 0x66, 0x44, 0x39, 0x25,
+ 0x51, 0x3a, 0x16, 0x10, 0x0a, 0x08, 0x12, 0x6e },
+ .klen = 16,
+ .input = { 0xe2, 0x04, 0xdb, 0xf2, 0x89, 0x85, 0x9e, 0xea,
+ 0x61, 0x35, 0xaa, 0xed, 0xb5, 0xcb, 0x71, 0x2c },
+ .ilen = 16,
+ .result = { 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x5f, 0x74,
+ 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x5f, 0x76, 0x65, 0x63, 0x74 },
+ .rlen = 16,
+ }, {
+ .key = { 0x4d, 0x76, 0x32, 0x17, 0x05, 0x3f, 0x75, 0x2c,
+ 0x5d, 0x04, 0x16, 0x36, 0x15, 0x72, 0x63, 0x2f },
+ .klen = 16,
+ .input = { 0x0b, 0x03, 0xcd, 0x8a, 0xbe, 0x95, 0xfd, 0xb1,
+ 0xc1, 0x44, 0x91, 0x0b, 0xa5, 0xc9, 0x1b, 0xb4,
+ 0xa9, 0xda, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0xb1, 0x3e, 0x2a, 0x8f,
+ 0xea, 0xa5, 0x6a, 0x85, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0xa8, 0xa5 },
+ .ilen = 32,
+ .result = { 0x54, 0x65, 0x61, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x67,
+ 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x64, 0x20, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20,
+ 0x79, 0x6f, 0x75, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21, 0x20, 0x72,
+ 0x65, 0x61, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x79, 0x21, 0x21, 0x21 },
+ .rlen = 32,
+ }
+};
+
/*
* Compression stuff.
*/
/*
* Cryptographic API.
*
- * TEA and Xtended TEA Algorithms
+ * TEA, XTEA, and XETA crypto alogrithms
*
* The TEA and Xtended TEA algorithms were developed by David Wheeler
* and Roger Needham at the Computer Laboratory of Cambridge University.
*
+ * Due to the order of evaluation in XTEA many people have incorrectly
+ * implemented it. XETA (XTEA in the wrong order), exists for
+ * compatibility with these implementations.
+ *
* Copyright (c) 2004 Aaron Grothe ajgrothe@yahoo.com
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
z = u32_in (src + 4);
while (sum != limit) {
- y += (z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + (z ^ sum) + ctx->KEY[sum&3];
+ y += ((z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + z) ^ (sum + ctx->KEY[sum&3]);
sum += XTEA_DELTA;
- z += (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + (y ^ sum) + ctx->KEY[sum>>11 &3];
+ z += ((y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + y) ^ (sum + ctx->KEY[sum>>11 &3]);
}
u32_out (dst, y);
sum = XTEA_DELTA * XTEA_ROUNDS;
+ while (sum) {
+ z -= ((y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + y) ^ (sum + ctx->KEY[sum>>11 & 3]);
+ sum -= XTEA_DELTA;
+ y -= ((z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + z) ^ (sum + ctx->KEY[sum & 3]);
+ }
+
+ u32_out (dst, y);
+ u32_out (dst + 4, z);
+
+}
+
+
+static void xeta_encrypt(void *ctx_arg, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+
+ u32 y, z, sum = 0;
+ u32 limit = XTEA_DELTA * XTEA_ROUNDS;
+
+ struct xtea_ctx *ctx = ctx_arg;
+
+ y = u32_in (src);
+ z = u32_in (src + 4);
+
+ while (sum != limit) {
+ y += (z << 4 ^ z >> 5) + (z ^ sum) + ctx->KEY[sum&3];
+ sum += XTEA_DELTA;
+ z += (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + (y ^ sum) + ctx->KEY[sum>>11 &3];
+ }
+
+ u32_out (dst, y);
+ u32_out (dst + 4, z);
+
+}
+
+static void xeta_decrypt(void *ctx_arg, u8 *dst, const u8 *src)
+{
+
+ u32 y, z, sum;
+ struct tea_ctx *ctx = ctx_arg;
+
+ y = u32_in (src);
+ z = u32_in (src + 4);
+
+ sum = XTEA_DELTA * XTEA_ROUNDS;
+
while (sum) {
z -= (y << 4 ^ y >> 5) + (y ^ sum) + ctx->KEY[sum>>11 & 3];
sum -= XTEA_DELTA;
.cia_decrypt = xtea_decrypt } }
};
+static struct crypto_alg xeta_alg = {
+ .cra_name = "xeta",
+ .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_CIPHER,
+ .cra_blocksize = XTEA_BLOCK_SIZE,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof (struct xtea_ctx),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(xtea_alg.cra_list),
+ .cra_u = { .cipher = {
+ .cia_min_keysize = XTEA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .cia_max_keysize = XTEA_KEY_SIZE,
+ .cia_setkey = xtea_setkey,
+ .cia_encrypt = xeta_encrypt,
+ .cia_decrypt = xeta_decrypt } }
+};
+
static int __init init(void)
{
int ret = 0;
goto out;
}
+ ret = crypto_register_alg(&xeta_alg);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ crypto_unregister_alg(&tea_alg);
+ crypto_unregister_alg(&xtea_alg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
out:
return ret;
}
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&tea_alg);
crypto_unregister_alg(&xtea_alg);
+ crypto_unregister_alg(&xeta_alg);
}
MODULE_ALIAS("xtea");
+MODULE_ALIAS("xeta");
module_init(init);
module_exit(fini);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TEA & XTEA Cryptographic Algorithms");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("TEA, XTEA & XETA Cryptographic Algorithms");
chan = (here[3] & uPD98401_AAL5_CHAN) >>
uPD98401_AAL5_CHAN_SHIFT;
if (chan < zatm_dev->chans && zatm_dev->rx_map[chan]) {
- int pos = ZATM_VCC(vcc)->pool;
-
+ int pos;
vcc = zatm_dev->rx_map[chan];
+ pos = ZATM_VCC(vcc)->pool;
if (skb == zatm_dev->last_free[pos])
zatm_dev->last_free[pos] = NULL;
skb_unlink(skb, zatm_dev->pool + pos);
mode = strsep(&cmsp, "-");
if (mode == NULL || strcmp(mode, "cbc") == 0)
- tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CBC);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CBC |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
else if (strcmp(mode, "ecb") == 0)
- tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
if (tfm == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
}
/* Hash the cipher key with the given hash algorithm */
- hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(opts, 0);
+ hash_tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(opts, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
if (hash_tfm == NULL) {
ti->error = PFX "Error initializing ESSIV hash";
return -EINVAL;
/* Setup the essiv_tfm with the given salt */
essiv_tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(crypto_tfm_alg_name(cc->tfm),
- CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB);
+ CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_ECB |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
if (essiv_tfm == NULL) {
ti->error = PFX "Error allocating crypto tfm for ESSIV";
kfree(salt);
goto bad1;
}
- tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, crypto_flags);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cipher, crypto_flags | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
if (!tfm) {
ti->error = PFX "Error allocating crypto tfm";
goto bad1;
u32 gem_status = readl(gp->regs + GREG_STAT);
if (gem_status == 0) {
+ netif_poll_enable(dev);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&gp->lock, flags);
return IRQ_NONE;
}
struct gem_init_block *init_block;
struct sk_buff *rx_skbs[RX_RING_SIZE];
- struct sk_buff *tx_skbs[RX_RING_SIZE];
+ struct sk_buff *tx_skbs[TX_RING_SIZE];
dma_addr_t gblock_dvma;
struct pci_dev *pdev;
#define DRV_MODULE_NAME "tg3"
#define PFX DRV_MODULE_NAME ": "
-#define DRV_MODULE_VERSION "3.37"
-#define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE "August 25, 2005"
+#define DRV_MODULE_VERSION "3.38"
+#define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE "September 1, 2005"
#define TG3_DEF_MAC_MODE 0
#define TG3_DEF_RX_MODE 0
TG3_RX_RCB_RING_SIZE(tp))
#define TG3_TX_RING_BYTES (sizeof(struct tg3_tx_buffer_desc) * \
TG3_TX_RING_SIZE)
-#define TX_RING_GAP(TP) \
- (TG3_TX_RING_SIZE - (TP)->tx_pending)
#define TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(TP) \
- (((TP)->tx_cons <= (TP)->tx_prod) ? \
- (TP)->tx_cons + (TP)->tx_pending - (TP)->tx_prod : \
- (TP)->tx_cons - (TP)->tx_prod - TX_RING_GAP(TP))
+ ((TP)->tx_pending - \
+ (((TP)->tx_prod - (TP)->tx_cons) & (TG3_TX_RING_SIZE - 1)))
#define NEXT_TX(N) (((N) + 1) & (TG3_TX_RING_SIZE - 1))
#define RX_PKT_BUF_SZ (1536 + tp->rx_offset + 64)
tp->tx_cons = sw_idx;
- if (netif_queue_stopped(tp->dev) &&
- (TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(tp) > TG3_TX_WAKEUP_THRESH))
- netif_wake_queue(tp->dev);
+ if (unlikely(netif_queue_stopped(tp->dev))) {
+ spin_lock(&tp->tx_lock);
+ if (netif_queue_stopped(tp->dev) &&
+ (TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(tp) > TG3_TX_WAKEUP_THRESH))
+ netif_wake_queue(tp->dev);
+ spin_unlock(&tp->tx_lock);
+ }
}
/* Returns size of skb allocated or < 0 on error.
/* run TX completion thread */
if (sblk->idx[0].tx_consumer != tp->tx_cons) {
- spin_lock(&tp->tx_lock);
tg3_tx(tp);
- spin_unlock(&tp->tx_lock);
}
/* run RX thread, within the bounds set by NAPI.
tw32_tx_mbox((MAILBOX_SNDHOST_PROD_IDX_0 + TG3_64BIT_REG_LOW), entry);
tp->tx_prod = entry;
- if (TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(tp) <= (MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1))
+ if (TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(tp) <= (MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1)) {
netif_stop_queue(dev);
+ if (TX_BUFFS_AVAIL(tp) > TG3_TX_WAKEUP_THRESH)
+ netif_wake_queue(tp->dev);
+ }
out_unlock:
mmiowb();
/*
* Changes:
*
+ * Mike Kershaw <dragorn@kismetwireless.net> 2005/08/14
+ * Add TUNSETLINK ioctl to set the link encapsulation
+ *
* Mark Smith <markzzzsmith@yahoo.com.au>
* Use random_ether_addr() for tap MAC address.
*
DBG(KERN_INFO "%s: owner set to %d\n", tun->dev->name, tun->owner);
break;
+ case TUNSETLINK:
+ /* Only allow setting the type when the interface is down */
+ if (tun->dev->flags & IFF_UP) {
+ DBG(KERN_INFO "%s: Linktype set failed because interface is up\n",
+ tun->dev->name);
+ return -EBUSY;
+ } else {
+ tun->dev->type = (int) arg;
+ DBG(KERN_INFO "%s: linktype set to %d\n", tun->dev->name, tun->dev->type);
+ }
+ break;
+
#ifdef TUN_DEBUG
case TUNSETDEBUG:
tun->debug = arg;
int i;
if (ai->tfm == NULL)
- ai->tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("aes", 0);
+ ai->tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("aes", CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
if (ai->tfm == NULL) {
printk(KERN_ERR "airo: failed to load transform for AES\n");
}
}
#ifdef MICSUPPORT
- if (ai->tfm)
- crypto_free_tfm(ai->tfm);
+ crypto_free_tfm(ai->tfm);
#endif
del_airo_dev( dev );
free_netdev( dev );
dprintk("NFSD: nfs4_make_rec_clidname for %.*s\n",
clname->len, clname->data);
- tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("md5", 0);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("md5", CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
if (tfm == NULL)
goto out;
cksum.len = crypto_tfm_alg_digestsize(tfm);
kfree(cksum.data);
status = nfs_ok;
out:
- if (tfm)
- crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+ crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
return status;
}
#define CRYPTO_TFM_MODE_CTR 0x00000008
#define CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY 0x00000100
+#define CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP 0x00000200
#define CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY 0x00100000
#define CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN 0x00200000
#define CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_SCHED 0x00400000
#define TUNSETIFF _IOW('T', 202, int)
#define TUNSETPERSIST _IOW('T', 203, int)
#define TUNSETOWNER _IOW('T', 204, int)
+#define TUNSETLINK _IOW('T', 205, int)
/* TUNSETIFF ifr flags */
#define IFF_TUN 0x0001
*/
#define IP_VS_FWD_METHOD(cp) (cp->flags & IP_VS_CONN_F_FWD_MASK)
-extern __inline__ char ip_vs_fwd_tag(struct ip_vs_conn *cp)
+static inline char ip_vs_fwd_tag(struct ip_vs_conn *cp)
{
char fwd;
sk_stream_mem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize, 1);
}
+static inline int sk_stream_wmem_schedule(struct sock *sk, int size)
+{
+ return size <= sk->sk_forward_alloc ||
+ sk_stream_mem_schedule(sk, size, 0);
+}
+
/* Used by processes to "lock" a socket state, so that
* interrupts and bottom half handlers won't change it
* from under us. It essentially blocks any incoming
skb = alloc_skb_fclone(size + hdr_len, gfp);
if (skb) {
skb->truesize += mem;
- if (sk->sk_forward_alloc >= (int)skb->truesize ||
- sk_stream_mem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize, 0)) {
+ if (sk_stream_wmem_schedule(sk, skb->truesize)) {
skb_reserve(skb, hdr_len);
return skb;
}
{
struct page *page = NULL;
- if (sk->sk_forward_alloc >= (int)PAGE_SIZE ||
- sk_stream_mem_schedule(sk, PAGE_SIZE, 0))
- page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0);
- else {
+ page = alloc_pages(sk->sk_allocation, 0);
+ if (!page) {
sk->sk_prot->enter_memory_pressure();
sk_stream_moderate_sndbuf(sk);
}
extern void tcp_xmit_retransmit_queue(struct sock *);
extern void tcp_simple_retransmit(struct sock *);
extern int tcp_trim_head(struct sock *, struct sk_buff *, u32);
+extern int tcp_fragment(struct sock *, struct sk_buff *, u32, unsigned int);
extern void tcp_send_probe0(struct sock *);
extern void tcp_send_partial(struct sock *);
return mss_now;
}
+/*
+ * N.B. We get the timeout wrong here, but then we always did get it
+ * wrong before and this is another step along the road to correcting
+ * it. It ought to get updated each time we pass through the routine,
+ * but in practise it probably doesn't matter too much for now.
+ */
+static inline struct sk_buff *dn_alloc_send_pskb(struct sock *sk,
+ unsigned long datalen, int noblock,
+ int *errcode)
+{
+ struct sk_buff *skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, datalen,
+ noblock, errcode);
+ if (skb) {
+ skb->protocol = __constant_htons(ETH_P_DNA_RT);
+ skb->pkt_type = PACKET_OUTGOING;
+ }
+ return skb;
+}
+
static int dn_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
- struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
+ struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct dn_scp *scp = DN_SK(sk);
struct dn_skb_cb *cb;
size_t len;
unsigned char fctype;
- long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ long timeo;
if (flags & ~(MSG_TRYHARD|MSG_OOB|MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_EOR|MSG_NOSIGNAL|MSG_MORE|MSG_CMSG_COMPAT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (addr_len && (addr_len != sizeof(struct sockaddr_dn)))
return -EINVAL;
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
/*
* The only difference between stream sockets and sequenced packet
* sockets is that the stream sockets always behave as if MSG_EOR
* has been set.
*/
if (sock->type == SOCK_STREAM) {
- if (flags & MSG_EOR)
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (flags & MSG_EOR) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
flags |= MSG_EOR;
}
- lock_sock(sk);
err = dn_check_state(sk, addr, addr_len, &timeo, flags);
if (err)
/*
* Get a suitably sized skb.
+ * 64 is a bit of a hack really, but its larger than any
+ * link-layer headers and has served us well as a good
+ * guess as to their real length.
*/
- skb = dn_alloc_send_skb(sk, &len, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, timeo, &err);
+ skb = dn_alloc_send_pskb(sk, len + 64 + DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER,
+ flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
if (err)
break;
cb = DN_SKB_CB(skb);
- skb_reserve(skb, DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER);
+ skb_reserve(skb, 64 + DN_MAX_NSP_DATA_HEADER);
if (memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len)) {
err = -EFAULT;
return skb;
}
-/*
- * Wrapper for the above, for allocs of data skbs. We try and get the
- * whole size thats been asked for (plus 11 bytes of header). If this
- * fails, then we try for any size over 16 bytes for SOCK_STREAMS.
- */
-struct sk_buff *dn_alloc_send_skb(struct sock *sk, size_t *size, int noblock, long timeo, int *err)
-{
- int space;
- int len;
- struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
-
- *err = 0;
-
- while(skb == NULL) {
- if (signal_pending(current)) {
- *err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
- break;
- }
-
- if (sk->sk_shutdown & SEND_SHUTDOWN) {
- *err = EINVAL;
- break;
- }
-
- if (sk->sk_err)
- break;
-
- len = *size + 11;
- space = sk->sk_sndbuf - atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
-
- if (space < len) {
- if ((sk->sk_socket->type == SOCK_STREAM) &&
- (space >= (16 + 11)))
- len = space;
- }
-
- if (space < len) {
- set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
- if (noblock) {
- *err = EWOULDBLOCK;
- break;
- }
-
- clear_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_WAITDATA, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
- SOCK_SLEEP_PRE(sk)
-
- if ((sk->sk_sndbuf - atomic_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc)) <
- len)
- schedule();
-
- SOCK_SLEEP_POST(sk)
- continue;
- }
-
- if ((skb = dn_alloc_skb(sk, len, sk->sk_allocation)) == NULL)
- continue;
-
- *size = len - 11;
- }
-
- return skb;
-}
-
/*
* Calculate persist timer based upon the smoothed round
* trip time and the variance. Backoff according to the
error:
if (ahp) {
- if (ahp->work_icv)
- kfree(ahp->work_icv);
- if (ahp->tfm)
- crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
+ kfree(ahp->work_icv);
+ crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
kfree(ahp);
}
return -EINVAL;
if (!ahp)
return;
- if (ahp->work_icv) {
- kfree(ahp->work_icv);
- ahp->work_icv = NULL;
- }
- if (ahp->tfm) {
- crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
- ahp->tfm = NULL;
- }
+ kfree(ahp->work_icv);
+ ahp->work_icv = NULL;
+ crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
+ ahp->tfm = NULL;
kfree(ahp);
}
if (!esp)
return;
- if (esp->conf.tfm) {
- crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
- esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
- }
- if (esp->conf.ivec) {
- kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
- esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
- }
- if (esp->auth.tfm) {
- crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
- esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
- }
- if (esp->auth.work_icv) {
- kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
- esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
- }
+ crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
+ esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
+ kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
+ esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
+ crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
+ esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
+ kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
+ esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
kfree(esp);
}
for_each_cpu(cpu) {
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = *per_cpu_ptr(tfms, cpu);
- if (tfm)
- crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+ crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
}
free_percpu(tfms);
}
memcpy(&c->clustermac, &i->clustermac, ETH_ALEN);
c->num_total_nodes = i->num_total_nodes;
c->num_local_nodes = i->num_local_nodes;
- memcpy(&c->local_nodes, &i->local_nodes, sizeof(&c->local_nodes));
+ memcpy(&c->local_nodes, &i->local_nodes, sizeof(c->local_nodes));
c->hash_mode = i->hash_mode;
c->hash_initval = i->hash_initval;
atomic_set(&c->refcount, 1);
tcp_mark_push(tp, skb);
goto new_segment;
}
- if (sk->sk_forward_alloc < copy &&
- !sk_stream_mem_schedule(sk, copy, 0))
+ if (!sk_stream_wmem_schedule(sk, copy))
goto wait_for_memory;
if (can_coalesce) {
if (off == PAGE_SIZE) {
put_page(page);
TCP_PAGE(sk) = page = NULL;
+ TCP_OFF(sk) = off = 0;
}
- }
+ } else
+ BUG_ON(off);
+
+ if (copy > PAGE_SIZE - off)
+ copy = PAGE_SIZE - off;
+
+ if (!sk_stream_wmem_schedule(sk, copy))
+ goto wait_for_memory;
if (!page) {
/* Allocate new cache page. */
if (!(page = sk_stream_alloc_page(sk)))
goto wait_for_memory;
- off = 0;
}
- if (copy > PAGE_SIZE - off)
- copy = PAGE_SIZE - off;
-
/* Time to copy data. We are close to
* the end! */
err = skb_copy_to_page(sk, from, skb, page,
int flag = 0;
int i;
- /* So, SACKs for already sent large segments will be lost.
- * Not good, but alternative is to resegment the queue. */
- if (sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_TSO) {
- sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_TSO;
- sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_NO_LARGESEND);
- tp->mss_cache = tp->mss_cache;
- }
-
if (!tp->sacked_out)
tp->fackets_out = 0;
prior_fackets = tp->fackets_out;
flag |= FLAG_DATA_LOST;
sk_stream_for_retrans_queue(skb, sk) {
- u8 sacked = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked;
- int in_sack;
+ int in_sack, pcount;
+ u8 sacked;
/* The retransmission queue is always in order, so
* we can short-circuit the walk early.
*/
- if(!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, end_seq))
+ if (!before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, end_seq))
break;
- fack_count += tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
+ pcount = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
+
+ if (pcount > 1 &&
+ (after(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq) ||
+ before(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq))) {
+ unsigned int pkt_len;
+
+ if (after(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq))
+ pkt_len = (start_seq -
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+ else
+ pkt_len = (end_seq -
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
+ if (tcp_fragment(sk, skb, pkt_len, skb_shinfo(skb)->tso_size))
+ break;
+ pcount = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
+ }
+
+ fack_count += pcount;
in_sack = !after(start_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq) &&
!before(end_seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq);
+ sacked = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked;
+
/* Account D-SACK for retransmitted packet. */
if ((dup_sack && in_sack) &&
(sacked & TCPCB_RETRANS) &&
* packet to the list. This won't be called frequently, I hope.
* Remember, these are still headerless SKBs at this point.
*/
-static int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len, unsigned int mss_now)
+int tcp_fragment(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 len, unsigned int mss_now)
{
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff *buff;
- int nsize;
+ int nsize, old_factor;
u16 flags;
nsize = skb_headlen(skb) - len;
tp->left_out -= tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
}
+ old_factor = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
+
/* Fix up tso_factor for both original and new SKB. */
tcp_set_skb_tso_segs(sk, skb, mss_now);
tcp_set_skb_tso_segs(sk, buff, mss_now);
- if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_LOST) {
- tp->lost_out += tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
- tp->left_out += tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
- }
+ /* If this packet has been sent out already, we must
+ * adjust the various packet counters.
+ */
+ if (after(tp->snd_nxt, TCP_SKB_CB(buff)->end_seq)) {
+ int diff = old_factor - tcp_skb_pcount(skb) -
+ tcp_skb_pcount(buff);
- if (TCP_SKB_CB(buff)->sacked&TCPCB_LOST) {
- tp->lost_out += tcp_skb_pcount(buff);
- tp->left_out += tcp_skb_pcount(buff);
+ tp->packets_out -= diff;
+ if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked & TCPCB_LOST) {
+ tp->lost_out -= diff;
+ tp->left_out -= diff;
+ }
+ if (diff > 0) {
+ tp->fackets_out -= diff;
+ if ((int)tp->fackets_out < 0)
+ tp->fackets_out = 0;
+ }
}
/* Link BUFF into the send queue. */
if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tp->snd_una)) {
if (before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, tp->snd_una))
BUG();
-
- if (sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_TSO) {
- sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_TSO;
- sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_NO_LARGESEND);
- }
-
if (tcp_trim_head(sk, skb, tp->snd_una - TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq))
return -ENOMEM;
}
return -EAGAIN;
if (skb->len > cur_mss) {
- int old_factor = tcp_skb_pcount(skb);
- int diff;
-
if (tcp_fragment(sk, skb, cur_mss, cur_mss))
return -ENOMEM; /* We'll try again later. */
-
- /* New SKB created, account for it. */
- diff = old_factor - tcp_skb_pcount(skb) -
- tcp_skb_pcount(skb->next);
- tp->packets_out -= diff;
-
- if (diff > 0) {
- tp->fackets_out -= diff;
- if ((int)tp->fackets_out < 0)
- tp->fackets_out = 0;
- }
}
/* Collapse two adjacent packets if worthwhile and we can. */
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->flags |= TCPCB_FLAG_PSH;
if (tcp_fragment(sk, skb, seg_size, mss))
return -1;
- /* SWS override triggered forced fragmentation.
- * Disable TSO, the connection is too sick. */
- if (sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_TSO) {
- sock_set_flag(sk, SOCK_NO_LARGESEND);
- sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_TSO;
- }
} else if (!tcp_skb_pcount(skb))
tcp_set_skb_tso_segs(sk, skb, mss);
rtnl_unlock();
#ifdef CONFIG_IPV6_PRIVACY
- if (likely(md5_tfm != NULL)) {
- crypto_free_tfm(md5_tfm);
- md5_tfm = NULL;
- }
+ crypto_free_tfm(md5_tfm);
+ md5_tfm = NULL;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
error:
if (ahp) {
- if (ahp->work_icv)
- kfree(ahp->work_icv);
- if (ahp->tfm)
- crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
+ kfree(ahp->work_icv);
+ crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
kfree(ahp);
}
return -EINVAL;
if (!ahp)
return;
- if (ahp->work_icv) {
- kfree(ahp->work_icv);
- ahp->work_icv = NULL;
- }
- if (ahp->tfm) {
- crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
- ahp->tfm = NULL;
- }
+ kfree(ahp->work_icv);
+ ahp->work_icv = NULL;
+ crypto_free_tfm(ahp->tfm);
+ ahp->tfm = NULL;
kfree(ahp);
}
if (!esp)
return;
- if (esp->conf.tfm) {
- crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
- esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
- }
- if (esp->conf.ivec) {
- kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
- esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
- }
- if (esp->auth.tfm) {
- crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
- esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
- }
- if (esp->auth.work_icv) {
- kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
- esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
- }
+ crypto_free_tfm(esp->conf.tfm);
+ esp->conf.tfm = NULL;
+ kfree(esp->conf.ivec);
+ esp->conf.ivec = NULL;
+ crypto_free_tfm(esp->auth.tfm);
+ esp->auth.tfm = NULL;
+ kfree(esp->auth.work_icv);
+ esp->auth.work_icv = NULL;
kfree(esp);
}
read_lock(&raw_v6_lock);
if ((sk = sk_head(&raw_v6_htable[hash])) != NULL) {
while((sk = __raw_v6_lookup(sk, nexthdr, daddr, saddr,
- skb->dev->ifindex))) {
+ IP6CB(skb)->iif))) {
rawv6_err(sk, skb, NULL, type, code, inner_offset, info);
sk = sk_next(sk);
}
for_each_cpu(cpu) {
struct crypto_tfm *tfm = *per_cpu_ptr(tfms, cpu);
- if (tfm)
- crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+ crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
}
free_percpu(tfms);
}
if (sk == NULL)
goto out;
- sk = __raw_v6_lookup(sk, nexthdr, daddr, saddr, skb->dev->ifindex);
+ sk = __raw_v6_lookup(sk, nexthdr, daddr, saddr, IP6CB(skb)->iif);
while (sk) {
delivered = 1;
rawv6_rcv(sk, clone);
}
sk = __raw_v6_lookup(sk_next(sk), nexthdr, daddr, saddr,
- skb->dev->ifindex);
+ IP6CB(skb)->iif);
}
out:
read_unlock(&raw_v6_lock);
sctp_unhash_endpoint(ep);
/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
- if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac)
- sctp_crypto_free_tfm(sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac);
+ sctp_crypto_free_tfm(sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->hmac);
/* Cleanup. */
sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
sctp_release_sock(sk);
return err;
cleanup:
- if (tfm)
- sctp_crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+ sctp_crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
goto out;
}
" unsupported checksum %d", cksumtype);
goto out;
}
- if (!(tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cksumname, 0)))
+ if (!(tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm(cksumname, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP)))
goto out;
cksum->len = crypto_tfm_alg_digestsize(tfm);
if ((cksum->data = kmalloc(cksum->len, GFP_KERNEL)) == NULL)
crypto_digest_final(tfm, cksum->data);
code = 0;
out:
- if (tfm)
- crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
+ crypto_free_tfm(tfm);
return code;
}
gss_delete_sec_context_kerberos(void *internal_ctx) {
struct krb5_ctx *kctx = internal_ctx;
- if (kctx->seq)
- crypto_free_tfm(kctx->seq);
- if (kctx->enc)
- crypto_free_tfm(kctx->enc);
- if (kctx->mech_used.data)
- kfree(kctx->mech_used.data);
+ crypto_free_tfm(kctx->seq);
+ crypto_free_tfm(kctx->enc);
+ kfree(kctx->mech_used.data);
kfree(kctx);
}
gss_delete_sec_context_spkm3(void *internal_ctx) {
struct spkm3_ctx *sctx = internal_ctx;
- if(sctx->derived_integ_key)
- crypto_free_tfm(sctx->derived_integ_key);
- if(sctx->derived_conf_key)
- crypto_free_tfm(sctx->derived_conf_key);
- if(sctx->share_key.data)
- kfree(sctx->share_key.data);
- if(sctx->mech_used.data)
- kfree(sctx->mech_used.data);
+ crypto_free_tfm(sctx->derived_integ_key);
+ crypto_free_tfm(sctx->derived_conf_key);
+ kfree(sctx->share_key.data);
+ kfree(sctx->mech_used.data);
kfree(sctx);
}
"bytes.\n", len, PAGE_SIZE);
return -ENOMEM;
}
- tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha1", 0);
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_tfm("sha1", CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
if (tfm == NULL) {
seclvl_printk(0, KERN_ERR,
"Failed to load transform for SHA1\n");