[PATCH] x86_64: TASK_SIZE fixes for compatibility mode processes
authorSiddha, Suresh B <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Sat, 16 Jul 2005 02:17:44 +0000 (19:17 -0700)
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org>
Sat, 16 Jul 2005 05:56:11 +0000 (22:56 -0700)
A malicious 32bit app can have an elf section at 0xffffe000.  During
exec of this app, we will have a memory leak as insert_vm_struct() is
not checking for return value in syscall32_setup_pages() and thus not
freeing the vma allocated for the vsyscall page.

Check the return value and free the vma incase of failure.

Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
arch/x86_64/ia32/syscall32.c

index 01d8db1a1c09c7bff982a740bf5222735e996893..816a3b89f13d870865d0a85353ae7a58c7386b65 100644 (file)
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ int syscall32_setup_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int exstack)
        int npages = (VSYSCALL32_END - VSYSCALL32_BASE) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
        struct vm_area_struct *vma;
        struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+       int ret;
 
        vma = kmem_cache_alloc(vm_area_cachep, SLAB_KERNEL);
        if (!vma)
@@ -78,7 +79,11 @@ int syscall32_setup_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int exstack)
        vma->vm_mm = mm;
 
        down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
-       insert_vm_struct(mm, vma);
+       if ((ret = insert_vm_struct(mm, vma))) {
+               up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+               kmem_cache_free(vm_area_cachep, vma);
+               return ret;
+       }
        mm->total_vm += npages;
        up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
        return 0;