seccomp,x86,arm,mips,s390: Remove nr parameter from secure_computing

The secure_computing function took a syscall number parameter, but
it only paid any attention to that parameter if seccomp mode 1 was
enabled.  Rather than coming up with a kludge to get the parameter
to work in mode 2, just remove the parameter.

To avoid churn in arches that don't have seccomp filters (and may
not even support syscall_get_nr right now), this leaves the
parameter in secure_computing_strict, which is now a real function.

For ARM, this is a bit ugly due to the fact that ARM conditionally
supports seccomp filters.  Fixing that would probably only be a
couple of lines of code, but it should be coordinated with the audit
maintainers.

This will be a slight slowdown on some arches.  The right fix is to
pass in all of seccomp_data instead of trying to make just the
syscall nr part be fast.

This is a prerequisite for making two-phase seccomp work cleanly.

Cc: Russell King <linux@arm.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
index 0c27ed6f3f2346e9bd9c13a8cea1265536572ba5..5e772a21ab9707916b82cb4d2a42d24fcb1bf878 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -933,8 +933,13 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
        current_thread_info()->syscall = scno;
 
        /* Do the secure computing check first; failures should be fast. */
-       if (secure_computing(scno) == -1)
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+       if (secure_computing() == -1)
                return -1;
+#else
+       /* XXX: remove this once OABI gets fixed */
+       secure_computing_strict(scno);
+#endif
 
        if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
                tracehook_report_syscall(regs, PTRACE_SYSCALL_ENTER);

diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
index 645b3c4fcfba9ae747f378a54fcbaf797103492b..f7aac5b57b4b8e29470d0d2dd5ee37db4523398e 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -770,7 +770,7 @@ asmlinkage long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, long syscall)
        long ret = 0;
        user_exit();
 
-       if (secure_computing(syscall) == -1)
+       if (secure_computing() == -1)
                return -1;
 
        if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) &&

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
index 5dc7ad9e2fbf2d1b035194b30db18a82957c1358..bebacad4830507a5a310a8722b87985465287f2f 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -803,7 +803,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
        long ret = 0;
 
        /* Do the secure computing check first. */
-       if (secure_computing(regs->gprs[2])) {
+       if (secure_computing()) {
                /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
                ret = -1;
                goto out;

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
index 678c0ada3b3ce5f94135c7076cf59800850ca474..93c182a00506600801d288ed73916f5a83ea9186 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1471,7 +1471,7 @@ long syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
                regs->flags |= X86_EFLAGS_TF;
 
        /* do the secure computing check first */
-       if (secure_computing(regs->orig_ax)) {
+       if (secure_computing()) {
                /* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
                ret = -1L;
                goto out;

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
index e1e1e80fc6a6fb1285d0efce67d651faa4550b61..957779f4eb40fbb920039d42ab34378055515311 100644 (file)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -216,7 +216,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address)
         */
        regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
        regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
-       tmp = secure_computing(syscall_nr);
+       tmp = secure_computing();
        if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
                warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs,
                                  "seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip");

diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 5d586a45a319f20cc1c91412428e81beb0517e60..aa3c040230be84e875d84336177ca82592411df0 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -27,19 +27,17 @@ struct seccomp {
        struct seccomp_filter *filter;
 };
 
-extern int __secure_computing(int);
-static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+extern int __secure_computing(void);
+static inline int secure_computing(void)
 {
        if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP)))
-               return  __secure_computing(this_syscall);
+               return  __secure_computing();
        return 0;
 }
-
-/* A wrapper for architectures supporting only SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT. */
-static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
-{
-       BUG_ON(secure_computing(this_syscall) != 0);
-}
+#else
+extern void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall);
+#endif
 
 extern long prctl_get_seccomp(void);
 extern long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long, char __user *);
@@ -56,8 +54,11 @@ static inline int seccomp_mode(struct seccomp *s)
 struct seccomp { };
 struct seccomp_filter { };
 
-static inline int secure_computing(int this_syscall) { return 0; }
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+static inline int secure_computing(void) { return 0; }
+#else
 static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; }
+#endif
 
 static inline long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
 {

diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 44eb005c6695010e79a5041b837914a12c69aa45..5e738e0dd2e9e55bc5017273c8e52bba94df2db4 100644 (file)
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -23,8 +23,11 @@
 
 /* #define SECCOMP_DEBUG 1 */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 #include <asm/syscall.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
 #include <linux/filter.h>
 #include <linux/pid.h>
 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
@@ -172,7 +175,7 @@ static int seccomp_check_filter(struct sock_filter *filter, unsigned int flen)
  *
  * Returns valid seccomp BPF response codes.
  */
-static u32 seccomp_run_filters(int syscall)
+static u32 seccomp_run_filters(void)
 {
        struct seccomp_filter *f = ACCESS_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter);
        struct seccomp_data sd;
@@ -564,10 +567,43 @@ static int mode1_syscalls_32[] = {
 };
 #endif
 
-int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
+static void __secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
+{
+       int *syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls;
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+       if (is_compat_task())
+               syscall_whitelist = mode1_syscalls_32;
+#endif
+       do {
+               if (*syscall_whitelist == this_syscall)
+                       return;
+       } while (*++syscall_whitelist);
+
+#ifdef SECCOMP_DEBUG
+       dump_stack();
+#endif
+       audit_seccomp(this_syscall, SIGKILL, SECCOMP_RET_KILL);
+       do_exit(SIGKILL);
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall)
+{
+       int mode = current->seccomp.mode;
+
+       if (mode == 0)
+               return;
+       else if (mode == SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT)
+               __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
+       else
+               BUG();
+}
+#else
+int __secure_computing(void)
 {
+       struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
+       int this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
        int exit_sig = 0;
-       int *syscall;
        u32 ret;
 
        /*
@@ -578,23 +614,12 @@ int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
 
        switch (current->seccomp.mode) {
        case SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT:
-               syscall = mode1_syscalls;
-#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
-               if (is_compat_task())
-                       syscall = mode1_syscalls_32;
-#endif
-               do {
-                       if (*syscall == this_syscall)
-                               return 0;
-               } while (*++syscall);
-               exit_sig = SIGKILL;
-               ret = SECCOMP_RET_KILL;
-               break;
+               __secure_computing_strict(this_syscall);
+               return 0;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
        case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: {
                int data;
-               struct pt_regs *regs = task_pt_regs(current);
-               ret = seccomp_run_filters(this_syscall);
+               ret = seccomp_run_filters();
                data = ret & SECCOMP_RET_DATA;
                ret &= SECCOMP_RET_ACTION;
                switch (ret) {
@@ -652,9 +677,10 @@ int __secure_computing(int this_syscall)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
 skip:
        audit_seccomp(this_syscall, exit_sig, ret);
-#endif
        return -1;
+#endif
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER */
 
 long prctl_get_seccomp(void)
 {