Bluetooth: Fix ignoring unknown SMP authentication requirement bits

The SMP specification states that we should ignore any unknown bits from
the authentication requirement. We already have a define for masking out
unknown bits but we haven't used it in all places so far. This patch
adds usage of the AUTH_REQ_MASK to all places that need it and ensures
that we don't pass unknown bits onward to other functions.

Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index dbd17a07dc2e00fa6afcbb39e1772b79a141b7ed..ef8f96d2c0590ff640799e4923a9e4fd96aa923d 100644 (file)
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -949,8 +949,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
        if (!smp)
                return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
+       /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
+       auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+
        if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
-           (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+           (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
                return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 
        SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
@@ -959,9 +962,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
        memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
        skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
 
-       /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
-       auth = req->auth_req;
-
        sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
        if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
                conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
@@ -1024,6 +1024,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
        if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
                return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
+       auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+
        /* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */
        if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
                u8 method;
@@ -1044,7 +1046,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
         */
        smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
 
-       auth = (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req);
+       auth |= req->auth_req;
 
        ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
        if (ret)
@@ -1160,7 +1162,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
        struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
        struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
        struct smp_chan *smp;
-       u8 sec_level;
+       u8 sec_level, auth;
 
        BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
@@ -1170,7 +1172,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
        if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
                return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
-       sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
+       auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+
+       sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
        if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))
                return 0;
 
@@ -1185,13 +1189,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
                return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
        if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) &&
-           (rp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+           (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
                return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 
        skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
        memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
-       build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, rp->auth_req);
+       build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
 
        smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
        memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));