net: Limit socket I/O iovec total length to INT_MAX.

commit 8acfe468b0384e834a303f08ebc4953d72fb690a upstream.

This helps protect us from overflow issues down in the
individual protocol sendmsg/recvmsg handlers.  Once
we hit INT_MAX we truncate out the rest of the iovec
by setting the iov_len members to zero.

This works because:

1) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets, partial
   writes are allowed and the application will just continue
   with another write to send the rest of the data.

2) For datagram oriented sockets, where there must be a
   one-to-one correspondance between write() calls and
   packets on the wire, INT_MAX is going to be far larger
   than the packet size limit the protocol is going to
   check for and signal with -EMSGSIZE.

Based upon a patch by Linus Torvalds.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

diff --git a/include/linux/socket.h b/include/linux/socket.h
index 9464cfbcd2655d4c4d04ba9c90f8a632b74c8f18..3273a0c5043b96321bf6dda00bc44d4d4c254003 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/socket.h
+++ b/include/linux/socket.h
@@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ extern int csum_partial_copy_fromiovecend(unsigned char *kdata,
                                          int offset, 
                                          unsigned int len, __wsum *csump);
 
-extern long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode);
+extern int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode);
 extern int memcpy_toiovec(struct iovec *v, unsigned char *kdata, int len);
 extern int memcpy_toiovecend(const struct iovec *v, unsigned char *kdata,
                             int offset, int len);

diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
index a407c3addbae432913a20dce2560d2bab1d248f2..9559afc639c138a52d0d9ce8d49b83c7ce8abfaa 100644 (file)
--- a/net/compat.c
+++ b/net/compat.c
@@ -40,10 +40,12 @@ static inline int iov_from_user_compat_to_kern(struct iovec *kiov,
                compat_size_t len;
 
                if (get_user(len, &uiov32->iov_len) ||
-                  get_user(buf, &uiov32->iov_base)) {
-                       tot_len = -EFAULT;
-                       break;
-               }
+                   get_user(buf, &uiov32->iov_base))
+                       return -EFAULT;
+
+               if (len > INT_MAX - tot_len)
+                       len = INT_MAX - tot_len;
+
                tot_len += len;
                kiov->iov_base = compat_ptr(buf);
                kiov->iov_len = (__kernel_size_t) len;

diff --git a/net/core/iovec.c b/net/core/iovec.c
index 8cee101bc4de3369e3d79359c7c4149ee297cc80..f911e665a7dbb2eb43981603439381782d98df8c 100644 (file)
--- a/net/core/iovec.c
+++ b/net/core/iovec.c
@@ -36,10 +36,9 @@
  *     in any case.
  */
 
-long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode)
+int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode)
 {
-       int size, ct;
-       long err;
+       int size, ct, err;
 
        if (m->msg_namelen) {
                if (mode == VERIFY_READ) {
@@ -61,14 +60,13 @@ long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address,
        err = 0;
 
        for (ct = 0; ct < m->msg_iovlen; ct++) {
-               err += iov[ct].iov_len;
-               /*
-                * Goal is not to verify user data, but to prevent returning
-                * negative value, which is interpreted as errno.
-                * Overflow is still possible, but it is harmless.
-                */
-               if (err < 0)
-                       return -EMSGSIZE;
+               size_t len = iov[ct].iov_len;
+
+               if (len > INT_MAX - err) {
+                       len = INT_MAX - err;
+                       iov[ct].iov_len = len;
+               }
+               err += len;
        }
 
        return err;