From: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 15 Jan 2012 03:20:59 +0000 (-0500)
Subject: ceph: fix length validation in parse_reply_info()
X-Git-Tag: firefly_0821_release~3680^2~3587^2~3
X-Git-Url: http://demsky.eecs.uci.edu/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=32852a81bccd9e3d1953b894966393d1b546576d;p=firefly-linux-kernel-4.4.55.git

ceph: fix length validation in parse_reply_info()

"len" is read from network and thus needs validation.  Otherwise, given
a bogus "len" value, p+len could be an out-of-bounds pointer, which is
used in further parsing.

Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sage Weil <sage@newdream.net>
---

diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
index 6203d805eb45..be1415fcaac8 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_msg *msg,
 	/* trace */
 	ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, len, bad);
 	if (len > 0) {
+		ceph_decode_need(&p, end, len, bad);
 		err = parse_reply_info_trace(&p, p+len, info, features);
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto out_bad;
@@ -270,6 +271,7 @@ static int parse_reply_info(struct ceph_msg *msg,
 	/* extra */
 	ceph_decode_32_safe(&p, end, len, bad);
 	if (len > 0) {
+		ceph_decode_need(&p, end, len, bad);
 		err = parse_reply_info_extra(&p, p+len, info, features);
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto out_bad;