From: Dan Carpenter Date: Fri, 10 Feb 2012 08:03:58 +0000 (+0100) Subject: relay: prevent integer overflow in relay_open() X-Git-Tag: firefly_0821_release~7541^2~1751 X-Git-Url: http://demsky.eecs.uci.edu/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=4ac2f3d3f1d4a08ad6a450127c4b0f590fe28bdf;p=firefly-linux-kernel-4.4.55.git relay: prevent integer overflow in relay_open() commit f6302f1bcd75a042df69866d98b8d775a668f8f1 upstream. "subbuf_size" and "n_subbufs" come from the user and they need to be capped to prevent an integer overflow. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- diff --git a/kernel/relay.c b/kernel/relay.c index 859ea5a9605f..2c242fb2368b 100644 --- a/kernel/relay.c +++ b/kernel/relay.c @@ -164,10 +164,14 @@ depopulate: */ static struct rchan_buf *relay_create_buf(struct rchan *chan) { - struct rchan_buf *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan_buf), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buf) + struct rchan_buf *buf; + + if (chan->n_subbufs > UINT_MAX / sizeof(size_t *)) return NULL; + buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan_buf), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return NULL; buf->padding = kmalloc(chan->n_subbufs * sizeof(size_t *), GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf->padding) goto free_buf; @@ -574,6 +578,8 @@ struct rchan *relay_open(const char *base_filename, if (!(subbuf_size && n_subbufs)) return NULL; + if (subbuf_size > UINT_MAX / n_subbufs) + return NULL; chan = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan), GFP_KERNEL); if (!chan)