From: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2009 21:17:36 +0000 (+1100)
Subject: capabilities: simplify bound checks for copy_from_user()
X-Git-Tag: firefly_0821_release~9833^2~3991^2~21
X-Git-Url: http://demsky.eecs.uci.edu/git/?a=commitdiff_plain;h=825332e4ff1373c55d931b49408df7ec2298f71e;p=firefly-linux-kernel-4.4.55.git

capabilities: simplify bound checks for copy_from_user()

The capabilities syscall has a copy_from_user() call where gcc currently
cannot prove to itself that the copy is always within bounds.

This patch adds a very explicity bound check to prove to gcc that this
copy_from_user cannot overflow its destination buffer.

Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
---

diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 4e17041963f5..c2316d3fa094 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capget, cap_user_header_t, header, cap_user_data_t, dataptr)
 SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
 {
 	struct __user_cap_data_struct kdata[_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S];
-	unsigned i, tocopy;
+	unsigned i, tocopy, copybytes;
 	kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
 	struct cred *new;
 	int ret;
@@ -255,8 +255,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
 	if (pid != 0 && pid != task_pid_vnr(current))
 		return -EPERM;
 
-	if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data,
-			   tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct)))
+	copybytes = tocopy * sizeof(struct __user_cap_data_struct);
+	if (copybytes > sizeof(kdata))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&kdata, data, copybytes))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < tocopy; i++) {